CHAPTER X.

INDIA.

'As time passes it rather appears that we are in the hands of a

Providence which is greater than all statesmanship, that this

fabric so blindly piled up has a chance of becoming a part of

the permanent edifice of civilization, and that the Indian

achievement of England, as it is the strangest, may after all

turn out to be the greatest; of all her achievements.'--Prof. J.

R. Seeley.

'BUT above all, what is to be done with India'? With this

question Mr. Goldwin Smith makes the relation of India to the

Empire the crux of the Federation problem. To him the difficulty

presented seems insoluble, chiefly because he believes that it

would be impossible for a federation of democratic communities

scattered over the globe to hold India, about which they know

little, as a dependency. He even doubts, in his customary vein

of pessimism, whether the fate of the Indian Empire is not

already 'sealed by the progress of democracy in Britain.' So far

from this last being the case it looks as if the English working

man, who has annually more than £60,000,000 of trade staked on

our hold on India, will be the last to weaken by his vote our

position in the country or our grip on the waterways which lead

to the East. Every second or third day's work of the Lancashire

cotton-spinner is done for the Indian market, or for other

Eastern {244} markets which we control on account of our

position in India. In some large districts, such as that of

Oldham, the proportion is three days' work out of four. And the

Lancashire spinner is a keen political thinker, especially where

his bread and butter are concerned.

The industry of the city of Dundee depends almost entirely upon

the supply of a single fibre from the valley of the Ganges. The

Dundee jute-worker is a Radical, but he is not likely for that

reason to forget that his daily wage depends on the hold which

the Empire keeps upon Bengal. The purely trade relation of India

to the United Kingdom was clearly put by Lord Dufferin in his

address to the London Chamber of Commerce three years ago. He

said:--

'During the past year our trade with our Indian Empire was

larger than our trade with any other country in the world, with

the exception of the United States, amounting to no less a sum

than £64,000,000. If, again, we merely confine our attention to

a comparison of our exports to India with our exports to other

countries, we shall find that the same statement holds good,

namely, that the exports of Great Britain to India are greater

than those to any other country in the world except the United

States, amounting as they do to £34,000,000, whereas our exports

to France do not exceed £24,000,000, and to Germany £27,000,000.

In fact, India's trade with the United Kingdom is nearly

one-tenth of the value of the total British trade with the whole

world. ... In 1888 she took £21,250,000 worth of our cotton

goods {245} and yarns, out of a total of £72,000,000 worth

exported to all countries, whereas China only took £6,500,000

worth, Germany £2,500,000 worth and the United States £2,000,000

worth. Again, if we take another great section of British

exports, such as hardware, machinery and metals, we find that

out of a total export of £36,000,000 to all countries India in

1888 took £5,750,000 worth, whereas we only sent £3,000,000

worth to France, £1,750,000 worth to Russia, and £750,000 worth

to China.

'These figures, I think, should be enough to convince the least

receptive understanding what a fatal blow it would be to our

commercial prosperity were circumstances ever to close, either

completely or partially, the Indian ports to the trade of Great

Britain, and how deeply the manufacturing population of

Lancashire, and not only of Lancashire, but of every centre of

industry in Great Britain and Ireland, is interested in the

well-being and expanding prosperity of our Indian

fellow-subjects. Indeed it would not be too much to say that if

any serious disaster ever overtook our Indian Empire, or if our

political relations with the Peninsula of Hindostan were to be

even partially disturbed, there is not a cottage in Great

Britain, at all events in the manufacturing districts, which

would not be made to feel the disastrous consequences of such an

intolerable calamity.'

There is another point to consider. The rapid growth of our vast

Indian commerce has been largely due to the application on an

immense scale of British capital {246} for the opening up of the

country by railways and canals, and for the conservation and

distribution of water by systems of irrigation. It is estimated

that £350,000,000 are thus invested, to which must be added

other large sums employed in various forms of industrial

enterprise; the profits and interest of all this capital

flowing back steadily to the United Kingdom, and evidently

secured only by British dominance.

When to all this we connect the fact that from 75,000 to 100,000

British people find well paid employment in carrying on the

government, defence and industrial development of the country we

begin to understand the vast range of national interests

involved in our retaining possession of India. The estimate that

the people of the United Kingdom draw from India sixty or

seventy millions sterling every year in direct income is

probably a moderate one. Directly then Britain's stake in India

is enormous. Indirectly our possession of the country would

probably determine the drift of the commerce of the vast regions

still further East.

Nor is it the United Kingdom alone which is concerned.

The present and prospective interest of the Australasian

colonies in India are also great, not only for the military

reasons which have been mentioned, but in view of the growing

trade relations. India reduced to anarchy by the withdrawal of

British rule, or India governed by Russia, would mean a serious

blow {247} to Australasian trade, present and prospective. It

might easily mean exclusion from all the markets of the East.

South Africa, which owed its earliest development to the fact

that it was the stopping place on the road to India, still owes

much of its importance to the same cause. The interest of Canada

in India is more remote, but now that Canadian steamship lines

are on the Pacific, with their terminus at Hong Kong, Britain's

position in the East has a new interest for the Dominion.

But every British colony great and small is directly and deeply

interested in the maintenance of the power of the Empire, and if

the continued power of the Empire involves, as it seems to do,

the retention and government of India, the colonies should not

shrink from sharing that responsibility.

Professor Seeley has proved with conclusive clearness that the

government of India has had very little effect upon the domestic

politics of England; there is no reason to think that it would

have more upon the domestic politics of the Empire.

The political difficulty about India's relation to a united

Empire is, however, felt very widely. It is one of the first

which occurs to the minds of most men when they turn their

attention to the question, as I have found during public

discussion in many parts of the Empire. Nor is this to be

wondered at. That a country enjoying popular representative

institutions should rule as an imperial power over some hundreds

{248} of millions of people without representation in their own

government is an extraordinary anomaly. Men's minds have,

however, become accustomed to it by long usage, and the fact is

accepted almost without remark. But when a proposal is made to

re-construct the national organism on what is claimed to be a

logical basis, the incompatibility between our popular system of

government, and the system which we apply to India at once

re-appears.

The anomaly, however, would be no greater under federation than

without it, and it is one with which the British mind in all

parts of the Empire is familiar. Most of the great colonies have

had on a small scale the experience which the United Kingdom has

had on a large scale of ruling weaker races without giving them

representation.

Unquestionably confusion of thought is caused by the careless

use of the term Empire into which English people have fallen.

Applied to India and the crown colonies it is admissible, though

with the qualification that in practice the Empress of India

acts as much under advice as the Queen of England. As a name for

the 'slowly grown and crowned Republic' of which the mother-land

is the type and the great self-governing colonies copies, the

term Empire is a misnomer, and has none of the meaning which it

has when applied to Russia, Austria, or the France of the

Napoleons. If immediate reflection of the popular will in public

policy be taken as the test, England, Canada, and Australia are

more republican than the modern {249} republics; as democratic

as is well possible under a representative system of government.

But the people of this 'crowned republic,' proud of their

capacity for self-government, and impatient of any illegitimate

control over themselves, have assumed the task of governing a

real Empire--one which contains a population of some hundreds of

millions of various races. The legitimacy of this assumed task

we need not stay to discuss. The actual relation of Britain to

India as to several other countries without self-government is a

fact; and one which has passed beyond the range of discussion.

This government of India the United Kingdom, upon which the work

now devolves, finds it possible to carry on, and on the whole

efficiently. That it is done to the good of the people ruled is

scarcely open to question. British rule in India may be far from

ideally perfect, but that it is superior to anything India ever

had before is freely admitted even by foreigners. Is there

anything in the nature of the case which would prevent the

representatives of a united British race from carrying forward

the government of India as do now the representatives of the

United Kingdom alone?

Let us consider the system of government. To the Indians

themselves no representation, as we understand the term, is

given. While largely employed for executive functions they take

no part in legislation. An English statesman of proved capacity,

assisted by a council of experienced specialists, is placed as

{250} Viceroy at the head of affairs. Under him is a trained

body of civil servants, selected by a rigid system of

examination. To these the general administration of the country

is committed. It is a system of government by experts.

The fiscal system of India, its revenue and expenditure, are

kept entirely separate from those of the United Kingdom. It has

its separate and clearly defined code of laws suited to its

circumstances. It has a practically independent military

organization. The government of the great dependency is not only

essentially different in form from that of the self-governing

portions of the Empire, but revolves in a sphere of its own. The

general lines of Indian policy come under the review of

Parliament; the pressure of public opinion is kept upon those

who rule India through the channel of Parliamentary criticism;

beyond this the rule of the country is left to the specialists

to whom it has been committed. It has been long since any

question of Indian policy made or unmade a government.

I have met everywhere, in Britain and in the colonies, people

who think that India makes a heavy drain upon the revenues of

the United Kingdom, and would do so upon the revenues of a

united Empire. This is an example of that ignorance which, it

has been truly said, is the most probable dissolvent of the

Empire. It is therefore not unnecessary to say that India pays

exclusively for its own defence and government. Every soldier,

white or native, from the {251} Commander-in-Chief down to the

humblest sepoy; every civil servant, from the Governor-General

to the lately appointed clerk, is paid from Indian revenues

alone. India does even more, it pays the whole expense of the

India Office in London, and for the maintenance of Aden and

other ports near the mouth of the Red Sea, with their garrisons,

although these give protection to other Eastern commerce and to

that of the Australasian colonies as well as Indian. India

contributes also to the maintenance of consular establishments

in China and of the British Embassy in Persia. The resources and

the fighting power of India stand today as a barrier to guard

from danger the enormous British commerce in the Eastern seas,

to keep back the most dangerous military power of Europe and

Asia from nearer approach to the English communities of the

South.

The question whether any degree of representation could be given

to the Indian population would remain for a federated Empire,

just as it now exists for the United Kingdom. The problem would

be no greater and no less. Any step taken in that direction

would no doubt be exceedingly cautious and tentative. But for

dealing with this, as with all other Indian problems, a united

Empire, with its consolidated strength, would be vastly more

efficient than a nation going through various stages of

disintegration.

The answer which appears to me sufficient to those whom claim

that Britain's control of India interposes {252} an insuperable

obstacle to a Federal system for the Empire is this:--

India is practically a crown colony, and as yet the United

Kingdom has shown no inclination to govern it otherwise than as

a crown colony. The same duty may be rightly accepted and duly

fulfilled by British people as a whole under any system of

common government. To accept it would create no new national

burden or risk, would react no more upon the ordinary political

development of the various states than it has upon that of the

United Kingdom.

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Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity · 第 10 / 14 章