CHAPTER IV.

THE UNITED KINGDOM.

To understand the relation of the United Kingdom to the question

of national unity we must try to grasp the main features of the

astonishing and unparalleled change which in the last half or

three quarters of a century has come over the industrial

condition of the British Islands. This change has left them in a

position absolutely unique among the nations of the present day,

a position, moreover, to which history furnishes no parallel.

It has been estimated that when the Queen came to the throne, of

the working population of the country one-third were

agricultural labourers, and one-third were artizans. There has

since been an addition of from 12,000,000 to 15,000,000 to the

whole population, and at the end of this period of remarkable

growth we find ourselves face to face with the overwhelming fact

that of all the working classes of Great Britain only an eighth

are agricultural labourers while three-fourths are artizans.

What this means is in no way more tersely described than when we

say that Britain has become the workshop of the {104} world.

What it involves is the conclusion that never in the history of

the human race has any great nation lived under such artificial

conditions as do British people at the end of this period of

extraordinary industrial development, a period which has its

limit well within the century. All the circumstances of national

existence have been revolutionized.

After the application to the soil of intense culture, of

scientific skill, of abundant capital, of cheap labour, only

about 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 quarters of wheat are produced out

of the 28,000,000 quarters which now represent the annual

consumption. The rest comes from the far distant prairies of the

United States and Canada, from India, South Australia, New

Zealand, the Black Sea and the Baltic. With other cereals it is

the same, the demand for those which cannot be produced at all

in Great Britain, such as rice and maize, being immense.

Cheap ocean freights, which make it possible to transfer a

bushel of wheat by sea from Montreal or New York to London at a

lower price than it can be carried by rail from some English

counties to London, handicap the English producer still more. It

seems as if the dependence upon the outside world for grain

supplies were likely to increase, not merely with the rapid

increase of population which is still going on, but with the

necessity of applying the land to more profitable forms of

production as ocean transit is still further cheapened, and as

increasing prosperity leads to a greater consumption of animal

food.

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As with grain foods so with meat. Hundreds of thousands of live

cattle, many hundred thousand tons of meat, chilled, frozen,

salted, or tinned, pour into the country every year from across

the sea. Canada alone last year sent 123,000 head of cattle; New

Zealand nearly 1,500,000 frozen carcasses of sheep. It has been

estimated that the quantity of meat food in the United Kingdom

at any time is only sufficient to supply the market for three

months; beyond that all must come from without.

So also with cheese, fruit, and other staple articles of

consumption. Still more striking is the dependence on distant

lands for a wide range of articles once esteemed luxuries, but

now reckoned among the comforts, if not the necessities, of

daily life, such as sugar, tea, and coffee. If the massing of

facts into figures best conveys to some minds the nature of the

situation it may be put in the statement that every year the

United Kingdom pays for articles used for food brought from

abroad the sum of £153,000,000 sterling. Or it may be better

illustrated by a comparison. Draw around almost any other nation

or country of modern times--Germany, Italy, Russia, the United

States, Canada, Australia--a barrier preventing the ingress of

any food supply from the outer world. There will be

inconvenience, some measure of restriction of consumption in a

few particulars, but the condition is one which could be endured

not merely for months but for years. Place a like barrier around

the British Islands and {106} in six weeks the pressure of want

will begin to be felt; in six months starvation will be the

prevalent condition of the population.

Such a picture is, of course, imaginary--the fact which lies

behind it is stern reality.

The illustration emphasizes, but does not exaggerate, the

absolutely unique nature of the national position.

For the first time in the course of human history we have had in

the last half century presented to us in the British Islands the

spectacle of a great people depending for its existence upon the

safe and continuous transport from the most remote corners of

the globe of about two-thirds of the chief articles of daily

consumption.

That the outlook of such a people upon the world should differ

fundamentally from that of any other people of past times or of

the present day is manifest. What has been said is not meant to

prove that the situation is one which should necessarily induce

extraordinary anxiety. Difficulties are to be measured by the

resources at hand to grapple with them. Danger only comes when

the sense of proportion between the two is lost.

Food is not all. Britain the workshop of the world, and

three-fourths of its working population artizans! Upon what do

these vast armies of industry, these millions of working men and

women, spend their toil to earn the wages that buy the food thus

brought to them from such great distances and at {107} such

expense? Once more we find the ends of the earth scoured to

furnish them with the raw material upon which they work. Wool

from Australia, New Zealand, India, Africa, South America;

cotton from the Southern States, India, Egypt; timber from

Canada, Russia, Scandinavia, Honduras; precious metals, ores,

jute, hemp and other fibres, oils, gums, ivory, shells, hides,

furs, precious stones--everything that can be moulded for use or

beauty, all productions of land and sea, are poured forth day by

day from the holds of a thousand ships in the greater ports of

the United Kingdom to be transferred to the centres of British

industry.

The critical character of this dependence for a perfectly steady

supply of raw material is under modern conditions as striking as

the extent of the dependence. The great Yorkshire woollen

spinners tell us that to be cut off even for three or four weeks

from the supplies of Australian wool would mean the closing of

hundreds or thousands of factories and a widespread paralysis of

industry. They point out that when the regularity of sea

transport depended upon wind and weather, or when the home

market supplied a larger share of the material, common prudence

made it necessary to lay in heavy stocks to provide against

contingencies for many months. So fixed has now become the habit

of depending upon the regular arrival of ocean steam-ships from

week to week, the regular sequence of great wool sales at

frequent stated periods, that it is possible {108} in

manufacturing to live as it were from hand to mouth; that, as a

matter of fact, a large proportion of manufacturers do so live,

purchasing only enough for their immediate wants, and renewing

their stock at very short intervals. Thus the effect of any

stoppage of sea-transport would be disastrously felt at once,

reaching in its influence alike the manufacturing capitalist and

the workman in his cottage.

A group of manufacturers at Galashiels, one of the important

Scottish centres of the wool trade, told me that nine out of

every ten pounds of wool they used was Australian. The

proportion can scarcely be less in the Bradford district and

other large areas of Yorkshire. Nor are such illustrations of

the completeness of dependence on supplies abroad exceptional or

confined to wool. Cut off Dundee from its importations of Indian

jute and the collapse of its main industry would be sudden and

general. Lancashire is not likely to forget what it means to

lose control of her ordinary markets for obtaining raw cotton.

We may put together once more the figures which express this

marvellous relation to British industry to the remoter parts of

the world.

For wool last year Britain paid £26,000,000; for raw cotton

£40,000,000; wood £14,000,000; metals £23,000,000; flax, hemp,

and jute £10,000,000; and so on.

But even what has been said of food and raw material of

manufacture exhibits but one side of the national position. To

be the workshop of the world {109} implies access to the markets

of the world. I say nothing of the vast centres of commerce

abroad which serve as the main points of distribution. But go to

the loneliest Australian or New Zealand bush; to the backwoods

and remote prairies of Canada; to distant South African gold and

diamond diggings, and we find the shelves of the humblest shop

filled with the products of the looms of Yorkshire, Lancashire,

or Paisley, of the factories everywhere scattered throughout the

United Kingdom where the vast inflow of raw material is worked

up. To foreign countries, as well as to those inhabited by

British people, to every civilized or uncivilized continent,

district, or island, however remote, these manufactures

penetrate, and must continue to penetrate, if the vast fabric of

British industry is to be maintained.

Once more, the figures which represent the annual aggregate of

export trade are immense: cotton goods £70,000,000; woollen

goods £26,000,000; iron and steel £28,000,000; machinery £

13,000,000.

Between this great inflow of raw material and food, and the

equally great output of manufactured goods, has sprung up yet

another prime factor in Britain's industrial position, her

shipping interests. She has become by far the greatest of ocean

carriers. It is not merely that scores of millions of capital

are invested in ships alone; that 60 per cent. of all the steam

tonnage of the world and a large proportion of its sailing

tonnage are under the British flag; that tens of thousands of

men find employment {110} upon the seas, and tens of thousands

more in the immediate handling of ships and their cargoes around

British harbours and docks. The mere construction of ships and

their equipment for this vast carrying trade gives an impulse to

almost every form of British industry. The shipyards of the

Clyde alone turn out at times a thousand tons or more of iron or

steel shipping for every working day of the year. The vast

aggregate for the whole country forms a large element in the

industrial life of the nation.

Here, then, in roughest outline, is a picture of the unique

position which the British Islands hold in the world today. Let

us remind ourselves once more that the extreme singularity of

this situation has been created well within the span of an

ordinary life, for the sea-borne commerce of the United Kingdom,

which today has an annual value of more than £740,000,000, was,

when the Queen came to the throne in 1837, only £155,000,000.

The difference between these figures fairly measures the

increased dependence of the country upon its imports, exports,

and the carrying trade.

Now for a nation existing under conditions such as have been

described, where the work and wages and food of the masses of

the people depend on easy and constant access to the remotest

corners of the globe, it seems possible to indicate what must be

the end and aim of national policy--the supreme objects of

statesmanship. Surely the first object must be to {111} secure

the absolute safety for trading purposes of the water-ways of

the world.

Maritime security Britain is bound to maintain, if she is to

retain manufacturing superiority. The only manufacturing rival

which seriously threatens her is the United States. It is a

friendly rivalry, and should remain such. But each country, with

what advantages it has, will play relentlessly for its own hand,

and for the welfare, real or supposed, of its own people.

Britain carries on the contest by means of Free Trade, thereby

cheapening production, and winning the market of the world. The

United States use for their weapon Protection, stimulating

production till it becomes cheap. Britain also, under this

opposing condition, depends for food and material on the outside

world--the United States have the food and most of the material

within themselves. The first serious break in Britain's power to

hold the waterways of the world would place her at a fatal

disadvantage. Safe in a continental isolation the United States

could supply the customers who came to her for manufactured

goods with what they wanted. To be on even terms Britain must

have maritime security, and this she could not have if by the

successive cutting away of her great outlying offshoots she

should lose control of those points of vantage which now are the

secret of her supremacy quite as much as the ships which she

sends forth from her dockyards.

Second only to maritime security seems to me the necessity for a

country in the position of Great Britain {112} to keep as far as

possible the sources from which she draws her food and raw

material within the national domain.

Great Britain has had at least one sharp reminder of the

advantage which would accrue to a country so dependent as she is

on the outside world of having the areas of production under the

national flag. This reminder was one which gave a rough shock to

the generally accepted theory that if the consumer wants to buy

and the producer wants to sell, all the conditions for

satisfactory commercial intercourse between countries are

fulfilled without reference to national relationship. In 1865

the War of Secession broke out in America, and the ports of the

cotton-producing states were blockaded. Millions of bales of

cotton were wasting on the wharves and in the warehouses at New

Orleans, Charleston, and other Southern towns. On the other

hand, in Lancashire millions of spindles were idle, and vast

bodies of people were reduced to extreme need or thrown for a

long period upon the charity of the benevolent from want of the

raw material of their industry. The producers certainly wished

to sell, the consumers to purchase. English manufacturers had

money with which to buy--English shippers had the vessels to

carry--the English Government had the men-of-war which could

easily have forced a way to the supplies which were needed.

Between was the barrier of international law and national

honour, which forbid a neutral nation to interfere with

belligerents. The barrier was respected, {113} and England

passed triumphantly through the moral strain involved in

resisting the temptation to go to war for an industrial end

alone. The lesson to be learned from such an example appears

manifest. The retention of the national right to keep open the

communication between the centre of consumption and the areas of

supply is alike desirable for the industry of the one and of the

other. To give an obvious illustration. The vast woollen

industries of Yorkshire are supplied almost exclusively from

regions now within the Empire--New Zealand, Australia, India,

and South Africa. So long as these countries remain under a

common British flag the working man who produces the wool and

the working man who spins it retain the national right to keep

their industries in touch with each other: the moment they pass

out from under the flag that right is given up. Great Britain

would have no more right to force her way into the ports of an

independent Australia or New Zealand, blockaded by a German,

French, or Chinese fleet, than she had to force her way into the

harbours of Louisiana or South Carolina. The neutral flag may

furnish a way of escape for Britain's industry when she is

herself in direct conflict with another power; it gives no

assistance when a nation with which she is at peace chooses to

close the ports of a country from which she draws her food or

the material of her industry. The reader will find that the

illustration is a far-reaching one if he extends it to the whole

range of Britain's wants either for supply or for markets for

her manufactured {114} goods; and to the whole range of colonial

necessity for a market for their staple products, and a supply

of what they do not produce.

Still more significant is the illustration if he remember that

as regards food supply the Empire might, in an emergency, soon

become entirely independent of foreign countries, while, with

the single exception of cotton, we could tide over an indefinite

period even in the matter of raw material for manufacture.

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Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity · 第 4 / 14 章