CHAPTER I.

IMPERIAL FEDERATION

{ii}

This Edition is intended for circulation only in India and the

British Colonies

{iii}

Macmillan's Colonial Library

IMPERIAL FEDERATION

THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL UNITY

BY

GEORGE R. PARKIN, M.A.

_WITH MAP_

London

MACMILLAN AND CO.

AND NEW YORK

1892

No. 143

{iv}

'I tell you that when you study English history you study not

the past of England only, but her future. It is the welfare of

your country, it is your whole interest as citizens that is in

question while you study history. How it is so I illustrate by

putting before you this subject of the Expansion of England. _I

show you that there is a vast question ripening for decision,

upon which almost the whole future of our country depends. In

magnitude this question far surpasses all other questions which

you can ever have to discuss in political life._'

PROFESSOR J. R. SEELEY.

OXFORD: HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

{v}

PREFACE

THIS book has been written at the request of many friends who

think that a useful purpose will be served by putting the facts

and arguments which it embodies into a connected form, where

they will be easily accessible to the ordinary reader, and where

either their fallacies may be exposed or their truth find a

wider recognition. In most of the chief centres of the British

world both at home and abroad I have found men of all classes,

and not seldom large masses of men, who agreed on the whole with

the line of thought which I here try to follow; agreed, too,

with an intensity of belief and a warmth of enthusiasm which

are, I think, rarely found except in connection with great and

true causes. This concurrence of other minds has deepened the

profound conviction which I have long felt that the completion

of a closer and permanent political unity between the British

communities scattered throughout the world should be a first aim

of national statesmanship, and might {vi} become, if its

advantages were clearly understood, a supreme object of popular

desire.

It is essentially a subject for full and free discussion.

Permanent national unity for British people can only be based on

an agreement of opinion among at least the larger self-governing

communities that the union is for the common good. That there

should be an absolute unanimity of consenting opinion among the

populations of the communities concerned we have no reason to

hope. It has never occurred in any large national consolidation

hitherto, and it is not likely to do so now. The continued unity

of the Empire is a political question involving immense issues,

and divergent opinions may be assumed from the start. Indeed, it

becomes more evident from day to day, to those who watch

carefully the current of events, that the end can only be

gained--as great ends have ever been gained--after a severe

struggle between contending forms of thought. The provincialism

which has uniformly resisted large national organization; the

pessimism which sees danger in every new form of political

evolution; the repugnance to change in an old country with forms

of government more or less fixed; the crudeness of political

thought and want of national perspective in young communities;

the ignorance which begets inertia: all these exist and must be

combated. In this struggle the better cause, the strongest

arguments, the deepest convictions, the most {vii} strenuous

moulders of public opinion, will win. Mere circumstances will

never shape themselves for the required solution. A policy of

drift will never result in united strength. Growth may be an

unconscious process--organization can only be the result of a

conscious effort. No thinking man today would wish to see the

American Republic resolved into its original sovereign states,

Germany into its kingdoms, small principalities, and duchies;

Canada into its distinct provinces; Italy into its cities. Yet

none of these would now be what they are had their fortunes been

left to the drift of circumstances alone. Their history proves

that the ideals of the clearest minds, backed up by intense

convictions and resolute effort, are essential to the attainment

of the highest political organization. Circumstances or the

course of events may thwart human effort or favour it, but they

can never take its place as a complete substitute.

The further consolidation of the Empire depends in great measure

upon the answer given to two questions. Is it for the advantage

of the different communities that they should remain together?

and, granting an affirmative answer to this, does the problem of

further unification on a mutually satisfactory basis present

difficulties which transcend the resources of British

statesmanship?

These questions roughly indicate the line of enquiry which I

wish to follow. Behind them lies an issue {viii} which British

people throughout the world will soon be forced to recognize as

infinitely surpassing in momentous significance any upon which

their political thought and energy are now being spent. We may

not unreasonably believe that the movements at present going on

in the mother-land and the colonies are only supplying us with

the political formulae required for grappling with the higher

national problem.

It seems like sheer political blindness not to perceive that in

different parts of the Empire forces are now actively at work

which may at any moment precipitate a decision of this great

question; movements in progress which, it seems safe to say,

must of necessity lead up to a decision within a time measured

at the very most by one or two decades.

Nations take long to grow, but there are periods when, as in the

long delayed flowering of certain plants, or in the

crystallization of chemical solutions, new forms are taken with

extreme rapidity. There are the strongest reasons for believing

that the British nation has such a period immediately before it.

The necessity for the creation of a body of sound public opinion

upon the relations to each other of the various parts of the

Empire is therefore urgent. In stating the case for British

Unity I have constantly found myself merely linking together

arguments already used by thinkers in many parts of the Empire.

{ix} Any apology on my part for thus making use of other men's

thoughts, is unnecessary. Earnest believers in a great cause

only wish that the grounds of their belief should be made known

as widely as possible.

No one can be more conscious than myself of the incompleteness

of the statement which I have tried to make. But even a partial

study of a great subject may serve a useful purpose. If what is

here said furnish to the advocates of National Unity some texts

upon which they may enlarge and improve, if it provoke that

honest criticism which leads to a firmer grasp of truth, I shall

be more than satisfied.

{x}

{xi}

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. PAGE

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER II

FEDERATION 31

CHAPTER. III

DEFENCE 59

CHAPTER IV.

THE UNITED KINGDOM 103

CHAPTER V.

CANADA 115

CHAPTER VI.

FRENCH CANADA 153

CHAPTER VII.

MR. GOLDWIN SMITH 163

CHAPTER VIII.

AUSTRALIA. TASMANIA. NEW ZEALAND. .192

{xii} CHAPTER IX. PAGE

SOUTH AFRICA. THE WEST INDIES 232

CHAPTER X.

INDIA. 243

CHAPTER XI.

AN AMERICAN VIEW 253

CHAPTER XII.

FINANCE 271

CHAPTER XIII.

TRADE AND FISCAL POLICY 278

CHAPTER XIV.

PLANS. CONCLUSION 296

MAP

Commercial and Strategic Chart of the British Empire, on

Mercator's Projection .._End of book_.

{1}

_THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL UNITY_

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

THE glory of the British political system is often said to lie

in the fact that it is a growth; that it has adapted itself, and

is capable of continuous adaptation, to the necessities of

national development. The fact is proved and the boast is

justified by British history, but behind them, no doubt, is a

race characteristic. A special capacity for political

organization may, without race vanity, be fairly claimed for

Anglo-Saxon people.

The tests which have already been, or are now being, applied to

this organizing capacity are sufficiently striking and varied.

In the British Islands themselves a gradual and steady process

of evolution, extending over hundreds of years, has led up from

the free but weak and disjointed government of the Heptarchy

period to the equally free but strong and consolidated

government of the United Kingdom. In the United States, within

little more than a hundred {2} years, we have seen one great

branch of the race weld into organic unity a number of loosely

aggregated provinces under a system which now extends over half

the area of a great continent. Twenty-five years ago the process

was repeated on the other half of the American continent. In the

face of difficulties, by many believed to be insuperable,

Canada, stretching from ocean to ocean a distance of nearly 4000

miles, has become a political unit, and already exhibits a

cohesion which small European States have often only gained

after long periods of internal and external conflict.

On another continent Australians, dealing with provinces larger

in area than European empires, are grappling courageously with

the problem of political combination, and the universal

confidence felt in the ultimate success of their efforts shows

what reliance is put upon the strength and efficiency of the

race instinct. In South Africa and the West Indies the

considerable intermixture of coloured races complicates the

question, but here too the forces which make for unity are more

or less actively at work.

Speaking generally we may say that in the long course of

Anglo-Saxon history whenever the need of combination has arisen

the political expedient has been devised to match the political

necessity. This capacity for adequate organization has been the

keynote of distinction between the democracy of our race and all

the democracies by which it has been preceded.

There is reason to think that this organizing quality {3} is one

which has given effectiveness to all others. The steadiness of

the advance which the race has made in social and industrial

directions has depended upon the security given by political

organization at once comprehensive, flexible, and strong. No

other branch of the human family has ever been so free to apply

itself to the higher problems of civilization.

All the conditions of the world at the present time point to the

conclusion that further progress must be safe-guarded in the

same way. On the one hand, we see an extraordinary organization

of military power and a widening of military combination among

European nations to which the past furnishes no parallel, and

which suggest hitherto unheard-of possibilities of conflict or

aggression. On the other hand, the vast extension of industrial

and commercial interests among British people, without any

parallel in the previous history of the world, seems to demand a

corresponding widening of the political combination which is

required to give them security.

Meanwhile the amazing spread of the race has become the main

fact of modern history--the one which assuredly will have the

most decisive influence on the future of mankind. Only within

the last hundred years, one might almost say within a still

narrower limit of time, has this been fully realized. The

tentative efforts of Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, and French to

dominate the new continents opened up by the discoveries at the

end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth

centuries did not {4} receive a decisive check till towards the

end of the eighteenth. Then the new tide fairly began to flow.

The flux of civilized population, by which new and great centres

of human activity are created, has since that time been so

overwhelmingly Anglo-Saxon that nearly all minor currents are

absorbed or assimilated by it. Teuton, Latin, Scandinavian, with

one or two limited but well-defined exceptions, lose their

identity and tend to disappear in the dominant mass of British

population which has flowed, and continues in scarcely abated

volume to flow, steadily away from the mother islands to occupy

those temperate regions which are manifestly destined to become

in an increasing degree centres of the world's force.

With abundant space on which to expand, increase has been rapid,

and it would seem that in mere mass of numbers English-speaking

people are destined at no distant date to surpass any other

branch of the human stock.

That an expansion so vast should bring in its train a new set of

political problems, with a range wider than any that had gone

before, is only natural. That new hopes should be conceived from

this wonderful change in the balance of the world's forces; that

new plans should be devised to utilize it, as other expansions

have been utilized, for the good of our race and of mankind, is

equally natural.

It is almost needless to point out that the conditions

incidental to this expansion were at first misunderstood. The

ignorance of public opinion as to the true {5} relations between

mother-land and colonies, seconded by the blindness and

obstinacy of politicians waging a bitter party fight, produced

in 1776 the great schism of the Anglo-Saxon race. Chatham,

Burke, and many of the clearest minds of England, believed that

the American Revolution was unnecessary--in America itself there

was a large, and for a long time a preponderant party, which

held that in constitutional change a way of escape could be

found from Revolution. The worse counsels prevailed, and

Revolution took the place of Reform and Readjustment. It is, no

doubt, idle to speculate upon the results which might have

followed from a different line of action; if the statesmen of

that day had proved equal to the task of dealing with the

political problem with which they were confronted. The idea that

the separation of the United States from Great Britain was a

pure gain to either country or to the world may, however, be

distinctly challenged.

It may easily be imagined that the earlier ripening of public

opinion in England upon the question of slavery, and the earlier

solution found for it on peaceful lines, might have helped to

solve the problem at an earlier stage in America as well, and

thus prevented the frightful catastrophe of the War of Secession

in 1865. The close and intimate political reaction upon each

other of the two greatest Anglo-Saxon communities, the one with

its higher standard of statesmanship and public morality, the

other with its more active liberalizing tendencies, might have

been in the highest {6} degree healthful for both. United with

all others of their own race and language, British people might

have been able, in self-sufficing strength, to withdraw almost a

hundred years earlier than could otherwise be possible from the

entanglements of European politics, and to be free to devote all

their energies to the maintenance of peace, and the development

of industry, commerce, and civilization. Qualifications to these

views will, of course, present themselves to every mind, and it

is not necessary to press them too far or to quarrel with the

course of history. Much more important is it to observe its

results and learn the lessons which it teaches.

We now see that the bifurcation of Anglo-Saxon national life

which took place in 1776 was of all other events in modern

history the one most pregnant with great consequences. The war

of the Revolution led primarily to the foundation of the

Republic of the United States. Its significance, however, is not

exhausted by this fact, great though it is. The reflex action

upon the thought and policy of Britain involved consequences as

important and far-reaching. Revolution for once in our

development had taken the place of Evolution, but in the end

enabled the latter to resume its steady course. The revolt of

the American colonies led to the closer study of the principles

which must control national expansion. Britain strove, and not

in vain, to acquire the art of bringing colonies into friendly

relation with the national system. The nation-building energy of

her people remained unimpaired, {7} and though one group of

colonies had been lost, others, extending over areas far more

extensive, were soon gained. Under new principles of government

these were acquired, not to be lost, but retained as they have

been up to the present time. Is that retention to be permanent?

Is it desirable? Can the colonies be brought, and ought they to

be brought, not merely into friendly relations, but into organic

harmony with the national system? Has our capacity for political

organization reached its utmost limit? For British people this

is the question of questions. In the whole range of possible

political variation in the future there is no issue of such

far-reaching significance, not merely for our own people but for

the world at large, as the question whether the British Empire

shall remain a political unit for all national purposes, or,

yielding to disintegrating forces, shall allow the stream of the

national life to be parted into many separate channels.

Twenty-five years ago it seemed as if English people, and it

certainly was true that the majority of English statesmen, had

made up their minds definitely as to the only possible and

desirable solution to this great national problem. The old

American colonies had gone, and had remained none the less good

customers of the mother-country for having become independent.

Very soon, it was sincerely believed, the whole world would be

converted to Free Trade, and with universal free trade and the

universal peace which was to follow, nothing was to be gained

from retaining the colonies, {8} while the colonies themselves

were expected to look eagerly forward to complete political

emancipation as the goal of their development. A few brilliant

writers in the press, a few eloquent speakers on the platform,

gave much vogue to these views. The correspondence of prominent

public men which has since come to light, the recollections of

men still living, furnish convincing proof that this opinion was

widely accepted in official circles. A governor, leaving to take

charge of an Australian colony, was told even from the Colonial

Office that he would probably be the last representative of the

Crown sent out from Britain. This tendency of official thought

found its culmination when, in 1866, a great journal frankly

warned Canada, the greatest of all the colonies, that it was

time to prepare for the separation from the mother-land that

must needs come. The shock which this outspoken declaration gave

to Canadian sentiment, built up as it had been on a century of

loyalty to the idea of a United Empire, was very great. That

statesman and journalist alike had misconceived the temper of

the British as well as of the colonial mind was soon made

manifest. This was shown by the almost universal applause which

greeted the passionately indignant protest of Tennyson, when, in

the final dedication to the Queen of his Idylls, he wrote:--

'And that true North[1], whereof we lately heard

A strain to shame us--keep you to yourselves: {9}

So loyal is too costly! friends, your love

Is but a burden: break the bonds and go!

Is this the tone of Empire! Here the faith

That made us rulers! This indeed her voice

And meaning, whom the roar of Hougoumont

Left mightiest of all nations under heaven!

What shock has fooled her since that she should speak

So feebly?'

At once it became clear that here the real heart of Britain

spoke--that poet rather than politician grasped with greater

accuracy the true drift of British thought.

It is not too much to say that from that day to this the policy

of separation, as the true theoretical outcome of {10} national

evolution, has been slowly but steadily dying. John Bright held

the theory in England almost up to the end of his great career.

Goldwin Smith advocates it in Canada still. Of their views I

shall have more to say later. But among conspicuous names theirs

have stood practically alone. Politicians in Britain do not

wish, and if they wished, would scarcely dare, to advocate it on

public platforms. Separation may come under the compulsion of

necessity, from the incapacity of statesmen to work out an

effective plan of union, or as the result of national apathy and

ignorance--not because it is desired, or from any theoretical

belief in its advantage to the people concerned.

If we lay aside, however, the question of national feeling, or

national interest, and look upon the matter as simply one of

constitutional growth and change, it is little wonder that the

statesmen of that earlier period took the view they did.

I have in my possession a document which seems to me of much

historical interest in this connection as furnishing concrete

evidence of the direction of political thought at the period to

which I have referred. It is the printed draft of a Bill

prepared with great care more than twenty-five years ago by Lord

Thring, whose long service as Parliamentary counsel to

successive Cabinets has given him an experience in the practical

forms of English legislation quite unrivalled. The Bill was

intended to be a logical sequel to those measures of Imperial

legislation by which responsible government was {11} granted to

the Canadian and Australian colonies. The new constitutions had

then been in operation for some time in several of the great

colonies, and already no slight friction had occurred in the

endeavour to adjust Imperial and Colonial rights and

responsibilities upon a clear and well-understood basis.

Moreover, the continued formation of new colonies and the desire

of certain Crown colonies to attain to responsible government

suggested a fundamental treatment of the whole question of

colonial relations. The Bill therefore embodies an attempt to

put upon a just basis the relations between Britain and her

colonies at each period of their growth, and to state clearly

their mutual obligations and mutual duties.

It naturally provides in the first place for the government of

settlements in their earlier stages of growth under the absolute

jurisdiction of the Crown.

In the next place, the transition of such a Crown settlement

into the rank and status of a colony with responsible government

is not left to be decided by agitation within the colonies or by

irregular pressure in other directions, such as lately took

place in the case of Western Australia; but it is made to depend

on a definite increase of European population and other

conditions equally applicable to all colonies alike. With the

grant of responsible government, however, comes a clear division

between imperial and local powers, and an equally definite

distribution of burdens; the guarantee to the colony of

protection from foreign aggression being contingent upon the

contribution by {12} the colony of the revenue or money required

for defence in fair proportion to its wealth and population.

Lastly, 'as the natural termination of a connection in itself of

a temporary character' (to use the words of the preface to the

Bill), provision is made for the formal separation of a colony

and its erection into an independent state when its people feel

equal to under-taking the full range of national responsibility.

Direct provision is made for independence only at the colony's

own request, but it is suggested that separation might be

brought about by coercive proclamation on the part of the

mother-country in case the colony fails to perform the national

duties which it accepted with responsible government.

The interest of this proposed legislation seems to me to lie in

the proof which it furnishes that the grant of responsible

government was by no means regarded as giving finality to

national relations, but only as marking a stage in colonial

development. The view thus taken by Lord Thring in England was

the view taken by Joseph Howe in Canada, to whose opinions I

shall have occasion hereafter to refer.

The merit of the Bill lay in the fact that it placed upon a

defined and easily understood footing the relations of

mother-land and colony so long as they remained together; and

provided a constitutional way of escape from the connection when

it had ceased to give satisfaction to either party. Its

peculiarity, indicative of the opinions prevailing at the time,

is that no notice is taken of the possibility of a colony rising

{13} to a place of greatness and power inconsistent with a

strictly subordinate colonial relation, and yet desiring to

perpetuate its organic connection with the nation.

The constitution of the United States provides that new

settlements, though thousands of miles from the centre of

government, and as truly colonies as those of Britain, shall

rise from the condition of territories into that of states,

under which they enjoy the full national franchise, and assume a

full share of national responsibility. In a like manner Lord

Thring's Bill fairly faced the fact that for communities such as

those which British people were forming, the colonial stage was

temporary and transitional, and it provided, in a different

sense, but in accord with existing conditions and beliefs, a

fixed goal for colonial aspirations, and a fixed limit to the

responsibilities of the mother-land.

The framer of this Bill is now, I have reason to think, among

those who believe that a very different end of colonial

development is both desirable and practicable. Such a reversal

of opinion is the natural outcome of the extraordinary changes

which have passed over the national life. The extension of

commercial and industrial relations, the growth of common

interests, the increased facility for communication, above all,

the retention in the colonies, under their new systems of free

government, of a strong national sentiment, and the absence of

the anticipated desire to break the national connection, have

thrown new light upon the whole question.

{14}

In that new light it now seems that there is an argument well

nigh unanswerable, which goes to prove that so far from being a

matter of indifference, the separation from the Empire of anyone

of our great groups of colonies would be an event pregnant with

anxieties and possible disaster alike to the colonies and to the

mother-land, and so far from being the natural line of political

development, that separation would be as unnatural as it is

unnecessary. It is this thought that has given birth to the idea

of national federation, to the conviction in many minds that the

chief effort of our national statesmanship should be directed to

securing the continued unity of the wide-spread British Empire,

to resisting any tendency towards that disintegration which a

generation ago was looked forward to with comparative unconcern.

This is not the thought of mere theorists or enthusiasts.

Statesmen and thinkers of the first rank both in the mother-land

and the colonies, while reserving their judgment as to the lines

on which complete unity can be gained, have strongly affirmed

their belief that it is the true goal for our national

aspirations, that the question is one of supreme concern for the

whole Empire, and that the problem must soon be grappled with in

practical politics.

Not the creation, but the preservation of national unity, is the

task which thus confronts British people, which they must accept

or refuse. Unity already exists: it is the necessary

starting-point of every discussion. It will prove, if need be,

an incalculable assistance {15} towards the attainment of the

completer unity at which we aim. But the existing unity is crude

in form, one which in its very nature is temporary and

transitional, one which ignores or violates political principles

ingrained in the English mind as essential to any finality in

political development, and which already results in gross

inequalities in the conditions of citizenship throughout the

Empire.

The logic by which this position is proved seems irresistible in

its appeal to the mind of the ordinary British citizen. It is

well to be clear on this point.

The essence of British political thought, the very foundation

upon which our freedom, political stability, and singular

collective energy as a nation have been built up, may be

expressed in two words--Representative Government. The loyalty

of the subject and the faithfulness of the ruler spring alike

from this. The willingness to bear public burdens, the deep

interest in public affairs, the close study and careful

application of political principles which distinguish the people

of our race from all others, and the advance of the whole body

politic towards greater individual freedom combined with greater

collective strength, are all direct outgrowths of Representative

Government. Other races may work out other systems and attain

greatness in doing so; we have committed ourselves to this, so

far as dealing with our own people is concerned. From the local

board which settles the poor-rate or school-tax for a parish, to

the Cabinet which deals with the highest concerns of the Empire

and the world, {16} this principle is the central element of

strength, since it is the ground on which public confidence is

based. A British subject who has no voice in influencing the

government of the nation throughout the whole range of its

operation has not reached that condition to which the whole

spirit of our political philosophy points as the state of full

citizenship. We are on absolutely safe ground when we say that

great English communities will not permanently consent to stop

short of this citizenship, nor will they relegate to others,

even to a majority of their own nationality, the uncontrolled

direction of their most important interests.

With certain qualifications, introduced to mitigate the glaring

anomaly of the situation, the great self-governing colonies of

the Empire are in fact now compelled to allow many of their most

important affairs to be managed by others. Canada, with a

commercial navy which floats on every sea, holding already in

this particular the fourth place among the nations of the world,

has a voice in fixing international relations only by the

courtesy of the mother-land, and not by the defined right of

equal citizenship. Australia, occupying a continent, with vast

and growing commercial interests, is in the same anomalous

position. English-speaking, self-governing populations,

amounting in the aggregate already to nearly a third of the

population of the United Kingdom, and likely within little more

than a generation to equal it, with enormous interests involved

in nearly every movement of national affairs, {17} have no

direct representative influence in shaping national policy or

arranging international relations.

The almost perfect freedom they enjoy in the control of local

affairs accentuates rather than mitigates the anomaly. By

accustoming them to the exercise of political rights it makes

them impatient of anything which falls short of the full dignity

of national citizenship.

No one who understands the genius of Anglo-Saxon people can

believe that this state of affairs will be permanent. No one who

sympathizes with the spirit which has constantly urged forward

British people on their career of political progress can wish it

to be so. Great countries with an assured future cannot always

remain colonies, as that term has hitherto been understood. The

system which persists in making no other provision for them is

on the point of passing away.

It is sometimes urged that freedom from national burdens should

be enough to reconcile colonists to any lack of representation

in national counsels; that if they have no sufficient share of

Imperial Government they are at least rid of Imperial anxieties;

that wise direction of affairs may, in any case, be looked for

from the mother-land. But no immunity from public burdens, can

compensate for the loss of a share in the higher life of the

nation and the higher dignity of full citizenship: no honourable

career can result from a readiness to shirk responsibility: a

willingness to rely upon others to do our {18} work or protect

our interests is not the spirit which has built up or will

perpetuate the power of our race. Such argument may suit the

infancy of colonies; applied to their adolescence it is

degrading, since it implies a mean and contented dependence. If

the greater British colonies are permanently content with their

present political status they are unworthy of the source from

which they sprang. It will not be so. The spirit of independence

has developed, not degenerated, in the wider breathing space of

new continents. A very little further growth, increasing the

complication and aggravating the anomaly of the existing

situation, will bring us to a stage where that spirit will no

longer endure the restraints now put upon it by practical

difficulties of political organization, and where those

difficulties must be swept away by the gathering force of

national instincts and necessities. About the direction of

change there may be a question; about the certainty of change

there can be none.

But the argument is equally strong when we reverse our attitude,

and place ourselves in the position of the taxpaying citizens of

the United Kingdom. There are probably few of these who are not

at times filled with a glow of pride and enthusiasm when they

think of the vast extent of those colonies, which, planted by

British energy, held through years of conflict by British

courage, and proudly inheriting British traditions, are rising

to pre-eminence in every quarter of the globe.

{19}

This pride and enthusiasm have very positive and practical

issues. The citizen of the remotest colony knows that should an

enemy wantonly attack his frontier--should port or city be

threatened by a hostile force--almost within twenty-four hours,

as soon as telegraph could summon or steam convey them, British

sailors or British soldiers would be pouring thither, as ready

to fight and die for that particular bit of soil as for the

shores of England itself. But the sentiment which makes this

possible is balanced and qualified by very different

considerations. The citizen of the United Kingdom has often been

compelled to regard the colonies as great dependencies which

increased his responsibilities and multiplied his difficulties

without returning to the mother-country, under their present

organization, strength in men or resources, or even in exclusive

commercial advantage. Every new colony or colonial interest was

to him something new to defend, and augmented the burden of

Empire.

Yearly the vast expense necessary to provide adequately for

national responsibilities increased, and added itself to the

weight of taxation incident to an advanced civilization and

complex social system. While forced to bear the chief burden of

the taxation required for national defence, the people of the

British Islands could see that the mass of the colonists

benefited by this protection already possessed, or were likely

before long to possess a higher average of wealth and comfort

than the mass of the people {20} who bestowed the benefit.

Looking forward little more than a generation he could foresee a

time when the colonists whose commerce was protected would equal

in number the whole home population which gave the protection,

when the volume of colonial commerce itself would surpass that

of the mother-land.

It requires little argument to prove that the anomaly of leaving

one part of a nation to bear a disproportionate share of the

burdens of the whole is as inconsistent with Anglo-Saxon ideas

of government as the exclusion of the colonies from a

proportionate voice in the conduct of national affairs.

An effective method of illustrating this anomalous condition of

the Empire and of British citizenship at the present time is to

consider the immediate change which takes place in the political

privileges and responsibilities of a man who shifts his

residence from the mother-country to Canada, Australia, or any

other great colony. He crosses the ocean, perhaps, to carry on

in another part of the Empire the business of the the bank, or

commercial house, or shipping firm with which he is connected

here. Such of his interests as require national protection

remain the same, and continue to enjoy security under the

British flag. He continues to take precisely the same interest

as before in the national welfare. But he loses at once the

right to influence national policy by his vote, and at the same

time he drops his old responsibilities of citizenship, since he

no longer pays the same proportion {21} of the taxes which make

the nation strong to protect him.

Take again a crucial case as applied to the working man. In

Australia one finds nearly 100,000,000 of sheep. The shepherding

and shearing of these sheep, the packing, carriage, and shipping

of their wool, give employment to a large section of the

industrial population. Nearly all this wool finds its market in

England, where the manufacture of a portion of it gives

employment to an immense population in centres such as the West

Riding of Yorkshire and parts of Scotland. The safety of this

wool in passing from the Australian centre of production to the

British centre of manufacture is essential to the prosperity of

the people in both. To this end Australian ports are made strong

at Australian expense and British ports at British expense. So

far all is fair and the distribution of the burden on industry

is equal. But between the two countries lie 12,000 miles of sea

to be guarded, and this is effectively done at enormous naval

and military expense, the burden of which, however, is almost

exclusively borne at the British end of the line. The proportion

paid by the Australian workman is comparatively insignificant.

Yet he is the one who earns the higher wages and feels the

pressure of taxation less.

I have heard a working man in a large public meeting in

Australia assert that the position viewed from this aspect was

unfair, and he added that he personally was far better able to

bear an equal share {22} of national burdens as a working man in

Australia than he had ever been as a working man in Britain. He

was certainly as competent to exercise the national franchise.

The illustration thus taken from a single colony and a single

department of industry has, of course, a wide application.

Whether viewed, then, from a purely British or a purely colonial

standpoint there are unanswerable reasons, and they are equally

unanswerable from either side, which point to an early

modification of the national system.

Especially is it to be noted, however, that the circumstances

which have developed this great problem have not arisen, like

many other political problems, from injustice or mismanagement

in the past, or from any causes tending to provoke mutual

recrimination. Through the simple processes of growth and

change, the conditions which satisfied the demands of national

life in the past have become insufficient to satisfy its

necessities for the future. Nothing could possibly be more

helpful for the solution of the question than this fact, that

men are able to approach it entirely free from party feuds and

local animosities.

Why, it may be asked, have not the inconsistency and the

temporary character of the existing national system been all

along obvious to every one? Why does the public attention

require to be directed to facts so manifest? Perhaps the best

answer is to be found in the wonderful rapidity of the changes

which have been going on, and the intense {23} absorption of

British people, both at home and abroad, in the actual processes

of national evolution, which left no time for studying their

indirect results.

Within the last century, and mainly within the last half

century, the United Kingdom has passed through the most

strenuous period of industrial development known in the history

of nations. The social system has been revolutionized by an

extraordinary increment of wealth, an immense increase of

population, and its concentration in towns, with all the

difficult problems which these changes involve. Political

thought has had enough to do to adjust the balance between

decreasing rural and increasing urban constituencies--to meet

the wants of a democracy advancing in prosperity and

intelligence, to maintain an equilibrium between new and

conflicting forces. Moral effort has been strained to the utmost

in dealing with education, sanitation, social reformation, and

kindred questions, a deepening sense of public responsibility in

such matters going hand in hand with an almost paralyzing

increase in the masses to be dealt with. Under such

circumstances it is scarcely to be wondered at that British

people within the United Kingdom have been too much absorbed in

what was directly before them to weigh carefully the results of

what was going on abroad; that even when most active in external

as well as internal affairs they seem to have conquered and

peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.'

{24}

In the colonies the preoccupation of thought and energy has with

equal reason been as complete. It is scarce fifty years since

the Canadian provinces obtained local self-government. The last

half century has witnessed the growth of a most complete system

of municipal and provincial institutions, crowned by a great act

of constructive statesmanship in Confederation. The organization

of half a continent on material lines has kept pace with each

step in political construction. Railroads, canals, telegraphs,

postal facilities, steamboat communication, all the machinery of

modern civilization, have been widely applied to an immense

area.

In Australia movement has been even more rapid and engrossing.

Melbourne has changed in fifty years from a village of a

thousand inhabitants to a city of 500,000. Australian commerce,

in its infancy when the Queen came to the throne, now equals

that of the United Kingdom at the same date. New Zealand, then

the home of mere savages, has already a British population which

exports annually £10,000,000 worth of the products of civilized

labour. In South Africa half a continent is being organized

under conditions of extreme difficulty.

In the rush of progress so swift as this, the mass of men are

conscious chiefly of the work immediately before them. But as

this work grows under their hands, the vast external interests

are created, and the wide external connections grow up, which

compel attention to the larger problems which they involve.

{25}

The local politician, as provinces consolidate, is, by a process

of natural compulsion, changed into the statesman with a

national and international range of political vision.

It seems almost superfluous to point out that in striving for

closer consolidation British people would be following strictly

along the lines of the most striking national movements of

modern times. They would be merely keeping abreast of the spirit

of the age.

For the idea of national unity the people of the United States

twenty-five years ago made sacrifices of life and money without

a parallel in modern history. No one now doubts that the end

justified the enormous expenditure of national force. 'The Union

must be preserved' was the pregnant sentence into which Lincoln

condensed the national duty of the moment, and to maintain this

principle he was able to concentrate the national energy for a

supreme effort. The strong man who saved the great republic from

disruption takes his place, without a question, among the

benefactors of mankind.

Germany struggled through years of difficulty, conflict, and

swaying tides of national passion towards the ideal of a united

fatherland. The ideal has been realised; the men who made its

attainment possible have won, not merely the gratitude of their

countrymen, but the world's respect as well; even their acts of

despotism are forgiven and more than half forgotten in the

momentous significance of their one supreme {26} achievement.

Today it seems as if their work of consolidated strength was the

best guarantee of Europe's peace.

Cavour's statue stands in the squares of Italian cities--his

name lingers in Italian hearts. To Tuscan, Lombard, and

Neapolitan alike he is 'our great Cavour'--the man whose

courageous genius found a basis in facts for the conception of

Italian unity, whose patient and resolute diplomacy made

possible the satisfaction of the national aspiration.

Canada has placed first on her roll of greatness the statesman,

to whom she mainly owes the achievement of Federal unity. Thus

beyond a doubt the men who have graven their names most deeply

on the history of our time are those who have carried out in

many lands and under varying conditions the work of national

consolidation. American unity, German unity, Italian unity,

Austro-Hungarian unity--the expansion of Russia without loss of

unity--these are the accomplished facts of our time which we

have to face. More than this. We do not need the philosophical

historian to tell us, for the process is going on under our own

eyes, that a governing tendency of the age is towards the union

of many states into combinations of nearly equal

strength--sometimes by fusion, sometimes by federation,

sometimes by alliance. On the practical equipoise of two such

great groups the equilibrium of Europe at this moment depends.

Race adds its influence to the tendency.

Pan-Sclavism--Pan-Latinism--Pan-Teutonism {27} are more than

names. They are forces which play their part in moulding the

destinies of nations and governments. The aspect of the whole

world irresistibly suggests the thought that we are passing from

a nation epoch to a federation epoch. That British people should

fall in with this tendency is in the strict line of historical

continuity. 'From clans in the north,' it has been truly said,

'and from a heptarchy in the south, England and Scotland grew

into nations and thence into one nation.' In the great offshoots

of the race abroad the tendency is renewed, and each step

prepares the way for another and greater effort. To consolidate

the empire which Chatham founded is the one manifest opportunity

remaining in the British world for British statesmen to place

their names in our history beside those of the greatest of the

statesmen of the past.

For the mother-land an organized national unity means, not

degradation from her imperial position, but a frank acceptance

of the facts of national growth, and the greater dignity which

would come from acknowledged leadership of the free communities

which have grown up around her.

Prussia gained, instead of losing, in dignity, when many of the

higher functions of her historic parliament became merged in

those of the Reichstag of the German people, when she gave up

her individual place as a nation in Europe to assume the

leadership of the German Empire. So would it be with Great

Britain.

{28}

For the colonies national unity means independence: not

'virtual' independence, as their present ill-defined condition

is sometimes spoken of, but the manly and sufficient

independence which comes from asserted rights and assumed

responsibilities.

There are two kinds of independence. The first is that of the

son grown restless under tutelage, who throws himself off, more

or less recklessly, from the family connection, refuses family

advice or assistance, and takes the chances of life on his own

account. Given, on the one hand, overbearing and unsympathetic

parents anxious to retain their control till the last moment,

or, on the other, children filled with ignorant self-conceit and

consequent discontent, and independence of this first type is

the natural result. Sometimes it is justified, and succeeds;

sometimes it is born of blind stupidity and makes lamentable

shipwreck. But this is not the ideal or the only form of

independence. Given reason, due consideration, mutual regard for

rights on both sides, and the family tie becomes a partnership

which combines the advantages of all the liberty required for

full development with the unity of action and counsel which

assures strength. It produces a great Rothschild firm, each head

of which is free to work out his own views at his own centre of

the world's finance, but each in touch with the other for

counsel or action, each making use of the business machinery

established by all the rest, and thus securing incomparable

business advantages for all. So in a wider sphere it produces

the nation--the great {29} American Republic--the Swiss,

Germanic, or Canadian Confederation; each state or group of

states working independently within its own well-defined sphere

of influence; each taking its share as freely in the equally

well-defined but wider orbit of a large national life.

Our admiration is not given to the independence of the American

state, or the Canadian or Australian province when holding aloof

from union, where we feel that a spirit of petty provincialism

is at work. Nor can it be reasonably given to the independence

of the Greek state impatient of any control beyond that which is

found within a city's walls. At least, in this case, if we

admire, we pity still more, for the lack of the power to

preserve the liberty which the city had created. We reserve our

admiration for the reasoned and secured independence of a state

whose members have abandoned the petty side of their

individuality, and displayed that political self-restraint,

sagacity, and largeness of view which is implied in wide

organization for the attainment of great ends.

It is to this independence of partnership that a real national

unity would lift the colonies of the British Empire. Doubtless

it would at first be the partnership of junior members. More

than this could not reasonably be expected. But the position

need not be an irksome one.

One primary principle reason approves and experience recommends

for our guidance in attempting to outline the form of union

which will best be adapted {30} to the genius of the British

people. For all its communities there should be the utmost

freedom of individual action which is consistent with united

strength. Apparently this condition will be best fulfilled under

some form of Federal connection.

[1] Lord Dufferin dedicated a Canadian edition of his 'Letters

from High Latitudes' in the words 'To that true North.' I cannot

refrain from connecting with these lines one more association

which will, I feel sure, in Canadian hearts at least, add a

tender grace to the vigorous thought of the poet and the

delicate compliment of the politician. I am able to do so

through the accident of a conversation with the late Rev.

Drummond Rawnsley, of Lincolnshire, a connexion and intimate

friend of Lord Tennyson, whom I happened to meet some years

since at the house of a common friend, Professor Bonamy Price,

at Oxford. Introduced to him by our host as a Canadian, I was

informed by him of a fact which he felt sure would interest all

Canadians. The Poet Laureate, with whom he had lately been

staying, had told him that when the articles referred to had

appeared in the _Times_, Lady Franklin, who was then a guest in

his house, and who felt the most intense interest in the future

of Canada, had been filled with indignation at the wrong which

they did to English sentiment and to Canadian loyalty, and had

strongly urged upon him the duty and propriety of giving

utterance to some sufficient protest. Being in the fullest

sympathy with Lady Franklin's views, the poet acted upon this

suggestion and the lines were written. I do not think any

private confidence is violated in mentioning the facts told to

me on such unquestionable authority. It seems well that Canadian

people should know when reading these lines, that behind the

poet's brain was the woman's heart, and that a lady whose name

is held in highest honour wherever the English language is

spoken, and wherever heroism and devotion touch the human heart,

is thus connected by the subtle thread of sympathy and the

golden verse of our greatest poet with their own loved land.

{31}

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