General Lee must have learned by mid-forenoon, after the long hours of
struggle at Culp’s Hill and Spangler’s Spring, that his troops could not
hold the Union works which they had occupied with so little effort the
previous evening. He had seen, also, that in the tremendous battling
during the preceding afternoon no important gains had been made at
Little Round Top and its vicinity. Longstreet had gained the
advantageous ridge at the Peach Orchard and had brought his batteries
forward from Pitzer’s Woods to this high ground in preparation for a
follow-up attack. Wright’s brigade, the last unit to move forward on
July 2 in the echelon attack begun by General Law, had charged across
the open fields at dusk and pierced the Union center just south of the
copse of trees on Cemetery Ridge. Wright’s success could not be pressed
to decisive advantage as the brigades on his left had not moved forward
to his support, and he was forced to retire. Again, lack of coordination
in attack was to count heavily against the Confederates.
The failure to make any pronounced headway on July 2 at Culp’s Hill and
Little Round Top, and the momentary success of Wright on Cemetery Ridge,
doubtless led Lee to believe that Meade’s flanks were strong and his
center weak. A powerful drive at the center might pierce the enemy’s
lines and fold them back. The shattered units might then be destroyed or
captured at will. Such a charge across open fields and in the face of
frontal and flank fire would, Lee well understood, be a gamble seldom
undertaken. Longstreet strongly voiced his objection to such a move,
insisting that “no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that
position.”
[Illustration: _View of the Peach Orchard and the Emmitsburg Road in
1890. The Wentz farm buildings appear at the left._ (Tipton
photograph.)]
[Illustration: _Devil’s Den, a formation of large granite boulders,
used as defense positions by Confederate sharpshooters._]
Time now was the important element. Whatever could be done must be done
quickly. Hood’s and McLaws’ divisions, who had fought bravely and lost
heavily at Round Top and the Wheatfield, were not in condition for
another severe test. Early and Johnson on the left had likewise endured
long, unrelenting battle with powerful Union forces in positions of
advantage. The men of Heth’s and Pender’s divisions had not been heavily
engaged since the first day’s encounter west of Gettysburg. These were
the men, along with Pickett’s division, whom Lee would have to count on
to bear the brunt of his final great effort at Gettysburg.