_There is present a something given--the world._
With reference to this something given, science takes up a position
that in its own way is every whit as arbitrary as again in its way
is that of religion; with this difference, however, that whereas the
latter, so to speak, turns the clock of mental life backward, science
would fain turn it forward.
The play of world-events with equal justice may be held to declare that
we comprehend adequate causes as to declare that we do not comprehend
them, inasmuch as all we may have comprehended as the adequate cause of
any life-phenomenon, itself on its part demands an adequate cause, and
so on backwards _ad infinitum_. In short, Every adequate cause is of a
secondary nature. From this science argues as follows:--
It is a fact that we comprehend adequate causes, in certain respects,
up to a certain degree, consequently perfect comprehension is possible,
everything depending simply on patience and correct methods.
With this claim of the _comprehensibility in principle_ of
life-phenomena, science takes upon itself the proud task, of itself
_working out a world-theory_ from the foundation upwards.
Comprehensibility in principle of life-phenomenon is that standpoint
with reference to actuality which is given for every science without
exception. On any other hypothesis science as science has no
justification whatever for its existence. Science, if it is to be what
its name implies, is that which furnishes knowledge. Knowledge can only
be furnished where things can be completely demonstrated, made tangible
to sense. That, however, is only possible if nothing lies hidden in
things that is not perceptible by sense. Hence science, if she does not
wish to gainsay her own right to exist, must proceed upon the arbitrary
hypothesis that _there is nothing in the play of world-events that is
not perceptible to the senses_. And if really there is something of
the sort there, then for her it is merely the _not yet demonstrable_,
which later on, with patience, with improvements in methods, will
also be achieved. This is the position which science takes up with
reference to the play of world-events, the foundation on which her
whole superstructure is erected. Science is possible there only where
there is the sensible, the demonstrable, where there is something
so constituted that I can class it with others of its kind. And all
science--to put it briefly--is just the endeavour to make tangible to
sense the entire play of world-events.
In support of this standpoint in principle of science, I cite the
following passage from W. Ostwald’s _Schule der Chemie_:--
_Pupil._ These are only properties. What I mean, however, is that
which lies at the root of all properties.
_Teacher._ This then ought to remain behind when you have thought
away all properties from the matter. Well, think away all its
properties from a piece of sugar--colour, shape, hardness, weight,
taste, and so forth--what then remains over? Nothing! For it is
only through its properties that I can recognize that there is
something there.... You must get rid of the notion that apart from
the properties of a thing there is anything at all to be found
beneath them that is higher or more real than the properties.
From this rejection of all that is not perceptible to sense, it follows
that science may not recognize as adequate causes for “that which is”
even as for “that which happens”--in short, for all the phenomena of
life--anything else but other phenomena of life. If for faith the
thought-necessity, an adequate cause, becomes an “adequate cause in
itself,” _a pure absolute_, for science it becomes _a pure relative_.
Anything is an adequate cause purely in its relation to another
phenomenon of life, and with reference to itself another phenomenon of
life again is the adequate cause. In brief, the adequate cause is here
just as much an “effect” as a “cause.”
With this rejection in principle of all that is not perceptible to
sense, science rejects all actual energies. For _an actual energy can
never be anything perceptible to sense_, the latter ever and always
necessitating the question as to its adequate cause.
In the universe as constructed for itself by science, the actuating
impulse is simply the various differences that obtain in situation and
tension, which are equally as countless in number as the countless
processes with which they are given. The play of world-events in its
entirety becomes a stupendous process of compensation, and all values
become simply values of relation. Here nothing has sense and meaning by
itself, but only as it first receives them from others.
The purely scientific standpoint can only be the materialistic
one, along with which of necessity is given the mechanical mode of
apprehending the play of world-events.
In the mechanical apprehension of things, the play of world-events
becomes a “falling.” Every fall demonstrates the absence of actual
forces by the fact that in its downward course it can be computed in
advance.
The aim and object of all science is computation in advance. The
ability to do this finds its due expression in scientific _law_.
The proof that upon this path one had arrived at a world-theory, would
thus be an absolutely and universally valid law.
Such a law science does not possess. Every law, without exception, is
an abstraction from experience, and may be swept away again by fresh
experiences.
Now it is true modern physics lays claim to one universal law--the law
of the conservation of energy.
We shall have to return to this law later on. Here in passing be it
only said--
First, That the law of the conservation of energy has by no means been
arrived at upon the legitimate path of science--that is, upon the path
of induction--but has been found intuitively. Secondly, The law of the
conservation of energy is nothing but a “reading” of the facts, on one
hand, by way of definite compromise; on the other, valid only for a
limited domain of nature.