REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS UPON THE DRAUGHT OF A
CONVENTION WITH MEXICO, FEBRUARY 19, 1862.
A convention was made at London, October 31, 1861, between
Great Britain, France, and Spain, professedly to obtain redress
and security from Mexico for citizens of the three contracting
powers. Provision was made for the accession of the United
States as a fourth party; but the note inviting us to join
was dated a month after the Convention. The invitation was
declined. But, anxious to help Mexico, Mr. Seward proposed
pecuniary aid, in the hope of enabling our neighbor republic to
satisfy the demands of the invading allies, so far at least as
to make them withdraw. The draught of such a Convention with
Mexico was transmitted to the Senate, who were asked to give
their advice with regard to it.
A few passages of a letter from Mr. Corwin to Mr. Sumner, dated
at Mexico, April 14, 1862, will show the condition of things
there.
“The general and leading objects of my mission to Mexico
were, first, to prevent the Southern Confederacy from
obtaining any recognition here, and thus cut off the hope
of augmenting the power of the South by acquisition,
accompanied with Slavery, in Mexico, or any of the Southern
Spanish-American republics; secondly, to use every proper
means to prevent European power from gaining a permanent
hold upon this part of the American Continent.
“In the first object I have fully succeeded. The Southern
Commissioner, after employing persuasion and threats,
finally took his leave of the city, sending back from Vera
Cruz, as I am informed, a very offensive letter to the
Government here. In obtaining the second end I have had
more difficulty.…
“If the French attempt to conquer this country, it is
certain to bring on a war of two or three years’ duration.
The gorges of the mountains, so frequent here, afford
to small detachments stronger holds than any position
fortified by art; and the Mexicans have a strong hatred of
foreign rule, which animates the whole body of the people.
I trust our Government will remonstrate firmly against all
idea of European conquest on this continent, and in such
time as to have its due influence on the present position
of France in Mexico.…
“But I am satisfied this danger may be avoided by the
pecuniary aid proposed by the present treaty with us, and
the united diplomacy of England, Spain, and the United
States. If these means are not promptly and energetically
applied, a European power may fasten itself upon Mexico,
which it will become a necessity with us, at no distant
day, to dislodge. To do this, in the supposed event, would
cost us millions twenty times told more than we now propose
to lend upon undoubted security.”
Spain and England soon withdrew from coöperation, leaving the
French Emperor alone to pursue the unhappy enterprise, which
ended in the sacrifice of Maximilian, whom he had placed on the
Mexican throne.
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred
a Message from the President, of December 17, 1861,
transmitting a Draught for a Convention with the Republic
of Mexico, with accompanying papers, and a Message from the
President, of January 24, 1862, transmitting a Despatch
from Mr. Corwin, Minister at Mexico, have had the same
under consideration, and report.
On the 2d of September, 1861, Mr. Seward, in a despatch to Mr. Corwin,
at Mexico, announced that the President greatly desired the political
status of Mexico as an independent nation to be permanently maintained;
that the events communicated by Mr. Corwin alarmed him, and he
conceived that the people of the United States would scarcely justify
him, were he to make no effort for preventing so great a calamity on
this continent as would be the extinction of that neighbor republic;
that he had therefore empowered Mr. Corwin to negotiate a treaty with
Mexico for the assumption by the United States of the interest, at
three per cent, upon the funded debt of that country, the principal
of which was understood to be about sixty-two millions of dollars, for
the term of five years from the date of the decree recently issued by
Mexico suspending such payment, provided that Mexico could pledge to
the United States its faith for the reimbursement of the money, with
six per cent interest, to be secured by special lien upon all the
public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican States of Lower
California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Cinaloa, the property so pledged
to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term
of six years from the time when the treaty went into effect, if such
reimbursement were not made before that time. The President felt that
this course was rendered necessary by circumstances as new as they are
eventful, and seeming to admit of no delay.
Mr. Seward proceeds to say, that his instructions are conditional upon
the consent of the British and French Governments to forbear action
against Mexico, on account of failure or refusal to pay the interest in
question, until after the treaty had been submitted to the Senate, and,
if ratified, then so long thereafter as the interest is paid by the
United States.
Mr. Seward adds, that his instructions are not to be considered as
specific, but general, subject to modification as to sums, terms,
securities, and other points.
Mr. Corwin, in an earlier despatch, dated at Mexico, 29th July, 1861,
and addressed to Mr. Seward, had already suggested the policy he was
now authorized to pursue, and proposed a lien on the public lands and
mineral rights in the provinces mentioned by Mr. Seward. From such
arrangement, in his opinion, two consequences would follow: first, all
hope of extending the domain of a separate Southern republic in this
quarter or in Central America would be extinguished; and, secondly,
any further attempt to establish European power on this continent would
cease to occupy either England or Continental Europe.
Afterwards, in a despatch, dated at Mexico, November 29, 1861, Mr.
Corwin enclosed to Mr. Seward the project of a treaty between the
United States and Mexico, by which the United States were to lend
Mexico five millions of dollars, payable in monthly instalments of
one half million a month,--also the further sum of four millions of
dollars, payable in sums of one half million every six months; the
whole to be secured by mortgage on the public lands, mineral rights,
and Church property of Mexico, for the realization of which a board
of five commissioners was to be organized, three to be appointed by
Mexico and two by the United States, holding sessions in the city of
Mexico until the debt and interest were fully discharged. No reference
was made in the proposed treaty to the consent of the British and
French Governments, mentioned by Mr. Seward as a condition, nor to the
application of the money, when received by Mexico; nor does anything on
this subject appear in the accompanying despatch.
The President, by his Message of December 17, 1861, submitted the
draught of this treaty to the Senate for their advice. Afterwards, by
another Message, of January 24, 1862, he called their attention to it
again, in the following language.
“I have heretofore submitted to the Senate a request for its
advice upon the question pending by treaty for making a loan to
Mexico, which Mr. Corwin thinks will in any case be expedient.
It seems to me to be my duty now to solicit an early action of
the Senate upon the subject, to the end that I may cause such
instructions to be given to Mr. Corwin as will enable him to
act in the manner which, while it will most carefully guard
the interests of our country, will at the same time be most
beneficial to Mexico.”
Meanwhile, Great Britain, France, and Spain, by a Convention, dated at
London, October 31, 1861, have entered into an alliance, the declared
object of which is “to demand from the authorities of the Republic of
Mexico more efficacious protection for the persons and properties of
their subjects, as well as a fulfilment of the obligations contracted
by the Republic of Mexico.” The high contracting parties engaged
not to seek for themselves, in the employment of coercive measures,
any acquisition of territory, nor any special advantage, and not to
exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to
prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute
freely the form of its government. Desiring that the measures they
intend to adopt should not bear an exclusive character, and being
aware that the Government of the United States, on its part, has, like
them, claims upon the Mexican Republic, they further agree that our
Government shall be invited to join in the Convention.
Mr. Seward, in a despatch, dated at Washington, December 4, 1861,
declined to join in the Convention, saying, “that the United States
prefer, as much as lies in their power, to maintain the traditional
policy recommended by the Father of their country, confirmed by
successful experience, and which forbids them to make an alliance with
foreign powers.”
In pursuance of this Convention, the naval and military forces of the
three great powers have assembled at San Juan de Ulua, and the flags of
the three powers now float over the castle. The Government of Mexico
has rallied the people to resistance, and there is at this moment the
prospect of a prolonged and exhausting contest. The occasion seems to
have arrived, when the aid proposed by Mr. Seward, in his despatch of
September 2, 1861, may be of decisive value to Mexico. To the United
States it may also be of great importance, if it could be the means of
removing from Mexico the pressure of hostile armaments, and placing a
neighbor republic in a more tranquil and independent condition. If the
Allied Powers desire security for their claims, and nothing else, then
a reasonable provision of this nature ought to be satisfactory, so far
as any question arises from the claim.
The debt of Mexico to the Allied Powers may be stated, in round
numbers, as follows.
To England, immediate $ 1,000,000
convention, 4 per cent interest 5,000,000
bondholders, 3 per cent interest 65,000,000
general claims 4,000,000
----------$75,000,000
To France, immediate 500,000
convention, balance, immediate 200,000
Pennand agreement 800,000
claims, general 3,500,000
---------- 5,000,000
To Spain, immediate 500,000
convention, 3 per cent interest 8,000,000
claims 1,500,000
---------- 10,000,000
----------
Total $90,000,000
Of course, payment or guaranty of this large mass on our part is out
of the question; nor was it contemplated by the United States in the
original instructions to Mr. Corwin. It was proposed to make such
payment as would afford present relief to Mexico, and secure the
forbearance of the Allied Powers. To this end, Mr. Seward offered to
assume the interest of the Mexican debt for the term of five years. But
the unfunded claims in the foregoing list, entitled “immediate,” it
is understood, are pressed with equal energy by the Allied Powers. If
these were satisfied, and provision made for the interest, the United
States would have the following liabilities.
Payments, immediate, or at 3, 6, and 12 months, as follows.
To England, 3, 6, and 12 months’ drafts of Mexico on
United States $1,000,000
To France, 3, 6, and 12 months’ drafts of Mexico on
United States 700,000
To Spain, 3, 6, and 12 months’ drafts of Mexico on
United States 500,000
----------
Total cash, or 3, 6, and 12 months $2,200,000
Interest, in semi-annual drafts of Mexico on the United States.
To England, convention, 4 per cent $200,000
bondholders, 3 per cent 1,950,000
---------- $2,150,000
To Spain, convention, 3 per cent 240,000
----------
Total interest, per annum $2,390,000
Other outstanding claims of the Allied Powers are not included in
either of these lists. It is proposed that these should be provided for
by a sinking fund, at the rate of 10 per cent a year for ten years, as
follows.
To England $400,000
To France 80,000
To France 350,000
To Spain 150,000
--------
Total, per annum $980,000
The assumption of all these liabilities for a long period would throw
upon the United States a burden too great for the present moment,
although, perhaps, not out of proportion to the anticipated advantages.
If anything be done on our part, it must be more moderate. The offer of
Mr. Seward for five years, if accepted, would devolve upon the United
States a responsibility sufficiently large; and this responsibility
ought to be kept within a limitation, of which $15,000,000 should be a
maximum.
But there are two conditions to be required by the United States,
before the assumption of any such responsibility. The first is the
assent of the Allied Powers, and the acceptance on their part of the
friendly offers proposed. Unless the Allied Powers are parties to the
transaction, it would be productive only of embarrassment and loss,
without accomplishing any permanent good to the United States or to
Mexico.
The other essential condition is, that security should be given by
Mexico for the liabilities assumed. It is not too much to expect such
security; nor is Mexico, as is well known, disinclined to give it. Her
creditors are now foreclosing their demands, at the cost, perhaps, of
her national existence, and she turns to the United States for help.
Not merely friendship, but a continental policy, affecting our own
cherished interests, prompts us to afford such help, so far as in our
power. In asking for security, we simply follow the rules of prudence,
whether between individuals or nations.
The security proposed by Mr. Corwin on the public lands, minerals, and
Church property of Mexico, would require the appointment of a board or
mixed commission for the management and disposition of this property.
This necessity adds to the complications of such security.
The security proposed by Mr. Seward, on the public lands and mineral
rights in the several provinces of Lower California, Chihuahua,
Sonora, and Cinaloa, is simple, and it is understood that in some of
this territory there is vast mineral wealth. The province of Lower
California is unquestionably the territory of Mexico most interesting
to the United States in a military and naval point of view.
Another security, perhaps less manageable, but more interesting still,
would be the right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, with a
mortgage on the adjoining public lands of the Isthmus. Estimated by its
pecuniary value, this security would not be large; but there can be no
doubt of its political and commercial value.
Still another security would be a pledge by Mexico of 25 per cent, or
perhaps a larger percentage, of the customs or other revenues.
It is not easy to say positively, at this distance from the scene of
operations, and with the information before the Committee, what is the
most practicable form of security. Perhaps it is advisable to leave
the matter to the careful discretion of our minister at Mexico, under
instructions from the President, with the explicit understanding that
the United States decline any territorial acquisition, and seek the
consolidation of Mexico, without dismemberment of any kind.
Such are the main features of the question on which the President has
asked the advice of the Senate. With more precise information on the
matters involved, it might be proper for the Senate to enter upon
details in its answer. But such information, especially with regard
to actual relations, now daily changing, between Mexico and the Allied
Powers, can be obtained only on the spot. It is evident, therefore,
that the Senate can do little more than indicate an opinion on what
has already been done, and declare the proper principles on which a
negotiation with Mexico should be conducted, without presuming to
fix in advance all its terms. Much must be left to the discretion of
our minister there, and to the instructions he will receive from the
President.
* * * * *
The Committee recommend the passage of the following resolution.
_Resolved_, That, in the changing condition of the relations
between Mexico and the Allied Powers, and in the absence
of precise information, it is impossible for the Senate to
advise the President with regard to all the terms of a treaty
with Mexico, so as to supersede the exercise of considerable
discretion on the part of our Minister there, under
instructions from the President, but that, in answer to the two
several Messages of the President, the Senate expresses the
following conclusions.
_First._ The Senate approves the terms of the instructions to
our Minister at Mexico contained in the despatch bearing date
September 2, 1861.
_Secondly._ The Senate does not advise a treaty in conformity
with the project communicated by our Minister to Mexico in his
despatch of November 29, 1861, as the same fails to secure in
any way the application of the money to the demands of the
Allied Powers, or either of them, and therefore can be in no
respect satisfactory to them.
_Thirdly._ The Senate advises a treaty with Mexico providing
for the assumption of the interest on the debt from Mexico to
the Allied Powers during a limited period of time, and also
for the payment of certain immediate claims by these Powers,
the whole liability to be kept within the smallest possible
sum; it being understood that the same shall be accepted by the
Allied Powers in present satisfaction of their claims, so that
they shall withdraw from Mexico.[206] And it shall be secured
by such mortgage or pledge as is most practicable, without any
territorial acquisition or dismemberment of Mexico.
* * * * *
The Resolution reported by the Committee was amended in the
Senate by striking out all after the word “_Resolved_,” and
inserting in lieu thereof as follows: “That, in reply to the
two several Messages of the President with regard to a treaty
with Mexico, the Senate express the opinion that it is not
advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United
States to assume any portion of the principal or interest of
the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of
European powers.”