“That we did consider them as thus inviolable, so far as to
afford protection to our seamen; but that we had never sought
to exempt them from search for rightful purposes, viz., for
enemy’s property, articles contraband of war, or _men in the
land or naval service of the enemy. These constituted the
utmost limit of the belligerent claim, as we understood the Law
of Nations._”[72]
Two champions were never more completely opposed than were the two
Governments on this question.
The treaties of the United States with foreign nations are in harmony
with the principle so energetically proposed and upheld,--beginning
with the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France in 1778, and ending
only with the Peruvian treaty as late as 1851. Here is the provision in
the treaty with France, negotiated by Franklin, whose wise forethought
is always conspicuous:--
“And it is hereby stipulated that free ships shall also give
a freedom to goods, and that everything shall be deemed to
be free and exempt which shall be found on board the ships
belonging to the subjects of either of the confederates,
although the whole lading or any part thereof should appertain
to the enemies of either, contraband goods being always
excepted. It is also agreed, in like manner, that the same
liberty be extended to persons who are on board a free ship,
with this effect, that, _although they be enemies to both
or either party, they are not to be taken out of that free
ship, unless they are soldiers and in actual service of the
enemies_.”[73]
The obvious effect of this stipulation is twofold: first, that enemies,
unless soldiers in actual service, shall not be taken out of a neutral
ship; and, secondly, that such persons are not contraband of war so
as to affect the voyage of a neutral with illegality. Such was the
proposition of Franklin, of whom it has been said, that he snatched the
lightning from the skies, and the sceptre from tyrants. That he sought
to snatch the trident also is attested by his whole diplomacy, of which
this proposition is part.
But the same principle is found in succeeding treaties, sometimes
with a slight change of language. In the treaty with the Netherlands,
negotiated by John Adams in 1782, the exception is confined to
“military men actually in the service of an enemy,”[74]; and this same
exception is also found in the treaty with Sweden in 1783,[75] with
Prussia in 1785,[76] with Spain in 1795,[77] with France in 1800,[78]
with Colombia in 1824,[79] with Central America in 1825,[80] with
Brazil in 1828,[81] with Mexico in 1831,[82] with Chile in 1832,[83]
with Venezuela in 1836,[84] with Peru-Bolivia in 1836,[85] with Ecuador
in 1839,[86] with New Granada in 1846,[87] with Guatemala in 1849,[88]
with San Salvador in 1850,[89] and in the treaty with Peru in 1851.[90]
Such is unbroken testimony, in the most solemn form, to the policy
of our Government. In some of the treaties the exception is simply
“soldiers,” in others it is “officers or soldiers.” Observe, too,
that every treaty testifies to the opinions of the Administration
that negotiated it, and of at least two thirds of the Senate that
ratified it,--so that this large number of treaties constitutes a
mass of authority from which there can be no appeal, embracing all
the great names of our history. It is true that among these treaties
there is none with Great Britain; but it is also true that this is
simply because our mother country refused assent, when this principle
was presented as an undoubted part of International Law which our
Government desired to confirm by treaty.
Clearly and beyond all question, according to American principle and
practice, the ship was not liable to capture on account of the presence
of emissaries, “not soldiers or officers”; nor could such emissaries be
legally taken from the ship. But the completeness of this authority is
increased by the concurring testimony of the Continent of Europe. Since
the Peace of Utrecht, in 1713, the policy of the Continental States
has generally refused to sanction the removal of enemies from a neutral
ship, unless military men in actual service. And now, since this debate
has commenced, we have the positive testimony of the French Government
to the same principle, given with special reference to the present
case. M. Thouvenel, the Minister of the Emperor for Foreign Affairs,
in a recent letter communicated to Mr. Seward, and published with the
papers before the Senate, earnestly insists that the Rebel emissaries,
not being military persons actually in the service of the enemy, were
not subject to seizure on board a neutral ship.[91]
I leave this question with the remark, that it is perhaps Great Britain
alone whose position here can be brought into doubt. Originally a
party to the Treaty of Utrecht, this imperial power soon saw that its
provisions in favor of Maritime Rights interfered plainly with that
dictatorship of the sea which Britannia was then grasping. Maritime
Rights were repudiated, and her Admiralty Courts have ever since
enforced this repudiation.
* * * * *
Still another question occurs. Beyond all doubt there were “despatches”
on board the ship,--such “despatches” as rebels can write. Public
report, the statement of persons on board, and the boastful declaration
of Jefferson Davis in an official document that these emissaries were
proceeding under appointment from him, which appointment would be a
“despatch” of the highest character,--and necessarily with instructions
also, being another “despatch,”--seem to place this beyond denial.
Assuming such fact, very notorious at the time of sailing, the ship was
liable to capture and to be carried off for adjudication, according to
British authorities,--unless the positive judgment of Sir William Scott
in the case of the Atalanta,[92] and also the Queen’s Proclamation
at the commencement of the Rebellion, enumerating “despatches” among
contraband articles, are treated as nullities, or so far modified in
application as to be words and nothing more. Even if the judgment be
uncertain and inapplicable, the Queen’s Proclamation is not. Does
it not warn British subjects against “carrying officers, soldiers,
_despatches_, arms, military stores or materials, … _for the use or
service_ of either of the said contending parties”? And we have the
authority of a recent English writer, quoted by the English press, who
characterizes the conveyance of despatches as “a _service_, which, in
whatever degree it exists, can only be considered in one character, as
an act of the most noxious and hostile nature.”[93]
But however binding and peremptory these authorities in Great Britain,
they cannot be accepted to reverse a standing policy of the United
States. For the sake of precision in rights claimed and accorded on
the ocean, our Government has explained in treaties what was meant by
contraband. As early as 1778, in the treaty with France negotiated
by Franklin, after specifying contraband articles, without including
despatches, it is declared that
“Free goods are all other merchandises and _things_ which are
not comprehended and particularly mentioned in the foregoing
enumeration of contraband goods.”[94]
This was before the judgment of Sir William Scott, recognizing
despatches as contraband; but in other treaties subsequent to this
well-known judgment, and therefore practically discarding it, after
enumerating contraband articles, without specifying “despatches,” the
following provision is introduced:--
“All other merchandises and _things_ not comprehended in the
articles of contraband explicitly enumerated and classified as
above shall be held and considered as free.”[95]
Then again John Quincy Adams, in his admirable draught of a treaty for
the reform of Maritime Rights, after declaring specifically what shall
be “under the denomination of contraband of war,” without including
“despatches,” adds:--
“All the above articles, _and none others_, shall be subject to
confiscation, whenever they are attempted to be carried to an
enemy.”[96]
Thus we have not only words of enumeration without mention of
“despatches,” but also words of exception. These testimonies constitute
the record of our nation on this question.
Here it may be remarked, that, while decisions of British Admiralty
Courts are freely cited, there are none of our Supreme Court. If any
existed, they would be of the highest value; but there are none, and I
can imagine no better reason than because the question is so settled by
treaties and diplomacy as to be beyond judicial inquiry.
The conclusion follows, that, according to American principle and
practice, the ship was not liable on account of despatches on board.
And here again we have the testimony of Continental Europe, if we may
accept the statement of Hautefeuille, and it would seem also that of
the French Government, in the recent letter of M. Thouvenel.
The French champion of neutral rights vindicates the immunity of
despatches against English construction in pointed language.
“We must be permitted to protest against the pretension
set up by the Americans of considering the transportation
of despatches as an act of contraband, and consequently of
maintaining that the stopping of the Trent is justified by
the fact that there were found on board despatches of the
Confederate Government. This pretension, which has always been
maintained by England, and which even at the present day is
still avowed by its journals, is wholly contrary to all the
principles of International Law.”[97]
But Continental testimony is not uniform. So considerable an
authority as Heffter recognizes the liability of a neutral vessel for
“_voluntarily_ forwarding despatches to or for a belligerent.”[98] This
is on general grounds, independent of treaty or national usage.
Even if the ship were liable, so that Captain Wilkes would have been
justified in bringing the Trent into port for adjudication, it does
not follow that the two Rebels could be summarily seized and taken
therefrom. Here again we are brought to that American principle which
condemns the pretension of seizing even enemies on board a neutral
vessel, unless they are soldiers in actual service, and has constantly
cried out against the desecration of our decks by British officers
seizing our peaceful sailors under claim of allegiance to the British
crown.
* * * * *
There is yet another question which remains. Assuming that despatches
are contraband, would their presence on board a neutral ship, sailing
between two neutral ports, render the voyage illegal? The mail steamer
was sailing between Havana, a port of Spain, and St. Thomas, a port
of Denmark. Here again, if we bow to English precedent, the answer is
prompt. The British oracle has spoken. In a well-considered judgment,
Sir William Scott declares that despatches taken on board a neutral
ship, sailing from a neutral country and bound for another neutral
country, are contraband,--but that, where there is reason to believe
the master ignorant of their character, “it is not a case in which the
property is to be confiscated, although in this, _as in every other
instance in which the enemy’s despatches are found on board a vessel_,
he has justly subjected himself to all the inconveniences of seizure
and detention, and to all the expenses of those judicial inquiries
which they have occasioned.”[99] Such is the Law of Nations according
to Great Britain.
Even if this rule had not been positively repudiated by the United
States, it is so inconsistent with reason, and, in the present
condition of maritime commerce, so utterly impracticable, that it can
find little favor. If a neutral voyage between two neutral ports is
rendered illegal on this account, then the postal facilities of the
world, and the costly enterprises by which they are conducted, are
exposed to interruptions under which they must at times be crushed, to
the infinite detriment of universal commerce. If the rule is applicable
in one sea, it is applicable in all seas, and there is no part of the
ocean which may not be vexed by its enforcement. It would reach to the
Mediterranean and to the distant China seas as easily as to the Bahama
Channel, and be equally imperative in the chops of the British Channel.
Not only the stately mail steamers traversing the ocean would be
subject to detention and possible confiscation, but the same penalties
must attach to the daily packets between Dover and Calais. The simple
statement of such a consequence, following directly from the British
rule, throws instant doubt over it, which the eloquent judgment of Sir
William Scott cannot remove.
Here again our way is clear. American principle and practice have
settled this question also. Wheaton commences his statement of the
Law of Contraband by saying, “The general freedom of neutral commerce
with the respective belligerent powers is subject to some exceptions.
_Among these is the trade with the enemy_ in certain articles called
contraband of war.”[100] It will be perceived that the trade must be
_with the enemy_, not with the neutral. And here the author followed
the suggestions of reason and the voice of American treaties. In the
celebrated treaty with Great Britain negotiated by John Jay in 1794,
after an enumeration of contraband articles, it is expressly said,
“And all the above articles are hereby declared to be just objects
of confiscation, _whenever they are attempted to be carried to an
enemy_.”[101] Of course, when on the way to neutrals, they are free.
And the early treaties negotiated by Benjamin Franklin and John
Adams are in similar spirit; and in precisely the same sense is the
treaty with Prussia in 1828, which in its twelfth article revives the
thirteenth article of our treaty with that same power in 1799, by
which contraband is declared to be detainable _only when carried to
an enemy_. Even if this rule were of doubtful authority with regard
to articles of acknowledged contraband, it is positive with regard to
despatches, which, as we have already seen, are among “merchandises
and _things_” declared free; with regard to which our early treaties
secured the greatest latitude. Nothing can be broader than the words in
the treaty of 1778 with France:--
“So that they may be transported and carried _in the freest
manner_ by the subjects of both confederates, even to places
belonging to an enemy, such towns or places being only excepted
as are at that time besieged, blocked up, or invested.”[102]
But the provision in the treaty with the Netherlands of 1782 is equally
broad:--
“So that all _effects_ and merchandises which are not expressly
before named may, _without any exception and in perfect
liberty_, be transported by the subjects and inhabitants
of both allies from and to places belonging to the enemy,
excepting only the places which at the same time shall be
besieged, blocked, or invested; and those places only shall
be held for such which are surrounded nearly by some of the
belligerent powers.”[103]
If the immunity of neutral ships needed further confirmation, it would
be found again in the concurring testimony of the French Government,
conveyed in the recent letter of M. Thouvenel,[104]--which is so
remarkable for its brief, but comprehensive, treatment of the questions
involved in this controversy. I know not how others may feel, but I
like to believe that this communication, when rightly understood, may
be accepted as a token of friendship for us, and also as a contribution
to those Maritime Rights for which France and the United States in
times past have done so much together. This eminent minister does not
hesitate to declare, that, if the flag of a neutral cannot completely
cover persons and merchandise in a voyage between two neutral ports,
then its immunity will be but a vain word.
* * * * *
As I conclude what I have to say on contraband in its several
divisions, I venture to assert that there are two rules in regard to it
which the traditional policy of our country has constantly declared,
and has embodied in treaty stipulations with every power that could be
persuaded to adopt them: first, that no article is contraband, unless
expressly enumerated and specified as such by name; secondly, that,
when such articles, so enumerated and specified, are found by the
belligerent on board a neutral ship, the neutral shall be permitted
to deliver them to the belligerent, whenever, by reason of bulk or
quantity, such delivery is possible, and then the neutral shall,
without further molestation, proceed with all remaining innocent cargo
to his destination, being any port, neutral or hostile, not at the time
actually blockaded.
Such was the early fixed policy of our country with regard to
contraband in neutral bottoms. It is recorded in several of our
earlier European treaties. Approximation to it is found in other
European treaties, showing our constant effort in this direction.
But this policy was not supported by the British theory and practice
of International Law, especially active during the wars of the
French Revolution; and to this fact may be ascribed something of the
difficulty which our Government encountered in effort to secure for
this liberal policy the complete sanction of European nations. But in
negotiations with the Spanish-American States the theory and practice
of Great Britain were less felt; and so to-day that liberal policy,
embracing the two rules touching contraband, is, among all American
nations, the public law, stipulated and fixed in solemn treaties. I do
not quote texts, but I refer to all these treaties, beginning with the
convention between the United States and Colombia in 1824. These rules,
if not directly conclusive on the question of contraband, at least
help to exhibit that spirit of emancipation with which our country has
approached the great subject of Maritime Rights.
* * * * *
Of course this discussion proceeds on the assumption that the Rebels
are regarded as belligerents, which is the character especially
accorded by Great Britain. If they are not regarded as belligerents,
then is the proceeding of Captain Wilkes indubitably illegal and void.
To a political offender, however deep his guilt, though burdened
with the undying execrations of all honest men, and bending beneath
the consciousness of the ruin he has brought upon his country, the
asylum of a foreign jurisdiction is sacred, whether on shore or sea;
and it is among the proudest boasts of England, at least in recent
days, that the exiles of defeated democracies, as well as of defeated
dynasties, have found a sure protection beneath her meteor flag. And
yet this lofty power has not always accorded to other flags what she
claimed for her own. One of the objections made to any renunciation of
impressment by Great Britain, at the beginning of the present century,
was, “that facility would be given, particularly in the British
Channel, by the immunity claimed for American vessels, _to the escape
of traitors_”[105]: thus assuming, not only that traitors--companions
of Robert Emmet, in Ireland, or companions of Horne Tooke, in
England--ought to be arrested on board a neutral ship, but that
impressment was needed for this purpose. This flagrant instance
cannot be a precedent for the United States, which has maintained the
right of asylum as firmly always as it has rejected the pretension of
impressment.
* * * * *
If I am correct in this review, then the conclusion is inevitable.
The seizure of the Rebel emissaries on board a neutral ship cannot be
justified, according to declared American principles and practice.
There is no single point where the seizure is not questionable, unless
we invoke British precedents and practice, which, beyond doubt, led
Captain Wilkes into his mistake. In the solitude of his ship he
consulted familiar authorities at hand, and felt that in Vattel and
Sir William Scott, as quoted by eminent writers, he had guides, while
the inveterate practice of the British navy lighted his way. He was
mistaken. There was a better example: it was the constant, uniform,
unhesitating practice of his own country on the ocean, conceding always
the greatest immunities to neutral ships, unless sailing to blockaded
ports, refusing to consider despatches as contraband of war, refusing
to consider persons other than soldiers or officers as contraband of
war, and protesting always against an adjudication of personal rights
by summary judgment of the quarter-deck. Had these well-attested
precedents been in his mind, the gallant captain would not, even for
a moment, have been seduced from allegiance to those principles which
constitute part of our country’s glory.
* * * * *
Mr. President, let the Rebels go. Two wicked men, ungrateful to their
country, with two younger confederates, are set loose with the brand
of Cain upon their foreheads. Prison-doors are opened; but principles
are established which will help to free other men, and to open the
gates of the sea. Never before in her renowned history has Great
Britain ranged herself on this side. Such an event is an epoch. “_Novus
sæclôrum nascitur ordo._” To the liberties of the sea this power is
at last committed. To a certain extent the great cause is now under
her tutelary care. If the immunities of passengers not in the military
or naval service, as well as of sailors, are not directly recognized,
they are at least implied; if neutral rights are not ostentatiously
proclaimed, they are at least invoked; while the whole pretension of
impressment, so long the pest of neutral commerce, and operating only
through lawless adjudication of the quarter-deck, is made absolutely
impossible. Thus is the freedom of the sea enlarged in the name of
peaceful neutral rights, not only by limiting the number of persons
exposed to the penalties of war, but by driving from it the most
offensive pretension that ever stalked upon its waves. Farewell to
kidnapping and man-stealing on the ocean! To such conclusion Great
Britain is irrevocably pledged. Nor treaty nor bond is needed. It is
sufficient that her late appeal can be vindicated only by renunciation
of early, long-continued tyranny. Let her bear the Rebels back. The
consideration is ample; for the sea became free as this altered power
went forth, steering westward with the sun, on an errand of liberation.
In this surrender, if such it may be called, the National Government
does not even “stoop to conquer.” It simply lifts itself to the
height of its own original principles. The early efforts of its best
negotiators, the patriot trials of its soldiers in an unequal war, at
length prevail, and Great Britain, usually so haughty, invites us to
practise upon principles which she has so strenuously opposed. There
are victories of force: here is a victory of truth. If Great Britain
has gained the custody of two Rebels, the United States have secured
the triumph of their principles.
As this result is in conformity with our cherished history, it is
superfluous to add other considerations; and yet I venture to suggest
that estranged sympathies abroad may be secured again by open adhesion
to principles which have the support already of Continental Europe,
smarting for years under British pretensions. The powerful organs
of opinion on the Continent are also with us. Hautefeuille, whose
earnest work on the Law of Nations[106] is the arsenal of neutral
rights, has entered into this debate with a direct proposition for the
release of the emissaries, as a testimony to the true interpretation of
International Law. Another distinguished Frenchman, Agénor de Gasparin,
whose impassioned love of liberty and enlightened devotion to our
country impart to his voice all the persuasion of friendship, has made
a similar appeal.[107] And a journal which of itself is an authority,
the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, declares, in words which harmonize with
what I have said to-day, that, “in disavowing a capture effected
by the arbitrary initiative of a naval officer, without any of the
guaranties of legal justice, without the intervention and the sanction
of a Court of Admiralty, the United States, far from renouncing
any of their political principles, would only render homage to the
doctrine which they have ever professed on the rights of neutrals.”
The same distinguished journal proceeds: “It would be in reality a
true triumph for this doctrine so to apply it to the profit of a
nation and of a government which have always contested or violated the
rights of neutrals, but which would be henceforward constrained to the
abandonment of their arbitrary pretensions by the conspicuous authority
of such a precedent.”[108]
Nor is this triumph enough. The sea-god will in future use his trident
less; but the same principles which led to the present renunciation
of early pretensions naturally conduct to yet further emancipation of
the sea. The work of maritime civilization is not finished. And here
the two nations, equally endowed by commerce, and matched together,
while surpassing all others, in peaceful ships, may gloriously unite
in setting up new pillars, to mark new triumphs, rendering the ocean a
highway of peace, instead of a bloody field.
The Congress of Paris, in 1856, where were assembled the
plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia,
Sardinia, and Turkey, has already led the way. Adopting the early
policy of the United States, often proposed to foreign nations,
this congress authenticated two important changes in restraint of
belligerent rights: first, that the neutral flag shall protect
enemy goods, except contraband of war; and, secondly, that neutral
goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an
enemy’s flag. This is much. Another proposition, for the abolition of
Privateering, was defective in two respects: first, because it left
nations free to employ private vessels under public commission as ships
of the navy, and therefore was nugatory; and, secondly, because, if
not nugatory, it was too obviously in the special interest of Great
Britain, which, through her commanding navy, would be left at will
to rule the sea. No change can be practicable which is not equal in
advantage to all nations; for the Equality of Nations is not a dry
dogma merely of International Law, but a vital sentiment common to
all. This cannot be overlooked; and every proposition must be brought
sincerely to its equitable test.
There is a way in which privateering may be effectively abolished
without shock to the Equality of Nations. A simple proposition,
assuring private property on the ocean the same immunity it now enjoys
on land, will at once abolish privateering, and relieve commerce on
the ocean from its greatest perils, so that, like commerce on land,
it will be undisturbed, except by illegal robbery and theft. Such
a proposition must operate for the equal advantage of all. On this
account, and in the policy of peace, always cultivated by our Republic,
it has been already presented to other nations. You have not forgotten
the important paper in which Mr. Marcy did this service,[109] and the
favor it found with European powers, always excepting Great Britain,
whose opposition was too potential. But this vast cause was never
commended with more force than by John Quincy Adams, as Secretary of
State, when, in a masterly despatch, he declared that “private war,
banished by the tacit and general consent of Christian nations from
their territories, has taken its last refuge upon the ocean, and
there continues to disgrace and afflict them by a system of licensed
robbery, bearing all the most atrocious characters of piracy.”[110]
The Governments of Europe were invited to enter into conventions by
which “all warfare against private property upon the sea is disclaimed
and renounced,” and at the same time the final suppression of the
slave-trade assured, so that the freedom of the sea was associated with
the freedom of men.[111] In the same humane interest, Henry Clay, as
Secretary of State, invited Great Britain “to agree to the abolition of
privateering, and no longer to consider private property on the high
seas as lawful prize of war.”[112] In such a cause the effort alone was
noble.
To complete the efficacy of this reform, closing the gate against
belligerent pretensions, Contraband of War should be abolished,
so that all ships may navigate the ocean freely, without peril or
detention from the character of persons or things on board: and here
I only follow the Administration of Washington, enjoining upon John
Jay, in his negotiation with England, to seek security for neutral
commerce, particularly “by abolishing contraband _altogether_.”[113]
The Right of Search, which, on outbreak of war, becomes an omnipresent
tyranny, subjecting every neutral ship to the arbitrary invasion of
every belligerent cruiser, would then disappear. It would drop, as
the chains from an emancipated slave; or rather, it would exist only
as an occasional agent, under solemn treaties, in the war waged by
civilization against the slave-trade; and then it would be proudly
recognized as an honorable surrender to the best interests of humanity,
glorifying the flag which made it.
With the consummation of these reforms in Maritime Law, war will be
despoiled of its most vexatious prerogatives, while innocent neutrals
are exempt from its torments. One step further is needed to complete
this exemption. Commercial Blockade must be abandoned; for, while
its first effects are naturally felt by the belligerent against whom
directed, it soon acts with kindred hardship upon all neutrals, near
or remote, whose customary commerce is interrupted,--so that the
blockade of an American port may cause distress in Liverpool and
Manchester, in Lyons and Marseilles, scarcely less than if these great
cities were under pressure of a blockading squadron. Neutrals, it
is said, must not relieve belligerents, and therefore blockade is
effectively a two-edged sword, wounding belligerents on the one side
and neutrals on the other side,--often, indeed, wounding neutrals as
much as belligerents. If not designedly so, it becomes thus mischievous
from the essential vice of its character. Blockade may be called the
elephant of naval warfare, as destructive, often, to friends as to
foes. So palpable is this becoming, that it is doubtful if neutrals
will much longer allow such backhanded agency, smiting the innocent as
well as the guilty, to continue under sanction of International Law.
Its extinction is needed to complete the triumph of Neutral Rights.[114]
Such a change, just in proportion to its accomplishment, will be a
blessing to mankind, inconceivable in grandeur. The statutes of the
sea, thus refined and elevated, will be agents of peace instead of
agents of war. Ships and cargoes will pass unchallenged from shore to
shore, and those terrible belligerent rights under which the commerce
of the world has so long suffered will cease from troubling. In
this work our country began early. Hardly had we proclaimed our own
independence, before we sought to secure a similar independence for
the sea. Hardly had we made a constitution for our own government,
before we sought to establish a constitution similar in spirit for the
government of the sea. If not prevailing promptly, it was because we
could not overcome the unyielding resistance of Great Britain. And now,
behold, this champion of belligerent rights has “changed his hand and
checked his pride.” Welcome to the new-found alliance! Welcome to the
peaceful transfiguration! Meanwhile, through all present excitements,
amidst all trials, beneath all threatening clouds, it only remains for
us to uphold the perpetual policy of the Republic, and to stand fast on
the ancient ways.