SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON THE SURRENDER OF MASON AND SLIDELL, REBEL
AGENTS, TAKEN FROM THE BRITISH MAIL STEAMER TRENT, JANUARY 9, 1862.
WITH APPENDIX.
_Hamlet._ Come on, Sir.
_Laertes._ Come, my Lord. [_They play._]
…
_Osric._ A hit, a very palpable hit.
_Laertes._ Well,--again.
[LAERTES _wounds_ HAMLET; _then, in scuffling, they change
rapiers, and_ HAMLET _wounds_ LAERTES.]
SHAKESPEARE, _Hamlet_, Act V. Scene 2.
It is, perhaps, well that you settled the matter by sending
away the men at once. _Consistently with your own principles
you could not have justified their detention._--RICHARD COBDEN,
_MS. Letter to Mr. Sumner_, January 23, 1862.
This announcement is not made, my Lord, to revive useless
recollections of the past, nor to stir the embers from fires
which have been in a great degree smothered by many years
of peace. Far otherwise. Its purpose is to extinguish those
fires effectually, before new incidents arise to fan them into
flame. The communication is in the spirit of peace and for
the sake of peace, and springs from a deep and conscientious
conviction that high interests of both nations require this so
long contested and controverted subject now to be finally put
to rest.--DANIEL WEBSTER, _Letter to Lord Ashburton_, August 8,
1842: Works, Vol. VI. p. 325.
The case of the Trent was an important incident of the
war,--most interesting for a time to the people of the United
States, attracting the attention of foreign nations, and
exciting England to hostile demonstrations, even to the verge
of practical coöperation with a Rebellion for the sake of
Slavery. The facts are few, and are authenticated by official
documents.
At an early stage of the Rebellion, the Slave-Masters of
Richmond appointed James M. Mason, of Virginia, commissioner
and envoy to England, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, in the
same capacity to France, each with a secretary, and also
with instructions and despatches. Their duty was to help the
Rebellion, especially in its financial and military exigencies,
to urge its recognition, to make treaties of commerce and
alliance, to obtain European intervention, and generally to
oppose the diplomacy of the United States. As the Rebel ports
were already under strict blockade, and there were no Rebel
vessels for their conveyance, they were driven to rely upon
accommodation under a neutral flag. Some time in October, 1861,
they succeeded in running the blockade and reaching Havana.
Here their pretensions and objects were notorious. But this was
only the first stage in the voyage. The next was conveyance to
Europe; and for this they relied upon the English flag, taking
passage in the Trent, bound from Havana to St. Thomas, from
which latter place a regular line of steamers, connecting with
the Trent, ran to England. Mr. Dana, in his excellent statement
of the case, says: “Their character and destination were well
known to the agent and master of the Trent, as well as the
great interest felt by the Rebels that they should, and by
the United States officials that they should not, reach their
destination in safety.”[11] The regular mails for England from
South America and Cuba were aboard, to be transferred at St.
Thomas, with a large number of passengers bound to England.
On the high seas, within a few hours’ sail of Nassau, the
Trent was stopped and searched by the national steamer San
Jacinto, commanded by Captain Wilkes, afterwards Rear-Admiral,
acting on his own responsibility, and without any instructions
from the National Government. The two commissioners and
their secretaries were found aboard, but the despatches were
secreted or confided to some of the passengers. Here Mr. Dana
remarks: “There was no evidence or charge that the commander
of the Trent aided in the concealment or forwarding of these
despatches. He did, however, deny the right of search, refused
all facilities for it, and obstructed it by everything but
actual force, and made it known to Captain Wilkes that he
yielded only to superior power, and that, if made a prize,
he and his crew would lend no aid in carrying the Trent into
port.”[12] Under these circumstances, Captain Wilkes took
the two commissioners with their suite, and carried them as
prisoners to the United States, while the Trent proceeded on
her voyage.
As this incident became known in the United States, there was
a general expression of sympathy and approbation. The press
was unanimous. Persons in authority gave their adhesion by
public speech or writing, among whom were Mr. Everett, Governor
Andrew, Chief-Justice Bigelow of Massachusetts, Professor
Parsons of the Law School at Cambridge, Mr. Caleb Cushing, and
Mr. George Sumner, all of whom were to a certain extent under
the influence of British precedents.
The Secretary of the Navy, under date of November 30, 1861,
addressed a communication to Captain Wilkes, containing the
following significant words.
“Your conduct in seizing these public enemies was marked by
intelligence, ability, decision, and firmness, and has the
emphatic approval of this Department. It is not necessary
that I should in this communication, which is intended to
be one of congratulation to yourself, officers, and crew,
express an opinion on the course pursued in omitting to
capture the vessel which had these public enemies on board,
further than to say that the forbearance exercised in this
instance must not be permitted to constitute a precedent
hereafter for infractions of neutral obligations.”[13]
The House of Representatives made haste, December 2, 1861, the
first day of its session, to adopt a joint resolution tendering
the thanks of Congress to Captain Wilkes, “for his brave,
adroit, and patriotic conduct in the arrest and detention of
the traitors James M. Mason and John Slidell.” This was on the
motion of Hon. Owen Lovejoy, the faithful Abolitionist. The
joint resolution, on reaching the Senate, was referred to the
Committee on Naval Affairs, of which Mr. Hale was chairman.
Mr. Sumner suggested its reference to the Committee on Foreign
Relations; but Mr. Hale insisted, by way of objection, that
“the attempt now to take it out of its ordinary course and
refer it to the Committee on Foreign Relations would be taken
as an intimation that there is some doubt in some minds as
to the propriety of the course that Captain Wilkes took.”
Unwilling to raise a debate at that moment, Mr. Sumner assented
to the reference proposed.
* * * * *
In England there was a counter sentiment, breaking out
into expressions of exasperation. The press was bitter and
vindictive. Public report attested a crisis, which may be read
in the newspapers of Richmond, throbbing sympathetically with
the London organs.
The _Richmond Examiner_, of December 19, broke forth in notes
of triumph.
“All other topics become trifles beside the tidings of
England which occupy this journal, and all commentary
that diverts public attention from that single point is
impertinence. The effect of the outrage of the Trent on the
public sentiment of Great Britain more than fulfils the
prophecy that we made when the arrest of the Confederate
ministers was a fresh event. All legal quibbling and
selfish calculation has been consumed like straw in the
burning sense of incredible insult.”
Then, speculating upon the position of the National Government,
the same journal says:--
“The Abolition element of the Northern States would go
straight to revolution at the least movement toward a
surrender of the captives.… Spectators of these events, who
can doubt that the Almighty fiat has gone forth against the
American Union, or that the Southern Confederacy is decreed
by Divine Wisdom?”
The _Richmond Enquirer_ of the same date likewise rejoiced.
“We have no need to invite attention to the extremely
interesting foreign news which we publish to-day from
England. The old British lion is giving an honest roar, in
view of the indignity visited upon the Queen’s flag.… We
will not disturb the eloquence of such facts by words of
comment. We will only say, Well done, John Bull! France,
too, echoes the British indignation, and will support her
action. _Vive Napoléon!_ … After the brave talk and the
congratulations to Wilkes by both Cabinet and Congress, it
would be to the last degree pusillanimous to retreat. We
think Lincoln will be afraid to prove so great a coward.”
Swiftly came the British demand, in a letter from Earl Russell
to Lord Lyons at Washington, dated at London, November 30, and
read to Mr. Seward December 19. It concluded in the following
terms.
“Her Majesty’s Government, therefore, trust, that, when
this matter shall have been brought under the consideration
of the Government of the United States, that Government
will, of its own accord, offer to the British Government
such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation,
namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their
delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again
be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology
for the aggression which has been committed. Should these
terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them
to him.”[14]
“The four gentlemen,” being the commissioners and their
secretaries, all Rebels, were to be liberated forthwith, and “a
suitable apology” was to be made by the National Government.
Such was the mandate. But accompanying these instructions
read to Mr. Seward was a private communication to Lord Lyons,
directing him to break up his legation and to leave Washington,
if the National Government did not submit to the terms required
after “a delay not exceeding seven days.” Here are the words:--
“Should Mr. Seward ask for delay, in order that this grave
and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you
will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If at the
end of that time no answer is given, or if any other answer
is given except that of a compliance with the demands of
Her Majesty’s Government, your Lordship is instructed to
leave Washington, with all the members of your legation,
bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to
repair immediately to London.… You will communicate with
Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne immediately upon receiving the
answer of the American Government, and you will send him
a copy of that answer, together with such observations
as you may think fit to make. You will also give all the
information in your power to the Governors of Canada, Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Jamaica, Bermuda, and such other of
Her Majesty’s possessions as may be within your reach.”[15]
These latter instructions, contemplating war, were unknown
in our country at the time of the settlement, and, when read
in the calmness of a period removed from the event, seem
incomprehensible in spirit. They are positive and peremptory,
without recognizing any possibility of delay, even for a
proposal of arbitration. Plainly they announce, as the British
alternatives, instant surrender, with suitable apology, or war.
This is the conclusion of Mr. Dana, in his admirable note, and
nobody can doubt it.
In accord with this note was the conduct of the British
Government, making preparations for war; and here is
unimpeachable British testimony.
“Troops were despatched to Canada with all possible
expedition; and that brave and loyal colony called out
its militia and volunteers, so as to be ready to act at a
moment’s notice. Our dock-yards here resounded with the din
of workmen getting vessels fitted for sea; and there was
but one feeling, which animated all classes and parties in
the country, and that was a determination to vindicate our
insulted honor and uphold the inviolability of the national
flag.”[16]
At that moment the American Republic was straining every
nerve to suppress a Rebellion whose single declared object
was the foundation of a new government with Slavery as its
corner-stone. War by England was practical recognition of the
new government, with alliance and breaking of the blockade.
The difficulty in comprehending this attitude is increased,
when it is known that the British Government did not regard the
seizure as authorized by instructions. In his letter to Lord
Lyons, Earl Russell says expressly: “Her Majesty’s Government
are willing to believe that the United States naval officer
who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with
any authority from his Government.”[17] Therefore the National
Government had done nothing,--absolutely nothing.
On the same day that Earl Russell indited his remarkable
despatch, Mr. Seward wrote from Washington to Mr. Adams,
at London, on business of the legation, and in his letter
mentions that Captain Wilkes “acted without any instructions
from the Government.” He adds: “We have done nothing on the
subject to anticipate the discussion.” The letter throughout
is in the spirit of peace. After declaring his inference
“that the British Government is now awake to the importance
of averting possible conflict, and disposed to confer and act
with earnestness to that end,” Mr. Seward says, “If so, we are
disposed to meet them in the same spirit, as a nation chiefly
of British lineage, sentiments, and sympathies, a civilized
and humane nation, a Christian people,” and then adds, that
the affair of the Trent “is to be met and disposed of by the
two Governments, if possible, in the spirit to which I have
adverted,”[18] that is, with a sense of “the importance of
averting possible conflict,” and a disposition “to confer and
act with earnestness to that end,” as a Christian people. It
so happened that Mr. Adams read this letter to Earl Russell on
the very day that Lord Lyons read the demand for surrender and
apology to Mr. Seward; but the British Government did not allow
its pacific contents to become known, and the war-fever went
on. Here Mr. Dana aptly remarks: “The truth seems to be, that,
so long as they were uncertain whether their menace of war
might not lead to war, they could not afford to withdraw the
chief motive for the war-spirit in the British people, and to
admit that their warlike demonstration had been needless. Their
popular support depended upon a general belief in a necessity
for their having accompanied their demand with the preparations
and menace of war.”[19]
The extraordinary character of this demand was recognized at
the time in Europe. The Count de Gasparin, after describing
it as “a question of declaring war,” and an “ultimatum,”
said: “Between great nations, between sister nations, it was
a strange opening. The usage is hardly to commence with an
_ultimatum_,--that is, to commence with the end. Ordinarily,
when there has been a misunderstanding or regrettable act,
especially when that act comes within a portion of the Law of
Nations which is yet full of obscurity, the natural opening
is to ask for explanations as to the intentions, and for
reparation for what has been done, without mixing therewith an
immediate menace of rupture.”[20] After expressing astonishment
that a demand of apology “figured in the original programme,”
which he pronounced entirely out of place, the impartial
Frenchman proceeds: “Seeing such haste and proclamation so
lofty of an exigence above debate, seeing the idea of an
impious war accepted with so much ease by some and with such
joy so little dissembled by others, Europe declared, without
ambiguity or reserve, that, if England were not miraculously
saved from her own undertaking, that, if she went so far as to
fire a cannon at the North as an ally of the South, she would
tear with her own hands her principal titles to the respect
of the civilized world.”[21] Rejecting the pretension that
the maintenance of peace was due to the “warlike measures of
England,” the eloquent moralist exclaims, “America has just
rendered to England the most signal service which ever a people
rendered to another people,” and this by refusing the war which
was menaced,--a war, as painted by him, where, in addition
to untold calamity, would be the wretchedness of striking at
the liberty of the world in alliance with slave-traders. How
naturally he adds: “From the moment that she is only the ally
of slave-traders, she has abdicated.”[22]
The summary tone of the British Government and the
contemporaneous preparations for war enhanced the difficulties
peculiar to such a question; but it was easy to see, on
examination, that the demand was in substantial conformity with
American precedents, and accordingly the Rebels, who had been
confined at Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor, were handed over to
the British Government.
* * * * *
While the question was under consideration by the Cabinet
of President Lincoln, and before any conclusion had been
communicated to the British Government, an incident occurred
in the Senate which showed the feeling that sought expression.
December 26th, Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, who had already
avowed his sympathy with the act of Captain Wilkes, found
occasion to discuss it at some length, and to denounce the idea
of surrendering the Rebels. A few passages will show the tone
he adopted.
“I believe that the Cabinet to-day and yesterday, and for
some days past, have had under consideration a measure
which involves more of good or evil to this country
than anything that has ever occurred before: I mean the
surrender, on the demand of Great Britain, of the persons
of Messrs. Slidell and Mason. To my mind, a more fatal act
could not mark the history of this country,--an act that
would surrender at once to the arbitrary demand of Great
Britain all that was won in the Revolution, reduce us to
the position of a second-rate power, and make us the vassal
of Great Britain.…
“I have seen many gentlemen, and I have seen none, not a
man can be found, who is in favor of this surrender; for it
would humiliate us in the eyes of the world, irritate our
own people, and subject us to their indignant scorn. If we
are to have war with Great Britain, it will not be because
we refuse to surrender Messrs. Mason and Slidell: that is a
mere pretence. If war shall come, it will be because Great
Britain has determined to force war upon us. They would
humiliate us first and fight us afterwards. If we are to
be humiliated, I prefer to take it after a war, and not
before.… I pray that this Administration will not surrender
our national honor. I tell them that hundreds and thousands
and hundreds of thousands will rush to the battle-field,
and bare their breasts to its perils, rather than submit to
degradation.”[23]
Mr. Sumner at that time had not seen the demand, and was
without any precise information on the subject, but felt it his
duty to say something by way of breakwater against the rising
tide. He spoke briefly.
MR. PRESIDENT,--The Senator has made his speech, and then withdrawn his
motion; he has accomplished his object. For myself, Sir, I would rather
meet this question, truly important, when presented in a practical
form. The Senator treats it on an hypothesis; he assumes that Great
Britain has made an arrogant demand, and then proceeds to denounce it.
How does he know that any such demand has been made? Who in the Senate
knows it? Who in the country knows it? I do not believe it,--will not
believe it, except on evidence.
The Senator says that he is not against arbitration. How does he know
that this is not the policy of the Administration? But I know nobody
here who can speak for the Administration on this point.
I submit to the Senator that on both points he has spoken too swiftly.
There is no evidence to justify him in belief that any arrogant demand
has been made; there is no evidence that can lead him to distrust the
fidelity of the Administration. Speaking for myself and nobody else, I
declare my conviction that the question will be peaceably and honorably
adjusted. I do not believe that it is a question for war; and I hail
with gratitude the declaration of the honorable Senator in favor of
arbitration. This at least is pacific in what must be called a war
speech. But do not understand me as intimating that such mode is under
consideration. I content myself with repeating, that the question is
in safe hands, and that it will be better for us to reserve ourselves
until it is presented in some practical form, or at least on evidence,
and not on mere hypothesis.
Mr. Sumner had been with the President and his Cabinet the day
before, to read important letters just received from Mr. Cobden
and Mr. Bright; but he did not know the conclusion on the
question. The few words in reply to Mr. Hale were in the spirit
of peace, and as such were warmly welcomed by the public.
The sympathy they awakened attests the prevailing interest.
A leading citizen of Providence wrote: “Very many thanks for
your mild rebuke of our friend Senator Hale, when he mounted
the war-horse.” Another in Boston adopted the same vein: “For
your wise words, after the war speech of Mr. Hale, you have my
thanks, and the thanks of thousands who will never express to
you their feelings. I know you will exert your great influence
on the side of peace, and I rejoice that you have so much moral
power in this matter.” Rev. George C. Beckwith, Corresponding
Secretary of the American Peace Society, had promptly declared
his trust: “It is a matter of special congratulation, that
the helm of our Foreign Relations, so far as the Senate is
concerned, is held at this juncture in hands so worthy of our
confidence. We trust that you and your Committee will have all
the wisdom and other qualities needed to meet the case now
before us just as it ought to be.” A friend holding high office
in Massachusetts augured new strength for Mr. Sumner in the
battle with Slavery: “Your decisive speech,” he wrote, “will do
much to raise you in the estimation of those who were alarmed
by your Emancipation doctrines, and who begin to see that you
are right in that, as well as other things.”
The confidence reposed had its responsibilities increased
by his position as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, and, when the surrender was announced, Mr. Sumner
felt it a duty to do what he could in reconciling the people
to his conclusion, especially as he was satisfied that the
original taking of the Rebels could not be justified without
adopting most obnoxious British precedents. Besides, reform in
Maritime Law seemed to be involved in the discussion, and he
was not without hope of contributing to this important result.
Therefore he made an early occasion to address the Senate on
the subject.
In his speech Mr. Sumner brought into strong relief the early
and long continued pretension of England to enter our ships and
take our sailors without trial of any kind, as Captain Wilkes
had entered the Trent and taken the Rebel agents. In presenting
this point, he was determined not only by the London press,
which adopted the original American objection to any such entry
and taking, but also by the unpublished opinions of the law
advisers of the Crown, which he had before him in manuscript.
The capture of the Rebels was known in London on the evening
of 27th November. But some time before, on an intimation that
such an attempt might be made, the British Government had asked
the opinion of the law officers on the questions involved
in such an act. An answer was returned, bearing date 12th
November, which was signed by the Queen’s Advocate-General, the
Attorney-General, and the Solicitor-General. In this opinion
it was stated: “The United States ship of war may put a prize
crew on board the West India steamer and carry her off to a
port of the United States for adjudication by a Prize Court
there; _but she would have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and
Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to
pursue her voyage_.” This opinion was supposed to have greater
value because it was given sixteen days before anything on the
subject had appeared in the London press. Afterwards the case
of the Trent was submitted to these law officers, and on the
28th of November they gave another opinion in accordance with
the former, where they say: “From on board a merchant ship of a
neutral power, pursuing a lawful and innocent voyage, _certain
individuals have been taken by force. They were not apparently
officers in the military or naval service of the Confederate
Government._” They conclude that Her Majesty’s Government “will
be justified in requiring reparation for the international
wrong which has been on this occasion committed.” In conformity
with this opinion, Earl Russell, in his letter demanding the
surrender, treated it simply as a forcible taking of “certain
individuals” from an innocent British vessel at sea by an
American ship of war, all of which had been too often done by
British ships of war with innocent American vessels at sea.
It will be observed that Earl Russell uses the most general
language, without specification; but the contemporaneous press
dwelt on the single point taken by the law officers. One of
these is quoted in Mr. Sumner’s speech.
In France, the _Revue des Deux Mondes_ wrote, as if instructed
from Downing Street:--
“England _confines herself_ to denying that an officer can
erect himself into a judge in such a cause, the decision of
which should belong only to a Court of Admiralty. Captain
Wilkes, _substituting himself arbitrarily for the judicial
authority_, alone competent to give a legal character to
his prize, England can see in the act which he committed on
the Trent only an act of violence, an outrage perpetrated
against the British flag.”[24]
This single point found sudden favor in England. Nassau W.
Senior, the eminent economist, in close relations with the
British Cabinet, wrote to Mr. Sumner, under date of December
10: “We think that Captain Wilkes _could not make himself judge
in his own cause_; that the utmost he could have done legally
would have been to take the Trent into an Admiralty Court.”
Here the able Englishman simply echoes the early and constant
doctrine of our country; but others among his countrymen did
the same.
The intimate relations of Mr. Sumner with Mr. Cobden and Mr.
Bright, already existing, were quickened during this anxious
period, when these eminent English statesmen wrote constantly,
full of friendship for our country and anxious always for
peace. The perfect freedom of these communications may be
judged by a passage in a letter of Mr. Cobden.
“I write to you, of course, in confidence; and I write to
you what I would not write to any other American,--nay,
what it would be perhaps improper for any other Englishman
than myself to utter to any other American but yourself.
But we are, I think, both more of Christians and
cosmopolitans than British or Yankee.”
Intervening time and death have removed the seal of confidence,
opening what passed between them to the observation of history.
Mr. Cobden occupied himself especially to obtain important
reforms in International Law on the ocean. This was part
of his scheme for disarmament; and here Mr. Sumner was a
fellow-laborer. He was anxious that the attention suddenly
directed to Maritime Rights should redound to the good of
the Human Family. His programme was given in a letter dated
December 5, and read by Mr. Sumner to President Lincoln and his
Cabinet, while considering the British demand, on the forenoon
of Christmas day. Mr. Cobden begins by quoting from the public
letter of General Scott, then at Paris.
“I am sure that the President and people of the United
States would be but too happy to let these men go free,
unnatural and unpardonable as their offences have been,
if by it they could emancipate the commerce of the world.
Greatly as it would be to our disadvantage, at this present
crisis, to surrender any of these maritime privileges of
belligerents which are sanctioned by the Laws of Nations,
I feel that I take no responsibility in saying that the
United States will be faithful to their traditional policy
upon this subject, and to the spirit of their political
institutions.”