THE ARMY OF THE NORTH.
I trust that it may not be thought that in this chapter I am going
to take upon myself the duties of a military critic. I am well aware
that I have no capacity for such a task, and that my opinion on such
matters would be worth nothing. But it is impossible to write of the
American States as they were when I visited them, and to leave that
subject of the American army untouched. It was all but impossible to
remain for some months in the northern States without visiting the
army. It was impossible to join in any conversation in the States
without talking about the army. It was impossible to make inquiry
as to the present and future condition of the people without basing
such inquiries more or less upon the doings of the army. If a
stranger visit Manchester with the object of seeing what sort of
place Manchester is, he must visit the cotton mills and printing
establishments, though he may have no taste for cotton and no
knowledge on the subject of calicoes. Under pressure of this kind
I have gone about from one army to another, looking at the drilling
of regiments, of the manoeuvres of cavalry, at the practice of
artillery, and at the inner life of the camps. I do not feel that I
am in any degree more fitted to take the command of a campaign than I
was before I began, or even more fitted to say who can and who cannot
do so. But I have obtained on my own mind's eye a tolerably clear
impression of the outward appearance of the northern army; I have
endeavoured to learn something of the manner in which it was brought
together, and of its cost as it now stands; and I have learned--as
any man in the States may learn, without much trouble or personal
investigation--how terrible has been the peculation of the
contractors and officers by whom that army has been supplied. Of
these things, writing of the States at this moment, I must say
something. In what I shall say as to that matter of peculation
I trust that I may be believed to have spoken without personal
ill-feeling or individual malice.
While I was travelling in the States of New England and in the
North-west, I came across various camps at which young regiments were
being drilled and new regiments were being formed. These lay in our
way as we made our journeys, and therefore we visited them; but they
were not objects of any very great interest. The men had not acquired
even any pretence of soldierlike bearing. The officers for the most
part had only just been selected, having hardly as yet left their
civil occupations, and anything like criticism was disarmed by the
very nature of the movement which had called the men together. I then
thought, as I still think, that the men themselves were actuated
by proper motives, and often by very high motives, in joining the
regiments. No doubt they looked to the pay offered. It is not often
that men are able to devote themselves to patriotism without any
reference to their personal circumstances. A man has got before him
the necessity of earning his bread, and very frequently the necessity
of earning the bread of others besides himself. This comes before him
not only as his first duty, but as the very law of his existence.
His wages are his life, and when he proposes to himself to serve his
country that subject of payment comes uppermost as it does when he
proposes to serve any other master. But the wages given, though very
high in comparison with those of any other army, have not been of
a nature to draw together from their distant homes at so short a
notice, so vast a cloud of men, had no other influence been at work.
As far as I can learn, the average rate of wages in the country since
the war began has been about 65 cents a day over and beyond the
workmen's diet. I feel convinced that I am putting this somewhat too
low, taking the average of all the markets from which the labour has
been withdrawn. In large cities labour has been higher than this,
and a considerable proportion of the army has been taken from large
cities. But taking 65 cents a day as the average, labour has been
worth about 17 dollars a month over and above the labourers' diet. In
the army the soldier receives 13 dollars a month, and also receives
his diet and clothes; in addition to this, in many States, 6 dollars
a month have been paid by the State to the wives and families of
those soldiers who have left wives and families in the States behind
them. Thus for the married men the wages given by the army have been
2 dollars a month, or less than £5 a year, more than his earnings at
home, and for the unmarried man they have been 4 dollars a month, or
less than £10 a year below his earnings at home. But the army also
gives clothing to the extent of 3 dollars a month. This would place
the unmarried soldier, in a pecuniary point of view, worse off by one
dollar a month, or £2 10_s._ a year, than he would have been at home;
and would give the married man 5 dollars a month, or £12 a year more
than his ordinary wages for absenting himself from his family. I
cannot think therefore that the pecuniary attractions have been very
great.
Our soldiers in England enlist at wages which are about one half that
paid in the ordinary labour market to the class from whence they
come. But labour in England is uncertain, whereas in the States it is
certain. In England the soldier with his shilling gets better food
than the labourer with his two shillings; and the Englishman has no
objection to the rigidity of that discipline which is so distasteful
to an American. Moreover, who in England ever dreamed of raising
600,000 new troops in six months, out of a population of thirty
million? But this has been done in the northern States out of a
population of eighteen million. If England were invaded, Englishmen
would come forward in the same way, actuated, as I believe, by the
same high motives. My object here is simply to show that the American
soldiers have not been drawn together by the prospect of high wages,
as has been often said since the war began.
They who inquire closely into the matter will find that hundreds and
thousands have joined the army as privates, who in doing so have
abandoned all their best worldly prospects, and have consented to
begin the game of life again, believing that their duty to their
country has now required their services. The fact has been that
in the different States a spirit of rivalry has been excited.
Indiana has endeavoured to show that she was as forward as
Illinois; Pennsylvania has been unwilling to lag behind New York;
Massachusetts, who has always struggled to be foremost in peace, has
desired to boast that she was first in war also; the smaller States
have resolved to make their names heard, and those which at first
were backward in sending troops have been shamed into greater
earnestness by the public voice. There has been a general feeling
throughout the people that the thing should be done;--that the
rebellion must be put down, and that it must be put down by arms.
Young men have been ashamed to remain behind; and their elders,
acting under that glow of patriotism which so often warms the hearts
of free men, but which perhaps does not often remain there long in
all its heat, have left their wives and have gone also. It may be
true that the voice of the majority has been coercive on many;--that
men have enlisted partly because the public voice required it of
them, and not entirely through the promptings of individual spirit.
Such public voice in America is very potent; but it is not, I think,
true that the army has been gathered together by the hope of high
wages.
Such was my opinion of the men when I saw them from State to State
clustering into their new regiments. They did not look like soldiers;
but I regarded them as men earnestly intent on a work which they
believed to be right. Afterwards when I saw them in their camps,
amidst all the pomps and circumstances of glorious war, positively
converted into troops, armed with real rifles and doing actual
military service, I believed the same of them,--but cannot say that
I then liked them so well. Good motives had brought them there. They
were the same men, or men of the same class that I had seen before.
They were doing just that which I knew they would have to do. But
still I found that the more I saw of them the more I lost of that
respect for them which I had once felt. I think it was their dirt
that chiefly operated upon me. Then, too, they had hitherto done
nothing, and they seemed to be so terribly intent upon their rations!
The great boast of this army was that they eat meat twice a day, and
that their daily supply of bread was more than they could consume.
When I had been two or three weeks in Washington, I went over to the
army of the Potomac and spent a few days with some of the officers.
I had on previous occasions ridden about the camps, and had seen
a review at which General Maclellan trotted up and down the lines
with all his numerous staff at his heels. I have always believed
reviews to be absurdly useless as regards the purpose for which
they are avowedly got up,--that, namely, of military inspection.
And I believed this especially of this review. I do not believe
that any Commander-in-chief ever learns much as to the excellence
or deficiencies of his troops by watching their manoeuvres on a
vast open space; but I felt sure that General Maclellan had learned
nothing on this occasion. If before his review he did not know
whether his men were good as soldiers, he did not possess any such
knowledge after the review. If the matter may be regarded as a review
of the general;--if the object was to show him off to the men, that
they might know how well he rode, and how grand he looked with his
staff of forty or fifty officers at his heels, then this review must
be considered as satisfactory. General Maclellan does ride very well.
So much I learned, and no more.
It was necessary to have a pass for crossing the Potomac either
from one side or from the other, and such a pass I procured from a
friend in the War-office, good for the whole period of my sojourn in
Washington. The wording of the pass was more than ordinarily long,
as it recommended me to the special courtesy of all whom I might
encounter; but in this respect it was injurious to me rather than
otherwise, as every picket by whom I was stopped found it necessary
to read it to the end. The paper was almost invariably returned to
me without a word; but the musket which was not unfrequently kept
extended across my horse's nose by the reader's comrade would be
withdrawn, and then I would ride on to the next barrier. It seemed
to me that these passes were so numerous and were signed by so many
officers, that there could have been no risk in forging them. The
army of the Potomac into which they admitted the bearer lay in
quarters which were extended over a length of twenty miles up and
down on the Virginian side of the river, and the river could be
traversed at five different places. Crowds of men and women were
going over daily, and no doubt all the visitors who so went with
innocent purposes were provided with proper passports; but any whose
purposes were not innocent, and who were not so provided, could
have passed the pickets with counterfeited orders. This, I have
little doubt, was done daily. Washington was full of secessionists,
and every movement of the Federal army was communicated to the
Confederates at Richmond, at which city was now established the
Congress and head-quarters of the Confederacy. But no such tidings of
the Confederate army reached those in command at Washington. There
were many circumstances in the contest which led to this result, and
I do not think that General Maclellan had any power to prevent it.
His system of passes certainly did not do so.
I never could learn from any one what was the true number of this
army on the Potomac. I have been informed by those who professed
to know that it contained over 200,000 men, and by others who also
professed to know, that it did not contain 100,000. To me the
soldiers seemed to be innumerable, hanging like locusts over the
whole country,--a swarm desolating everything around them. Those
pomps and circumstances are not glorious in my eyes. They affect me
with a melancholy which I cannot avoid. Soldiers gathered together in
a camp are uncouth and ugly when they are idle; and when they are at
work their work is worse than idleness. When I have seen a thousand
men together, moving their feet hither at one sound and thither at
another, throwing their muskets about awkwardly, prodding at the air
with their bayonets, trotting twenty paces here and backing ten paces
there, wheeling round in uneven lines, and looking, as they did so,
miserably conscious of the absurdity of their own performances, I
have always been inclined to think how little the world can have
advanced in civilization, while grown-up men are still forced to
spend their days in such grotesque performances. Those to whom the
"pomps and circumstances" are dear--nay, those by whom they are
considered simply necessary--will be able to confute me by a thousand
arguments. I readily own myself confuted. There must be soldiers, and
soldiers must be taught. But not the less pitiful is it to see men
of thirty undergoing the goose-step, and tortured by orders as to
the proper mode of handling a long instrument which is half-gun and
half-spear. In the days of Hector and Ajax, the thing was done in a
more picturesque manner, and the songs of battle should, I think, be
confined to those ages.
The ground occupied by the divisions on the further or south-western
side of the Potomac was, as I have said, about twenty miles in length
and perhaps seven in breadth. Through the whole of this district the
soldiers were everywhere. The tents of the various brigades were
clustered together in streets, the regiments being divided; and the
divisions, combining the brigades, lay apart at some distance from
each other. But everywhere, at all points, there were some signs of
military life. The roads were continually thronged with waggons, and
tracks were opened for horses wherever a shorter way might thus be
made available. On every side the trees were falling, or had fallen.
In some places whole woods had been felled with the express purpose
of rendering the ground impracticable for troops, and firs and pines
lay one over the other, still covered with their dark rough foliage,
as though a mighty forest had grown there along the ground, without
any power to raise itself towards the heavens. In other places the
trees had been chopped off from their trunks about a yard from the
ground, so that the soldier who cut it should have no trouble in
stooping, and the tops had been dragged away for firewood, or for
the erection of screens against the wind. Here and there in solitary
places there were outlying tents, looking as though each belonged to
some military recluse; and in the neighbourhood of every division was
to be found a photographing-establishment upon wheels, in order that
the men might send home to their sweethearts pictures of themselves
in their martial costumes.
I wandered about through these camps both on foot and on horseback
day after day, and every now and then I would come upon a farm-house
that was still occupied by its old inhabitants. Many of such houses
had been deserted, and were now held by the senior officers of the
army; but some of the old families remained, living in the midst of
this scene of war in a condition most forlorn. As for any tillage
of their land, that under such circumstances might be pronounced as
hopeless. Nor could there exist encouragement for farm-work of any
kind. Fences had been taken down and burned; the ground had been
overrun in every direction. The stock had of course disappeared; it
had not been stolen, but had been sold in a hurry for what under such
circumstances it might fetch. What farmer could work or have any hope
for his land in the middle of such a crowd of soldiers? But yet there
were the families. The women were in their houses, and the children
playing at their doors, and the men, with whom I sometimes spoke,
would stand around with their hands in their pockets. They knew that
they were ruined; they expected no redress. In nine cases out of ten
they were inimical in spirit to the soldiers around them. And yet it
seemed that their equanimity was never disturbed. In a former chapter
I have spoken of a certain general,--not a fighting general of the
army, but a local farming general,--who spoke loudly and with many
curses of the injury inflicted on him by the secessionists. With that
exception, I heard no loud complaint of personal suffering. These
Virginian farmers must have been deprived of everything,--of the very
means of earning bread. They still hold by their houses, though they
were in the very thick of the war, because there they had shelter
for their families, and elsewhere they might seek it in vain. A man
cannot move his wife and children if he have no place to which to
move them, even though his house be in the midst of disease, of
pestilence, or of battle. So it was with them then, but it seemed as
though they were already used to it.
But there was a class of inhabitants in that same country to whom
fate had been even more unkind than to those whom I saw. The lines
of the northern army extended perhaps seven or eight miles from the
Potomac, and the lines of the Confederate army were distant some
four miles from those of their enemies. There was, therefore, an
intervening space or strip of ground about four miles broad, which
might be said to be no man's land. It was no man's land as to
military possession, but it was still occupied by many of its old
inhabitants. These people were not allowed to pass the lines either
of one army or of the other; or if they did so pass they were not
allowed to return to their homes. To these homes they were forced to
cling, and there they remained. They had no market, no shops at which
to make purchases even if they had money to buy; no customers with
whom to deal even if they had produce to sell. They had their cows,
if they could keep them from the Confederate soldiers, their pigs and
their poultry; and on them they were living--a most forlorn life. Any
advance made by either party must be over their homesteads. In the
event of battle they would be in the midst of it; and in the meantime
they could see no one, hear of nothing, go no whither beyond the
limits of that miserable strip of ground!
The earth was hard with frost when I paid my visit to the camp, and
the general appearance of things around my friend's quarters was on
that account cheerful enough. It was the mud which made things sad
and wretched. When the frost came it seemed as though the army had
overcome one of its worst enemies. Unfortunately cold weather did not
last long. I have been told in Washington that they rarely have had
so open a season. Soon after my departure that terrible enemy, the
mud, came back upon them, but during my stay the ground was hard and
the weather very sharp. I slept in a tent, and managed to keep my
body warm by an enormous overstructure of blankets and coats; but I
could not keep my head warm. Throughout the night I had to go down,
like a fish beneath the water, for protection, and come up for air at
intervals, half-smothered. I had a stove in my tent, but the heat of
that when lighted was more terrible than the severity of the frost.
The tents of the brigade with which I was staying had been pitched
not without an eye to appearances. They were placed in streets as it
were, each street having its name, and between them screens had been
erected of fir-poles and fir-branches, so as to keep off the wind.
The outside boundaries of the nearest regiment were ornamented with
arches, crosses, and columns constructed in the same way; so that
the quarters of the men were reached, as it were, through gateways.
The whole thing was pretty enough, and while the ground was hard
the camp was picturesque, and a visit to it was not unpleasant. But
unfortunately the ground was in its nature soft and deep, composed of
red clay, and as the frost went and the wet weather came, mud became
omnipotent and destroyed all prettiness. And I found that the cold
weather, let it be ever so cold, was not severe upon the men. It was
wet which they feared and had cause to fear, both for themselves and
for their horses. As to the horses, but few of them were protected by
any shelter or covering whatsoever. Through both frost and wet they
remained out, tied to the wheel of a waggon or to some temporary rack
at which they were fed. In England we should imagine that any horse
so treated must perish; but here the animals seemed to stand it. Many
of them were miserable enough in appearance, but nevertheless they
did the work required of them. I have observed that horses throughout
the States are treated in a hardier manner than is usually the case
with us.
At the period of which I am speaking, January, 1862, the health of
the army of the Potomac was not as good as it had been, and was
beginning to give way under the effects of the winter. Measles had
become very prevalent, and also small-pox--though not of a virulent
description; and men, in many instances, were sinking under fatigue.
I was informed by various officers that the Irish regiments were
on the whole the most satisfactory. Not that they made the best
soldiers, for it was asserted that they were worse, as soldiers, than
the Americans or Germans; not that they became more easily subject to
rule, for it was asserted that they were unruly;--but because they
were rarely ill. Diseases which seized the American troops on all
sides seemed to spare them. The mortality was not excessive, but the
men became sick and ailing, and fell under the doctor's hands.
Mr. Olmstead, whose name is well known in England as a writer on the
southern States, was at this time secretary to a Sanitary Commission
on the army, and published an abstract of the results of the
inquiries made, on which I believe perfect reliance may be placed.
This inquiry was extended to two hundred regiments, which were
presumed to be included in the army of the Potomac; but these
regiments were not all located on the Virginian side of the river,
and must not therefore be taken as belonging exclusively to the
divisions of which I have been speaking. Mr. Olmstead says, "The
health of our armies is evidently not above the average of armies in
the field. The mortality of the army of the Potomac during the summer
months averaged 3½ per cent., and for the whole army it is stated at
5 per cent." "Of the camps inspected, 5 per cent.," he says, "were
in admirable order; 44 per cent. fairly clean and well policed. The
condition of 26 per cent. was negligent and slovenly, and of 24 per
cent. decidedly bad, filthy, and dangerous." Thus 50 per cent. were
either negligent and slovenly, or filthy and dangerous. I wonder
what the report would have been had Camp Benton at St. Louis been
surveyed! "In about 80 per cent. of the regiments the officers
claimed to give systematic attention to the cleanliness of the men;
but it is remarked that they rarely enforced the washing of the feet,
and not always of the head and neck." I wish Mr. Olmstead had added
that they never enforced the cutting of the hair. No single trait has
been so decidedly disadvantageous to the appearance of the American
army, as the long, uncombed, rough locks of hair which the men have
appeared so loth to abandon. In reading the above one cannot but
think of the condition of those other twenty regiments!
According to Mr. Olmstead two-thirds of the men were native-born, and
one-third was composed of foreigners. These foreigners are either
Irish or German. Had a similar report been made of the armies in
the West, I think it would have been seen that the proportion of
foreigners was still greater. The average age of the privates was
something under twenty-five, and that of the officers thirty-four. I
may here add, from my own observation, that an officer's rank could
in no degree be predicated from his age. Generals, colonels, majors,
captains, and lieutenants, had been all appointed at the same time
and without reference to age or qualification. Political influence or
the power of raising recruits had been the standard by which military
rank was distributed. The old West Point officers had generally been
chosen for high commands, but beyond this everything was necessarily
new. Young colonels and ancient captains abounded without any harsh
feeling as to the matter on either side. Indeed in this respect the
practice of the country generally was simply carried out. Fathers and
mothers in America seem to obey their sons and daughters naturally,
and as they grow old become the slaves of their grandchildren.
Mr. Olmstead says that food was found to be universally good and
abundant. On this matter Mr. Olmstead might have spoken in stronger
language without exaggeration. The food supplied to the American
armies has been extravagantly good, and certainly has been wastefully
abundant. Very much has been said of the cost of the American army,
and it has been made a matter of boasting that no army so costly has
ever been put into the field by any other nation. The assertion is,
I believe, at any rate true. I have found it impossible to ascertain
what has hitherto been expended on the army. I much doubt whether
even Mr. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, or Mr. Stanton, the
Secretary-at-War, know themselves, and I do not suppose that Mr.
Stanton's predecessor much cared. Some approach, however, may be
reached to the amount actually paid in wages and for clothes and
diet, and I give below a statement which I have seen of the actual
annual sum proposed to be expended on these heads, presuming the army
to consist of 500,000 men. The army is stated to contain 660,000 men,
but the former numbers given would probably be found to be nearer the
mark.
Dollars.
Wages of privates, including
sergeants and corporals 86,640,000
Salaries of regimental officers 23,784,000
Extra wages of privates; extra pay to
mounted officers, and salary of
officers above the rank of colonel 17,000,000
-----------
127,424,000
or
£25,484,000 sterling.
To this must be added the cost of diet and clothing. The food of the
men, I was informed, was supplied at an average cost of 17 cents a
day, which, for an army of 500,000 men, would amount to £6,200,000
per annum. The clothing of the men is shown by the printed statement
of their war department to amount to 3 dollars a month for a period
of five years. That, at least, is the amount allowed to a private of
infantry or artillery. The cost of the cavalry uniforms and of the
dress of the non-commissioned officers is something higher, but not
sufficiently so to make it necessary to make special provision for
the difference in a statement so rough as this. At 3 dollars a month
the clothing of the army would amount to £3,600,000. The actual
annual cost would therefore be as follows:--
Salaries and wages £25,484,400
Diet of the soldiers 6,200,000
Clothing for the soldiers 3,600,000
-----------
£35,284,400
I believe that these figures may be trusted, unless it be with
reference to that sum of $17,000,000 or £3,400,000, which is presumed
to include the salaries of all general-officers with their staffs,
and also the extra wages paid to soldiers in certain cases. This is
given as an estimate, and may be over or under the mark. The sum
named as the cost of clothing would be correct, or nearly so, if the
army remained in its present force for five years. If it so remained
for only one year the cost would be one-fifth higher. It must of
course be remembered that the sum above named includes simply the
wages, clothes, and food of the men. It does not comprise the
purchase of arms, horses, ammunition, or waggons; the forage of
horses; the transport of troops, or any of those incidental expenses
of warfare which are always, I presume, heavier than the absolute
cost of the men, and which in this war have been probably heavier
than in any war ever waged on the face of God's earth. Nor does it
include that terrible item of peculation as to which I will say a
word or two before I finish this chapter.
The yearly total payment of the officers and soldiers of the armies
is as follows. As regards the officers it must be understood that
this includes all the allowances made to them, except as regards
those on the staff. The sums named apply only to the infantry and
artillery. The pay of the cavalry is about ten per cent. higher.
Lieutenant-General. £1,850
General Scott alone holds that
rank in the States' army
Major-General 1,150
Brigadier-General 800
*Colonel 530
*Lieutenant-Colonel 475
Major 430
Captain 300
First Lieutenant 265
Second Lieutenant 245
First Sergeant 48
Sergeant 40
Corporal 34
Private 31
*A Colonel and Lieutenant-Colonel are attached to
each regiment.
In every grade named the pay is, I believe, higher than that given by
us, or, as I imagine, by any other nation. It is, however, probable
that the extra allowances paid to some of our higher officers when
on duty may give to their positions for a time a higher pecuniary
remuneration. It will of course be understood that there is nothing
in the American army answering to our colonel of a regiment. With us
the officer so designated holds a nominal command of high dignity and
emolument as a reward for past services.
I have already spoken of my visits to the camps of the other armies
in the field, that of General Halleck, who held his head-quarters
at St. Louis, in Missouri, and that of General Buell, who was at
Louisville, in Kentucky. There was also a fourth army under General
Hunter, in Kansas, but I did not make my way as far west as that.
I do not pretend to any military knowledge, and should be foolish
to attempt military criticism; but as far as I could judge by
appearance, I should say that the men in Buell's army were, of the
three, in the best order. They seemed to me to be cleaner than the
others, and, as far as I could learn, were in better health. Want
of discipline and dirt have, no doubt, been the great faults of the
regiments generally, and the latter drawback may probably be included
in the former. These men have not been accustomed to act under the
orders of superiors, and when they entered on the service hardly
recognized the fact that they would have to do so in ought else than
in their actual drill and fighting. It is impossible to conceive any
class of men to whom the necessary discipline of a soldier would come
with more difficulty than to an American citizen. The whole training
of his life has been against it. He has never known respect for
a master, or reverence for men of a higher rank than himself. He
has probably been made to work hard for his wages,--harder than an
Englishman works,--but he has been his employer's equal. The language
between them has been the language of equals, and their arrangement
as to labour and wages has been a contract between equals. If he
did not work he would not get his money,--and perhaps not if he did.
Under these circumstances he has made his fight with the world; but
those circumstances have never taught him that special deference to
a superior, which is the first essential of a soldier's duty. But
probably in no respect would that difficulty be so severely felt as
in all matters appertaining to personal habits. Here at any rate the
man would expect to be still his own master, acting for himself and
independent of all outer control. Our English Hodge, when taken from
the plough to the camp, would, probably, submit without a murmur
to soap and water and a barber's shears; he would have received
none of that education which would prompt him to rebel against such
ordinances; but the American citizen, who for a while expects to
shake hands with his captain whenever he sees him, and is astonished
when he learns that he must not offer him drinks, cannot at once
be brought to understand that he is to be treated like a child in
the nursery;--that he must change his shirt so often, wash himself
at such and such intervals, and go through a certain process of
cleansing his outward garments daily. I met while travelling a
sergeant of an old regular American regiment, and he spoke of the
want of discipline among the volunteers as hopeless. But even he
instanced it chiefly by their want of cleanliness. "They wear their
shirts till they drop off their backs," said he; "and what can you
expect from such men as that?" I liked that sergeant for his zeal
and intelligence, and also for his courtesy when he found that I was
an Englishman; for previous to his so finding he had begun to abuse
the English roundly,--but I did not quite agree with him about the
volunteers. It is very bad that soldiers should be dirty, bad also
that they should treat their captains with familiarity and desire
to exchange drinks with the majors. But even discipline is not
everything; and discipline will come at last even to the American
soldiers, distasteful as it may be, when the necessity for it is made
apparent. But these volunteers have great military virtues. They are
intelligent, zealous in their cause, handy with arms, willing enough
to work at all military duties, and personally brave. On the other
hand they are sickly, and there has been a considerable amount of
drunkenness among them. No man who has looked to the subject can, I
think, doubt that a native American has a lower physical development
than an Irishman, a German, or an Englishman. They become old sooner,
and die at an earlier age. As to that matter of drink, I do not think
that much need be said against them. English soldiers get drunk when
they have the means of doing so, and American soldiers would not get
drunk if the means were taken away from them. A little drunkenness
goes a long way in a camp, and ten drunkards will give a bad name to
a company of a hundred. Let any man travel with twenty men of whom
four are tipsy, and on leaving them he will tell you that every man
of them was a drunkard.
I have said that these men are brave, and I have no doubt that they
are so. How should it be otherwise with men of such a race? But it
must be remembered that there are two kinds of courage, one of which
is very common and the other very uncommon. Of the latter description
of courage it cannot be expected that much should be found among the
privates of any army, and perhaps not very many examples among the
officers. It is a courage self-sustained, based on a knowledge of the
right and on a life-long calculation that any results coming from
adherence to the right will be preferable to any that can be produced
by a departure from it. This is the courage which will enable a man
to stand his ground in battle or elsewhere, though broken worlds
should fall around him. The other courage, which is mainly an affair
of the heart or blood and not of the brain, always requires some
outward support. The man who finds himself prominent in danger bears
himself gallantly, because the eyes of many will see him; whether
as an old man he leads an army, or as a young man goes on a forlorn
hope, or as a private carries his officer on his back out of the
fire, he is sustained by the love of praise. And the men who are not
individually prominent in danger, who stand their ground shoulder
to shoulder, bear themselves gallantly also, each trusting in the
combined strength of his comrades. When such combined strength has
been acquired, that useful courage is engendered which we may rather
call confidence, and which of all courage is the most serviceable in
the army. At the battle of Bull's Run the army of the North became
panic-stricken and fled. From this fact many have been led to believe
that the American soldiers would not fight well, and that they could
not be brought to stand their ground under fire. This I think has
been an unfair conclusion. In the first place the history of the
battle of Bull's Run has yet to be written; as yet the history of
the flight only has been given to us. As far as I can learn, the
northern soldiers did at first fight well;--so well, that the army of
the South believed itself to be beaten. But a panic was created--at
first, as it seems, among the teamsters and waggons. A cry was
raised, and a rush was made by hundreds of drivers with their carts
and horses; and then men who had never seen war before, who had not
yet had three months' drilling as soldiers, to whom the turmoil of
that day must have seemed as though hell were opening upon them,
joined themselves to the general clamour, and fled to Washington,
believing that all was lost. But at the same time the regiments of
the enemy were going through the same farce in the other direction!
It was a battle between troops who knew nothing of battles; of
soldiers who were not yet soldiers. That individual high-minded
courage, which would have given to each individual recruit the
self-sustained power against a panic, which is to be looked for in a
general, was not to be looked for in them. Of the other courage of
which I have spoken, there was as much as the circumstances of the
battle would allow.
On subsequent occasions the men have fought well. We should, I think,
admit that they have fought very well when we consider how short has
been their practice at such work. At Somerset, at Fort Henry, at Fort
Donnelson, at Corinth, the men behaved with courage, standing well
to their arms, though at each place the slaughter among them was
great. They have always gone well into fire, and have generally
borne themselves well under fire. I am convinced that we in England
can make no greater mistake than to suppose that the Americans as
soldiers are deficient in courage.
But now I must come to a matter in which a terrible deficiency has
been shown, not by the soldiers, but by those whose duty it has been
to provide for the soldiers. It is impossible to speak of the army
of the North and to leave untouched that hideous subject of army
contracts. And I think myself the more specially bound to allude to
it because I feel that the iniquities which have prevailed, prove
with terrible earnestness the demoralizing power of that dishonesty
among men in high places, which is the one great evil of the American
States. It is there that the deficiency exists, which must be
supplied before the public men of the nation can take a high rank
among other public men. There is the gangrene, which must be cut out
before the government, as a government, can be great. To make money
is the one thing needful, and men have been anxious to meddle with
the affairs of government, because there might money be made with
the greatest ease. "Make money," the Roman satirist said; "make it
honestly if you can, but at any rate make money." That first counsel
would be considered futile and altogether vain by those who have
lately dealt with the public wants of the American States.
This is bad in a most fatal degree, not mainly because men in high
places have been dishonest, or because the government has been badly
served by its own paid officers. That men in high places should be
dishonest, and that the people should be cheated by their rulers is
very bad. But there is worse than this. The thing becomes so common,
and so notorious, that the American world at large is taught to
believe that dishonesty is in itself good. "It behoves a man to be
smart, sir!" Till the opposite doctrine to that be learned; till men
in America,--ay, and in Europe, Asia, and Africa,--can learn that
it specially behoves a man not to be smart, they will have learned
little of their duty towards God, and nothing of their duty towards
their neighbour.
In the instances of fraud against the States' government to which I
am about to allude, I shall take all my facts from the report made
to the House of Representatives at Washington by a Committee of that
House in December, 1861. "Mr. Washbourne, from the Select Committee
to inquire into the Contracts of the Government, made the following
Report." That is the heading of the pamphlet. The Committee was known
as the Van Wyck Committee, a gentleman of that name having acted as
chairman.
The Committee first went to New York, and began their inquiries with
reference to the purchase of a steam-boat called the "Catiline."
In this case a certain Captain Comstock had been designated from
Washington as the agent to be trusted in the charter or purchase
of the vessel. He agreed on behalf of the Government to hire that
special boat for £2000 a month for three months, having given
information to friends of his on the matter, which enabled them to
purchase it out-and-out for less than £4000. These friends were
not connected with shipping matters, but were lawyers and hotel
proprietors. The Committee conclude "that the vessel was chartered to
the Government at an unconscionable price; and that Captain Comstock,
by whom this was effected, while enjoying _the peculiar confidence of
the Government_, was acting for and in concert with the parties who
chartered the vessel, and was in fact their agent." But the report
does not explain why Captain Comstock was selected for this work by
authority from Washington, nor does it recommend that he be punished.
It does not appear that Captain Comstock had ever been in the regular
service of the Government, but that he had been master of a steamer.
In the next place one Starbuck is employed to buy ships. As a
government agent he buys two for £1300, and sells them to the
government for £2900. The vessels themselves, when delivered at the
Navy Yard, were found to be totally unfit for the service for which
they had been purchased. But why was Starbuck employed, when, as
appears over and over again in the report, New York was full of paid
government servants ready and fit to do the work? Starbuck was merely
an agent, and who will believe that he was allowed to pocket the
whole difference of £1600? The greater part of the plunder was,
however, in this case refunded.
Then we come to the case of Mr. George D. Morgan, brother-in-law
of Mr. Welles, the Secretary of the Navy. I have spoken of this
gentleman before, and of his singular prosperity. He amassed a large
fortune in five months, as a government agent for the purchase of
vessels, he having been a wholesale grocer by trade. This gentleman
had had no experience whatsoever with reference to ships. It is shown
by the evidence that he had none of the requisite knowledge, and that
there were special servants of the government in New York at that
time, sent there specially for such services as these, who were in
every way trustworthy, and who had the requisite knowledge. Yet
Mr. Morgan was placed in this position by his brother-in-law the
Secretary of the Navy, and in that capacity made about £20,000 in
five months, all of which was paid by the government, as is well
shown to have been the fact in the report before me. One result of
such a mode of agency is given;--one other result, I mean, besides
the £20,000 put into the pocket of the brother of the Secretary of
the Navy. A ship called the "Stars and Stripes" was bought by Mr.
Morgan for £11,000, which had been built some months before for
£7000. This vessel was bought from a company which was blessed with a
President. The President made the bargain with the government agent,
but insisted on keeping back from his own company £2000 out of the
£11,000 for expenses incident to the purchase. The company did not
like being mulcted of its prey, and growled heavily; but their
President declared that such bargains were not got at Washington
for nothing. Members of Congress had to be paid to assist in such
things. At least he could not reduce his little private bill for such
assistance below £1600. He had, he said, positively paid out so much
to those venal Members of Congress, and had made nothing for himself
to compensate him for his own exertions. When this President came
to be examined, he admitted that he had really made no payments to
Members of Congress. His own capacity had been so great that no such
assistance had been found necessary. But he justified his charge on
the ground that the sum taken by him was no more than the company
might have expected him to lay out on Members of Congress, or on
ex-Members who are specially mentioned, had he not himself carried
on the business with such consummate discretion! It seems to me that
the Members or ex-Members of Congress were shamefully robbed in this
matter.
The report deals manfully with Mr. Morgan, showing that for five
months' work,--which work he did not do and did not know how to
do,--he received as large a sum as the President's salary for the
whole Presidential term of four years. So much better is it to be an
agent of government than simply an officer! And the Committee adds,
that they "do not find in this transaction the less to censure in the
fact that this arrangement between the Secretary of the Navy and Mr.
Morgan was one between brothers-in-law." After that who will believe
that Mr. Morgan had the whole of that £20,000 for himself? And yet
Mr. Welles still remains Secretary of the Navy, and has justified the
whole transaction in an explanation admitting everything, and which
is considered by his friends to be an able State paper. "It behoves a
man to be smart, sir." Mr. Morgan and Secretary Welles will no doubt
be considered by their own party to have done their duty well as
high trading public functionaries. The faults of Mr. Morgan and of
Secretary Welles are nothing to us in England; but the light in which
such faults may be regarded by the American people is much to us.
I will now go on to the case of a Mr. Cummings. Mr. Cummings, it
appears, had been for many years the editor of a newspaper in
Philadelphia, and had been an intimate political friend and ally of
Mr. Cameron. Now at the time of which I am writing, April, 1861, Mr.
Cameron was Secretary-at-War, and could be very useful to an old
political ally living in his own State. The upshot of the present
case will teach us to think well of Mr. Cameron's gratitude.
In April, 1861, stores were wanted for the army at Washington, and
Mr. Cameron gave an order to his old friend Cummings to expend
2,000,000 dollars, pretty much according to his fancy, in buying
stores. Governor Morgan, the Governor of New York State and a
relative of our other friend Morgan, was joined with Mr. Cummings
in this commission, Mr. Cameron no doubt having felt himself bound
to give the friends of his colleague at the Navy a chance. Governor
Morgan at once made over his right to his relative; but better things
soon came in Mr. Morgan's way, and he relinquished his share in this
partnership at an early date. In this transaction he did not himself
handle above 25,000 dollars. Then the whole job fell into the hands
of Mr. Cameron's old political friend.
The 2,000,000 of dollars, or £400,000, were paid into the hands of
certain government treasurers at New York, but they had orders to
honour the draft of the political friend of the Secretary-at-War, and
consequently £50,000 was immediately withdrawn by Mr. Cummings, and
with this he went to work. It is shown that he knew nothing of the
business; that he employed a clerk from Albany whom he did not know,
and confided to this clerk the duty of buying such stores as were
bought; that this clerk was recommended to him by Mr. Weed, the
editor of a newspaper at Albany, who is known in the States as the
special political friend of Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State; and
that in this way he spent £32,000. He bought linen pantaloons and
straw hats to the amount of £4200, because he thought the soldiers
looked hot in the warm weather; but he afterwards learned that they
were of no use. He bought groceries of a hardware dealer named
Davidson, at Albany, that town whence came Mr. Weed's clerk. He did
not know what was Davidson's trade, nor did he know exactly what he
was going to buy; but Davidson proposed to sell him something which
Mr. Cummings believed to be some kind of provisions, and he bought
it. He did not know for how much,--whether over £2000 or not. He
never saw the articles and had no knowledge of their quality. It was
out of the question that he should have such knowledge, as he naïvely
remarks. His clerk Humphreys saw the articles. He presumed they
were brought from Albany, but did not know. He afterwards bought a
ship,--or two or three ships. He inspected one ship "by a mere casual
visit:" that is to say, he did not examine her boilers; he did not
know her tonnage, but he took the word of the seller for everything.
He could not state the terms of the charter, or give the substance of
it. He had had no former experience in buying or chartering ships. He
also bought 75,000 pair of shoes at only 25 cents, or one shilling a
pair, more than their proper price. He bought them of a Mr. Hall, who
declares that he paid Mr. Cummings nothing for the job, but regarded
it as a return for certain previous favours conferred by him on Mr.
Cummings in the occasional loans of £100 or £200.
At the end of the examination it appears that Mr. Cummings still held
in his hand a slight balance of £28,000, of which he had forgotten
to make mention in the body of his own evidence. "This item seems to
have been overlooked by him in his testimony," says the report. And
when the report was made nothing had yet been learned of the destiny
of this small balance.
Then the report gives a list of the army supplies miscellaneously
purchased by Mr. Cummings:--280 dozen pints of ale at 9_s._ 6_d._
a dozen; a lot of codfish and herrings; 200 boxes of cheeses and
a large assortment of butter; some tongues; straw hats and linen
"pants;" 23 barrels of pickles; 25 casks of Scotch ale, price not
stated; a lot of London porter, price not stated; and some Hall
carbines of which I must say a word more further on. It should be
remembered that no requisition had come from the army for any of
the articles named; that the purchase of herrings and straw hats
was dictated solely by the discretion of Cummings and his man
Humphreys,--or, as is more probable, by the fact that some other
person had such articles by him for sale; and that the government
had its own established officers for the supply of things properly
ordered by military requisition. These very same articles also were
apparently procured, in the first place, as a private speculation,
and were made over to the government on the failure of that
speculation. "Some of the above articles," says the report, "were
shipped by the 'Catiline,' which were probably loaded on private
account, and not being able to obtain a clearance was in some way,
through Mr. Cummings, transferred over to the government,--_Scotch
ale, London porter, selected herrings_, and all." The italics as well
as the words are taken from the report.
This was the confidential political friend of the Secretary-at-War,
by whom he was intrusted with £400,000 of public money! £28,000
had not been accounted for when the report was made, and the
army supplies were bought after the fashion above named. That
Secretary-at-War, Mr. Cameron, has since left the Cabinet; but he has
not been turned out in disgrace; he has been nominated as minister to
Russia, and the world has been told that there was some difference
of opinion between him and his colleagues respecting slavery! Mr.
Cameron in some speech or paper declared on his leaving the Cabinet
that he had not intended to remain long as Secretary-at-War. This
assertion, I should think, must have been true.
And now about the Hall carbines, as to which the gentlemen on this
Committee tell their tale with an evident delight in the richness of
its incidents which at once puts all their readers in accord with
them. There were altogether some five thousand of these, all of which
the government sold to a Mr. Eastman in June, 1861, for 14_s._ each,
as perfectly useless, and afterwards bought in August for £4 8_s._
each, about 4_s._ a carbine having been expended in their repair in
the mean time. But as regards 790 of these now famous weapons, it
must be explained they had been sold by the government as perfectly
useless, and at a nominal price, previously to this second sale made
by the government to Mr. Eastman. They had been so sold, and then,
in April, 1861, they had been bought again for the government by the
indefatigable Cummings for £3 each. Then they were again sold as
useless for 14_s._ each to Eastman, and instantly rebought on behalf
of the government for £4 8_s._ each! Useless for war purposes they
may have been, but as articles of commerce it must be confessed that
they were very serviceable.
This last purchase was made by a man named Stevens on behalf of
General Fremont, who at that time commanded the army of the United
States in Missouri. Stevens had been employed by General Fremont as
an agent on the behalf of government, as is shown with clearness
in the report, and on hearing of these muskets telegraphed to the
General at once. "I have 5000 Hall's rifled cast-steel muskets,
breech-loading, new, at 22 dollars." General Fremont telegraphed
back instantly, "I will take the whole 5000 carbines ... I will pay
all extra charges . . ." And so the purchase was made. The muskets,
it seems, were not absolutely useless even as weapons of war.
"Considering the emergency of the times," a competent witness
considered them to be worth "10 or 12 dollars." The government had
been as much cheated in selling them as it had in buying them. But
the nature of the latter transaction is shown by the facts that
Stevens was employed, though irresponsibly employed, as a government
agent by General Fremont; that he bought the muskets in that
character himself, making on the transaction £1 18_s._ on each
musket; and that the same man afterwards appeared as an aide-de-camp
on General Fremont's staff. General Fremont had no authority himself
to make such a purchase, and when the money was paid for the first
instalment of the arms, it was so paid by the special order of
General Fremont himself out of moneys intended to be applied to
other purposes. The money was actually paid to a gentleman known at
Fremont's head-quarters as his special friend, and was then paid in
that irregular way because this friend desired that that special
bill should receive immediate payment. After that who can believe
that Stevens was himself allowed to pocket the whole amount of the
plunder?
There is a nice little story of a clergyman in New York who sold
for £40 and certain further contingencies, the right to furnish 200
cavalry horses; but I should make this too long if I told all the
nice little stories. As the frauds at St. Louis were, if not in fact
the most monstrous, at any rate the most monstrous which have as
yet been brought to the light, I cannot finish this account without
explaining something of what was going on at that western Paradise in
those halcyon days of General Fremont.
General Fremont, soon after reaching St. Louis, undertook to build
ten forts for the protection of that city. These forts have since
been pronounced as useless, and the whole measure has been treated
with derision by officers of his own army. But the judgment displayed
in the matter is a military question with which I do not presume to
meddle. Even if a general be wrong in such a matter, his character as
a man is not disgraced by such error. But the manner of building them
was the affair with which Mr. Van Wyck's committee had to deal. It
seems that five of the forts, the five largest, were made under the
orders of a certain Major Kappner at a cost of £12,000, and that the
other five could have been built at least for the same sum. Major
Kappner seems to have been a good and honest public servant, and
therefore quite unfit for the superintendence of such work at St.
Louis. The other five smaller forts were also in progress, the works
on them having been continued from 1st September to 25th September,
1861; but on the 25th September General Fremont himself gave special
orders that a contract should be made with a man named Beard, a
Californian, who had followed him from California to St. Louis. This
contract is dated the 25th of September. But nevertheless the work
specified in that contract was done previous to that date, and most
of the money paid was paid previous to that date. The contract did
not specify any lump sum, but agreed that the work should be paid for
by the yard and by the square foot. No less a sum was paid to Beard
for this work--the cormorant Beard, as the report calls him--than
£24,200, the last payment only, amounting to £4000, having been made
subsequent to the date of the contract. £20,200 was paid to Beard
before the date of the contract! The amounts were paid at five times,
and the last four payments were made on the personal order of General
Fremont. This Beard was under no bond, and none of the officers of
the government knew anything of the terms under which he was working.
On the 14th of October General Fremont was ordered to discontinue
these works, and to abstain from making any further payments on their
account. But, disobeying this order, he directed his Quartermaster to
pay a further sum of £4000 to Beard out of the first sums he should
receive from Washington, he then being out of money. This however
was not paid. "It must be understood," says the report, "that every
dollar ordered to be paid by General Fremont on account of these
works was diverted from a fund specially appropriated for another
purpose." And then again, "The money appropriated by Congress to
subsist and clothe and transport our armies was then, in utter
contempt of all law and of the army regulations, as well as in
defiance of superior authority, ordered to be diverted from its
lawful purpose and turned over to the cormorant Beard. While he had
received 170,000 dollars (£24,200) from the Government, it will be
seen from the testimony of Major Kappner that there had only been
paid to the honest German labourers, who did the work on the first
five forts built under his directions, the sum of 15,500 dollars
(£3100), leaving from 40,000 to 50,000 dollars (£8000 to £10,000)
still due; and while these labourers, whose families were clamouring
for bread, were besieging the Quartermaster's department for their
pay, this infamous contractor Beard is found following up the army
and in the confidence of the Major-General, who gives him orders for
large purchases, which could only have been legally made through the
Quartermaster's department." After that who will believe that all
the money went into Beard's pocket? Why should General Fremont have
committed every conceivable breach of order against his government,
merely with the view of favouring such a man as Beard?
The collusion of the Quartermaster M'Instry with fraudulent knaves
in the purchase of horses is then proved. M'Instry was at this time
Fremont's Quartermaster at St. Louis. I cannot go through all these.
A man of the name of Jim Neil comes out in beautiful pre-eminence. No
dealer in horses could get to the Quartermaster except through Jim
Neil, or some such go-between. The Quartermaster contracted with
Neil and Neil with the owners of horses; Neil at the time being
also military inspector of horses for the Quartermaster. He bought
horses as cavalry horses for £24 or less, and passed them himself
as artillery horses for £30. In other cases the military inspectors
were paid by the sellers to pass horses. All this was done under
Quartermaster M'Instry, who would himself deal with none but such as
Neil. In one instance, one Elleard got a contract from M'Instry, the
profit of which was £8000. But there was a man named Brady. Now Brady
was a friend of M'Instry's, who, scenting the carrion afar off, had
come from Detroit, in Michigan, to St. Louis. M'Instry himself had
also come from Detroit. In this case Elleard was simply directed by
M'Instry to share his profits with Brady, and consequently paid to
Brady £4000, although Brady gave to the business neither capital nor
labour. He simply took the £4000 as the Quartermaster's friend. This
Elleard, it seems, also gave a carriage and horses to Mrs. Fremont.
Indeed Elleard seems to have been a civil and generous fellow. Then
there is a man named Thompson, whose case is very amusing. Of him
the Committee thus speaks:--"It must be said that Thompson was not
forgetful of the obligations of gratitude, for, after he got through
with the contract, he presented the son of Major M'Instry with a
riding pony. That was the only mark of respect," to use his own
words, "that he showed to the family of Major M'Instry."
General Fremont himself desired that a contract should be made with
one Augustus Sacchi for a thousand Canadian horses. It turned out
that Sacchi was "nobody: a man of straw living in a garret in New
York whom nobody knew, a man who was brought out there"--to St.
Louis--"as a good person through whom to work." "It will hardly be
believed," says the report, "that the name of this same man Sacchi
appears in the newspapers as being on the staff of General Fremont,
at Springfield, with the rank of captain."
I do not know that any good would result from my pursuing further the
details of this wonderful report. The remaining portion of it refers
solely to the command held by General Fremont in Missouri, and adds
proof upon proof of the gross robberies inflicted upon the government
of the States by the very persons set in high authority to protect
the government. We learn how all utensils for the camp, kettles,
blankets, shoes, mess-pans, &c., were supplied by one firm, without
a contract, at an enormous price, and of a quality so bad as to be
almost useless, because the Quartermaster was under obligations to
the partners. We learn that one partner in that firm gave £40 towards
a service of plate for the Quartermaster, and £60 towards a carriage
for Mrs. Fremont. We learn how futile were the efforts of any honest
tradesman to supply good shoes to soldiers who were shoeless, and
the history of one special pair of shoes which was thrust under the
nose of the Quartermaster is very amusing. We learn that a certain
paymaster properly refused to settle an account for matters with
which he had no concern, and that General Fremont at once sent down
soldiers to arrest him unless he made the illegal payment. In October
£1000 was expended in ice, all which ice was wasted. Regiments were
sent hither and thither with no military purpose, merely because
certain officers, calling themselves generals, desired to make up
brigades for themselves. Indeed every description of fraud was
perpetrated, and this was done not through the negligence of those in
high command, but by their connivance and often with their express
authority.
It will be said that the conduct of General Fremont during the days
of his command in Missouri is not a matter of much moment to us
in England; that it has been properly handled by the Committee of
Representatives appointed by the American Congress to inquire into
the matter; and that after the publication of such a report by them,
it is ungenerous in a writer from another nation to speak upon the
subject. This would be so if the inquiries made by that Committee
and their report had resulted in any general condemnation of the men
whose misdeeds and peculations have been exposed. This, however, is
by no means the case. Those who were heretofore opposed to General
Fremont on political principles are opposed to him still; but those
who heretofore supported him are ready to support him again.* He has
not been placed beyond the pale of public favour by the record which
has been made of his public misdeeds. He is decried by the democrats
because he is a republican, and by the anti-abolitionists because
he is an abolitionist; but he is not decried because he has shown
himself to be dishonest in the service of his government. He was
dismissed from his command in the West, but men on his side of the
question declare that he was so dismissed because his political
opponents had prevailed. Now, at the moment that I am writing this,
men are saying that the President must give him another command.
He is still a major-general in the army of the States, and is as
probable a candidate as any other that I could name for the next
Presidency.
*Since this was written General Fremont has been restored to high
military command, and now holds equal rank and equal authority
with Maclellan and Halleck. In fact, the charges made against him
by the Committee of the House of Representatives have not been
allowed to stand in his way. He is politically popular with a
large section of the nation, and therefore it has been thought
well to promote him to high place. Whether he be fit for such
place, either as regards capability or integrity, seems to be
considered of no moment.
The same argument must be used with reference to the other gentlemen
named. Mr. Welles is still a Cabinet Minister and Secretary for
the Navy. It has been found impossible to keep Mr. Cameron in the
Cabinet, but he was named as the Minister of the States government to
Russia after the publication of the Van Wyck report, when the result
of his old political friendship with Mr. Alexander Cummings was
well known to the President who appointed him and to the Senate who
sanctioned his appointment. The individual corruption of any one
man--of any ten men--is not much. It should not be insisted on loudly
by any foreigner in making up a balance-sheet of the virtues and
vices of the good and bad qualities of any nation. But the light in
which such corruption is viewed by the people whom it most nearly
concerns is very much. I am far from saying that democracy has failed
in America. Democracy there has done great things for a numerous
people, and will yet, as I think, be successful. But that doctrine as
to the necessity of smartness must be eschewed before a verdict in
favour of American democracy can be pronounced. "It behoves a man to
be smart, sir." In those words are contained the curse under which
the States' government has been suffering for the last thirty years.
Let us hope that the people will find a mode of ridding themselves of
that curse. I, for one, believe that they will do so.