spaces, in which the rougher materials of war are deposited. The roadways,
laid with iron trams, which greatly facilitate the transfer of heavy guns,
are lined here and there with pyramids of shot and shell, lackered and
shining in the sun. These missiles are continually circulating along the
shoots from one spot in the Arsenal to another, passing at one time
underfoot, at another overhead, the action of gravity being pressed into
the service with other labour-saving contrivances, to remove 13-inch
shells and 98-pounder solid shot, sometimes to very considerable
distances. Vast as are the stores of these warlike implements, and far as
the vistas of pyramids stretch (and there are no less than 688,000 in the
Arsenal at present), they would speedily be drained by a short return of
war, in which artillery now plays so prominent a part. At the siege of
Sebastopol alone, which scarcely occupied eighteen months, no less than
253,042 shot and shell of all sizes were fired from our batteries, a
number which the enemy surpassed, in one attack alone, if we are to
believe the evidence afforded by some of the ravines, in which this iron
rain descended so thickly that it paved the ground and prevented the grass
from springing up. The French were even more prodigal of these
projectiles; for, according to the report made to the Emperor, 1,100,000
of them were sent by our allies into the doomed city.
The neighbourhood of each department is generally indicated by the class
of war stores to be seen at hand. We may be sure we are near the great-gun
foundry, for instance, when we see the long files of iron guns of all
sizes and patterns, from the light 32-pounders to the truly formidable
98-pounders of the naval service, flanking the road, compared with which
the light brass field-pieces that fringe the wall of the building itself
seem the merest toy-guns. Here and there trim grass-plots are seen with a
neat edging of three hundred 13-inch mortars, and at the grand entrance of
the foundry itself enormous shells, a yard in diameter, prepared for
Mallett's mammoth mortar, are planted, as if to show how daring are the
ideas of modern war, which proposes to throw such Titanic missiles at the
enemy. Here too may be seen veterans which have seen service--avenues of
wounded guns from the Crimea. These are the picked specimens of the
eighty-eight pieces of ordnance either disabled by the enemy or worn out
by their own fire in that ever-memorable siege. One, a 68-pounder, was
shattered by a singular accident; just as it was being discharged a shell
fired by the enemy exploded in its mouth, and destroyed it after it had
fired no less than 2,000 rounds. Another gun, which is split in the
muzzle, was hit thirteen times. There appears to have been luck in this
mystic number, however, for by the aid of an iron band the mishap was
repaired, and it went on doing duty until one of its trunnions was knocked
off, and even then, like the gallant Widderington, at Chevy Chase, it
fought upon its stumps; for, on being sunk into the ground, and fired at a
high elevation, it was kept at work up to the end of the siege. Some of
these guns are pitted with cannon-shot even as far back as the breech, and
one or two are hit in their very stern-most parts. These wounds are the
result of ricochet firing, a kind of practice which enables a shot to drop
in the most unexpected places.
In the mounting yard, as it is termed, which lies between the gun and
carriage factories, the field-pieces are mounted upon their carriages and
fitted up for service previous to their removal to the depôt of artillery
near the Common. Since the war the captured cannon from Sebastopol have
been stored here preparatory to their being either broken up or
distributed as trophies to the various towns of the United Kingdom. Of
these guns 1079 are of iron and 94 of brass. They are of admirable metal,
and would have proved very serviceable, except that unfortunately their
bore does not suit any of our shot. Gun-carriages rent by the bursting of
guns, or so unscientifically constructed as inevitably to destroy
themselves, like the iron carriages taken from the enemy at Kertch, are
kept as lessons for the Captain Instructor to dwell upon, when he takes
round his bevy of young artillery cadets. This official performs the
essential duty of giving the future artillery officer a clear insight into
the method of constructing and repairing all the more essential engines
and tools he will have to work with--such as guns, gun-carriages, &c., and
of obtaining a general notion of the relative strength of metals, and of
the value of the various materials out of which the munitions of war are
formed. The vast workshops of Woolwich afford an admirable field for the
acquisition of this kind of knowledge.
The neighbourhood of the Arsenal to the chief Military Academy in the
kingdom gives these embryo artillery officers an opportunity of witnessing
the experiments which are constantly going on in the Marshes, either for
the purpose of testing new guns, or of practically examining the
capabilities of new inventions. The extraordinary energy with which
projectors of all kinds (clergymen among the number) devoted themselves to
the task of inventing new implements of destruction during the Russian war
entirely belied that lamb-like spirit attributed by Mr. Cobden to his
fellow-countrymen. No less than 1976 new projects were submitted to the
Select Committee of Ordnance with respect to artillery alone. Of this
number a large proportion were of the most imbecile kind--such as
proposals to fill shells with Cayenne pepper, chloroform, and cacodyle,
the latter a most virulent material which has the property of poisoning
the air around it. The asphyxiating ball of the French was the true parent
of the whole brood. Only forty-three of the propositions were favourably
reported on, and of this number only thirty have been adopted into the
service. First and foremost among these is the plan of filling shells with
liquid iron. It is scarcely possible to exaggerate the destructive effect
of this new application of an old material. At the second shot fired in
the Marshes against a perfectly new butt which cost 200_l._, it set it on
fire and entirely destroyed it. The engines of the Arsenal and the old
expedient of heaping earth against the burning wood were of no avail, the
molten iron having penetrated in all directions deep into the timber. It
is hard to believe that any ship will be able to resist the destructive
effect of these shells, or that masses of men will be found courageous
enough to withstand their devastating effects; for immediately the
percussion shell comes in contact with any object, it explodes and throws
the molten metal in all directions--splashing and striking objects that
are completely out of the way of the contents of ordinary shells, and
proving far more deadly both to animate and inanimate substances than the
famous Greek fire of old. This very invention was brought to the notice of
the authorities as early as 1803 by a workman in a London iron-foundry;
but the suggestion was so contrary to all the current notions of the time,
that it was rejected, and not heard of again until a new war brought into
play more advanced ideas.
The new guns that were brought forward were innumerable, and many of them,
such as the Mersey steel gun, and the great mortar, are still under trial.
If this mortar, which is built up of a series of rings 9 inches broad and
3-1/2 inches thick, laid over one another, and fitting tightly, so as to
form a barrel, should ultimately prove capable of resisting the full
charge of 70 lbs. weight of powder, it will be the most destructive
implement yet invented for the purpose of crushing fortified places. In
some of the trials which have taken place in the Marshes, it threw its
36-inch shell, weighing 26 cwt., upwards of two miles; and when the
missile fell, it buried itself in the ground to so considerable a depth,
that after digging down 12 feet, and probing for 15 feet more, it still
remained undiscovered. The artillerymen say jestingly that it has dropped
down to Australia, No casemate at present in existence could withstand the
crushing weight of its fall, and its bursting charge of 200 lbs. of
powder.
After contemplating this vast establishment for the manufacture of arms,
with its sixty steam-engines, which through the agency of upwards of three
miles of running shafting, give motion to upwards of a thousand machines,
we must not omit to mention the human labour which directs this enormous
manufacturing power. During the height of the Crimean war, upwards of
10,000 men and boys were employed in the Arsenal, an army of workers
engaged upon the production of the materials of destruction equal to the
entire force encamped at Aldershot, and double the number of men that
besieged and took Delhi. When such masses of men as this have to be dealt
with daily, it is obvious how necessary it must be to possess an organized
system by which the loss of what might otherwise be considered mere
fractions of time is noted. Let us suppose, for instance, that every man
and boy in the Arsenal lost only five minutes per day, and it would amount
in the aggregate to the loss of the labour of one man for twelve weeks to
the Government.
The next problem to be solved is how to pay 10,000 men in any reasonable
time. It would be clearly impossible to calculate each man's wages at the
time of payment, even if a little army of clerks were employed. It is
therefore done beforehand by a staff of men employed for this purpose. The
amount due to each person having been ascertained, the money is laid out
on boards divided into partitions numbered consecutively. A corresponding
number for each man, with the amount to be given to him, is distributed
previously to the payment taking place, on what is termed a "pay ticket."
On pay-day the artisans take their places in single file, arranging
themselves according to their numbers, and, passing in front of the
pay-boards, receive their wages, and surrender their tickets, which are
receipts for the money. No money is exchanged if not brought back before
the man reaches a certain point, and in this space there are persons
stationed to watch that no exchange is made of bad money for good. To
search every man as he left would be impossible, yet it is highly
necessary to have some means of checking petty depredations of metal, &c.
Formerly peculations of this kind were constant, and the aggregate loss
must have been immense. When it was first determined to put a stop to it,
the men were told only a few minutes before leaving work that they would
be searched as they went out. The effect of this announcement was that the
whole Arsenal was strewed with small pilfered articles thrown hastily
away. Now a couple of policemen at the gate touch indiscriminately a
certain per-centage of the men as they are going, and these have to pass
through a side lodge to be searched. As no man can tell whether or no he
will be touched, the whole mass is kept honest. The mere lodging of such a
body of men was at first a difficulty, even in so large a town as
Woolwich: the demand, however, soon produced supply, and the means taken
to insure the fall of Sebastopol caused the rise of a new town of at least
two thousand houses in the immediate neighbourhood of the Arsenal.
Complete as we have shown the organization of the Arsenal to be, both as
regards its mechanical resources and its staff, it is generally understood
that the Government do not intend to depend upon it wholly for the supply
of the munitions of war. In the case of small-arms, its powers, as we have
seen, are wholly inadequate to the task. In those branches, however, where
the manufacturing power is ample, they will not attempt to push it to the
point of excluding the private manufacturer from a share in the business.
This is, we think, a wise decision; for, however excellent may be the
present arrangements now everything is new and the broom is fresh, it
cannot be denied that the tendency of this and all other Government
establishments is to go to sleep, since they neither possess the stimulus
of private gain to teach them economy, nor that unity of direction which
gives such vigour to private enterprises. The principle of competition
ought therefore to be kept up, and we should run the private manufacturer
against the public one in order to keep down price, and pit the Royal
Factory against the trade in order to keep up quality. Another great gain
will accrue from the determination of the Government, which is, that the
private manufacturers will not lose the art of making certain stores of
war--an art which can not be learned in a day. It would be unwise for the
authorities to put all their eggs into one basket, and this they would
most assuredly do by entirely depending upon their own powers of
production, and in disassociating themselves from the great and fertile
manufacturing power of England, which generally knows so well how to
economize and progress.
If the Government have shown judgment and foresight upon this point, we
cannot say as much for their inexcusable neglect to provide for the
security of this enormous establishment, which contains within its walls
not only the principal depôt of warlike stores in the island, but also the
means of producing them. We do not believe that our neighbours are going
to sail up the Thames quite as easily as the Dutch did, or that any
foreign army marching from Dover could destroy the Arsenal on its way to
the capital without our having ample notice of their approach.
Nevertheless we cannot think that the sole Arsenal of England, placed as
it is in a very accessible part of the island, should be left entirely
without the means of defence. The place itself could not be fortified, as
it is commanded by the heights of Shooter's Hill; but the neighbourhood is
admirably adapted for the purpose. In the opinion of military engineers,
it would not be necessary even to erect the requisite works until the
moment their services were required. Half a dozen earth batteries, mounted
with heavy guns, would command all the land approaches; and a few flats,
posted so as to sweep the reaches of the river, would effectually prevent
the approach of any hostile force by water. The scheme of these batteries
should, however, be settled beforehand in all their details, so that in
the moment of danger they could be completed almost in the presence of the
enemy, in case an invader should give the Channel Fleet the slip some
misty morning, and succeed in making good his footing upon our shores.
SHIPWRECKS.
There is no nobler or more national sight in our island than to behold the
procession of stately vessels as they pass in panoramic pride along our
shores, or navigate the great arterial streams of commerce,--to witness
the deeply-laden Indiaman warped out of the docks, or to see the emigrant
ship speeding with bellying sails down Blackwall Reach, watched by many
weeping eyes, and the depository of many aching hearts. It would, however,
spoil the enjoyment of the least-interested spectator if the veil could be
lifted from the dark future; if that gallant Indiaman could be shown him
broadside on among the breakers; or that stately vessel, with bulwarks
fringed with tearful groups looking so sadly to the receding shore, were
pictured by him foundering in mid ocean--gone to swell the numbers of the
dismal fleet that yearly sails and is never heard of more. Sadder still
would be his reflections if another passing ship could be shown him,
destined perhaps to circle the globe in safety, and when within sight of
the white cliffs of Albion, full of joyful hearts, suddenly, in the dark
and stormy night, fated to be dashed to atoms, like the _Reliance_ and
_Conqueror_, on a foreign strand. If such dramatic contrasts as these
could be witnessed, we should without doubt strain every nerve to prevent
their recurrence. As it is, the sad tale of disasters at sea comes to us
weakened by the lapse of time and the distance of the scene of the
catastrophe: instead of having the harrowing sight before our eyes, we
have only statistics which raise no emotion, and even rarely arrest
attention. In connection with these annual returns there is published a
fearful-looking map termed a wreck chart, in which the shores of Great
Britain and Ireland are shown fringed with dots,--the sites of wrecks,
collisions, and other disasters. From this we perceive how all the
dangerous headlands and sandbanks on the coast are strewn with--
"A thousand fearful wrecks,
A thousand men that fishes gnaw'd upon;
Wedges of gold, great anchors, heaps of pearl,
Inestimable stones, unvalued jewels--
All scatter'd in the bottom of the sea."
Strange to say, these dismal finger-posts to marine disasters are
generally found grouped around the sites of lighthouses. If we analyze the
chart for the year 1857, we perceive at a glance the relative dangers of
the three seaboards of triangular England, and that a fatal pre-eminence
is given to the East coast. Out of a total of 1,143 wrecks and casualties
which took place in this year, no less than 600, or more than one-half,
occurred between Dungeness and Pentland Frith. Along this perilous sea,
beset with sands, shoals, and rocky headlands, no less than 150,000
vessels pass annually, the greater part ill-constructed, deeply-laden
colliers, such as we see in the Pool, and wonder how they manage to
survive a gale of wind. The South coast, extending from Dungeness to the
Land's End, is comparatively safe, only 84 wrecks having taken place in
1847; whilst from the Land's End to Greenock, where the influence of the
Atlantic gales is most sensibly felt, the numbers rise again to 286, and
the Irish coast contributes a total of 173.
If we take a more extended view of these disastrous occurrences by opening
the wreck chart attached to the evidence of the select committee on
harbours of refuge, given in 1857, containing the casualties of five years
from 1852 to 1856, both inclusive, we shall be better able to analyze
their causes. Within this period no less than 5,128 wrecks and collisions
took place, being an average of 1,025 a year. According to the evidence of
Captain Washington, R.N., the scientific and indefatigable hydrographer of
the Admiralty, these casualties consisted of
Vessels.
Total losses by stranding or otherwise 1,940
" " collisions 244
Serious damage having to discharge 2,401
Collisions with serious damage 543
-----
5,128
The total losses from all causes, therefore, amounted to 2,184 vessels, or
to an average of nearly 437 in each year. The destruction of life
consequent upon these casualties was 4,148 persons, or, upon the average
of five years, nearly 830 in each year. In 1854 no fewer than 1,549
persons were drowned.
How such a calamity should have been so long tolerated in a civilized
country, without any proper attempt at a remedy, it is not easy to
comprehend. Still more incomprehensible, in a trading country, is the
apparent disregard of the pecuniary sacrifice. It appears in evidence that
the loss by total wrecks is estimated at 1,000,000_l._ a year at least,
and by other casualties at 500,000_l._, making together 1,500,000_l._ as
the annual loss to the country from the accidents on our own coasts--a sum
which in two years would be ample to build all the harbours of refuge that
are needed around our shores.
The first step towards a remedy for this state of things is to inquire
into the causes of shipwreck. There can be little hesitation in naming
Marine Insurance as the chief destroyer. Unseaworthiness and overloading
of vessels; their being ill found in anchors, cables, sails, and rigging;
defects of compasses, want of good charts, incompetency of masters, may
all be attributed to this source. If the shipowners were not guaranteed
from loss, they would take care that their vessels were seaworthy,
commanded by qualified persons, and furnished with every necessary store.
The terms of the insurance, moreover, offer a direct premium to create in
all cases of casualty a "total loss." For instance, a ship strikes the
ground and becomes damaged, but, under able management, might be got off
and repaired. In this case, however, the assured has to bear one third
part of the loss; whereas, if the loss is total, he gets the whole of his
insurance. Under these circumstances, even when there is no deliberate
desire to perpetrate a wrong, the captain will leave the ship to her fate
instead of using his energies to preserve her to the detriment of his
employer. It is the opinion of many that if the insurers were to agree to
pay the whole insurance, whether the damaged vessel were got off or not,
that we should see a marked diminution in the list of total losses at
sea, for the natural inclination of the captain to save his ship would
then no longer be counterbalanced by his desire to save the pocket of the
owner.
There is a class of casualties, however, which are the product of villany,
against which we see no protection excepting in the vigilance of the
insurers: we refer to those cases of wilful casting away, which are not
unknown even in this country, as the late trial of a captain, at the Old
Bailey, will testify; but which are most frequent on the Florida Reef. It
is notorious that our American friends are in the habit of sailing ships
into these waters, with the deliberate intention of steering them to
destruction. So well is this known, that those on shore can predict, with
tolerable accuracy, from the handling of the vessel, whether she is about
to be sunk or not. When it is not the skipper's interest to lose his
craft, he will allow the wreckers, who swarm as plentifully as sharks in
those waters, to act as pilots, and to put the ship in dangerous positions
for the purpose of making a claim for salvage, which the swindling captain
shares with them. In the years 1854, 1855, and 1856, 189 ships were either
lost or put into Key West. The salvage upon the latter class amounted to
298,400·05 dollars, a large portion of which was, without doubt, obtained
by fraud. It is far from our purpose to insinuate that the Americans are
worse than their neighbours in this particular; had the English the same
opportunity, there would always be found persons to enter upon similar
practices. The memory of wrecking is not yet extinct in Cornwall, and only
a few years since it was notorious that the pilots of the Downs were in
the habit of recommending the cables of the vessels in their charge to be
slipped in very moderate gales of wind, because these worthies had a good
understanding with the chain and anchor makers of the neighbouring ports
who would have to supply fresh tackle.