AT COLESBERG
The troops with General French were in very fine fettle. They had no
past history; they were not damped by the remembrance of a Majesfontein,
a Stormberg, or a Colenso. They had perfect confidence in their chief;
they had just enough hard work to keep their wits polished and their
minds alert, and in the intervals there was sport of a kind for those
who fancied it.
Fighting in and around Colesberg was incessant. The Boers were most
stubborn in their determination to get rid of the British, and General
French was equally stubborn in his determination to get rid of the
Boers! Colesberg was a situation to be desired, and both British and
Boer forces fought desperately to hold it. It is situated some
thirty-seven miles north of Naauwpoort, which is the junction of a
branch line to De Aar. Between Naauwpoort and Colesberg are undulating
pastures, and the town itself, which boasts a population of 1900 souls,
possesses three--till lately--thriving hotels. In addition to these
attractions it has for the Boers another--the attraction of being the
birthplace of Oom Paul. Its capture would have mightily impressed the
waverers in Cape Colony, consequently General French determined to
celebrate the New Year by making another lunge at the enemy.
Early on Monday morning his troops took up a position upon the kopjes
surrounding the town. His force, divided into two brigades commanded by
Colonel Porter (Carabineers) and Colonel Fisher (10th Hussars),
simultaneously attacked the Boer position.
The second brigade started from Rensburg at five on the previous
afternoon, passed the night at Maider's farm, and in the small hours
proceeded to their destination, the Boer position on Kul Kop, and seized
the kopjes overlooking Colesberg on the west.
The advance was made on the Boer haunts at nine, and was greeted by a
tornado from the surprised enemy, whose position extended for six miles
round the entire village. Our artillery answered briskly, continuing a
two hours' argument which had the result of effectually silencing the
seven or eight Boer guns. (Curiously enough, on inspection, it was
discovered that some of the Boer shells had been manufactured at the
Royal Laboratory, Woolwich!)
Meanwhile the cavalry and horse-artillery were endeavouring to work
round to the north of the enemy's position. The foe, ever nimble, was
kept "on the trot." He was driven from hill to hill. Brilliantly the
Berkshires, under Major M'Cracken, stormed a kopje to the west of
Colesberg, occupying successive positions and pouring a torrent of lead
on the enemy, who fled in disorder with loud shouts! Splendidly wheeled
the cavalry, under Colonel Fisher, executing at the same time a flank
movement and closing in round the Dutchmen, who had but time to flee.
The enemy retired towards the west, followed always by the British, but
owing to the peculiar disposition of the many kopjes in the vicinity the
task of pursuing them was difficult. In their retreat towards Colesberg
Junction they were hotly chased by the cavalry, and Colesberg itself was
left almost in our hands.
On the 2nd of January an unfortunate accident occurred. A train within
the British lines was mysteriously set in motion, and was carried by the
impetus given to it in the direction of the Boer lines. It travelled
slowly, but sufficiently fast to get out of reach, and as the machine
was full of supplies, it was necessary to fire on and destroy it rather
than allow the Boers to reap the reward of rebel treachery. The brakes
were found to have been taken off the trucks, and a Dutchman was
arrested on suspicion of having perpetrated the deed. At first an
attempt was made to mend the trucks, the working party being supported
by Carabineers and the Mounted Infantry; but these were bombarded by the
Boers, and finally the trucks had to be fired to prevent the rations
they contained, a quantity of rum, from falling into the hands of the
enemy. The New South Wales Lancers under Major Lee, who were sent to the
scene to avert looting by the foe, spent five hours under fire, holding
the position and returning the fire with great gallantry.
The small force under General French's command at this time consisted of
the Carabineers, 10th Hussars, Inniskilling Dragoons, O and R Batteries
of Horse Artillery, the Berkshires and Suffolks, the New South Wales
Lancers and New Zealanders. With this limited number he had worked
wonders, driving the Dutchmen out from the kopjes immediately around
Arundel, and forcing them continually to shift their position, a process
which effectually deterred them from gaining ground. The Boer position
now lay on long lines of kopjes to east and west of the rails, from
Taaibosch Laagte to Rensburg; in the middle of the plain was the
dumpling-figured kopje known as Val Kop which the British had been
forced to evacuate.
The enemy now prepared a little surprise. At daybreak on the 4th they
made a sudden attempt to outflank the British position beyond Coleskop,
westward of the town; thus hoping to reopen communications with the
northern waggon bridge.
In General French's report of the day's work, he said: "The enemy was
found to have established himself in strength at some hills running
about east and west at right angles to the left rear of our position.
The cavalry on the left should not have allowed him to do this unseen,
but in turning him out they rendered signal service. The 10th Hussars,
with two guns which I sent to them, threatened to take them in reverse,
and they were heavily fired upon by the remaining four guns of O Battery
in front. This caused several hundred to abandon the position, and the
plain was covered with flying horsemen. The 10th Hussars on one flank,
and a squadron of the Inniskillings on the other, dashed after them. The
10th Hussars were checked by some of the Boers taking up a strong
position in some rocks to cover the retreat of the others. In a most
gallant style Colonel Fisher dismounted his men and led them on foot
against this position, which they carried with great boldness and
intrepidity.
"In this daring operation, I regret to say, Major Harvey was killed, and
Major Alexander severely wounded.
"The 6th Dragoons, led by Captain E. A. Herbert, showed no less dash,
pursuing the enemy, mounted, and inflicting some loss with their lances.
Some 200 of the enemy had, however, still clung to the hills, and after
shelling them for some considerable time, both in front and flank, I
decided to clear the position with the Mounted Infantry. Advancing under
cover of the fire of the artillery, Captain De Lisle moved his men with
great skill to a position where he could move against the enemy's right
flank. Here he dismounted and advanced to attack, choosing the ground
with admirable care. At this threat at least 100 more of the Boers took
to flight in many small parties, the remainder endeavoured to check the
Mounted Infantry advance. When one half the position was made good, a
final exodus was made by the enemy, and twenty-one last remaining Boers
surrendered. The Mounted Infantry suffered no casualties. This operation
was most skilfully and boldly carried out by Captain De Lisle. It has
been conclusively ascertained that on this day the enemy lost upwards of
ninety killed and wounded, our casualties being six killed and fifteen
wounded."
[Illustration: OFFICERS--CITY OF LONDON IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS.
Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]
On the 5th of January, Lieutenant Sir John Milbanke, who went out with a
patrol of five men on the plain north of Colesberg, came in touch with
the enemy. The Boers galloped up to intercept the small British party,
and Sir John Milbanke was slightly wounded in the thigh. This form of
skirmish was an almost daily occurrence, for round the place was a
species of Boer girdle. The Dutchmen, like flies--swept off at one
moment to return the next--now buzzed in the hills within a mile radius
from the town, while on the north, in the direction of the Free State,
and in the east towards Aliwal and Burghersdorp, they remained in
undisturbed possession of the country. To the north of Colesberg was a
hill which practically commanded the road to Orange River, and also
other roads leading to the town. That this hill should be in British
possession was eminently desirable, and Colonel Watson conceived the
idea that it might be easily taken and held by us. With General French's
permission, on Friday, the 5th of January, he arranged an expedition, a
midnight one, for the purpose of gaining the coveted position. He
started forth at two o'clock on the morning of the 6th with four
companies of the Suffolk Regiment. After marching stealthily in the
darkness for about a mile, they reached the foot of the hill. This kopje
had been often reconnoitred by various officers, and it was not due to
any rashness on their part that a lamentable accident occurred. They
marched through the dead of night to the top of the hill. In the morning
twilight they were attacked by the enemy, who, aware of their design,
was awaiting them. So completely had the troops fallen into a trap, that
when the rifles blazed out they were at a distance of only thirty paces
from the Dutchmen. The Colonel, who had halted to address the men, the
Adjutant, and two other officers, were wounded before the Suffolks had
found time to fire a single shot. Indeed, so quickly were they pounced
on, that Colonel Watson, on giving orders to charge, fell riddled with
bullets. Suddenly orders, none knew from whence, were given to "retire."
Some said it was a ruse of the Boers. The rear fled back to the pickets,
some thousand yards off, believing the order came from their officers;
others--about a hundred and twenty officers and men--remained, refusing
to budge. They fought bravely, but were eventually compelled to
surrender. All were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Of eleven
officers, but one remained! The Boers were evidently well-informed of
the commanding officer's programme, and their tactics were so clever and
combined that they contrived to create something of a panic when the
unfortunate Suffolks, who thought themselves only preparing for attack,
were definitely attacked. Critics sitting in judgment at home declared
that ordinary precautions would have averted the chance of being
entrapped, but others, who knew Kaffir ways and the condition of the
country, where every keyhole was an ear and every leaf of a tree an eye,
were inclined to marvel that so few disasters happened.
One of the officers writing of the affair said: "It is quite certain the
Colonel never gave that order, or the officers would have retired too.
They remained to a man, except Graham, who was wounded early, and could
not hold his rifle. He dragged himself down the hill, and somehow
crawled the two miles into camp. The Boers said those that were left
charged three times and behaved splendidly. The position was impossible
to take, even if a brigade had attacked, although it had been carefully
reconnoitred. The ditch, with the loopholed wall near the top of the
hill, could only have been discovered by a balloon. The Colonel's last
words were, 'Remember Gibraltar, my boys!'"[7]
There was deep regret at the loss of this distinguished officer, and the
whole force lamented the first check which this column had sustained.
The enemy was shelled at intervals, so as to make his position as
uncomfortable as possible, but the Boers still remained in possession of
the route leading to the Free State by Achtertang. Soon the Essex
Regiment was sent on to replace the 1st Suffolk, who went south to
recruit their shattered forces.
Among the wounded officers was Major Graham; Lieutenants Wilkins, Carey,
and White were killed. With those taken prisoners were Captains Brett,
Thomson, Brown; Second Lieutenants Allen, Wood-Martin, and Butler. Of
the men, 26 were killed, 45 wounded, and 72 taken prisoners or missing.
The British occupied Slingersfontein on the 9th of January. From this
time Colonel Porter and his splendidly alert troops--the 5th Dragoons,
New Zealanders and New South Wales Lancers--were busily occupied in
keeping the enemy "on the run," forcing him to leave one kopje after
another, and maintaining harassing tactics which entirely upset the
Dutchmen's calculations. Still the Boers were ubiquitous. They now held
a strong position between Colesberg and Slingersfontein, from which with
the small force at hand it was impossible to dislodge them. On the 13th,
the inconvenience of the situation was rendered more intense by a
perfect cyclone of dust which caused the utmost discomfort. Meals were
also made impossible by the aggressive attacks of the enemy, who plumped
shell after shell in the midst of the camp. Colonel Porter retired his
troops to the cover of a neighbouring hill, while three squadrons of the
6th Dragoon Guards and four guns of O Battery, Horse Artillery, advanced
across the plain and prepared to tackle the enemy. This was done with
such celerity and decision that almost in five minutes the Boer guns
were silenced and the enemy driven to cover. As a result of the prompt
activities of our artillery, the Boer tents were removed eastwards.
[Illustration: POSITION AT COLESBERG ABOUT 20TH JANUARY.]
These sand-storms, characteristic of the Veldt, were a terrible test to
patience. At one moment the camp was an orderly array of mushroom tents
springing decorously from the earth; in the next it was seemingly an
animated mass of anthills trying to maintain life against an ochreous
avalanche of dust. Occasionally when the cyclone of grit had ceased, it
was followed by a hurricane of hail, accompanied by the gloom of night,
the bellow of the blast and growl of the thunder-claps fighting together
in the hills. Then would the frightened cattle stampede, and the whole
routine of military life become deranged. A rushing mob, a battle of the
elements, a vast ditch irrigated with rivulets, bombardment by the big
guns of the wind--such would be the programme for a good hour or so!
Then, as often as not, the sun would suddenly come out and shine
affably, with the placid, self-satisfied beam of dear old ladies when
they've trumped their partner's best card of a long suit at whist!
After this, the routine of life would go on much as before, the Dutchmen
clinging to their positions, and General French determining to make
these as untenable as possible.
On the 15th the New Zealanders had an excellent opportunity of
exhibiting their smartness and dash. The Boers made a stubborn attempt
to seize a hill that practically commanded the country to east and west
of their main position. This valuable eminence was held by a detachment
of New Zealanders and D Company of the Yorkshire Regiment under Captain
Orr. Early in the morning desultory firing began, and later the Boers,
increasing the warmth of their fire, worked towards the right of the
position held by the New Zealanders. At the same time they assailed the
Yorkshires, directing their fire at a small wall held by them and
forcing them to keep close cover. Gradually the Boers advanced, creeping
towards the wall ever nearer and nearer. They then blazed furiously from
their position on the slopes, killing the Sergeant-Major and wounding
Captain Orr. At this time Captain Madocks, R.A. (attached to the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles), and ten New Zealanders appeared on the scene,
and, to the dismay of the Boers, the whole party with a dash and a yell
leapt over the wall and charged down on their assailants with fixed
bayonets. It was a splendid act, and one which, as the officer
commanding the Yorkshires had dropped wounded, came just in time to save
the situation.
Away rushed the enemy, rolling one over another in their effort to be
off, while a sustained storm of bullets inflicted heavy loss on their
retreating numbers. From the distance they made a feeble attempt to fire
at the gallant fellows who had routed them, but eventually they retired
to the small kopjes at the base of the contested hill. There they were
saluted by a detachment of two guns of O Battery from the west of the
kopje. The enemy's long-range gun now came into play and forced the
British guns to move their position farther to the west. That done, the
small kopjes were effectively shelled and the Dutchmen's fire silenced.
The whole engagement was a signal success, and the Yorkshires and New
Zealanders were well pleased with their share of the day's work.
Twenty-one Boers were left dead on the field and many more were wounded.
(On the morning of this day an unfortunate incident occurred at
Colesberg. Lieutenant Thompson, R.H.A., while out scouting, was wounded
and taken prisoner. This officer, together with Lieutenants Talbot
Ponsonby, Lamont, and Aldridge, was especially mentioned for services
performed with the guns.)
[Illustration: GENERAL FRENCH'S REMARKABLE POSITION AT COLESBERG, AS
SEEN FROM KUL OR COLE'S KOP ABOUT 15TH JANUARY.
Sketch by Frederick Villiers, War Artist.]
The events of the last few days had served to show that, however the
Colonials might differ in their customs, habits, and ideas, they were
assuredly identical in their dogged bravery and their fine spirit of
dash--
"They come of The Blood, slower to bless than to ban,
Little used to lie down at the bidding of any man,"--
and Captain Madocks and his hardy New Zealanders had now the
well-merited good fortune to have earned the esteem and appreciation of
all who had seen their splendid rush to the rescue of the Yorkshires. On
the 16th General French visited the New Zealanders' camp and
congratulated them on their gallant conduct during the fight.
The Boers now brought to bear on the position one of the guns captured
by them at Stormberg, and launched some ten shots into the kopjes held
by a company of the Welsh Regiment. They got as good as they gave, and
before long the enemy was completely silenced. General French's system
was a tit-for-tat form of warfare, which failed to commend itself to the
Dutchmen. It served well, however--in default of sufficient troops to
make any definite advance--to hold the enemy from proceeding farther
south in British territory. News now came in that a large force of
Dutchmen had been transferred from Majesfontein for the purpose of
reinforcing the Boer commandoes at Colesberg, and thus rendering the
paralysis of the British complete.
A very serious disaster befell a patrol consisting partly of New South
Wales Lancers and South Australian Horse, who had so nobly volunteered
their services to the Mother Country at the beginning of the war. On the
morning of the 16th of January a party of nineteen rode out from Colonel
Porter's camp for the purpose of reconnoitring towards Achtertang. It
was not yet dawn, but they pursued their investigations, reaching Norval
Camp without seeing any signs of the enemy. About 8 A.M. they commenced
the return journey naturally with a feeling of greater security than
when they started. They unfortunately fell into an ambush. A hot fight
ensued, but the Boers were in overwhelming numbers, and the party was
hard pressed. Two escaped to camp, and six more, after hiding till it
was possible to make good their escape, followed them. The rest were
made prisoners, but not without a struggle, as the bodies of four dead
Australian and seven dead Boer horses, left on the field, served to
testify. Lieutenant Dowling was killed. The enemy now occupied Klein
Toren to the north of Slingersfontein.
On the 18th inst. Major-General Clements, D.S.O., arrived with two
regiments of the 12th Brigade (the Royal Irish and the Worcestershire),
and was placed in command of all the troops at and east of Slinger's
Farm. Two battalions were posted at that place, and occupied a good
commanding position, which had been well fortified and intrenched.
General Clements had also, at Slinger's, one company New Zealand Mounted
Rifles; one squadron and four guns. Colonel Porter, 6th Dragoon Guards,
with four squadrons, two guns, and one company of infantry, was posted
at a farm called Potfontein, some eight miles east, and a little south,
of Slinger's. The enemy's force at Colesberg was now hemmed in on the
west, south, and east, and their position began to look uncomfortable,
particularly as a battery firing lyddite shells was at hand to assist in
the British operations. The British now held a series of positions of
great extent, shaped after the manner of a mark of interrogation, with
Colesberg within the curve of the hook.
The distance to be covered between the camps on the east and west flanks
was about sixteen miles. Supplies were conveyed by waggons drawn by
mules of South African breed--sleek, and as a rule good-tempered beasts.
The South American mules were of a weaklier stamp, their poor condition
being the result of importation. The tracks through the veldt, called by
courtesy roads, were now in many places a foot deep in dust wherever
sand-drifts had been lodged, and these promised in the event of rain to
develop into morasses.
On the 25th General French made a reconnaissance in person, and
discovered that the enemy was strongly posted at Rietfontein. The
reconnaissance occupied two days, during which the troops covered forty
miles. In spite of many efforts to cut the Boer's communications with
the Free State the Boers outwitted him, or rather out-dodged him, and
retained their hold on Colesberg. Their position consisted of commanding
hills down a defile through which a spruit flows towards the Orange
River. The windings of this stream are followed by Waggon Road for more
than a mile, then, after passing the hills, it flows over undulating
country towards the river.
On Saturday, the 27th, a melancholy incident took place. For some weeks
Major MacCracken had been holding a hill close up to the Boer position,
and on this particular morning, though no fighting was taking place, a
shell was plumped upon the hill by the enemy with the result that an
officer was wounded. A New Zealander named Booth, orderly to General
Clements, was killed while holding the General's horse. At this time
General French had mysteriously disappeared. His destination, though not
announced, was Cape Town, where he went on a visit to Lord Roberts,
whose plans were rapidly approaching completion. The upshot of that
momentous visit we shall discover anon.
LORD ROBERTS'S ADVANCE
At Modder River Lord Methuen, to encourage the performers in a series of
inter-regimental boxing matches, offered three splendid challenge cups
for competition. These were won by the Scots Guards, the Grenadier
Guards, and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders respectively, on the
3rd of February, when the series came to an exciting conclusion.
Meanwhile, when the cat was away the mice could play. The Boers engaged
in their usual game of destroying railway tracks between Modder Camp and
Langeberg, and as many as thirty-three explosions were heard, which
portended considerable damage to line and culverts. However the trains
conveying the sick to hospital at the Cape got away in safety, and as
many invalids as possible were despatched to the base in order that the
advance movement, when it should commence, would not be hampered.
The junction of De Aar at this time was simmering with activity. Stores
to the value of a million pounds were being accumulated in preparation
for a gigantic move in the direction of Modder River. Though at the
moment Lord Roberts's plans were not generally known, it was certain
that a vast number of troops--many more than those then under Lord
Methuen's command--were about to congregate in the neighbourhood of
Orange River, and in consequence there was suppressed excitement among
the British and corresponding trepidation among the Free Staters.
General French, whose splendid activity had been going on in most trying
circumstances, now found himself freed to begin operations on a scale
more fitted to his talents and more congenial to them. Cavalry was
pouring in, and with cavalry and such a commander there was immense
cause for hope.
The Suffolks who, after their disaster at Colesberg, went to Port
Elizabeth to recruit their forces, now came up to De Aar, and were
re-officered prior to being sent to the front. Other regiments were also
trickling in, and slowly disposing of themselves in positions previously
arranged by Lord Roberts at the Cape. All these dispositions were made
with intense secrecy, Lord Kitchener setting himself to work to
reorganise the transport department in such a manner as to make all the
complicated moves of the coming war game possible.
[Illustration: WITH GENERAL FRENCH: NEW ZEALANDERS SAVING A PICKET OF
THE YORKSHIRE REGIMENT NEAR SLINGERSFONTEIN ON JANUARY 15.
Drawing by W. Small from a Sketch by G. D. Giles.]
Life at Modder River began to grow correspondingly animated. Experiments
in the working of the Marconi wireless telegraphy were set on foot, and
other active preparations for decisive combat were pushed forward. The
Boers were busy too. They were making further trenches in front of the
Majesfontein ridge with a view to still further strengthening their
position, an exertion which they subsequently found to be somewhat
unnecessary. They also swelled their numbers. From the report of
deserters it seemed that President Steyn had drawn to his banner many
reluctant farmers by means of false representations, he having
circulated the report that the British meant to seize and confiscate
property for the purpose of enriching their own soldiers after the war.
The Canadian Regiment, who till then had been guarding the lines of
communication, moved to the front. They were in great spirits, and much
rejoiced at being allowed to take a more active share in operations.
The Australian Infantry Regiment was now to be mounted. It was a
misfortune that the Australians were not mounted from the first, as all
were good horsemen, and would have come in handy to assist the British
cavalry in the work of reconnaissance, which the mobile nature of Boer
movements rendered unusually hard. The companies were composed of about
125 men from Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, West Australia,
and Tasmania respectively.
On the 6th of February Lord Roberts left Cape Town for the front. He
stopped _en route_ at Belmont. Every eye was turned to him as he
alighted at the railway station. It was nine o'clock, and presently a
crowd collected to view the two warriors on whom the British Empire
pinned its faith. One was the smallest man in the station; the other was
the largest. The Field-Marshal, neat as a new pin, with his refined
visage, grey moustache and tufted imperial, looked young, even happy,
and undisturbed by his responsibilities; the hero of Omdurman, large and
broad-shouldered, his forage cap crammed on his head, his keen
steel-tinted eyes piercing the heart of things at a glance, appeared
stern and preoccupied. They were met by Colonel Otter, and the
Field-Marshal at once asked to see the Canadians. Colonel Otter
accordingly brought him to the main guard, which consisted of one
sergeant, one corporal, and two men. One of these described the
inspection by the august chief. "We were standing at the present, and
Lord Roberts appeared to be sizing us up pretty well. He inquired how we
liked our bandoliers for cartridges, and on Sergeant Ellard informing
him that they were too loose, and that the cartridges fell out of them,
Lord Roberts said that he would see that this was remedied. Lord Roberts
presented Sergeant Ellard with a basket of roses, and on distribution of
them I received one." This flower was treasured and sent home to the
trooper's family in remembrance of the great day which brought him face
to face with England's grandest soldier. On the 9th the Chief arrived at
Modder River. At this time General Macdonald and the Highland Brigade
were keeping the Boers occupied on the west, and during this manoeuvre
tremendous activities were set on foot. For instance, while General
Macdonald's Brigade was marching back to camp on the 10th of February, a
force consisting of 23,000 infantry, 11,000 mounted men, and 48 guns,
with transport of some 700 waggons, drawn by 9000 mules and oxen, was
approaching the Free State! A brigade of Mounted Infantry under Colonel
Hannay was moving from Orange River to Ramdam, situated about eight
miles from Jacobsdal. On the 11th, Boers were discovered intercepting
the road and holding the hills, but these, with a detached part of
Colonel Hannay's force, were held where they were, while the main body
with the baggage pushed on to their destination. On the 12th General
French--who was now for the first time since his departure from
Ladysmith, in command of a cavalry division--seized the crossing of the
Riet River at Dekiel's Drift, whereupon the 6th and 7th Divisions there
encamped themselves.
Before going further, it is necessary to follow the movements of the
Highland Brigade, movements which materially assisted the development of
the intricate plan of advance.
"FIGHTING MAC" AT KOODOESBERG
The Boers were now threatening the line between the Orange and Modder
Rivers, and in consequence of various reports regarding their movements
Colonel Broadwood proceeded to Sunnyside with the Royal Horse Artillery,
Mounted Infantry, and Roberts's Horse, the newly-raised regiment from
whom great things were expected. The enemy retired and crossed the Riet
River, taking care to keep well out of the way, for it was known that
"Fighting Mac" was on the warpath, and the last thing the rebels desired
was to find their own line of communications interrupted.
On the 3rd of February General Macdonald with the Highland Brigade, 9th
Lancers, 9th and 62nd Batteries Royal Field Artillery, moved out in a
westerly direction with a view to blocking the main drift at
Koodoesberg, and thus preventing a force reported to be coming from
Griqualand West from joining that coming from the north for the purpose
of cutting Lord Methuen's line of communication. There was also another
motive for the movement, and that was to attract the attention and
energy of the enemy while Lord Roberts was arranging for a decisive
stroke in another quarter. The march was a trying one owing to the
tropical temperature, exposure to a scorching sun, and the perpetual
inconvenience of dust. The troops however, bore it bravely. They
bivouacked at Fraser's Drift, and on the following (Sunday) morning
moved forward to Koodoesberg. The distance--some thirteen miles--was
covered, again in sweltering conditions, over a shadeless expanse of
rough road, which reflected the glare of the heavens and threw out hot
rays as from a baker's oven. Men dropped continually from sunstroke, and
exhaustion, and thirst; but, fortunately, owing to the near proximity of
the river, there were few serious cases. The troops arrived at their
destination about one o'clock, without having seen any Boers. On
reaching the drift the men refreshed themselves by bathing in the river,
a luxury in which they revelled. But repose was short. A hurried meal of
bully beef and biscuits and they were at work again, providing for
contingencies. Two thousand yards off were a group of kopjes, behind
which it was said some 4000 Boers were hiding.
[Illustration: MAP ILLUSTRATING THE MOVEMENT TO KOODOESBERG.]
The General at once set himself to construct breastworks to protect the
drift and secure his positions on north and south of the river, while
the 9th Lancers and their scouts reconnoitred the surrounding country to
ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy. They came on a
small picket of Boers--there was a rapid exchange of shots--but on the
nearer approach of our troops the Boers fled. On Monday both sides of
the river were taken possession of. A large body of mounted Boers were
seen advancing about 2000 yards off, but beyond firing a few shots at
the British force no serious conflict took place. On Tuesday there was a
smart race between our men and a large force of Boers advancing from
their laagers. Both parties made for a big kopje, which was cleverly
gained by the British after a breathless scramble. The enemy, worsted,
galloped off, pursued by the Lancers.
At nine o'clock on Wednesday, the 7th, the Boers, who had engaged
themselves in dragging a heavy gun to the scene of action, began to
blaze out upon the Seaforth Highlanders. These, with alacrity, sprang to
action. As a private said, "It was not a Majesfontein affair this time,
and a holy joy filled our hearts at the prospect of having a little bit
of our own back." The enemy was established at the north end of
Koodoesberg, whence they shelled the works that were being constructed
to protect the drift. At the drift were seven companies of Highland
Light Infantry. On the left bank were the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, half a battalion of Seaforths, two guns, and the 9th
Lancers observing both flanks. Holding the south end of Koodoesberg on
the right bank of the river were the Black Watch, half a battalion of
Seaforths, one company of Highland Light Infantry, and four guns (62nd
Field Battery). An animated battle ensued, and the British guns did
splendid execution. The troops took cover behind hastily-constructed
sangars, and the bullets of the enemy failed to touch them. There were
no evidences of the celebrated Boer marksmanship on this occasion. The
enemy pounded the hill with shrapnel, and made a ferocious effort to
rout the Highlanders from their position. The 62nd Field Battery, after
some smart cannonading, which was as effective as it was vigorous,
forced the Dutchmen to shift their gun to a position farther north.
Eventually the weapon of the Dutchmen was silenced altogether.
Meanwhile, at the request of General Macdonald, General Babington, with
his own regiment of cavalry (12th Lancers) and two batteries of Horse
Artillery, had been despatched from Modder River. They started at 11.30
A.M. on the 7th, and had they arrived in time might have cut off the
retreat of the enemy and entirely hemmed them in.
As it was, they marched along the north side of the Modder, and only
arrived at four o'clock, in time, however, to quickly pursue the foe in
his retreat northwards, which retreat had been begun with all speed on
the first hint of the coming of an additional force. The sufferings
endured by some of the cavalry were intense, and one man expired through
exposure and thirst. Others were in pitiable plight, but finally
recovered.
While the great struggle was taking place it was discovered that the
enemy was intrenched at a small drift on the west. Whereupon two
companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders became engaged in a
smart skirmish, and gave the Federals so warm a time that by nightfall,
after being shelled in their trenches, they were glad enough to slink
off. By morning the enemy had entirely evacuated their position, and not
a vestige of them was to be seen. Had the cavalry not been utterly worn
out on reaching the scene of action, the Dutchmen would have been caught
before they had time to seek refuge in flight.
[Illustration: "FIGHTING MAC" AND THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE IN ACTION AT
KOODOESBERG.
From a Sketch by Lestor Ralph.]
The troops then, under orders from Lord Methuen, retired to Modder
River. They started from Koodoesberg on the evening of Thursday, made a
moonlight march to Fraser's Drift, returning to camp footsore and
dilapidated on Friday. But before leaving, the officers and men who fell
in the action were buried on the south bank of the river. Among them was
Captain Blair, who, after having been previously struck by a bullet, had
been mortally wounded by a shell. Lieutenant Tait, a very gallant
officer, a notable golfer, and a general favourite, also fell, and
Captain Eykyn eventually died of his injuries.
General Macdonald's reconnaissance at Koodoesberg Drift was entirely
satisfactory. The position there was important, as it prevented Boer
reinforcements from passing _via_ the chief drift from Douglas to
Majesfontein, and the movement served to confound the enemy, and protect
the operations of the Belmont garrison in the direction of Douglas, not
to speak of its value in keeping Boer activities to the west of
Majesfontein at the time when Lord Roberts was developing his plans in
regard to the east of that place. The enemy had been kept amused and out
of mischief, and been wholesomely trounced into the bargain!
The casualties, which were comparatively few, were as follows:--
_Killed_:--2nd Royal Highlanders--Captain Eykyn; Lieutenant
Tait. 2nd Seaforth Highlanders--Captain Blair.
_Wounded_:--2nd Seaforth Highlanders--Captain Studdert, A.S.C.
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders--Captain Kirk. 9th
Lancers--Second Lieutenant Cavendish; Lieutenant Mackenzie,
R.A.M.C.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur John Watson was forty-six years of age. He
entered the army as a sub-lieutenant of the 12th Foot (now the
Berkshires) on August 9, 1873, and received his lieutenancy from the same
date. He was instructor of musketry to the regiment from February 12,
1880, to January 24, 1883, received his company on the 14th of April
following, and, passing the Staff College in 1884, served with the
Bechuanaland Expedition under Sir Charles Warren later in the year, and
from February 17 to October 28, 1885, was brigade-major in Bechuanaland,
being honourably mentioned in dispatches. He was employed on staff
service with the Egyptian army from February 12 to September 7, 1886,
obtaining his major's commission on October 21 following; and in 1888
served in the Hazara Expedition as brigade-major to the first column
under Brigadier-General Channer, when he was again mentioned in
dispatches, and received the medal with clasp. From July 20, 1889, to
February 20, 1896, he was garrison instructor in Bengal, and deputy
assistant-adjutant-general for instruction in the Punjaub, taking part in
1895 in the operations in the Chitral, accompanying the relief force
under Sir Robert Low, acting as road commandant on the lines of
communication. For his services in this campaign he received his second
medal with clasp. He was gazetted lieutenant-colonel of the Suffolk
Regiment on September 19, 1898.
APPENDIX
THE STORY OF SPION KOP.
A great deal of consternation and not a little surprise was caused by
the publication of the official account (_London Gazette_, April 16,
1900) of the evacuation of Spion Kop. In order to make intelligible the
causes of the terrible fiasco it is necessary to quote for the benefit
of those interested not only Lord Roberts's comments on the subject, but
the statements of the officers concerned. Sir Redvers Buller, writing
from Spearman's Hill, January 30, 1900, gave his version of the
proceedings:--
"I have the honour to report that General Sir Charles Warren's
Division having arrived at Estcourt, less two battalions 10th
Brigade, which were left at the Cape, by the 7th January, it
moved to Frere on the 9th.
"The column moved as ordered, but torrents of rain fell on the
9th, which filled all the spruits, and, indeed, rendered many
of them impassable for many hours. To forward supply alone took
650 ox waggons, and as in the 16 miles from Frere to
Springfield there were three places at which all the waggons
had to be double spanned, and some required three spans, some
idea may be formed of the difficulties; but these were all
successfully overcome by the willing labours of the troops.
"The 4th Brigade reached Springfield on the 12th in support of
the mounted troops, who had surprised and seized the important
position of Spearman's Hill, commanding Potgieter's Drift, on
the 11th.
"By the 13th all troops were at Springfield and Spearman's
Hill, and supply was well forward.
"On the 16th a reserve of seventeen days' supply having been
collected, General Sir Charles Warren, in command of the 2nd
Division, the 11th Brigade of the 5th Division, the Brigade
Division Royal Field Artillery, 5th Division, and certain corps
troops, including the Mounted Brigade, moved from Springfield
to Trichardt's Drift, which is about six miles west of
Potgieter's.
"I attach Sir Charles Warren's report of his operations.
"On the night of the 23rd General Warren attacked Spion Kop,
which operation he has made the subject of a special report. On
the morning of the 25th, finding that Spion Kop had been
abandoned in the night, I decided to withdraw General Warren's
force; the troops had been continuously engaged for a week, in
circumstances entailing considerable hardships; there had been
very heavy losses on Spion Kop. I consequently assumed the
command, commenced the withdrawal of the ox and heavy mule
transports on the 25th: this was completed by midday the 26th;
by double spanning, the loaded ox waggons got over the drift at
the rate of about eight per hour. The mule waggons went over
the pontoon bridge, but all the mules had to be taken out and
the vehicles passed over by hand. For about seven hours of the
night the drift could not be used as it was dangerous in the
dark, but the use of the pontoon went on day and night. In
addition to machine guns, six batteries of Royal Field
Artillery and four howitzers, the following vehicles were
passed: ox waggons, 232; 10-span mule waggons, 98; 6-span, 107;
4 span, 52; total, 489 vehicles. In addition to these the
ambulances were working backwards and forwards evacuating the
sick and wounded.
"By 2 P.M. the 26th all the ox waggons were over, and by 11.30
P.M. all the mule transports were across and the bridge clear
for the troops. By 4 A.M. the 27th all the troops were over,
and by 8 A.M. the pontoons were gone and all was clear. The
troops had all reached their new camps by 10 A.M. The marches
averaged for the mounted troops about seven miles, and for the
infantry and artillery an average of five miles.
"Everything worked without a hitch, and the arrangements
reflected great credit on the Staff of all degrees; but I must
especially mention Major Irwin, R.E., and his men of the
Pontoon Troop, who were untiring. When all men were over, the
chesses of the pontoon bridge were so worn by the traffic that
I do not think they would have lasted another half-hour."
He concluded by saying:--
"Thus ended an expedition which I think ought to have
succeeded. We have suffered very heavy losses, and lost many
whom we can ill spare; but, on the other hand, we have
inflicted as great or greater losses upon the enemy than they
have upon us, and they are, by all accounts, thoroughly
disheartened; while our troops are, I am glad and proud to say,
in excellent fettle."
Sir Charles Warren's report addressed to the Chief of the Staff, ran
thus:--
"On the 8th January field orders were published constituting
the 10th Brigade of the 5th Division a Corps Brigade, and
placing the 4th Brigade in the 5th Division. The 5th Division
thus constituted marched from Frere on the 10th instant,
arriving at Springfield on the 12th instant.
"On the 15th January I received your secret instructions to
command a force to proceed across the Tugela, near Trichardt's
Drift to the west of Spion Kop, recommending me to proceed
forward, refusing my right (namely) Spion Kop, and bringing my
left forward to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop. This
move was to commence as soon as supplies were all in, and the
10th Brigade (except two companies) removed from Springfield
Bridge to Spearman's Hill.
"I was provided with four days' rations with which I was to
cross the Tugela, fight my way round to north of Spion Kop, and
join your column opposite Potgieter's.
"On the 15th January I made the arrangements for getting
supplies, and moved the 10th Brigade on the following day, and
on the evening of the 16th January I left Springfield with a
force under my command, which amounted to an Army Corps (less
one Brigade), and by a night march arrived at Trichardt's
Drift, and took possession of the hills on the south side of
the Tugela.
"On the 17th January I threw pontoon bridges across the Tugela,
passed the infantry across by ponts, and captured the hills
immediately commanding the drift on the north side with two
brigades commanded by Generals Woodgate and Hart. The
Commander-in-Chief was present during part of the day, and gave
some verbal directions to General Woodgate.
"The Mounted Brigade passed over principally by the drift, and
went over the country as far as Acton Homes, and on the
following day (18th) had a successful action with a small party
of Boers, bringing in 31 prisoners.
"During the night of the 17th, and day of the 18th, the whole
of the waggons belonging to the force were brought across the
Tugela, and the artillery were in position outside of Wright's
Farm.
"On the 19th two brigades advanced, occupying the slopes of the
adjoining hills on the right, and the waggons were successfully
brought to Venter's Spruit.
"In the evening, after having examined the possible roads by
which we could proceed, I assembled the General Officers and
the Staff, and the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, and
Commanding Royal Engineer, and pointed out to them that of the
two roads by which we could advance, the eastern one by Acton
Homes must be rejected, because time would not allow of it, and
with this all concurred. I then pointed out that the only
possible way of all getting through by the road north of Fair
View would be by taking three or four days' food in our
haversacks, and sending all our waggons back across the Tugela,
but before we could do this we must capture the position in
front of us.
"On the following day, 20th January, I placed two brigades and
six batteries of artillery at the disposal of General Sir C. F.
Clery, with instructions to attack the Boer positions by a
series of outflanking movements, and by the end of the day,
after fighting for twelve hours, we were in possession of the
whole part of the hills, but found a strongly-intrenched line
on the comparatively flat country beyond us.
"On the 21st the Boers displayed considerable activity on our
left, and the Commander-in-Chief desired me to move two
batteries from right to left. At a subsequent date, during the
day, I found it impossible to proceed without howitzers, and
telegraphed for four from Potgieter's. These arrived early on
the morning of the 22nd, and the Commander-in-Chief, arriving
about the same time, directed me to place two of these
howitzers on the left, two having already been placed on the
right flank. I pointed out to the Commander-in-Chief that it
would be impossible to get waggons through by the road leading
past Fair View, unless we first took Spion Kop, which lies
within about 2000 yards of the road. The Commander-in-Chief
agreed that Spion Kop would have to be taken. Accordingly that
evening orders were drawn up giving the necessary instructions
to General Talbot Coke to take Spion Kop that night, but, owing
to an absence of sufficient reconnaissance, he requested that
the attack might be put off for a day.
"On the 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, the
attack on Spion Kop was decided upon, and Lieut.-Colonel
aCourt, of the Headquarter Staff, was directed by the
Commander-in-Chief to accompany General Woodgate, who was
detailed to command the attacking column. The account of the
capture of Spion Kop is given in another report.
"On the morning of the 25th January the Commander-in-Chief
arrived, decided to retire the force, and assumed direct
command. The whole of the waggons of the 5th Division were got
down to the drift during the day, and were crossed over before
2 P.M. on the 26th January."
In regard to the Council of War, Sir Charles Warren amplified his
previous statement:
"Upon the 19th of January, on arrival at Venter's Laager, I
assembled all the General Officers, Officers Commanding Royal
Artillery and Royal Engineers of Divisions, and Staff Officers,
together. I pointed out to them that, with the three and a
half (3-1/2) days' provisions allowed, it was impossible to
advance by the left road through Acton Homes. In this they
unanimously concurred. I showed them that the only possible
road was that going over Fair View through Rosalie, but I
expressed my conviction that this could not be done unless we
sent the whole of our transport back across the Tugela, and
attempted to march through with our rations in our
haversacks--without impedimenta."
Sir Charles then added:--
"The hills were cleared on the following day, and very strong
intrenchments found behind them. The Commander-in-Chief was
present on the 21st and 22nd January, and I pointed out the
difficulties of marching along the road, accompanied by
waggons, without first taking Spion Kop.
"Accordingly, on the night of the 22nd, I ordered General Coke
to occupy Spion Kop. He, however, desired that the occupation
might be deferred for a day in order that he might make a
reconnaissance with the Officers Commanding battalions to be
sent there.
"On 23rd January the Commander-in-Chief came into camp, and
told me that there were two courses open--(1) to attack, (2) to
retire. I replied that I should prefer to attack Spion Kop to
retiring, and showed the Commander-in-Chief my orders of the
previous day.
"The Commander-in-Chief then desired that I should put General
Woodgate in command of the expedition, and detailed
Lieutenant-Colonel aCourt to accompany him as Staff Officer.
"The same evening General Woodgate proceeded with the
Lancashire Fusiliers, the Royal Lancaster Regiment, a portion
of Thorneycroft's Horse, and half-company Royal Engineers,
supported by two companies of the Connaught Rangers and by the
Imperial Light Infantry, the latter having just arrived by
Trichardt's Drift.
"The attack and capture of Spion Kop was entirely successful.
General Woodgate, having secured the summit on the 24th,
reported that he had intrenched a position and hoped he was
secure, but that the fog was too thick to permit him to see.
The position was rushed without casualties other than three men
wounded.
"Lieutenant-Colonel aCourt came down in the morning and stated
that everything was satisfactory and secure, and telegraphed to
the Commander-in-Chief to that effect. Scarcely had he started
on his return to headquarters when a heliogram arrived from
Colonel Crofton (Royal Lancaster). The message was, 'Reinforce
at once, or all lost. General dead.'
"He also sent a similar message to headquarters. I immediately
ordered General Coke to proceed to his assistance, and to take
command of the troops. He started at once, and was accompanied
by the Middlesex and Dorsetshire Regiments.
"I replied to Colonel Crofton, 'I am sending two battalions,
and the Imperial Light Infantry are on their way up. You must
hold on to the last. No surrender.'
"This occurred about 10 A.M.
"Shortly afterwards I received a telegram from the
Commander-in-Chief, ordering me to appoint Lieutenant-Colonel
Thorneycroft to the command of the summit. I accordingly had
heliographed, 'With the approval of the Commander-in-Chief, I
place Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft in command of the summit,
with the local rank of Brigadier-General.'
"For some hours after this message I could get no information
from the summit. It appears that the signallers and their
apparatus were destroyed by the heavy fire.
"I repeatedly asked for Colonel Thorneycroft to state his view
of the situation. At 1.20 P.M. I heliographed to ascertain
whether Colonel Thorneycroft had assumed command, and at the
same time asked General Coke to give me his views on the
situation on Spion Kop. Still getting no reply, I asked whether
General Coke was there, and subsequently received his view of
the situation. He stated that, unless the Artillery could
silence the enemy's guns, the men on the summit could not stand
another complete day's shelling, and that the situation was
extremely critical."
Later on in the evening arrangements were made to send two (Naval)
12-pounders, and the Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to the summit,
together with half-company Royal Engineers (and working parties, two
reliefs of 600 men each), to strengthen the intrenchments and provide
shell cover for the men. The 17th Company, Royal Engineers--it must be
noted--proceeded at the same time as General Woodgate's force, and were
employed until daylight upon the intrenchments, then upon road-making
and water supply.
Sand-bags were sent up early on the 24th instant, but they were too
late. Colonel Sim and his party, while ascending, met Colonel
Thorneycroft descending the hill. The position was evacuated. Sir
Charles Warren concluded thus:--
"I wish to bring to notice that I heard from all but one
expression of the admirable conduct and bravery shown by
officers and men suffering under a withering artillery fire on
the summit of the slopes, and also of those who, with so much
endurance, persisted in carrying up water and food and
ammunition to the troops during the day.
"During the day a Staff Officer of the Headquarter Staff was
present on the summit, and reported direct to the
Commander-in-Chief.
"At sunset I considered that the position could be held next
day, provided that guns could be mounted and effective shelter
provided. Both of these conditions were about to be fulfilled,
as already mentioned.
"In the absence of General Coke, whom I ordered to come to
report in person as to the situation, the evacuation took place
under orders, given upon his own responsibility, by
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft. This occurred in the face of the
vigorous protests of General Coke's Brigade-Major, the Officer
commanding the Middlesex Regiment, and others.
"It is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide whether
there should be an investigation into the question of the
unauthorised evacuation of Spion Kop."
General Buller, in forwarding to the Secretary of State for War Sir
Charles Warren's report, made the following observations:--
"Sir C. Warren is hardly correct in saying that he was only
allowed three and a half days' provisions. I had told him that
transport for three and a half days would be sufficient burden
to him, but that I would keep him filled up as he wanted it.
That he was aware of this is shown by the following telegram
which he sent on the day in question. It is the only report I
had from Sir C. Warren:--
(Sent 7.54 P.M. Received 8.15 P.M.)
'Left Flank, 19th January.
'To the Chief of the Staff--
'I find there are only two roads by which we could
possibly get from Trichardt's Drift to Potgeiter's, on
the north of the Tugela, one by Acton Homes, the other
by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too
long, the second is a very difficult road for a large
number of waggons, unless the enemy is thoroughly
cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some
special arrangements which will involve my stay at
Venter's Laager for two or three days. I will send in
for further supplies and report progress. WARREN.'
"The reply to this was that three days' supply was being sent.
"I went over to Sir C. Warren on the 23rd. I pointed out to him
that I had no further report and no intimation of the special
arrangements foreshadowed by this telegram of the 19th, that
for four days he had kept his men continuously exposed to shell
and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous
hill, that the position admitted of no second line, and the
supports were massed close behind the firing line in
indefensible formations, and that a panic or sudden charge
might send the whole lot in disorder down the hill at any
moment. I said it was too dangerous a situation to be
prolonged, and that he must either attack or I should withdraw
his force. I advocated, as I had previously done, an advance
from his left. He said that he had the night before ordered
General Coke to assault Spion Kop, but the latter had objected
to undertaking a night attack on a position the road to which
he had not reconnoitred, and added that he intended to assault
Spion Kop that night.
"I suggested that as General Coke was still lame from the
effects of a lately broken leg, General Woodgate, who had two
sound legs, was better adapted for mountain climbing.
"As no heliograph could, on account of the fire, be kept on the
east side of Spion Kop, messages for Sir C. Warren were
received by our signallers at Spearman and telegraphed to Sir
C. Warren; thus I saw them before he did, as I was at the
signal station. The telegram Sir C. Warren quotes did not give
me confidence in its sender, and at the moment I could see that
our men on the top had given way and that efforts were being
made to rally them. I telegraphed to Sir C. Warren: 'Unless you
put some really good hard fighting man in command on the top
you will lose the hill. I suggest Thorneycroft.'
"The statement that a staff officer reported direct to me
during the day is a mistake. Colonel aCourt was sent down by
General Woodgate almost as soon as he gained the summit.
"I have not thought it necessary to order any investigation. If
at sundown the defence of the summit had been taken regularly
in hand, intrenchments laid out, gun emplacements prepared, the
dead removed, the wounded collected, and, in fact, the whole
place brought under regular military command, and careful
arrangements made for the supply of water and food to the
scattered fighting line, the hills would have been held, I am
sure.
"But no arrangements were made. General Coke appears to have
been ordered away just as he would have been useful, and no one
succeeded him; those on the top were ignorant of the fact that
guns were coming up, and generally there was a want of
organisation and system that acted most unfavourably on the
defence.
"It is admitted by all that Colonel Thorneycroft acted with the
greatest gallantry throughout the day, and really saved the
situation. Preparations for the second day's defence should
have been organised during the day and have been commenced at
nightfall.
"As this was not done I think Colonel Thorneycroft exercised a
wise discretion.
"Our losses, I regret to say, were very heavy, but the enemy
admitted to our doctors that theirs were equally severe, and
though we were not successful in retaining the position, the
losses inflicted on the enemy and the attack generally have had
a marked effect upon them.
"I cannot close these remarks without bearing testimony to the
gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops, the endurance
shown by the Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex Regiment, and
Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry was admirable, while the
efforts of the 2nd Battalion Scottish Rifles and 3rd Battalion
King's Royal Rifles were equally good, and the Royal Lancasters
fought gallantly."
The Commander-in-Chief, writing to the Secretary of State for War, thus
criticised both operations and operators:--
"The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the
despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the
accompanying documents themselves that the original intention
was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichardt's Drift, and
thence by following the road past Fair View and Acton Homes, to
gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in
front of Potgieter's Drift being too strong to be taken by
direct attack. The whole force, less one brigade, was placed
under the orders of Sir Charles Warren, who, the day after he
had crossed the Tugela, seems to have consulted his General and
principal Staff Officers, and to have come to the conclusion
that the flanking movement which Sir Redvers Buller had
mentioned in his secret instructions was impracticable on
account of the insufficiency of supplies. He accordingly
decided to advance by the more direct road leading north-east
and branching off from a point east of Three Tree Hill. The
selection of this road necessitated the capture and retention
of Spion Kop, but whether it would have been equally necessary
to occupy Spion Kop, had the line of advance indicated by Sir
Redvers Buller been followed, is not stated in the
correspondence. As Sir Charles Warren considered it impossible
to make the wide flanking movement which was recommended, if
not actually prescribed, in his secret instructions, he should
at once have acquainted Sir Redvers Buller with the course of
action which he proposed to adopt. There is nothing to show
whether he did so or not, but it seems only fair to Sir Charles
Warren to point out that Sir Redvers Buller appears throughout
to have been aware of what was happening. On several occasions
he was present during the operations. He repeatedly gave advice
to his subordinate Commander, and on the day after the
withdrawal from Spion Kop he resumed the chief command."
The abandonment of Spion Kop was condemned by Lord Roberts in the
following terms:--
"As regards the withdrawal of the troops from the Spion Kop
position, which, though occupied almost without opposition in
the early morning of the 24th January, had to be held
throughout the day under an extremely heavy fire, and the
retention of which had become essential to the relief of
Ladysmith, I regret that I am unable to concur with Sir
Redvers Buller in thinking that Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft
exercised a wise discretion in ordering the troops to retire.
Even admitting that due preparations may not have been made for
strengthening the position during the night, reorganising the
defence and bringing up artillery--in regard to which Sir
Charles Warren's report does not altogether bear out Sir
Redvers Buller's contention--admitting also that the senior
officers on the summit of the hill might have been more
promptly informed of the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren
to support and reinforce them, I am of opinion that
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft's assumption of responsibility and
authority was wholly inexcusable. During the night the enemy's
fire, if it did not cease altogether, could not have been
formidable, and though lamp signalling was not possible at the
time owing to the supply of oil having failed, it would not
have taken more than two or three hours at most for
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft to communicate by messenger with
Major-General Coke or Sir Charles Warren, and to receive a
reply. Major-General Coke appears to have left Spion Kop at
9.30 P.M. for the purpose of consulting with Sir Charles
Warren, and up to that hour the idea of a withdrawal had not
been entertained. Yet almost immediately after Major-General
Coke's departure Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft issued an order,
without reference to superior authority, which upset the whole
plan of operations and rendered unavailing the sacrifices which
had already been made to carry it into effect."
In spite of this somewhat severe criticism, however, Lord Roberts went
on to say:--
"On the other hand, it is only right to state that
Lieut.-Colonel Thorneycroft appears to have behaved in a very
gallant manner throughout the day, and it was doubtless due, in
a great measure, to his exertions and example that the troops
continued to hold the summit of the hill until directed to
retire."
The action of Captain Phillips he warmly praised:--
"The conduct of Captain Phillips, Brigade-Major of the 10th
Brigade, on the occasion in question, is deserving of high
commendation. He did his best to rectify the mistake which was
being made, but it was too late. Signalling communication was
not re-established until 2.30 A.M. on the 25th January, and by
that time the Naval guns could not have reached the summit of
the hill before daybreak. Major-General Coke did not return,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft had gone away. Moreover,
most of the troops had begun to leave the hill, and the working
parties, with the half-company of Royal Engineers, had also
withdrawn."
Briefly the Commander-in-Chief deplored the chaotic state of affairs
prior to the retirement. He said:--
"It is to be regretted that Sir Charles Warren did not himself
visit Spion Kop during the afternoon or evening, knowing as he
did that the state of affairs there was very critical, and that
the loss of the position would involve the failure of the
operations. He was, consequently, obliged to summon
Major-General Coke to his headquarters in the evening, in order
that he might ascertain how matters were going on, and the
command on Spion Kop thus devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel
Thorneycroft; but Major-General Coke was not aware of this.
About midday, under instructions from Sir Redvers Buller, Sir
Charles Warren had directed Lieutenant-Colonel Thorneycroft to
assume command on the summit of the hill, with the temporary
rank of Brigadier-General, but this order was not communicated
to Major-General Coke, who, until he left the position at 9.30
P.M., was under the impression that the command had devolved on
Colonel Hill, as senior officer, after Colonel Crofton had been
wounded. Omissions or mistakes of this nature may be trivial in
themselves, yet may exercise an important influence on the
course of events; and I think that Sir Redvers Buller is
justified in remarking that 'there was a want of organisation
and system which acted most unfavourably on the defence.'"
In conclusion, the principal actors in the drama were censured, while
the troops engaged received well-merited praise:--
"The attempt to relieve Ladysmith, described in these
despatches, was well devised, and I agree with Sir Redvers
Buller in thinking that it ought to have succeeded. That it
failed may, in some measure, be due to the difficulties of the
ground and the commanding positions held by the enemy--probably
also to errors of judgment and want of administrative capacity
on the part of Sir Charles Warren. But whatever faults Sir
Charles Warren may have committed, the failure must also be
ascribed to the disinclination of the officer in supreme
command to assert his authority and see that what he thought
best was done, and also to the unwarrantable and needless
assumption of responsibility by a subordinate officer.
"The gratifying feature in these despatches is the admirable
behaviour of the troops throughout the operations."
LIST OF STAFF
The following Divisions reached South Africa at the end of 1899 and the
beginning of 1900.
FIFTH DIVISION
Lieutenant-General--Lieut.-General Sir C. Warren, G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B., R.E.
Aides-de-Camp--Major R. M. B. F. Kelly, R.A.; Lieut. I. V.
Paton, Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Assistant Adjutant-General--Colonel A. W. Morris, _p.s.c._
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals--Bt.-Major T. Capper, East
Lancashire Regt., _p.s.c._; Bt.-Major H. N. Sargent, Army
Service Corps.
Assistant Provost-Marshal--Bt.-Major E. C. J. Williams, East
Kent Regt.
Principal Medical Officer--Lieut.-Colonel W. B. Allin, M.B.,
R.A.M.C.
Divisional Signalling Officer--Captain A. A. McHardy, R.A.
10TH BRIGADE
Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) J. T. Coke.
Aide-de-Camp--Lieut. W. E. Kemble, R.A.
Brigade-Major--Captain H. G. C. Phillips, Welsh Regt., _p.s.c._
11TH BRIGADE
Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) E. R. P. Woodgate,
K.C.M.G., C.B., _p.s.c._
Aide-de-Camp--Captain F. M. Carleton, D.S.O., Royal Lancashire
Regt.
Brigade-Major--Captain N. H. Vertue, East Kent Regt.
SIXTH DIVISION
Lieutenant-General--Major-General (local Lieut.-General) T.
Kelly-Kenny, C.B., _p.s.c._
Aides-de-Camp--Major H. I. W. Hamilton, D.S.O., Royal West
Surrey Regt., _p.s.c._; Captain W. H. Booth, East Kent Regt.
Assistant Adjutant-General--Colonel A. E. W. Goldsmid, _p.s.c._
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals--Major C. C. Monro, Royal
West Surrey Regt., _p.s.c._; Major J. E. Caunter, Lancashire
Fusiliers, _p.s.c._
Assistant Provost-Marshal--Major M. G. Wilkinson, King's Own
Scottish Borderers.
Principal Medical Officer--Lieut.-Colonel W. L. Gubbins, M.B.,
R.A.M.C.
Divisional Signalling Officer--Lieut. J. T. Burnett-Stuart,
Rifle Brigade.
12TH BRIGADE
Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) R. A. P. Clements,
D.S.O., A.D.C.
Aide-de-Camp--Captain H. de C. Moody, South Wales Borderers.
Brigade-Major--Captain R. S. Oxley, King's Royal Rifle Corps,
_p.s.c._
13TH BRIGADE
Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) C. E. Knox.
Aide-de-Camp--Captain O. H. E. Marescaux, Shropshire Light
Infantry.
Brigade-Major--Captain R. W. Thompson, North Lancashire Regt.,
_p.s.c._
SEVENTH DIVISION
Lieutenant-General--Major-General (local Lieut.-General) C.
Tucker, C.B. Aides-de-Camp--
Assistant Adjutant-General--Colonel H. E. Belfield, _p.s.c._
Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-Generals--Brevet-Major H. G. Fitton,
D.S.O., Royal Berkshire Regt., _p.s.c._; Lieut.-Colonel H. G.
Rice, Army Service Corps.
Assistant Provost-Marshal--Brevet-Major F. Wintour, Royal West
Kent Regt., _p.s.c._
Principal Medical Officer--Lieut.-Colonel J. A. Gormley, M.D.,
R.A.M.C.
Divisional Signalling Officer--Captain J. R. K. Birch, Cheshire
Regt.
14TH BRIGADE
Major-General--Major-General Sir H. C. Chermside, G.C.M.G.,
C.B., R.E.
Aide-de-Camp--Captain E. FitzG. M. Wood, Devonshire Regt.
Brigade-Major--Captain W. M. Marter, 1st Dragoon Guards,
_p.s.c._
15TH BRIGADE
Major-General--Colonel (local Maj.-General) A. G. Wavell,
_p.s.c._
Brigade-Major--Captain L. R. Carleton, Essex Regt., _p.s.c._
END OF VOL. III.
Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
Edinburgh & London
TRANSCRIBERS' NOTES
General : Corrections to punctuation have not been individually
documented
Page 5: "enroll" standardised to "enrol" after "forward in crowds to"
Page 15: "Divison" corrected to "Division" after "the Sixth"
Page 30: Variant spelling "via" not standardised as part of a
quotation
Page 31: "bombproof" standardised to "bomb-proof" after "burrowing
like rabbits, or in"
Page 55: "Jaysfontein" corrected to "Jasfontein" after "away from a
farm at"
Page 56: "Zoutspansdrift" corrected to "Zoutpansdrift" after "in the
direction of Kamak and"
Page 56: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "lot of those
around"
Page 58: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "The inhabitants
of"
Page 71: "bloodthirsty" standardised to "blood-thirsty" after "They
proved to be not"
Page 71: "farm-house" standardised to "farmhouse" after "bivouacked at
the"
Page 73: "horse-shoe" as in the original. Not standardised as this is
an adjectival usage
Page 77: "look-out" standardised to "lookout" after "They employed"
Page 78: "Koodoosberg" corrected to "Koodoesberg" after "troops from
Barkly and"
Page 85: "bloodstained" standardised to "blood-stained" after "the
eyes of those who,"
Page 86: "gantlet" as in the original
Page 92: "Divsion" corrected to "Division" after "Second"
Page 96: "POTGEITER'S" corrected to "POTGIETER'S" after "THE CROSSING
OF"
Page 99: "Carbineers" corrected to "Carabineers" after "one squadron
Natal"
Page 108: "roast" corrected to "roost" after "We shall be rulers of
the"
Page 123: "head-quarters" standardised to "headquarters" after "some
even reaching"
Page 134: "Blomfontein" corrected to "Bloemfontein" after "Steyn and
Kruger dated"
Page 148: "rough-riders" standardised to "roughriders" after "despatch
of 500 expert"
Page 174: "Naauwport" corrected to "Naauwpoort" after "thirty-seven
miles north of"
Page 179: "sandstorms" standardised to "sand-storms" after "These"
Page 182: "Ochtertang" corrected to "Achtertang" after "reconnoitring
towards"
Page 185: "unusally" corrected to "unusually" after "Boer movements
rendered"
Page 194: "Sandbags" standardised to "Sand-bags" before "were sent up
early"
Page 195: "Potgeiter's" as in the original. Left as part of a
quotation.