MONTE VIDEO AND BUENOS AYRES.
In a letter from Lord Chatham, quoted in the last chapter, allusion is
made to a campaign in South America which contrasted unfavourably with
the successful siege of Copenhagen. The plan of this work requires that
the reader should now turn to this unsuccessful Expedition, and see how
bravely English troops endeavoured to compensate by their exertions for
want of generalship in their leaders. To the Artilleryman this chapter
will have a special interest,--from the fact that two of the officers
who took a prominent part in the campaign were destined to become very
eminent in their corps and profession--Sir Augustus Frazer, and Sir
Alexander Dickson.
[Sidenote: Letter to D. A. Gen. 12 Jan. 1806.]
On the 12th January, 1806, Major Spicer, who commanded the Artillery
with Sir David Baird’s Expedition to the Cape of Good Hope, reported
that, two days previously, Cape Town had fallen into their hands. During
the operations which resulted in this important capture, the officers
and men under his command behaved in a “persevering, cool, and steady
manner.” The heavy surf prevented him from landing more than six
6-pounders and two 5½-inch howitzers, the whole of which were in action
and did good service, although outnumbered, three to one, by the
artillery of the enemy. Captains Turner and Ogilvie received special
mention for their conduct on the occasion.
In the beginning of April, Major Spicer went on a tour of inspection
round the outposts, leaving Captain Ogilvie--his Brigade-Major--sick at
Cape Town. He had barely started, when the Admiral, Sir Home Popham,
resolved--on his own responsibility, and entirely without the knowledge
of the English Government--to proceed with a naval and military force
to South America, for the purpose of attacking the Spanish settlements,
and securing the trade of the country for England. General Beresford was
put in command of the military part of the Expedition; and the
detachment of the Royal Artillery, which was at first ordered to
accompany it, consisted of Lieutenant A. Macdonald, 1 bombardier, 1
_lance_-bombardier, 18 gunners, 1 conductor, 1 wheeler, 1 collar-maker,
1 corporal and 9 men of the Gunner-driver Corps, and 18 horses. Captain
Ogilvie having offered to resign his staff appointment if allowed to
accompany the force, his offer was accepted; and in a letter which he
wrote from St. Helena, _en route_, he was able to announce that the
detachment under his command had been augmented by an officer and 100
gunners of the St. Helena Artillery. The fleet consisted of 5
men-of-war, and the military force, in addition to the Artillery, was
composed of a detachment of the 20th Light Dragoons, a few Engineers,
and the 71st Regiment. The Expedition reached a point about twelve miles
distant from Buenos Ayres, and on the 25th June, 1806, a landing was
effected. Advancing boldly, and driving the Spanish troops before them,
the English reached the city, and on the 28th June summoned the Governor
to surrender--a summons to which he immediately yielded. So small,
however, was the force under General Beresford’s command, that he could
not hold the city; and in a very short time the English troops had
actually to surrender as prisoners of war. Sir Home Popham continued to
blockade the river for some time; but was soon ordered home to be tried
by court-martial for his unauthorized proceedings. Thus ended the first
act of this unfortunate drama.
The English Government, although disapproving of the original
Expedition, was compelled to take some steps to avenge the disaster to
Beresford’s force. The fleet, now under the command of Admiral Sterling,
had already been [Sidenote: Captain Watson to D. A. Gen. 8 Oct. 1806.]
considerably increased; and reinforcements from the Cape of Good Hope
had arrived, including a few Artillerymen under Captain A. Watson, four
troops of the 20th,--and two of the 21st, Light Dragoons, the 38th,
47th, and a detachment of the 54th Regiment. A further force of 3000
men under the command of Sir S. Auchmuty was ordered to the River La
Plata, and arrived on the 5th January, 1807; the Artillery being under
the command of Captain Dickson. Captain Watson shortly after this date
returned to the Cape of Good Hope, and the command of the Royal
Artillery devolved for the time on Captain Dickson. Prior, however, to
this taking place, Sir S. Auchmuty decided on an attempt on Monte Video,
and took the place by assault on the 3rd February, 1807. The conduct of
the Artillery on this occasion may be ascertained from the following
extract from the General Order, which was published immediately after
the capture of [Sidenote: ‘London Gazette,’ 13 April, 1807.] the
town:--“The established reputation of the Royal Artillery has been
firmly supported by the company under my orders; and I consider myself
much indebted to Captains Watson, Dickson, Carmichael, and Wilgress, for
their zealous and able exertions.” On this occasion Captain Wilgress,
who acted as Adjutant to the Artillery, was wounded.
On the 2nd June, an additional force of 4200 men, under General
Craufurd, arrived at Monte Video from England; and the command of the
whole army devolved upon a most incapable officer, General Whitelocke.
With this last reinforcement came a troop of Horse Artillery, now C
Battery, B Brigade, under Captain A. Frazer, who, being senior to
Captain Dickson, now assumed command of the Artillery, and retained it
until the active operations were over, when he was relieved by
Lieut.-Colonel Schalch, who reached Monte Video on the 26th July, 1807.
General Beresford’s force still remained prisoners of war--some
remaining at Buenos Ayres, the others divided in small detachments among
the various villages in the neighbourhood. General Linières, the French
commander of the Spanish forces, was most kind and courteous to the
prisoners, and did all he could to promote their comfort. But the
feeling of the people, more especially of the Roman Catholic clergy, was
very bitter against the English, and led to a painful occurrence. On the
14th January, Captain Ogilvie, while riding with Colonel Pack of the
71st Regiment--who was also a prisoner of war--was assassinated; and his
companion with difficulty escaped. Captain Ogilvie had been severely
wounded at the first attack on Buenos Ayres, and his loss was deeply
regretted. The command of the captive Artillery now devolved upon
Lieutenant Alexander Macdonald, who had received two wounds in the
attack on Buenos Ayres, and who had been recommended by Captain Ogilvie
as a most deserving and zealous young officer.
General Whitelocke decided on a second assault on Buenos Ayres; having
first, and unsuccessfully, attempted to persuade General Linières to
release his prisoners. The failure of his attempt on the city will,
perhaps, be more readily understood, if a few words of description of
Buenos Ayres, as it was in 1807, precede the narrative.
[Sidenote: Major Nicolls’ 45 Regiment, MS. Journal in R. A. Record
Office.]
The city extended for nearly three miles along the banks of the Rio de
la Plata, and its breadth at the widest point was about a mile and a
half. The population, including the suburban villas or _quintas_, was
about 70,000. Like most modern cities in the United States and Canada,
it had been [Sidenote: Captain Frazer’s and Capt. Dickson’s Letters to
D. A. Gen.] built on a fixed plan, not left to the distorted tastes of
individual proprietors--as is not unfrequently the case in England. Its
streets and squares were large, broad, and convenient; and although the
individual houses did not always harmonise, and were rarely impressive,
they did little injury to the general effect. Most of them were
two-storeyed, and built in Moorish fashion, in the form of a square,
with one large entry, the different apartments on the ground floor
opening into the square, and the roof flat, and occasionally terraced.
The Fort, or Citadel, was a miserable work, with a parapet of little
more than two feet in height. In many places it was incapable of
resisting artillery fire, and, at the best, was of little use save in
overawing a mob, or as a receptacle for the city treasure and the public
records. The most important public buildings were the Cathedral, and the
churches of St. Francisco, St. Domingo, St. Michael, and the
Jesuits--all imposing enough externally, but with gaudy interiors, which
offended the sober taste of English travellers. There was also a large
civic hall, known as the Cabildos; and the Plaza de Toros, where the
passion of the inhabitants for bull-fighting was gratified, was a very
striking place. The Custom-house, Arsenal, and theatres were small and
unimposing.
For many reasons Buenos Ayres was admirably adapted for defence against
an enemy whose attack should develop itself in the form of street
fighting. The barracks were scattered over the city in low, retired
squares, and the houses were like so many small fortifications. Their
shape rendered each perfectly distinct, and not easily assailable save
from a neighbouring roof. This one weak point led to the passing of a
law, which might have led at times to embarrassing results, under which
the proprietor of one house was permitted to _fire at any stranger whom
he might detect on the roof of an adjoining one_. The gates and doors of
the houses were very strong, made of wood several inches thick, and
heavily bolted and barred; the windows had strong iron railings outside,
and heavy wooden shutters with iron fastenings within; and the flat
roofs were very useful, both for offence and defence. Altogether, it was
as awkward a city to take in the way unhappily chosen by General
Whitelocke, as can be imagined.
In most of the squares enclosed by the larger houses there were wells;
but the water was brackish, and the inhabitants preferred the water from
the river, which was sold in the streets, and which, although somewhat
muddy, became clear when allowed to stand, and, with the addition of a
little alum, was believed to have peculiar virtues for clearing and
strengthening the voice. The river, between Buenos Ayres and Colonia,
was about thirty miles in breadth; and it should be mentioned that the
latter place had already surrendered to a force of 800 English troops,
under Colonel Pack of the 71st, who had made his escape from Buenos
Ayres shortly after the assassination of Captain Ogilvie. The Artillery
with this force was commanded by Captain Wilgress, who had recovered
from the wound he received at Monte Video, only to receive a second and
more severe injury at Colonia. His detachment manned two light
6-pounders and two light 3-pounders; and he had in addition eight
Spanish 16-pounders, with which it was intended to arm the defensive
works proposed to be erected at Colonia. Had these last-mentioned guns,
and the siege ordnance left at the village of Reduccion and at Monte
Video, been brought against Buenos Ayres, with a view to its
bombardment, there is no doubt that the city, whose streets proved a
tomb to the attacking forces, would have been their prize.
The country round Buenos Ayres was well wooded, and the land in the
immediate vicinity rich and singularly productive. Thanks to the
inquiring minds of General Beresford’s force, it was ascertained that
beef, mutton, fowls, and river fish, were cheap and abundant, bread
excellent, and the markets filled daily soon after sunrise with
wild-fowl, quails, and partridges in abundance. The last-named birds
must have resembled the Canadian tree partridge, as they were caught
with ease, even in the immediate suburbs, by means of a noose at the end
of a stick. There was abundance of larger game in the country, both
four-footed and winged, and [Sidenote: Major Nicolls’ Diary.] “vultures
and birds of that class, luckily, very common too, otherwise the air
would be infected by the quantity of carrion left after the men, dogs,
and pigs had been satisfied.... Bullocks are here what the cocoa-trees
are in India. They turn them to the following uses: food, fuel, shoes,
ropes, trunks, sacks, covering for houses, beds, bridles, saddles,
bird-cages, drinking-cups, &c..... Their horses are the accidental breed
of the country, descended from those originally brought by the
Spaniards. They are undersized, but show some blood, are very tractable,
and hardy. Each proprietor affixes his mark on his droves, makes
geldings of them, and they run wild till required for use or sale. They
are driven in now and then for inspection. The King of Spain is a
proprietor; his mark is the tip of the left ear cut off. They are of
very trifling value in the drove--not more than half a dollar each. It
is not uncommon for a traveller whose horse is jaded to catch another
and leave his own. The Peons, or country people, who have more Indian
than Spanish blood in them, are very expert horsemen. They tame a wild
horse in a few hours, but by severe treatment. Their bridles are those
used by the Mamelukes, and they use stick and spur without reluctance.”
The chief exports from Buenos Ayres were hides, tallow, skins of
valuable animals, bark, coffee, and spices; the imports were cloths,
wearing apparel, glass, earthenware, cutlery, &c. So extensive was the
trade of the place, and so keen were the inhabitants for its
development, that it is not to be wondered at that, in the first flush
of short-lived conquest, the English commanders dwelt on its possible
advantage to Great Britain in terms, which the hope of justifying an
unauthorized expedition may possibly have made somewhat fervent.
The moral aspect of Buenos Ayres in 1807 seems to have been very
uninviting. Immorality of the grossest description prevailed in both
sexes and in all classes; indolence and intemperance characterized the
lower orders, and the whole community was priest-ridden to an
intolerable extent. The Bishop, in particular, tyrannized over all ranks
and classes; and when he went anywhere in state every one knelt to him,
the guards even presenting arms to him kneeling. During the short time
that General Beresford commanded, the Bishop demanded the same ceremony
from the English troops; but it was refused, and he never forgave it. He
was a very crafty man, and to the last he affected good-will to the
English; but by his orders every pulpit was used for fulminating threats
against them, and for inventing and exaggerating tales of English
atrocity. To such an extent was this carried, that the better class of
the inhabitants did not dare to make any advances to the English
officers, or show them open kindness, although they always welcomed them
to their houses if they came uninvited. The revenue of the Bishop was
very great, and included a fourth part of all sums paid as fees at
births, marriages, and funerals, the amount of which varied with the
will and ability of the parties concerned, or their friends. Another
fourth went to the King, and the remainder to the canons of the church
in which the necessary ceremony was performed. The priests of Buenos
Ayres were very numerous, and their private life was said to be most
immoral. As regarded the people generally, Major Nicolls wrote: “With
respect to religion, they appear to attend pretty regularly to its
exterior forms, especially the women, who attend mass daily, in which,
however, the men do not show so much zeal. Since, however, vice of every
description follows, it does not appear likely that forms of this nature
would be very useful, either in this world or as a preparation for that
to come. On General Beresford’s taking the city many thousands of
indulgences and remissions of all kinds were found, which have ever
proved a source of revenue and power to the Roman Catholic clergy, and
are here made the tools of Government.[13] The Bishop amuses the high
and low every week with some pompous procession or ceremony to make the
great remember that there is such a thing as religion. To the sick he
holds out forty days’ plenary indulgence for going to mass and giving
alms; and the poor are governed by a promise that their sins shall be
forgiven. On our landing, the Bishop induced the people to swear they
would defend the place to the last, for which their sins should be
forgiven.”
Against this city General Whitelocke resolved to move the greater part
of his force, leaving small garrisons in Monte Video and Colonia. Before
describing the Expedition, an anecdote is worthy of mention, as showing,
what has so frequently been shown already, the evil effects of the dual
government of the Artillery which existed in the days of the Board of
Ordnance. There is deposited in the Royal [Sidenote: Dated Monte Video,
6 June, 1807.] Artillery Record Office the original order to Captain
Frazer, signed by General Whitelocke, desiring him, as commanding
officer of Artillery and representing the Ordnance Department, “to pay
the sum of _forty pounds_ sterling for every field-piece that may be
captured from the enemy during the approaching service at Buenos Ayres,
according to the established usage of the service in such cases.”
In the same office is a correspondence in which Captain Frazer is
_forbidden_ by the Board to make any such payment. The question for
consideration is not whether the General or the Board was right in the
interpretation of the Regulations. The error of the system was that the
officer who received an order from the General, under whom he was
immediately serving, was made the channel for conveying to that General
an intimation that his order was wrong, and was not to be obeyed. The
marvel is that, under such a system, harmony was _ever_ possible between
the commanding officer of Artillery and his General; and, certainly, if
tact could have been imparted to a cadet at the Academy, along with his
mathematics, he would probably have found it the more useful
accomplishment of the two in his after career.
The arrangements made by Captain Frazer for the transport and service of
the Artillery were admirable and exhaustive. In General Whitelocke’s
report of the subsequent operations, he used the following terms of
commendation:--“I [Sidenote: ‘London Gazette’ extraordinary, 13 Sept.
1807.] cannot sufficiently bring to notice the uncommon exertions of
Captain Frazer, commanding the Royal Artillery, the fertility of whose
mind, zeal, and animation, in all cases left difficulties behind.” That
Captain Frazer was staunchly supported by the officers and men under his
command is apparent from his letters. Captain Dickson, whom he had
superseded, and under whom, singularly enough, he was destined to serve
in the Peninsula, was most loyal in his [Sidenote: Captain Frazer to D.
A. Gen. 21 June, 1807.] exertions, and earned the following
acknowledgment:--“I have met with so much assistance from Captain
Dickson, whom I found in command of the Artillery on my arrival, that it
is at once my duty and my inclination to report to you the sense I
entertain of his valuable assistance. But it is unnecessary for me to
mention more than the name of a brother-officer who is at once so highly
and so deservedly valued.” And again, after the conclusion of the
campaign: “If, in my several letters to you, I have not mentioned
Captains Hawker and Dickson, you will, I trust, impute this to the real
cause--a delicacy in venturing to express an opinion of officers of
equal standing in the Regiment with myself, and with whom, in many
cases, I should feel myself flattered to be compared.”
Captain Frazer had urged the propriety of heavy artillery accompanying
the army, with a view to a bombardment of the city, prior to an assault;
and in answer to an argument employed--that Monte Video would be left
unprotected--he drew out a detailed statement showing that no less than
145 guns, mortars, and howitzers would be left mounted in that city,
besides 270 dismounted. He further showed that there was an abundance of
ammunition for these guns; and he detailed three officers to remain
behind, of whom he was [Sidenote: Captain Frazer to D. A. G. R. A.]
afterwards able to say: “Colonel Brown, Commandant of the Garrison of
Monte Video, has expressed to me his high sense of the exertions of
Captain Durnford and Lieutenants England and Stopford, whose exertions
were unremitting during our temporary absence.” But his appeal was to no
purpose. General Whitelocke had determined to land at a place about
thirty miles from Buenos Ayres, called Enfinada de Barragon, and thence
march over the swamps which intervened, and which would have made the
movement of heavy artillery very difficult. With great difficulty,
Captain Frazer obtained permission to take three 24-pounders, two
12-inch Spanish mortars, and two 5½-inch howitzers as a reserve, in
addition to his field guns; but these, which would have been so useful
in the subsequent attack, were not allowed to proceed farther than the
village of Reduccion, where the first encounter with the enemy took
place. The following was the detail of the Royal Artillery which
actually took part in the attack on Buenos Ayres, on the 5th July,
1807:--
[Sidenote: MS. Returns in R. A. Record Office.]
1st Brigade--Captain A. S. Frazer. } 98 N.C. officers and men.
2nd Captain W. D. Nicolls. } 4 6-pounder guns.
Lieutenant Lloyd Down. } 2 3-pounder ”
2nd Brigade--Captain James Hawker. } 100 N.C. officers and men.
2nd Captain Henry Lane. } 5 4-pounder guns.
Lieutenant Thomas Trotter. } 1 5½-inch howitzer.
3rd Brigade--Captain Alexander Dickson. { 100 N.C. officers and men.
Lieutenant J. Mackonochie. { 3 12-pounder guns.
” Falkner Hope. { 4 6-pounder ”
{ 2 5½-inch howitzers.
Captain Frazer erred rather in being too minute in his arrangements,
than the reverse; he wrote his orders with his own hand, and knowing the
nature of the country which the men would have to traverse after
disembarkation, he issued the most detailed instructions before leaving
Monte Video, as to dress, diet, horses, &c. These are too long for
reproduction, but some are quaintly amusing, and one suggests a new use
for foot-straps to a gunner dismounted. “The men will land with one
great coat and blanket each, with a flannel waistcoat, brush, comb,
razor, and shaving-brush rolled up in the blanket; and with such
proportion of cooked provisions as may be directed. _Every man to have
shoe-straps tied round his shoes to keep them on in boggy ground_; the
men’s hair to be plaited up behind, not tied in a queue; the great coats
and blankets to be rolled up so as to leave them as much as possible the
full and free use of their limbs.”
To each Brigade of guns was attached a cart containing long troughs,
which were laid over very swampy ground or across ditches, and in which
the gun-wheels were made to travel, which otherwise would have sunk to
the axletrees. In fact everything which ingenuity could devise to
lighten the difficulties of the operation was thought of by Captain
Frazer. That he was rewarded by success is apparent by [Sidenote:
Captain Frazer, R.H.A., to D. A. Gen.] the following extract:--“During
the advance the Artillery exerted themselves to the admiration of the
whole army; the Artillerymen pulling at the drag-ropes up to their
waists in water.... In the most difficult ground they were continually
obliged to restrain their zeal, lest they should outmarch the army,
whose repeated intimations of ‘Easy the Artillery!’ were most
gratifying.” Of the services of his own troop of Horse Artillery,
Captain Frazer wrote: “The conduct of the officers and men was
admirable, yet it were better that the praise due to
Quartermaster-Sergeant Hay and the men of the Horse Artillery should
come from any other pen than mine; but their gallantry and intelligence
have ensured the respect of the whole army. It would be injustice not to
mention in terms of the most unequivocal commendation
Quartermaster-Sergeant Hay, in whom the valuable qualities of clear
arrangements and undaunted courage are joined to the greatest zeal; this
man is cast in no ordinary mould.”
On arrival at Buenos Ayres, after two engagements at Reduccion and Passo
Chico, in which the English were successful, General Whitelocke
completely invested the city. The plan of attack on which he decided was
to enter the place in separate columns by totally different entrances
[Sidenote: ‘Gazette,’ 13 Sept. 1807.] and streets; each column to march
“along the street directly in its front, till it arrived at the last
square of houses next the River La Plata, of which it was to possess
itself, forming on the flat roofs, and there wait for further orders. No
firing was to be permitted until the columns had reached their final
points and formed.” The reader, who has already been informed of the
size of Buenos Ayres, and the style of the houses, will at once see the
madness of such a method of attack; but the extraordinary thing to be
noted is that General Whitelocke employed, as an argument for the course
he adopted, the very circumstance which should have forbidden him to
hazard his troops in the dangerous and unsatisfactory occupation of
street fighting. “The knowledge,” he wrote, “that the enemy meant to
occupy the flat roofs of the houses gave rise to the plan of attack.”
The guns accompanied the columns; but “the detachments of the Horse
Artillery were not mounted, and of the Cavalry only two squadrons had
their horses.” The attack took place on the 5th July, and if endurance
and courage among the troops could have redeemed their General’s
blunder, this would have been done. At the end of the day no fewer than
2500 men were killed, wounded, or prisoners. The battle was just what
might have been foreseen. In General Whitelocke’s own words, “The nature
of the fire to which the troops were exposed was violent in the
extreme. Grape shot at the corners of all the streets, musketry, hand
grenades, bricks, and stones from the tops of all the houses; every
householder with his negroes defended his dwelling, each of which was in
itself a fortress, and it is not, perhaps, too much to say that the
whole male population of Buenos Ayres was employed in its defence.”
General Whitelocke’s subsequent conviction by court-martial for
incapacity might have been assured on his own testimony.
The only real gain to the English army at the end of the day was the
possession of the Plaza de Toros: and its situation was such, that, if
fortified, it would have commanded the town, and perhaps compelled the
inhabitants to insist on a surrender. Captain Frazer urged this without
success: he pointed out that with some guns captured that day from the
Spaniards he could construct a battery of 26 guns, immediately
serviceable, and strengthen it by unspiking 10 other pieces of ordnance
which had been for a time rendered unserviceable by the enemy, prior to
their capture: he assured the General that there were not less than 600
barrels of powder, captured that day in the Arsenal of Buenos Ayres, and
an apparent abundance of every requisite for the service of a battery;
and he reminded him that each gun which they had brought from Monte
Video was provided with 200 rounds: but all was to no purpose. A
loop-hole for an escape without utter disgrace, as he thought, was
opened to General Whitelocke, of which he availed himself, and which he
thus described in his official report:--“On the morning of the 6th inst.
General Linières addressed a letter to me, offering to give up all his
prisoners taken in the late affair, together with the 71st Regiment and
others taken with General Beresford, if I desisted from any other attack
on the town, and withdrew His Majesty’s forces from the River Plata,
intimating at the same time, from the exasperated state of the populace,
he could not answer for the safety of the prisoners, if I persisted in
offensive measures. Influenced by this consideration (which I knew from
better authority to be founded on fact), and reflecting of how little
advantage would be the possession of a country, the inhabitants of which
were so absolutely hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which
the bravery of the troops had obtained, and acceded to the annexed
Treaty, which I trust will meet the approbation of His Majesty.”
It may be here mentioned that the Treaty was carried out; the English
army returning to Monte Video, and [Sidenote: MS. Narratives of Captains
Hawker and Nicolls, and Lieut. Trotter, relative to attack on Buenos
Ayres.] thence to England. But as, fortunately, an immense number of
private and unpublished papers on this subject had been accumulated by
Sir A. Frazer, and ultimately reached the Royal Artillery Record Office
with a view to embodiment in some such work as this, it seems desirable
to analyze the conduct of General Whitelocke at this crisis, and to
ascertain, as far as is practicable, whether any other course would have
been successful.
[Sidenote: Major Nicoll’s Diary, and Official Report. Captain Frazer’s
Diary, &c.]
First, the threat of murdering the prisoners should have been dismissed
from General Whitelocke’s mind at once. With his powers of retaliating
after any such atrocity,--being, as he was, in possession of part of the
town,--the threat was an empty one; and between civilized communities
most unlikely of execution, even if the control of the General had been
weak. But, as a matter of fact, General Linières’ power and popularity
among the inhabitants at the time were very great;--a rumour of his
having fallen during the day produced a profound depression, which made
the reaction of joy the more intense when it was found that he was
uninjured. That such a crime against humanity would have been allowed by
one who was admitted by all to be chivalrous in the extreme, is utterly
improbable; and the use of the threat merely showed that he found it
necessary to make use of every argument, real and unreal, to secure his
purpose;--that his position was not sufficiently strong to dictate terms
to an enemy, even in the first hour of his discomfiture;--and, possibly,
that he measured the man with whom he had to deal, and acted
accordingly.
Secondly, the very eagerness of General Linières to let the troops go,
and his ready permission to let them take all the guns, &c., which they
had captured, should have suggested to General Whitelocke that these
were not the characteristics of a General confident in his own strength,
and in his enemy’s inferiority.
And, thirdly, _were_ the inhabitants so bitterly hostile to the English,
as General Whitelocke assumed? Doubtless they were not likely to evince
much amiability while having to fight for their lives and homes; but,
had a different mode of attack been adopted--blockade with a threatened
bombardment, followed by the occupation in force of one or two
commanding points--would it not have been possible so to foster English
trade with the inhabitants as to ensure a thoroughly friendly feeling?
This was evidently believed by those whose written opinions are
extant--opinions formed in the city, and after careful inquiry. They
said that had the Bishop been strictly watched, and warned that he would
be sent to Europe, should he be detected in any political conspiracy, or
countenancing any irregularity;--had all the Spanish officers and
regular troops been sent to England immediately, and all the arms and
ammunition of the inhabitants removed;--had the chief public officers
been removed, but no injury done to the private inhabitants, and had
honesty and uprightness been displayed in the English administration,
the country might have been easily retained as a very useful appendage
to Great Britain. The presence of an English army would have raised the
price of nearly every commodity, and at the same time the system of
ready-money payment would have benefited the local trade, and would have
given the stock-owners a very strong interest in the presence of the
English. The people of all ranks in Buenos Ayres were fond of copying
English fashions in dress and furniture, and the facilities for
comparing these would have been favourable to the invaders. The people
born in the country, who were despised by the Spaniards, would have been
raised to a degree of consideration unknown to them previously; and it
would have been politic to place many of them in the situations of which
the Castilians had been deprived. As for the Indians, the gain to them
would have been immense, for their skins would have met with a ready
sale at an increased price. Commercial intercourse between England and
Buenos Ayres once established, every vessel that sailed between their
ports would have spun another thread in the web which bound them
together, until what at first might have been a mere commercial
alliance, would have ended in a firm friendship and union.
All these possibilities were frustrated by the ignorance of a General.
His landing so far from the city was one great blunder: his sub-division
of his army, leaving part at Reduccion and part at Colonia, was another:
his dispensing with siege artillery was a fatal error; and his crowning
folly was the employment of a trained soldiery in street fighting, thus
depriving them of the opportunity of exercising the qualities which a
disciplined army possesses, and compelling them to meet an enemy under
the very circumstances which that enemy would himself have chosen.
General Whitelocke had sufficient troops to prevent the entry of
supplies into the city if he had chosen;--or he might have entered
Buenos Ayres two days before, when there was nothing but the wildest
confusion within;--or he might have confined the attack to the side of
the Ritoro, and approached the Citadel by regular parallels, using the
streets to a great extent for that purpose, and ending by an assault
which would have certainly been successful.
But he took the very course which was certain to be fatal; and the army
he commanded, after performing useless prodigies of valour, had to
succumb to terms which were openly talked of at Monte Video, while the
army was awaiting embarkation for England, as disgraceful.
And with this irritating consciousness of failure, there came among the
troops, when at Monte Video, not a little demoralization. Crime was
general; desertions frequent; insubordination not unknown; and capital
punishment was resorted to to enforce discipline. It is with pride that
the Artilleryman learns from Captain Frazer’s letters, that not a single
desertion occurred from the ranks of the Royal Artillery.
The possible consequences of a General’s incapacity ought to stir every
officer to a determination to master his profession. The thought that
his ignorance may some day be the cause of unnecessary slaughter, or may
neutralise the bravest efforts of his men, and tarnish his country’s
honour, ought to make a man afraid of being found wanting when called
upon. In the success of a great General, the officer who loves his
profession traces means and maxims which he himself may study; and in
the failures of an incapable commander, he searches for blunders which
he may avoid. The study of both will be found useful to the man who may
some day have to lead others, and would fain lead them to victory.
The last letter written by Captain Frazer from Monte Video was one
imploring that he and his troop might be attached to any portion of the
army which might be on active service. He seemed eager to drown the
recollection of failure in the excitement of successes under some more
able leader. And, as this history will show, he was not disappointed.
The time was near when England was to draw the sword on behalf of
suffering Spain, nor to sheathe it again until the invader had been
driven from Spanish soil, albeit at a terrible cost to herself of life
and treasure. But with all their attendant sufferings and cost, those
were days to gloat over; now, alas! is it not too often found that--
[Sidenote: Rossetti.]
“... Man is parcelled out in men
Even thus:--because for any wrongful blow
No man not stricken asks, ‘I would be told
Why dost thou strike:’ but his heart whispers then,
‘He is he, I am I!’ By this we know
That the earth falls asunder, being old.”