THE NECESSITY, BIRTH, AND PROGRESS OF THE ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.
Of all the so-called Battalion Records, which were kept at the various
Head-quarter offices at Woolwich up to the year 1859, and the details of
which are, at the best, of the most scanty description, perhaps the most
meagre and most disappointing are those of the Royal Horse Artillery.
From the well-known _esprit_ of this branch of the service, it might
have been expected that its earlier history would have been treated
almost with effusion by those in whose custody was a book purporting to
contain a record of its services. But it may be said with truth that for
one item of information obtained from the written records of this
brilliant arm, ten have been obtained from the traditions handed down
verbally, and fondly treasured by successive generations of officers;
and even a greater part of the required information has been obtained
from works of general military history, and from extant official
letter-books.
The first section of these old Record Books professes to treat of the
circumstances of the original formation of the particular part of the
Regiment concerned. In the Records of the Royal Horse Artillery this
section is compressed into two lines. “The Royal Horse Artillery was
formed as an additional corps to the Regiment of Artillery on the 1st
February, 1793.” Remarkable for its brevity, this account of the
formation of the Royal Horse Artillery is also remarkable for its
inaccuracy. It was _not_ an additional corps to the Royal Artillery, but
from the very commencement an essential, integral part of it. The Driver
Corps, formed in 1794, _was_ an additional corps to the Royal Artillery;
but its officers were, until after Waterloo, drawn from a different
source, and its men were never Artillerymen. The Royal Horse Artillery,
on the other hand, was invariably officered by the Royal Artillery, and
was recruited from its ranks. Of the wisdom, or otherwise, of this
policy, it will be necessary to treat hereafter; but of the fact there
can be no doubt. Yet again, in the brief record quoted above, are
compressed other inaccuracies. The Horse Artillery did not spring into
existence, as a corps, on 1st February, 1793, as the words would imply.
Two troops were authorised in January of that year, but not for twelve
years of straggling augmentations of staff-officers and troops, can it
be said to have attained its proper maturity. The earlier wars of the
French Revolution were the boyhood of the Royal Horse Artillery, as the
Peninsular campaign was its glorious manhood. After Waterloo, until the
Crimean War, its history was a blank page.
It is fortunate that an officer of the Regiment has been found, at once
so capable and so patient in tracing out the circumstances which
impressed on the world the necessity [Sidenote: Captain H. W. L. Hime,
Royal Artillery. Proceedings R. A. Institution.] of this arm, as the
author of the papers on ‘The Mobility of Field Artillery, Past and
Present.’ According to this writer, England was the last among the
leading nations in Europe to adopt the use of Horse Artillery. As early
as 1788, the subject had strongly attracted the attention of the
Master-General of the Ordnance; but, unfortunately, he referred it to a
committee. The period of gestation, so to speak, in committees on
military subjects is very great; in this particular instance the winter
of 1792 had arrived without any result from their labours.
The introduction of Horse Artillery into the Prussian service dates from
1759; and in 1792 this arm was introduced into the French and Swedish
armies. In other European countries improvement had been made in Field
Artillery, without, however, adopting the system of _mounted
detachments_; but this latter is the distinctive mark of Horse
Artillery. It has been asserted, and on good authority, that Horse
Artillery was used in India prior even to its adoption by Frederick the
Great--and dating as far back as 1756. If the existence of an Artillery
without mobility was sufficient to impress on the authorities in that
country a sense of the necessity of some improvements, the argument was
not wanting. In an engagement between the English [Sidenote: ‘History of
the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Hindostan,’ vol. i.
pp. 312-368.] and French troops near Trichinopoly in 1753, “the English,
_for more expedition_, marched without any field-pieces;” and when the
infantry advanced against the French in an action fought shortly
afterwards, “the _artillery, in the hurry, could not keep up with the
battalion_.” The advantage of a more mobile artillery must certainly
have been apparent after such melancholy exhibitions.
It has already been mentioned in this work that rapidity of movement,
more especially under fire, was rendered hopeless by the frequent
employment of peasants to act as drivers to the batteries. The formation
of the Royal Horse Artillery did not free the Field Batteries from this
evil. A quaint circumstance in proof of this is narrated by the
[Sidenote: Hime.] author already mentioned. “In 1798, the Commandant of
Woolwich inspected some guns manned by gunners of the 8th Battalion,
R.A. The guns were each drawn by three horses in single file, which were
driven by contract drivers on foot, hired for the occasion, dressed in
white smocks [Sidenote: ‘Aide-Mémoire to the Military Sciences,’ art.
‘Ordnance.’] with blue collars and cuffs, and armed with long carter’s
whips of the ordinary farm pattern. When this formidable array had been
reviewed, the Commandant, General Lloyd, and the Garrison Adjutant,
expressed their joint opinion that field artillery movements could not
be performed quicker.” The increase of mobility over that old system--of
which the above is a real, although, perhaps, exceptional
illustration--which followed the introduction of Horse Artillery can
best be shown by another and later instance. At the battle of Fuentes
d’Onor, Bull’s troop of Horse Artillery--now D Battery, B Brigade--was
surrounded and cut off by the French cavalry. It was at the time under
the command of the 2nd Captain, Norman Ramsay. [Sidenote: Gleig.] “Guns
thus dealt with are almost always lost, and consequently the army ceased
to think of Ramsay and his men, except as prisoners. Presently, however,
a great commotion was observed among the French squadrons; men and
officers closed in confusion towards one point, where a thick dust was
rising, and where loud cries and the sparkling of blades and flashing of
pistols indicated [Sidenote: Napier.] some extraordinary occurrence....
Suddenly the multitude became violently agitated; an English shout
pealed high and clear; the mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay
burst forth, sword in hand, at the head of his troop, his horses,
breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain; the guns
bounded behind them like things of no weight, and the mounted gunners
followed close, with heads bent low, and pointed weapons, in desperate
career.” Between the crawling peasant-driven team on Woolwich parade,
and this glowing description of a Horse Artillery battery but a very few
years later, there is a contrast, which shows at a glance the immense
stride in the direction of mobility, which had followed the introduction
of that branch of the Regiment to whose story this chapter is devoted.
Much of this improvement was due to the fostering care of the
Master-General, and of the Deputy-Adjutant-General, afterwards Sir John
Macleod; much also was due to the encouragement of General Officers, who
found to their amazement a force of Artillery, which could conform to
their most rapid movements; and not a little was due to the practical
school of experience opened in the Peninsula; but, to their honour be it
stated, the rapid progress towards the standard of perfection attained
by the Royal Horse Artillery was mainly due to the labours, the
devotion, of the officers belonging to it, who were inspired by the same
_esprit_ and the same conscientious regard for their duties, as have
continued to animate the officers of that brilliant arm to this day.
While the Committee, appointed to decide the question of Horse Artillery
in connection with our service, was--according to wont--babbling
harmlessly and fruitlessly in the fourth year of its existence, a
virtual rupture took place between England and France. The Duke of
Richmond, then Master-General, immediately took the matter himself in
hand; and of three schemes, very dissimilar, over which the Committee
had been debating, he selected the following, as the basis of the
organization of a troop of Royal Horse Artillery.
INDEX.
A. Horses.
B. Drivers.
C. Ammunition.
D. Captains.
E. Lieuts.
F. N.C.O.’s.
G. Gunners.
H. Drummers.
I. Civil Lists.
---------------------------+----+---+----+-------------------+---+---------------
| | | | Distribution of | |
| | | | detachments. | |
Detail. | | | +---+---+-------+---+ | Remarks.
| A. | B.| C.| D.| E.| F.| G.| H.| I.|
---------------------------+----+---+--------+-------+---+---+---+---------------
5½-inch howitzers (2) | 8| 4| 160| 1| 1| 2| 20| ..| ..| 4 men held the
Waggons (2) | 8| 4| | | | | | | | horses in
| | | | | | | | | | action.
3-prs. (2) | 8| 4| 480| 1| 1| 2| 20| ..| ..| Ditto.
Waggons (2) | 8| 4| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
6-prs., Col. Williams’ (2) | 4| 2| 160| ..| 1| 2| 20| ..| ..| Ditto.
Tumbrils (2) | 4| 2| | | | | | | |
Horses for detachments | 66| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
2 Sergeants, Sergt.-Major,}| 2| ..| ..| ..| ..| 2| ..| ..| ..|
and Clerk of Stores }| | | | | | | | | |
Drummers to have }| 2| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 2| ..|
bugle horns, and }| | | | | | | | | |
act as orderly men }| | | | | | | | | |
1 forge cart | 3| 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
1 waggon for Artificers’ }| 3| 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
Stores }| | | | | | | | | |
Officers’ horses not }| | | | | | | | | |
included }| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..|
| | | | | | | | | |
CIVIL LIST. | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
1 Commissary of horse | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
2 Conductors of horse | 2| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 2|
1 Collar-maker | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
1 Wheeler | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
1 Blacksmith | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
1 Farrier | 1| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| ..| 1|
+----+---+----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------------
Total | 123| 22| 800| 2| 3| 8| 60| 2| 7|
---------------------------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---+---+---+---------------
The formation of the first two troops, A and B, took place at Woolwich,
having been ordered in January 1793. The Captains were R. Lawson,
afterwards so distinguished in Egypt, and the Brigade-Major of the
Regiment, J. Macleod, afterwards Deputy-Adjutant-General. In these--as
in the other troops subsequently formed--great care was taken to
appoint none but officers of well-known ability. This fact, combined
with the permission given to the Horse Artillery to select the best
recruits joining the Regiment, had the immediate effect of causing the
new branch to be looked on as a _corps d’élite_: as, indeed, was the
case in every other country in Europe, except Austria. Whether this has
proved a benefit, or otherwise, to the corps, will hereafter be
considered. The _esprit_ generally to be found in a _corps d’élite_ was
fanned by other, minor, considerations. It must be remembered that the
gunners of Field Artillery, other than Horse Artillery, and of Garrison
Artillery, were, and still are, interchangeable. But in the Horse
Artillery “the men were magnificently dressed, they were amply paid, and
they were not haunted by the constant dread of being suddenly and
forcibly torn from the Field Artillery service, which they loved, and
thrust into the Garrison Artillery service, [Sidenote: Hime.] which was
strange to them.” Only 4 guns per troop were granted at first; and the
establishment consisted, in addition to the officers, of 8
non-commissioned officers, 49 gunners, [Sidenote: R. H. A. Records.] and
35 drivers. On the formation of C and D Troops, on 1st November, 1793,
the armament of each troop was raised to 6 guns, and the establishment
per troop was 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 45 drivers, and
187 horses.
The officers appointed to command the new troops were, E. Howorth,
afterwards Sir E. Howorth, who subsequently commanded the Artillery at
Talavera, Busaco, and Fuentes d’Onor, and J. M. Hadden, who afterwards
became Surveyor-General of the Ordnance. The reader will continue to
observe the selection always made of able officers to command the troops
of Horse Artillery. In 1794, E and F Troops were formed, and the command
given respectively to Captain W. Cuppage, an officer who afterwards held
for twenty-six years the appointment of Inspector of the Royal Carriage
Department, and to Captain J. Butler, an officer who afterwards became
Lieutenant-Governor of the Royal Military College at Sandhurst.
In 1794, the number of guns per troop was augmented to 8; and this
remained the establishment until 1804, in which year the number was
reduced to 6; at which it continued until the reductions after the
battle of Waterloo. In 1794, when the number of guns was raised to 8,
the following was the establishment: 15 non-commissioned officers, 97
gunners, 71 drivers, 246 horses per troop. This was reduced in the
following year very considerably, and became 15 non-commissioned
officers, 85 gunners, 51 drivers, and 170 horses.
The next variation in the establishment was caused by the formation, in
Ireland, of G Troop, from detachments serving in that country. The
command of the new troop was given to Captain--afterwards Sir--G. B.
Fisher, an officer who in 1827 was appointed Commandant of Woolwich. For
two years after the formation of G Troop, the establishment of the
troops was as follows: 8 guns, 16 non-commissioned officers, 96 gunners,
58 drivers, and 190 horses. An augmentation of 1 non-commissioned
officer and 1 gunner per troop took place in 1803.
In 1804, the number of guns per troop having being reduced to 6, H Troop
was formed at Woolwich, and the command given to Captain A. Macdonald, a
smart officer, who subsequently had the good fortune to command the
Horse Artillery of the Cavalry Division at Waterloo. On the reduction to
6 guns, the strength of each troop was, 14 non-commissioned officers, 75
gunners, 46 drivers, and 142 horses.
In 1805, an augmentation of four troops took place--I, K, L, and M; and
the commands were given respectively to Captain W. Millar, an officer
who subsequently became Inspector of Artillery, and Director-General of
the Field Train Department; to Captain C. Godfrey, an officer who went
on half-pay a few years later, in 1811; to Captain N. Foy, who died in
1817; and to Captain the Hon. W. H. Gardner, who died as a
Colonel-Commandant in 1856.
For the few years following this augmentation, the establishment
remained virtually the same; but, in January 1813, 194 officers,
non-commissioned officers, and men were added to act as Rocket
Detachments, and also as a depôt to supply the troops on service. A
depôt for the Royal Horse Artillery has existed under various names,
and in somewhat chequered circumstances. It commenced--as stated
above--in 1813; it existed for many years in the form of an Adjutant’s
Detachment at Woolwich; in 1859 it was transferred to Canterbury; on a
somewhat larger scale it was transferred to Maidstone after the
amalgamation of the Royal and Indian Artilleries; for a short time
subsequently, the Horse Artillery Batteries at home acted as a depôt for
those serving abroad; and, at the date of the publication of this work,
the last-mentioned arrangement is supplemented by the existence of two
Horse Artillery Batteries in the general depôt for the Regiment.
In 1814, the various Rocket Detachments were combined, those at home
becoming the 1st, and those abroad the 2nd, Rocket Troop. The officers
appointed to command these were Captain W. G. Elliott, an officer who
retired from the Regiment in 1828, and Captain--afterwards Sir--E. C.
Whinyates, an officer whose ability, zeal, and services have hardly been
surpassed in the Regiment. He ultimately--after a long and active
career--became Commandant of Woolwich, where his kindly manners were
long remembered. He commanded the Rocket Troop at Waterloo, where he was
severely wounded.
Among the many heart-breaking reductions which exasperate the Artillery
student, perhaps none are more distressing, than the reduction of the
2nd Rocket Troop in 1816. _The 1st Rocket Troop had never been out of
England_; the 2nd had done good service at Leipsic and Waterloo. Neither
of them had had a long existence; but one had had a stirring, glorious
history. On the 16th May, 1815, the following order had been
issued:--“His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in the name and on the
behalf of His Majesty, has been pleased to command that _the Rocket
Troop of Royal Artillery, which was present at the Battle of Leipsic_,
be permitted to wear the word ‘Leipsic’ on their appointments, in
commemoration of their services on that occasion.” And to the same troop
the reward fell, given to those who had been at the Battle of Waterloo.
Yet, when the pruning-knife came to be used, the troop which had earned
these honours was selected for reduction; and, as if adding insult to
injury, the word ‘Leipsic’ came actually to be worn by the surviving
troop, which had never been on active service at all! On its reduction,
the officers of the 2nd Rocket Troop were transferred to the Corps of
Royal Artillery Drivers.
Up to this point, we have traced the growth, _numerically_, of the Royal
Horse Artillery. The conclusion of hostilities after Waterloo led to
very extensive reductions. In 1816, besides the 2nd Rocket Troop, D, K,
L, and M Troops were [Sidenote: _Vide_ vol. i. p. 394.] reduced, with
the consequent changes of designation in the surviving troops. From a
total, of all ranks, amounting to 2675, in 1815, and 2621 horses, the
Horse Artillery fell in 1816 to 1181 men and 959 horses. Of the six
troops in France with the Army of Occupation, the following was the
establishment per troop, each troop having 6 guns:--
5 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, 85 gunners, 56 drivers, 168
horses.
The troops on home service were allowed only 4 guns, and an
establishment of 5 officers, 11 non-commissioned officers, 56 gunners,
24 drivers, 102 horses.
But this was merely a beginning. In 1819, B and G Troops were reduced;
the troops in France were brought on the Home Establishment, and the
number of guns per troop reduced to 2. The strength was then 5 officers,
10 non-commissioned officers, 47 gunners, 18 drivers, 36 horses, per
troop; and the total strength of the Royal Horse Artillery did not
exceed 616 of all ranks, and 317 horses.[2]
At this miserable establishment the troops remained for some years. In
1828, the two troops on service in Ireland were raised to 4 guns, and
remained so; the relieving troops taking over 2 guns, and a suitable
proportion of men, from those they relieved. In 1848, _all_ the troops
were raised to 4 guns, with the required increase of men and horses;
and this lasted until 1852, when each troop was raised to 6 guns, the
present establishment.
In 1847, the Rocket Troop became I Troop: and rocket carriages were
added to the equipment of the whole.[3]
[Sidenote: Communicated by Sir D. E. Wood.]
The 4-gun Troops in Ireland had 2 ammunition waggons, 1 forge and 1
store waggon. On the augmentation to 6 guns in 1852, there were allowed
to each troop 6 waggons, 1 forge and 1 store waggon, and 1 captain’s
cart.
[Sidenote: Sir E. C. Warde.]
The augmentations after 1847 were due to “the foresight and
determination of Lord Hardinge, who was one of the best friends the
Corps ever had, being utterly without [Sidenote: Reports to House of
Commons, and to Lord Panmure, by Sir R. Gardiner, in 1848, 1849, and
1856.] and fully appreciating the value of an efficient, and of
sufficient, artillery.” But he was warmly aided by one within the Corps,
whose motives were as single as his arguments were sound, whose voice
was ever ready to plead for the corps in which he had spent a long,
pure, and illustrious life, Sir Robert Gardiner. Owing to these
augmentations, 42 guns of Horse Artillery were available for service
[Sidenote: R. H. A. Records.] in the field in 1854: and the total
strength of the Brigade stood at 1175 of all ranks, and 1054 horses.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: Communicated by Sir D. E. Wood, K.C.B., Captain Gordon, C.B.,
and Colonel G. T. Field, R.A.]
The following was the establishment of a troop of Horse Artillery when
sent on active service to the Crimea in the Spring of 1854:--
Officers 6
N.-C. Officers 15
Gunners 80
Drivers 77
Trumpeters 1
Farriers 1
Shoeing smiths 4
Collar-makers 2
Wheelers 2
_Equipment_--
Light 6-prs. 4
12-pr. howitzers 2
6-pr. ammunition waggons 5
12-pr. howitzers 4
6-pr. rocket carriage 1
Forge 1
Store-limber waggon 1
Store cart 1
Spare gun carriage 1 (not horsed).
_Horses_--
Officers 12
Troop 192
---
Total 204
On the 29th November, 1855, the following was laid down as the detail of
a troop of Horse Artillery with the army in the Crimea.
Officers 6
N.-C. Officers 20
Gunners 97
Drivers 123
Trumpeters 1
---
Total 247
Farriers 1
Shoeing smiths 6
Collar-makers 3
Wheelers 2
---
Total 259
---
_Equipment_--4 9-pr. guns.
2 24-pr. howitzers.
6 gun ammunition waggons.
5 howitzer waggons.
1 store-limber waggon.
1 spare gun carriage.
1 forge.
1 rocket carriage.
1 store cart.
1 medicine cart.
2 forge waggons.
3 water carts.
--
Total 28 carriages.
No. of Horses.
Riding 92
Draught 180
---
Total 272
---
Of the troops which had been reduced after Waterloo, B was reformed as a
reserve half troop in 1855, and completed in the following year: and G
and K Troops were reformed in 1857.
The highest point reached between the reductions after Waterloo, and the
year 1857, was in February 1856, when the total of all ranks reached
1950, and the number of horses was 1370. The amalgamation of the Royal
with the Indian Artilleries brought the strength of Royal Horse
Artillery available for service to an unprecedented standard: at the
present moment there are in the regiment thirty-one _service_ and two
_depôt_ Horse Artillery Batteries. But this chapter relates solely to
the _old_ Royal Horse Artillery.
As yet the _numerical_ variations in the Royal Horse Artillery have
alone been treated. But there are many other details, mainly of interior
economy, which will doubtless be interesting to the modern
representatives of the arm, and which may here be briefly stated.
[Sidenote: Maj.-Gen. Brome to the Duke of Richmond, 6/9/17.]
At first, it was directed that recruits might be taken who were 5 feet
6¾ inches in height: but before six months had passed, the standard was
raised, at the urgent request of the Captains, to 5 feet 8 inches. There
was often difficulty in obtaining a sufficient number of suitable
recruits, and even when the troops were complete, it was customary to
attach to each, when in the field, a few of the Driver Corps, with
[Sidenote: Lefroy.] additional horses or mules. Extra pay was granted
from the first to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and gunners
of Horse Artillery.
The exact relative _status_ of the new branch of the service was
speedily settled. On 21st February, 1797, the Board of Ordnance granted
the same allowance for forage to the officers, as was allowed to
officers of Cavalry; and so early had it been decided that the Horse
Artillery should take the right of all Cavalry, that, as will be seen by
the following letter, the Master-General would not in 1804 allow the
point to be disputed.
* * * * *
“Woolwich, June 9, 1804.
“DEAR COLONEL,
[Sidenote: D. A. Gen. R.A., to Colonel Cuppage.]
“I submitted to the Master General your letter of the 5th instant,
relating to a conversation which took place with General Sir David
Dundas, when the Horse Artillery marched past with the Cavalry, on
the King’s birthday, in which Sir David, though the Horse
Artillery _then_ led, expressed doubts as to the precedence and
rank of the Horse Artillery on such future occasions.
“Lord Chatham not being aware upon what circumstances Sir David’s
doubts have arisen, and not considering the communication from you
in any other light than as a wish to know how far, as commanding
officer of Artillery, you are justifiable in making a claim to the
right for the Horse Artillery when paraded with Cavalry, his
Lordship has desired me simply to say that he considers the
privilege so well established by practice, as well as opinion,
that he is unwilling to suppose it can be disputed.
“_His Majesty has never seen the Horse Artillery in any other
place_: they were encamped on the right of all the Cavalry (of the
Blues) at Windsor: and in all parades of ceremony and honour,
placed on the right of the Cavalry.
“I am, dear Colonel,
“Your obedient Servant,
“J. MACLEOD.”
* * * * *
Both by custom and regulation this precedence continued to belong to the
Royal Horse Artillery until July 1869, when it was ordered that the
Household Cavalry, _when the Sovereign should be present_, should have
the precedence awarded to a body guard.
It was laid down as a rule, that no officer should be appointed to the
Horse Brigade, who had not been on foreign service: but as this rule was
occasionally broken, it was decided in July 1805 that any officers who
had been appointed to the Horse Artillery, prior to having been on
foreign service, should “(to avoid any officers being confined to one
species of duty) be liable after three or four years’ service in the
Horse Brigade to be exchanged again into the Battalions, so that they
may take their share of duty on foreign service, and obtain that
experience which is necessary to an Artillery officer, as he advances in
the Regiment.” For the information of the general reader it should here
be stated, that prior to 1861, when the amalgamation of the Imperial and
East India Company’s armies took place, the Royal Horse Artillery never
went abroad except on active service. Since 1861, however, India has
opened a field of foreign service for this branch of the Regiment: and
fifteen batteries of service Horse Artillery are to be found in that
country, against sixteen at home.
[Sidenote: General Orders and R. H. A. Records, and MS. Notes of General
Belson, R.A., 1812.]
The changes in the dress of the Horse Artillery may be gathered from the
following statistics. An order dated 1st November, 1806, lays down the
following rules for the dress of officers:--“Except at dress parades the
blue Regimental overalls are to be worn till dinner-time in place of the
blue pantaloons, which is to be the afternoon dress when at home. At all
parades, whether mounted or dismounted, and during the day, the black
velvet stock is to be worn, with an inch of shirt collar over it: no
other white to be shown. In the evenings, it is requested that black
silk handkerchiefs may be substituted with the same proportion of shirt
collar over them. When officers are dressed for a ball, evening party,
or dine out, they are to wear the jacket open, white pantaloons, plain
white waistcoat (with sash over it), light sword, regulation sword-knot,
black belt, with cocked-hat and feather. In common a white leather
sword-knot is to be worn. Spurs with horizontal rowels to be worn at all
times.”
Prior to 1812, gaiters and knee-boots had been worn: but on the 14th
January in that year his Royal Highness the Prince Regent issued the
following order:--
“The officers of the Royal Horse Artillery are to wear jackets similar
to the private men, with an aiguillette. In parade dress, they are to
wear white leather pantaloons, and Hussar boots, with gold binding. On
ordinary duties or on march, they are to wear overalls of a colour
similar to the private men’s, and a short _surtout_, which is calculated
to be worn likewise as a _pelisse_ on service. When attending a
drawing-room or levee, they may appear in long coats, with lappels and
aiguillettes, the same as are worn with the jacket, but without lace on
the seams: or in the Regimental jacket, as they may prefer. The officers
of the Horse Artillery are likewise to wear cocked-hats, with the star
loop, with their _dress_ regimentals.”
[Sidenote: 1823.]
By General Order of 5th August, 1823, leather pantaloons and Hessian
boots were abolished, blue-grey overalls and Wellington boots being
substituted.
[Sidenote: 1827.]
By General Order of 22nd December, 1827, helmets were abolished, and
chacos with tassels substituted.
[Sidenote: 1831.]
By General Order of 15th March, 1831, drivers’ jackets were assimilated
to those of the gunners.
[Sidenote: 1831.]
By General Order of 20th December, 1831, steel spurs for officers were
abolished, and brass spurs substituted.
[Sidenote: 1834.]
By General Order of 26th May, 1834, cross-belts were abolished, and
waist-belts substituted.
[Sidenote: 1837.]
In 1837 bearskin busbies were substituted for chacos. The plumes were
altered in 1839.
[Sidenote: 1853.]
Sealskin busbies were substituted for bearskin. The officers, however,
continued to wear the bearskin until 1855, when the sable busby was
adopted. The plume was shortened from 12 to 8 inches.
[Sidenote: 1854.]
The officers’ _pelisse_ was abolished in this year.
[Sidenote: 1855.]
The full-dress jacket was altered by reducing the amount of lace. A
cross-belt of gold lace with pouch was instituted for the officers; as
also a plain blue stable-jacket in place of the undress frock-coat and
red embroidered waistcoat.
[Sidenote: 1857.]
In this year booted leather overalls were instituted; and swan-neck
steel spurs for all ranks were substituted for the brass spurs of the
officers, and the straight steel spurs of the men.
* * * * *
A more important thing, however, than the dress has been the armament of
the Royal Horse Artillery. Its greatest deeds have been wrought with the
6-pounder; but that was not its invariable weapon. Talking merely of the
pre-amalgamation days[4]--the days which belong to _history_ instead of
_to-day_, when rifled ordnance was unknown in Horse Artillery--there
were even then not unfrequent changes of armament. One troop, as we
shall see hereafter, went on service with 12-pounders; on the eve of
Waterloo, owing to the want of guns of position, three troops received
9-pounders, instead of the 6-pounders which they had brought from
England; and coming to later days, at the commencement of the Crimean
War, the two troops, C and I, which first left England were armed with
6-pounders; but, on reaching Varna, C Troop was ordered to exchange them
for 9-pounders; and I Troop would have been left behind, for inability
to do the same, had it not been that Lord Raglan yielded to the urgent
entreaties of its commander, Colonel Maude, to allow it to accompany the
expedition.
During the Peninsular Campaign, the armament of a troop was as
follows:--2 9-pounders, or 2 heavy 6-pounders; 1 heavy 5½-inch
howitzer; 3 light 6-pounders; 6 ammunition [Sidenote: Lefroy.] waggons;
3 reserve waggons, and 4 other carriages. Compared with the simplicity
of modern Horse Artillery armament, the presence of three different guns
in the same troop, with the consequent necessity of a variety of
ammunition, seems a very complicated and undesirable arrangement. This
was frequently felt at the time; and at the change of armament made
before Waterloo, a foreshadowing of the modern harmony of weapons might
be detected in the arming of I Troop--Bull’s--with 5½-inch howitzers
only. And right noble was the service done by that troop on the 18th of
June.
During the season of starvation between 1819 and 1848, the guns attached
to the skeleton troops were 6-pounders. With the augmentations, a
proportion of howitzers made its re-appearance.
The proper armament for Horse Artillery, in the days before the
substitution of rifled ordnance put an end to the discussion, was
exhaustively treated by Sir Robert Gardiner. His arguments are
interesting even at the present day, when the perfection of Field
Batteries, and their ability to carry more gunners into action by means
of the new-pattern carriage, have combined to make not a few question
the necessity of so expensive an arm as Horse Artillery being retained.
If we substitute the 9-pounder rifled gun for the old 6-pounder, and the
16-pounder for the old 9-pounder, in Sir Robert’s remarks, we shall find
his arguments as applicable [Sidenote: Report on the Artillery by Sir R.
Gardiner, 31 Mar. 1848.] to the later as to the former controversy.
“There can be no greater mistake than to put rivalry or comparisons, or
to expect the same results from the employment of Horse Artillery as of
Brigade (i. e. Field) Artillery. Though _one and the same arm_, they are
equipped and intended for totally distinct purposes. The necessary quick
movements of the Horse Artillery could not be attained by 9-pounders;
the telling effect of 9-pounders could not be expected from Horse
Artillery. One is intended to act with Cavalry, and, from the nature of
its equipment and the lightness of its metal, is expected to maintain at
all times, and under all circumstances, of bad roads, of rough, hilly,
or broken ground, the same pace as Cavalry; and, in short, to bring
artillery into action wherever Cavalry can act.... I can name two
instances in which, while acting with cavalry, any other than Horse
Artillery would have been perfectly useless. One, the affair of Morales,
in Spain; the other, the movement from Quatre Bras to the position of
Waterloo. Both were specially movements of Horse Artillery, and both
tried the wind and speed of our horses. In the latter movement
particularly, through a deep cross country, any Artillery differently
equipped would have inevitably fallen into the hands of the enemy. In
all light movements of the Infantry of an army, Horse Artillery is as
indispensably necessary and as exclusively effective, as it is with
cavalry. I have myself, in cases of reconnoissance, been withdrawn from
the Cavalry for the moment, to cover movements in which heavier
Artillery could bear no part.... On the other hand, if Horse Artillery
has its distinct advantages over heavier guns, so likewise the latter
have their distinct purposes, for which the employment of Horse
Artillery would be wholly inapplicable and inadequate.... I have known
Brigade Artillery as perfect, in its way, as Horse Artillery; but no
more comparison can be drawn between them than between Cavalry and
Infantry.”
Then follows a remark, which shows how the writer anticipated the
changes which have come, and which have done so much to improve our
Field Artillery: “Our present Brigades would be greatly advanced in
efficiency if, like the Horse Artillery, or the Brigades with the Duke
of Wellington’s army in the Peninsula, they were placed under the
command and the responsibility of their captains. They should also, to
become effective Field Artillery, be placed on the same footing as the
Horse Artillery, for their contingent share in all garrison and general
duties. They should march to and from the outposts in relief in the same
manner as the Horse Artillery; they should combine, like the Horse
Artillery, the knowledge of the duties of Cavalry with those of
Artillery. They would thus gradually attain that perfection in their
own distinctive service, which I believe to be unequalled in the few
skeleton troops we possess of Horse Artillery.”
At the time these words were penned, Field Artillery had reached a point
of degradation which had hardly been surpassed even in the old days of
peasant drivers. Of the six batteries or brigades nominally at Woolwich,
two existed on [Sidenote: Sir R. Gardiner’s Report.] paper, having
neither men nor horses. “Two others,” wrote Sir R. Gardiner, “are so
little advanced in their necessary drill and training as to be quite
non-effective for the purposes of service, or even the common movements
of parade and review. Two only might possibly move without causing
interruption or confusion to other troops they might be acting with; but
that is as much as can be said of them.... The riding and driving of our
Brigade drivers is at this moment very bad. With the exception of the
Brigades stationed in Dublin, where they have occasional opportunities
of moving with other troops, they are unskilful, and ignorant of
Artillery movements; at Woolwich they are employed in _carter’s work_ in
the civil departments of the Arsenal; and, of course, as long as such a
system is pursued they can never become Artillery drivers.... The
Brigades in Ireland are more efficient, and fitted to move with other
troops, than the Brigades in England. But it is a delusion to say that
England has a Field Artillery. There is not a single 9-pounder horsed in
the British service--an astounding fact. Nor will it be believed, except
by those who know the truth, that the English army has been for years
without Artillery attached either to Cavalry or Infantry, for the common
purposes of drill and exercise in their combined movements.”
The progress of Field Artillery to its present excellence may be said to
date from 1848. Already, before 1856, the Light Field Artillery had
regained what it had lost during the economical era which followed
Waterloo; and since 1859, when the new brigade system put an end to the
incessant change of batteries from field to garrison service, the
progress has been continuous. But this progress would have been
impossible had it not been that a standard of Field Artillery
excellence had been maintained, even under the most adverse and
depressing circumstances, by those unequalled skeleton troops of Horse
Artillery, whose officers have, by their influence and exertions, done
so much to make what may be called _medium_ Field Artillery the
admirable service which it now is. It has been said that the influence
of the Horse Artillery, during the period between 1816 and 1848, was
injurious to the Field Batteries. If it were so, it was in the most
indirect manner possible. Economy in our military administration being
peremptorily demanded, the only alternative left to the Board of
Ordnance was between a very small force of admirable Field Artillery,
and a larger force of batteries starved in equipment and incapable of
service in the field. The officers of the Regiment, whose position
entitled them to be the advisers of the Board, were undoubtedly men
whose sympathies lay with the Horse Artillery, in which they had all
served; but they were also men who had seen, during the campaigns in the
Peninsula, Belgium, and France, what was possible with a well-equipped
Field Artillery of less mobility. In deciding on a small but perfect
force, rather than a larger and indifferent one, it must be admitted
that they acted wisely. The brilliant Field Artillery of the great war
would have otherwise become a mere tradition, whereas, under the system
adopted, it remained a reality, a model, and a standard. The adoption of
the other alternative would have vitally injured the Horse, without much
benefit to the Field Artillery; and it would have rendered the
reorganisation of both a more difficult, and a more tardy operation.
That the Field Artillery suffered terribly during the period mentioned,
is too true; but dispassionate study of the Regimental history proves,
not what has often been asserted, that the suffering was due to the
blighting influence of a _corps d’élite_ but merely to an unwise, an
unprofitable, and a singularly short-sighted economy.[5]
A much larger question arises when the policy of a _corps d’élite_, as a
part of a larger body on which it feeds, has to be considered. No
subject has been so fruitful of discussion in the Regiment; and nowhere
can a decision be more safely arrived at than in a careful study of the
Regimental history. There are strong arguments in favour of, and also
against, the policy which has existed since the formation of the Royal
Horse Artillery; and the best way of arriving at a conclusion is to
state these arguments, and to weigh their respective values.
It has been said that the existence of a _corps d’élite_ produces
[Sidenote: Trochu.] “l’énervation de la masse au profit des groupes.” In
[Sidenote: Hime.] stronger language it has also been said: “The more
ruthlessly the system of selection is carried out, the more rapidly do
the troops from amongst whom the selection is made lose their
self-respect and become at first apathetic, and at last inefficient. The
_corps d’élite_, the insatiable parasite, must degenerate in precisely
the same degree as the body which feeds it; and the end is, that in the
lapse of a few years the whole edifice crumbles, totters, and falls.
When the oak falls, the ivy that killed it must fall too.”
But those who apply such language to the existence, in the Royal
Artillery, of a _corps d’élite_ such as the Royal Horse Artillery,
forget several important considerations which distinguish it from such a
corps as the French _Chasseurs à pied_, of which it was said that
everything that was good, everything that was efficient, everything that
was soldierlike in the Infantry of the Line was seized upon with
unsparing hands, and remorselessly drafted into it. In the first place,
the selection for this branch of the Regiment is only made for the
purpose of officering it. The field battery which rejoices in smart
non-commissioned officers and men is in no dread of losing them to feed
a favoured corps. From the day a recruit joins the Horse Artillery, his
efficiency and his education depend on the officers of that arm; and
therefore to them is the credit due if their efforts are successful.
There have been occasions when the Horse Artillery was permitted to
select from the recruits of the other battalions; but these days have
passed away. No service battery of Field or Garrison Artillery has to
minister to the wants of our _corps d’élite_, and therefore the language
employed in [Sidenote: Hime.] another place by the able author quoted
above, in reference to the _Infantry corps d’élite_ in our service, is
more applicable than that used by him in reference to our Field
Artillery: “The recruits are selected with care; but they are selected
from society at large, not from regiments of the Line; and the result is
that this noble body of men, the Guards, are a source of wholesome
emulation, instead of contentious rivalry, to the rest of the army.”
The whole question, therefore, may be condensed into one point--the
wisdom or otherwise of _officering_ the Horse Artillery from the
Regiment at large. Such petty considerations as higher pay, special
privileges, &c., which are apt to embitter the minds of some, must be
put aside as unworthy. In a question affecting not merely the Regiment,
but our whole military life as well, we cannot be too careful in
clearing the ground of all but the purest argument. The opposers of the
existing system have always been able to argue with great force, because
there are undoubted anomalies, which can easily be described in such a
way as to appear ludicrous. As selection for employment in the Horse
Brigade has always been conditional on previous zeal and efficiency, it
follows that the reward for activity and knowledge in the performance
of, it may be, Siege and Garrison Artillery duties, is often employment
in a service totally dissimilar. This may be compared with rewarding an
Infantry officer for skill in battalion drill, by giving him a troop of
Horse! Yet, while admitting the anomaly, it is impossible to suggest a
better test, if both branches of the Regiment are to be officered from
the same list. The only test of efficiency which can be trusted is
efficiency already proved. It must be believed that a man who has been
faithful and zealous in one line of duty will display the same zeal and
conscience in another; and if selection _has_ to be made,--if there are
many candidates for any employment, their previous history, even under
very different circumstances, is the best witness for or against them.
But another argument employed against the existing system is, that an
officer, who has once served in the more brilliant branch, returns with
reluctance, on promotion, to the others, and is restless and
dissatisfied until he is reappointed. In other words, that _esprit_ for
the particular branch drowns that for the Regiment. History is the best
witness here.
Excluding the many living men, who have proved that Horse Artillery
service has not affected their Regimental _esprit de corps_, let us
recall the names of the men who have been most distinguished for
professional talent of every description since the formation of the
Royal Horse Artillery. Sir John Macleod, Sir Augustus Frazer, Sir
Alexander Dickson, Sir John May, Sir Robert Gardiner, and Sir E. C.
Whinyates, all served in the Horse Artillery, but never allowed
themselves to be blinded, by their love of that service, to the
interests of the Regiment at large. Their letters, their very lives, are
witnesses to their devotion to the whole Corps; and while serving with
the Siege or Garrison Artillery, their performance of duty was inspired
by the same zeal, as when serving in what may be called the more
attractive branch. They all saw and felt that the less showy was the
more scientific, that Garrison Artillery was the backbone of the
Regiment, and that, under favourable circumstances, it would dwarf, even
in popularity, the mounted batteries. The Peninsular and Waterloo
campaigns were conducive to the efficiency and popularity of Horse
Artillery; but let Siege Artillery have as many years of such service as
it went through at Sebastopol, with the mounted batteries acting merely
as carriers of ammunition, and its efficiency and popularity would be
quite as great.
History therefore does not support the theory that service in the Horse
Brigade injures the capacity, or the _esprit de corps_, of an officer
who returns to the other branches. The question at issue therefore
condenses itself into a still narrower field; viz., admitting that the
present system does not prevent Artillery officers from being
_generally_ efficient, would they not be much _more_ efficient if they
belonged to Field or Garrison Artillery during their whole career,
without the power of interchanging their services? If ability in field
battery service were rewarded by appointment to the Horse Artillery, and
skill in Garrison Artillery service were rewarded, either by special
employment or by appointment to some such corps as was recommended by
Sir Robert Gardiner--an Artillery of the Guard--would we not have better
officers of each branch than we now have? Logically, there can be but
one answer; and were this the only consideration, the argument would
terminate in favour of a separation of the officers of the various arms,
similar to that already existing between the non-commissioned officers
and men. We should then have probably _more_ skilled artillerists, in
point of number, in each branch; although perhaps no _individual_ more
skilled than those who have appeared under, or in spite of, the
anomalous system which has hitherto existed.
But would the Regiment in the end be a gainer by the change? Has not the
system of interchange been the best school possible for familiarising
the Artillery officer with the duties and movements of other arms, and
thus qualifying him for commands in the field? General Foy, in writing
of the days when such a thing as a command being given to [Sidenote:
Foy.] a General of Artillery was unknown, owing to jealousy of the
Ordnance, said: “On a trop en horreur les avancements hors de la règle
pour permettre qu’un artilleur qui se trouverait trop à l’étroit dans
son arme s’élançât dans le service général de la ligne. Jamais de
l’école de Woolwich ne sortira un Bonaparte.” The days of the Ordnance
have passed away: public opinion points more surely every day to the
employment of Generals who are not merely soldiers, but scientific
soldiers as well; and it would be a suicidal policy which would
recommend a change which, if carried out logically, would result in the
_certainty_ of admirable officers of high but _narrow_ professional
training, and the _impossibility_ of any whose experience of general
service would qualify them for a mixed command. The Garrison
Artilleryman who in his battery had attained a skill in his particular
groove, hitherto but rare, would feel every day his association with the
other arms getting less, and his consequent inability to command them
getting greater. If this consideration be carefully borne in mind, even
those who feel most strongly on the subject--and they are many--will
hesitate ere they precipitate a result which would inscribe on the walls
of the Academy the dismal prediction, “Jamais de l’école de Woolwich ne
sortira un Bonaparte.”
* * * * *
_Note._--The extra rate of pay to non-commissioned officers and
gunners of the Royal Horse Artillery is based on the following
General Order, dated 21 January, 1793:--
“The Master-General directs that an allowance of twopence per day,
in addition to their Regimental pay, shall be made to each
non-commissioned officer and gunner of the Brigade of Horse
Artillery, when and so long as he continues mounted, and having
the care and management of an horse, in consideration of the
extraordinary and constant attention required of such persons for
the due performance of this particular service, which must deprive
them of the occasional advantages arising from their being
employed in works for which additional pay is given.
“The dismounted non-commissioned officers and gunners of this
Brigade not being in the same circumstances, nor deprived of their
share in the works, will not be entitled to the said allowance;
nor will the drivers of this Brigade, as they are to be enlisted
merely for that special service, and will have but little of other
duties to learn or perform.”
_Note 2._--The style of horse considered suitable for Horse
Artillery at first, may be ascertained from the following
instructions, dated Woolwich, March 1810:--“The horses to be from
four to six years old (when bought), to be short-legged,
open-chested, and broad-winded; not to exceed 15 hands 2 inches,
nor--four years old--under 15 hands ½ inch; to have good bone and
action, the colours to be bay, brown, and dark chestnut.” The
price allowed, after a month’s trial, was thirty guineas.