On the 23d of August, 1833, the first trial of Prudence Crandall for
the _crime_ of keeping a boarding-school for colored girls in the State
of Connecticut, and endeavoring to give them a good education,--the
first trial for _this crime_,--was had in Brooklyn, the seat of the
county of Windham, within a stone’s throw of the house where lived
and died General Israel Putnam, who, with his compatriots of 1776,
perilled his life in defence of the self-evident truth that “all men
were created _equal_, and endowed by their Creator with the inalienable
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” It was had at
the County Court, Hon. Joseph Eaton presiding.
The prosecution was conducted by Hon. A. T. Judson, Jonathan A. Welch,
Esq., and I. Bulkley, Esq. Miss Crandall’s counsel were Hon. Calvin
Goddard, Hon. W. W. Ellsworth, and Henry Strong, Esq.
The indictment of Miss Crandall consisted of two counts, which amounted
to the same thing. The first set forth, in the technical terms of the
law, that “with force and arms” she had received into her school; and
the second, that, “with force and arms,” she had instructed certain
colored girls, who were not inhabitants of the State, without having
first obtained, in writing, permission to do so from the majority
of the civil authority and selectmen of the town of Canterbury, as
required by the law under which she was prosecuted.
Mr. Judson opened the case. He, of course, endeavored to keep out of
sight the most odious features of the law which had been disobeyed
by Miss Crandall. He insisted that it was only a wise precaution to
keep out of the State an injurious kind of population. He urged that
the public provisions for the education of all the children of the
inhabitants of Connecticut were ample, generous, and that colored
children belonging to the State, not less than others, might enjoy the
advantages of the common schools, which were under the supervision
and control of proper officials in every town. He argued that it was
not fair nor safe to allow any person, without the permission of such
officials, to come into the State and open a school for any class of
pupils she might please to invite from other States. He alleged that
other States of the Union, Northern as well as Southern, regarded
colored persons as a kind of population respecting which there should
be some special legislation. If it were not for such protection as the
law in question had provided, the Southerners might free all their
slaves, and send them to Connecticut instead of Liberia, which would
be overwhelming. Mr. Judson denied that colored persons were citizens
in those States, where they were not enfranchised. He claimed that
the privilege of being a freeman was higher than the right of being
educated, and asked this remarkable question: “Why should a man be
educated who could not be a freeman?” He denied, however, that he was
opposed to the improvement of any class of the inhabitants of the land,
if their improvement could be effected without violating any of the
provisions of our Constitution, or endangering the union of the States.
His associates labored to maintain the same positions.
These positions were vigorously assailed by Mr. Ellsworth and Mr.
Strong, and shown to be untenable by a great array of facts adduced
from the history of our own country, of the opinions of some of the
most illustrious lawyers and civilians of England and America, and of
arguments, the force of which was palpable.
Nevertheless, the Judge saw fit, though somewhat timidly, in his charge
to the Jury, to give it as his opinion that “the law was constitutional
and obligatory on the people of the State.”
The Jury, after an absence of several hours, returned into court, not
having agreed upon a verdict. They were instructed on some points, and
sent out a second, and again a third time, but with no better success.
They stated to the Court that there was no probability they should
ever agree. Seven of them were for conviction, and five for acquittal.
So they were discharged.
Supposing that this result operated as a continuance of the case to the
next term of the County Court, to be held the following December, a
few days after the trial I went with my family to spend several weeks
with my friends in Boston and the neighborhood. But much to my surprise
and discomfort, the last week in September, just as I was starting
off to deliver an antislavery lecture, at a distance from Boston, I
received the information that the persecutors of Miss Crandall, too
impatient to wait until December for the regular course of law, had
got up a new prosecution of her, to be tried on the 3d of October,
before Judge Daggett of the Supreme Court, who was known to be hostile
to the colored people, and a strenuous advocate of the Black Law. It
was impossible for me so to dispose of my engagements that I could get
back to Brooklyn in time to attend the trial. I could only write and
instruct the counsel of Miss Crandall, in case a verdict should be
obtained against her, to carry the cause up to the Court of Errors.
The second trial was had on the 3d of October; the same defence as
before was set up, and ably maintained. But Chief Justice Daggett’s
influence with the Jury was overpowering. He delivered an elaborate
and able charge, insisting upon the constitutionality of the law; and,
without much hesitation, the verdict was given against Miss Crandall.
Her counsel at once filed a bill of exceptions, and an appeal to the
Court of Errors, which was granted. Before that--the highest legal
tribunal in the State--the cause was argued on the 22d of July, 1834.
The Hon. W. W. Ellsworth and the Hon. Calvin Goddard argued against
the constitutionality of the Black Law, with very great ability and
eloquence. The Hon. A. T. Judson and the Hon. C. F. Cleaveland said all
that perhaps could be said to prove such a law to be consistent with
the Magna Charta of our Republic. All who attended the trial seemed to
be deeply interested, and were made to acknowledge the vital importance
of the question at issue. Most persons, I believe, were persuaded that
the Court ought to and would decide against the law. But they reserved
the decision until some future time. And that decision, I am sorry to
say, was never given. The Court evaded it the next week by finding
that the defects in the information prepared by the State’s Attorney
were such that it ought to be quashed; thus rendering it “unnecessary
for the Court to come to any decision upon the question as to the
constitutionality of the law.”
Whether her persecutors were or were not in despair of breaking down
Miss Crandall’s school by legal process, I am unable to say, but they
soon resorted to other means, which were effectual.