"Si canimus sylvas, sylvae sint Consule dignae."

This literary foppery was one of the few things in which he was

consistent. Royalist or Girondist, Jacobin or Imperialist, he was always

a Trissotin.

As the monarchical party became weaker and weaker, Barere gradually

estranged himself more and more from it, and drew closer and closer to

the republicans. It would seem that, during this transition, he was for

a time closely connected with the family of Orleans. It is certain that

he was entrusted with the guardianship of the celebrated Pamela,

afterwards Lady Edward Fitzgerald; and it was asserted that he received

during some years a pension of twelve thousand francs from the Palais

Royal.

At the end of September, 1791, the labors of the National Assembly

terminated, and those of the first and last Legislative Assembly

commenced.

It had been enacted that no member of the National Assembly should sit

in the Legislative Assembly; a preposterous and mischievous regulation,

to which the disasters which followed must in part be ascribed. In

England, what would be thought of a Parliament which did not contain one

single person who had ever sat in Parliament before? Yet it may safely

be affirmed that the number of Englishmen who, never having taken any

share in public affairs, are yet well qualified, by knowledge and

observation, to be members of the legislature is at least a hundred

times as great as the number of Frenchmen who were so qualified in 1791.

How, indeed, should it have been otherwise? In England, centuries of

representative government have made all educated people in some measure

statesmen. In France the National Assembly had probably been composed of

as good materials as were then to be found. It had undoubtedly removed a

vast mass of abuses; some of its members had read and thought much about

theories of government; and others had shown great oratorical talents.

But that kind of skill which is required for the constructing,

launching, and steering of a polity was lamentably wanting; for it is a

kind of skill to which practice contributes more than books. Books are

indeed useful to the politician, as they are useful to the navigator and

to the surgeon. But the real navigator is formed on the waves; the real

surgeon is formed at bedsides; and the conflicts of free states are the

real school of constitutional statesmen. The National Assembly had,

however, now served an apprenticeship of two laborious and eventful

years. It had, indeed, by no means finished its education; but it was no

longer, as on the day when it met, altogether rude to political

functions. Its later proceedings contain abundant proof that the members

had profited by their experience. Beyond all doubt, there was not in

France any equal number of persons possessing in an equal degree the

qualities necessary for the judicious direction of public affairs; and,

just at this moment, these legislators, misled by a childish wish to

display their own disinterestedness, deserted the duties which they had

half learned, and which nobody else had learned at all, and left their

hall to a second crowd of novices, who had still to master the first

rudiments of political business. When Barere wrote his Memoirs, the

absurdity of this self-denying ordinance had been proved by events, and

was, we believe, acknowledged by all parties. He accordingly, with his

usual mendacity, speaks of it in terms implying that he had opposed it.

There was, he tells us, no good citizen who did not regret this fatal

vote. Nay, all wise men, he says, wished the National Assembly to

continue its sittings as the first Legislative Assembly. But no

attention was paid to the wishes of the enlightened friends of liberty;

and the generous but fatal suicide was perpetrated. Now the fact is that

Barere, far from opposing this ill-advised measure, was one of those who

most eagerly supported it; that he described it from the tribune as wise

and magnanimous; that he assigned, as his reasons for taking this view,

some of those phrases in which orators of his class delight, and which,

on all men who have the smallest insight into politics, produce an

effect very similar to that of ipecacuanha. "Those," he said, "who have

framed a constitution for their country are, so to speak, out of the

pale of that social state of which they are the authors; for creative

power is not in the same sphere with that which it has created."

M. Hippolyte Carnot has noticed this untruth, and attributes it to mere

forgetfulness. We leave it to him to reconcile his very charitable

supposition with what he elsewhere says of the remarkable excellence of

Barere's memory.

Many members of the National Assembly were indemnified for the sacrifice

of legislative power, by appointments in various departments of the

public service. Of these fortunate persons Barere was one. A high Court

of Appeal had just been instituted. This court was to sit at Paris; but

its jurisdiction was to extend over the whole realm; and the departments

were to choose the judges. Barere was nominated by the department of the

Upper Pyrenees, and took his seat in the Palace of Justice. He asserts,

and our readers may, if they choose, believe, that it was about this

time in contemplation to make him Minister of the Interior, and that, in

order to avoid so grave a responsibility, he obtained permission to pay

a visit to his native place. It is certain that he left Paris early in

the year 1792, and passed some months in the south of France.

In the meantime, it became clear that the constitution of 1791 would

not work. It was, indeed, not to be expected that a constitution new

both in its principles and its details would at first work easily. Had

the chief magistrate enjoyed the entire confidence of the people, had he

performed his part with the utmost zeal, fidelity, and ability, had the

representative body included all the wisest statesmen of France, the

difficulties might still have been found insuperable. But, in fact, the

experiment was made under every disadvantage. The King, very naturally,

hated the constitution. In the Legislative Assembly were men of genius

and men of good intentions, but not a single man of experience.

Nevertheless, if France had been suffered to settle her own affairs

without foreign interference, it is possible that the calamities which

followed might have been averted. The King, who, with many good

qualities, was sluggish and sensual, might have found compensation for

his lost prerogatives in his immense civil list, in his palaces and

hunting grounds, in soups, Perigord pies, and champagne. The people,

finding themselves secure in the enjoyment of the valuable reforms which

the National Assembly had, in the midst of all its errors, effected,

would not have been easily excited by demagogues to acts of atrocity;

or, if acts of atrocity had been committed, those acts would probably

have produced a speedy and violent reaction. Had tolerable quiet been

preserved during a few years, the constitution of 1791 might perhaps

have taken root, might have gradually acquired the strength which time

alone can give, and might, with some modifications which were

undoubtedly needed, have lasted down to the present time. The European

coalition against the Revolution extinguished all hope of such a result.

The deposition of Louis was, in our opinion, the necessary consequence

of that coalition. The question was now no longer, whether the King

should have an absolute Veto or a suspensive Veto, whether there should

be one chamber or two chambers, whether the members of the

representative body should be reeligible or not; but whether France

should belong to the French. The independence of the nation, the

integrity of the territory, were at stake; and we must say plainly that

we cordially approve of the conduct of those Frenchmen who, at that

conjuncture, resolved, like our own Blake, to play the men for their

country, under whatever form of government their country might fall.

It seems to us clear that the war with the Continental coalition was, on

the side of France, at first a defensive war, and therefore a just war.

It was not a war for small objects, or against despicable enemies. On

the event were staked all the dearest interests of the French people.

Foremost among the threatening powers appeared two great and martial

monarchies, either of which, situated as France then was, might be

regarded as a formidable assailant. It is evident that, under such

circumstances, the French could not, without extreme imprudence, entrust

the supreme administration of their affairs to any person whose

attachment to the national cause admitted of doubt. Now, it is no

reproach to the memory of Louis to say that he was not attached to the

national cause. Had he been so, he would have been something more than

man. He had held absolute power, not by usurpation, but by the accident

of birth and by the ancient polity of the kingdom. That power he had, on

the whole, used with lenity. He had meant well by his people. He had

been willing to make to them, of his own mere motion, concessions such

as scarcely any other sovereign has ever made except under duress. He

had paid the penalty of faults not his own, of the haughtiness and

ambition of some of his predecessors, of the dissoluteness and baseness

of others. He had been vanquished, taken captive, led in triumph, put in

ward. He had escaped; he had been caught; he had been dragged back like

a runaway galley slave to the oar. He was still a state prisoner. His

quiet was broken by daily affronts and lampoons. Accustomed from the

cradle to be treated with profound reverence, he was now forced to

command his feelings, while men who, a few months before, had been

hackney writers or country attorneys, sat in his presence with covered

heads, and addressed him in the easy tone of equality. Conscious of fair

intentions, sensible of hard usage, he doubtless detested the

Revolution; and, while charged with the conduct of the war against the

confederates, pined in secret for the sight of the German eagles and the

sound of the German drums. We do not blame him for this. But can we

blame those who, being resolved to defend the work of the National

Assembly against the interference of strangers, were not disposed to

have him at their head in the fearful struggle which was approaching? We

have nothing to say in defence or extenuation of the insolence,

injustice, and cruelty with which, after the victory of the republicans,

he and his family were treated. But this we say, that the French had

only one alternative, to deprive him of the powers of first magistrate,

or to ground their arms and submit patiently to foreign dictation. The

events of the tenth of August sprang inevitably from the league of

Pilnitz. The King's palace was stormed; his guards were slaughtered. He

was suspended from his regal functions; and the Legislative Assembly

invited the nation to elect an extraordinary Convention, with the full

powers which the conjuncture required. To this Convention the members of

the National Assembly were eligible; and Barere was chosen by his own

department.

The Convention met on the twenty-first of September, 1792. The first

proceedings were unanimous. Royalty was abolished by acclamation. No

objections were made to this great change; and no reasons were assigned

for it. For certainly we cannot honor with the name of reasons such

apothegms, as that kings are in the moral world what monsters are in the

physical world; and that the history of kings is the martyrology of

nations. But, though the discussion was worthy only of a debating club

of schoolboys, the resolution to which the Convention came seems to have

been that which sound policy dictated. In saying this, we do not mean to

express an opinion that a republic is, either in the abstract the best

form of government, or is, under ordinary circumstances, the form of

government best suited to the French people. Our own opinion is, that

the best governments which have ever existed in the world have been

limited monarchies; and that France, in particular, has never enjoyed so

much prosperity and freedom as under a limited monarchy. Nevertheless,

we approve of the vote of the Convention which abolished kingly

government. The interference of foreign powers had brought on a crisis

which made extraordinary measures necessary. Hereditary monarchy may be,

and we believe that it is, a very useful institution in a country like

France. And masts are very useful parts of a ship. But, if the ship is

on her beam ends, it may be necessary to cut the masts away. When once

she has righted, she may come safe into port under jury rigging, and

there be completely repaired. But, in the meantime, she must be hacked

with unsparing hand, lest that which, under ordinary circumstances, is

an essential part of her fabric, should, in her extreme distress, sink

her to the bottom. Even so there are political emergencies in which it

is necessary that governments should be mutilated of their fair

proportions for a time, lest they be cast away forever; and with such an

emergency the Convention had to deal. The first object of a good

Frenchman should have been to save France from the fate of Poland. The

first requisite of a government was entire devotion to the national

cause. That requisite was wanting in Louis; and such a want, at such a

moment, could not be supplied by any public or private virtues. If the

King were set aside the abolition of kingship necessarily followed. In

the state in which the public mind then was, it would have been idle to

think of doing what our ancestors did in 1688, and what the French

Chamber of Deputies did in 1830. Such an attempt would have failed

amidst universal derision and execration. It would have disgusted all

zealous men of all opinions; and there were then few men who were not

zealous. Parties fatigued by long conflict, and instructed by the severe

discipline of that school in which alone mankind will learn, are

disposed to listen to the voice of a mediator. But when they are in

their first heady youth, devoid of experience, fresh for exertion,

flushed with hope, burning with animosity, they agree only in spurning

out of their way the daysman who strives to take his stand between them

and to lay his hand upon them both. Such was in 1792 the state of

France. On one side was the great name of the heir of Hugh Capet, the

thirty-third king of the third race; on the other side was the great

name of the republic. There was no rallying point save these two. It was

necessary to make a choice; and those, in our opinion, judged well who,

waiving for the moment all subordinate questions, preferred independence

to subjugation, and the natal soil to the emigrant camp.

As to the abolition of royalty, and as to the vigorous prosecution of

the war, the whole Convention seemed to be united as one man. But a deep

and broad gulf separated the representative body into two great parties.

On one side were those statesmen who are called, from the name of the

department which some of them represented, the Girondists, and, from the

name of one of their most conspicuous leaders, the Brissotines. In

activity and practical ability, Brissot and Gensonne were the most

conspicuous among them. In parliamentary eloquence, no Frenchman of that

time can be considered as equal to Vergniaud. In a foreign country, and

after the lapse of half a century, some parts of his speeches are still

read with mournful admiration. No man, we are inclined to believe, ever

rose so rapidly to such a height of oratorical excellence. His whole

public life lasted barely two years. This is a circumstance which

distinguishes him from our own greatest speakers, Fox, Burke, Pitt,

Sheridan, Windham, Canning. Which of these celebrated men would now be

remembered as an orator, if he had died two years after he first took

his seat in the House of Commons? Condorcet brought to the Girondist

party a different kind of strength. The public regarded him with justice

as an eminent mathematician, and, with less reason, as a great master of

ethical and political science; the philosophers considered him as their

chief, as the rightful heir, by intellectual descent and by solemn

adoption, of their deceased sovereign D'Alembert. In the same ranks were

found Gaudet, Isnard, Barbaroux, Buzot, Louvet, too well known as the

author of a very ingenious and very licentious romance, and more

honorably distinguished by the generosity with which he pleaded for the

unfortunate, and by the intrepidity with which he defied the wicked and

powerful. Two persons whose talents were not brilliant, but who enjoyed

a high reputation for probity and public spirit, Petion and Roland, lent

the whole weight of their names to the Girondist connection. The wife of

Roland brought to the deliberations of her husband's friends masculine

courage and force of thought, tempered by womanly grace and vivacity.

Nor was the splendor of a great military reputation wanting to this

celebrated party. Dumourier, then victorious over the foreign invaders,

and at the height of popular favor, must be reckoned among the allies of

the Gironde.

The errors of the Brissotines were undoubtedly neither few nor small;

but, when we fairly compare their conduct with the conduct of any other

party which acted or suffered during the French Revolution, we are

forced to admit their superiority in every quality except that single

quality which in such times prevails over every other, decision. They

were zealous for the great social reform which had been effected by the

National Assembly; and they were right. For, though that reform was, in

some respects, carried too far, it was a blessing well worth even the

fearful price which has been paid for it. They were resolved to maintain

the independence of their country against foreign invaders; and they

were right. For the heaviest of all yokes is the yoke of the stranger.

They thought that, if Louis remained at their head, they could not carry

on with the requisite energy the conflict against the European

coalition. They therefore concurred in establishing a republican

government; and here, again, they were right. For, in that struggle for

life and death, it would have been madness to trust a hostile or even a

half-hearted leader.

Thus far they went along with the revolutionary movement. At this point

they stopped; and, in our judgment, they were right in stopping, as they

had been right in moving. For great ends, and under extraordinary

circumstances, they had concurred in measures which, together with much

good, had necessarily produced much evil; which had unsettled the public

mind; which had taken away from government the sanction of prescription;

which had loosened the very foundations of property and law. They

thought that it was now their duty to prop what it had recently been

their duty to batter. They loved liberty, but liberty associated with

order, with justice, with mercy, and with civilization. They were

republicans; but they were desirous to adorn their republic with all

that had given grace and dignity to the fallen monarchy. They hoped that

the humanity, the courtesy, the taste, which had done much in old times

to mitigate the slavery of France, would now lend additional charms to

her freedom. They saw with horror crimes, exceeding in atrocity those

which had disgraced the infuriated religious factions of the sixteenth

century, perpetrated in the name of reason and philanthropy. They

demanded, with eloquent vehemence, that the authors of the lawless

massacre, which, just before the meeting of the Convention, had been

committed in the prisons of Paris, should be brought to condign

punishment. They treated with just contempt the pleas which have been

set up for that great crime. They admitted that the public danger was

pressing; but they denied that it justified a violation of those

principles of morality on which all society rests. The independence and

honor of France were indeed to be vindicated, but to be vindicated by

triumphs and not by murders.

Opposed to the Girondists was a party which, having been long execrated

throughout the civilized world, has of late--such is the ebb and flow of

opinion--found not only apologists, but even eulogists. We are not

disposed to deny that some members of the Mountain were sincere and

public-spirited men. But even the best of them, Carnot for example and

Cambon, were far too unscrupulous as to the means which they employed

for the purpose of attaining great ends. In the train of these

enthusiasts followed a crowd, composed of all who, from sensual, sordid,

or malignant motives, wished for a period of boundless license.

When the Convention met, the majority was with the Girondists, and

Barere was with the majority. On the King's trial, indeed, he quitted

the party with which he ordinarily acted, voted with the Mountain, and

spoke against the prisoner with a violence such as few members even of

the Mountain showed.

The conduct of the leading Girondists on that occasion was little to

their honor. Of cruelty, indeed, we fully acquit them; but it is

impossible to acquit them of criminal irresolution and disingenuousness.

They were far, indeed, from thirsting for the blood of Louis; on the

contrary, they were most desirous to protect him. But they were afraid

that, if they went straightforward to their object, the sincerity of

their attachment to republican institutions would be suspected. They

wished to save the King's life, and yet to obtain all the credit of

having been regicides. Accordingly, they traced out for themselves a

crooked course, by which they hoped to attain both their objects. They

first voted the King guilty. They then voted for referring the question

respecting his fate to the whole body of the people. Defeated in this

attempt to rescue him, they reluctantly, and with ill-suppressed shame

and concern, voted for the capital sentence. Then they made a last

attempt in his favor, and voted for respiting the execution. These zig

zag politics produced the effect which any man conversant with public

affairs might have foreseen. The Girondists, instead of attaining both

their ends, failed of both. The Mountain justly charged them with having

attempted to save the King by underhand means. Their own consciences

told them, with equal justice, that their hands had been dipped in the

blood of the most inoffensive and most unfortunate of men. The direct

path was here, as usual, the path not only of honor but of safety. The

principle on which the Girondists stood as a party was, that the season

for revolutionary violence was over, and that the reign of law and order

ought now to commence. But the proceeding against the King was clearly

revolutionary in its nature. It was not in conformity with the laws. The

only plea for it was that all ordinary rules of jurisprudence and

morality were suspended by the extreme public danger. This was the very

plea which the Mountain urged in defence of the massacre of September,

and to which, when so urged, the Girondists refused to listen. They

therefore, by voting for the death of the King, conceded to the Mountain

the chief point at issue between the two parties. Had they given a

manful vote against the capital sentence, the regicides would have been

in a minority. It is probable that there would have been an immediate

appeal to force. The Girondists might have been victorious. In the worst

event, they would have fallen with unblemished honor. Thus much is

certain, that their boldness and honesty could not possibly have

produced a worse effect than was actually produced by their timidity and

their stratagems.

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