The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of Schacht,
confirms, the following facts:
a) Schacht established contact with Göring in December 1930 and with
Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He subsequently established contact
between the leadership of the Nazi Party, and the foremost
representatives of the German industrial and financial circles. This, in
particular, is confirmed by the testimony of Witness Severing
(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 23 May 1946; USA-615).
b) In July 1932 Schacht demanded that Von Papen resign his post as Reich
Chancellor in favor of Hitler. This fact is confirmed by Von Papen’s
testimony at the preliminary interrogation and by Schacht’s own
testimony in Court (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
c) In November 1932 Schacht collected signatures of German
industrialists, urging them to come out for Hitler’s appointment as
Reich Chancellor. On 12 November 1932 Schacht wrote to Hitler:
“I have no doubt that the way we are directing the course of
events can only lead to your appointment as Reich Chancellor. We
are trying to secure a large number of signatures among the
industrial circles to ensure your appointment to this post.”
(EC-456, USA-773; PS-3901, USA-837)
d) In February 1933 Schacht organized the financing of the pre-election
campaign conducted by the Nazi Party, and demanded at the conference of
Hitler and Göring with the industrialists that the latter provide three
million marks (D-203). Schacht admitted in Court that he had pointed out
the necessity for providing the Nazi leaders with this sum (Transcript,
Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946), while the Defendant Funk and the former
member of the management of “I. G. Farbenindustrie” Schnitzler, who were
present at this conference, both confirmed that it was Schacht who was
the initiator of the financing of the pre-election campaign (Transcript,
4 July 1946; EC-439, USA-618).
e) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted in his
public statements that he asked for the support in the elections of both
the Nazi Party and of Hitler (USA-615; USA-616; Transcript, Afternoon
Session, 2 May 1946).
On 29 August 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler: “No matter where my
activities lead me in the near future, even if some day you see me
imprisoned in a fortress, you can always depend on me as your loyal
aide” (EC-457, USA-619).
_Thus, Schacht consciously and deliberately supported the Nazi Party and
actively aided in the seizure of power in Germany by the Fascists._ Even
prior to his appointment as Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and
immediately after the seizure of power by the Nazis, Schacht led in
planning and developing the German armaments, as follows:
a) On 17 March 1933, Schacht was appointed President of the Reichsbank
(PS-3021, USA-11), and as he himself stated in a speech before his
Reichsbank colleagues on 21 March 1938, the Reichsbank under his
management was “none other than a National Socialist institution”
(Transcript, Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946).
b) In August 1934, Schacht was appointed Reich Minister of Economy
(PS-3021, USA-11). His Ministry “was given the task of carrying out the
economic preparation for war” (EC-128, USA-623). A special decree
granted Schacht, in his capacity of Reich Minister of Economy, unlimited
authority in the field of economy (_Reichsgesetzblatt_, 1934, Part 1, p.
565).
c) Making use of these powers in 1934 Schacht launched upon the
execution of the “new program” developed by him (_Reichsgesetzblatt_,
1934, Part 1, p. 826), and, as Schacht himself noted in his speech of 29
November 1938, this organization played a tremendous part in the course
of Germany’s rearmament (EC-611, USA-662).
d) For the purpose of the most effective execution of this “new program”
Schacht used the property and means of those political enemies of the
Nazi regime, who either became the victims of terror or were forced to
emigrate (Schacht’s note to Hitler of 3 May 1939; PS-1168, USA-37).
Schacht used swindler’s tactics and coercion in an effort to acquire raw
material and foreign currency for armaments (Affidavit of Vice-President
of the Reichsbank, Puhl; EC-437, USA-624).
e) During the first days of his association with the Reichsbank, Schacht
issued a series of decrees (27 October 1933, 23 March 1934, 19 February
1935), which in the long run helped realize the broad program of the
financing of armaments, developed by him, and with the aid of which, as
he testified, he “had found the way to finance the rearmament program.”
In his speech in Leipzig on 4 March 1935, Schacht, while summing up his
preceding economic and financial activities, announced “. . . everything
that I say and do has the Führer’s full agreement and I shall not do or
say anything which is not approved by the Führer” (Transcript, Afternoon
Session, 3 May 1946).
Having become the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht
unified under himself the leadership of the entire German economy and
through his efforts the establishment of the Hitlerite war machine was
accomplished.
a) The secret law of 21 May 1935, which appointed Schacht the
Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, states as follows:
“The task of the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy is to
place all the economic resources in the service of warfare. The
Plenipotentiary General for War Economy within the framework of
his functions is given the right to issue legal orders,
deviating from the existing laws. He is the responsible head for
financing wars through the Reich Ministry and the Reichsbank”
(PS-2261, USA-24).
b) Schacht financed German armaments through the Mefo system of
promissory notes, which was a swindling venture on a national scale that
has no precedent, and the success of which was dependent upon the
realization of the aggressive plans of the Hitlerites. It was because of
this that Schacht set 1942 as the date when the Mefo notes were to
mature, and he pointed out in his speech of 29 November 1938 the
relation between “the daring credit policy” of the Reichsbank and the
aims of the Hitlerite foreign policy (EC-611, USA-622).
c) Having made full use of his plenary powers, Schacht carefully
developed and carried out a broad program of economic mobilization which
allowed the Hitlerite leaders to wage war at any time considered most
favorable. In particular, from the report of Schacht’s deputy, Wohltat,
“the preparation for mobilization carried out by the Plenipotentiary for
War Economy” shows that Schacht provided to the last detail for the
system of exploitation of the German economy in war time, all the way
from the utilization of industrial enterprises, of raw material
resources and manpower down to the distribution of 80,000,000 ration
cards (EC-258, USA-625). It is significant that this report was drawn up
a month after Hitler’s statement at the conference of 5 November 1937,
at which Hitler set forth this concrete plan of aggression (PS-386,
USA-25).
Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January 1937: “I worked
out the preparation for war in accordance with the principle that the
plan of our war economy must be built in peace time in such a way that
there will be no necessity for any reorganization in case of war”.
Schacht confirmed his statement in court (Transcript, Afternoon Session,
2 May 1946).
Schacht consciously and deliberately prepared Germany for war.
d) The former Minister of War Von Blomberg testified that: “Schacht was
fully cognizant of the plans for development and increase of the German
Armed Forces, since he was constantly informed . . . of all the
financing necessary for the development of the German armed forces”
(USA-838).
On 31 August 1936, Von Blomberg informed Schacht that: “The
establishment of all the Air Force units must be completed by 1 April
1937, and therefore large expenditures must be entailed in 1936 . . . .”
(PS-1301, USA-123).
In the spring of 1937, Schacht participated in the military exercises in
Godesberg (EC-174).
e) In his memorandum to Hitler on 3 May 1935, entitled the “Financing of
Rearmament”, Schacht wrote: “A speedy fulfillment of the program for
rearmament on a mass scale is the basis of German policy, and,
therefore, everything else must be subordinate to this task; the
completion of this task, the achievement of this purpose must meet no
obstacles . . . .” (PS-1168, USA-37).
In his speech on 29 November 1938, Schacht announced that Reichsbank’s
credit policy made it possible for Germany to create an “unsurpassed
machine, and, in turn, this war machine made possible the realization of
the aims of our policy” (EC-611, USA-622).
One must exclude the supposition that Schacht was not informed as to
what purposes these weapons were to serve since he could not but take
into consideration their unprecedented scale and an obvious preference
for offensive types of weapons (heavy tanks, bombers, and so on).
Besides, Schacht knew perfectly well that not a single country intended
to wage war on Germany nor had it any reasons to do so.
a) Schacht utilized the military might growing under his direction to
back Germany’s territorial demands which grew in proportion to the
increase in armaments.
Schacht testified in Court that “at first he confined himself (in his
demands) to the colonies which had once belonged to Germany”
(Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).
In September 1934, during his talk with the American Ambassador Dodd,
Schacht pointed out that he desired annexation if possible without war,
but through war, if the United States would stay out of it (EC-461,
USA-58).
In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul Fuller:
“Colonies are essential to Germany. If it is possible, we shall
acquire them through negotiations, if not, we shall seize them.”
(EC-450, USA-629)
Schacht admitted in Court that military pressure put upon Czechoslovakia
was “in some measure the result and the fruit of his labor” (Transcript,
Morning Session, 3 May 1946).
b) Schacht personally participated in the plunder of private and State
property of the countries which became victims of Hitlerite aggressions.
The minutes of the conference of the Military-Economic Staff on 11 March
1938, in which Schacht participated, state that those present were given
Hitler’s latest directives about the invasion of Austria. Further, the
minutes state: “After this, at the suggestion of Schacht, it was decided
that . . . all the financial accounting will be made in Reichsmarks at
the rate of exchange: two schillings for one Reichsmark” (EC-421,
USA-645).
Schacht admitted in Court that he personally was in charge of the
seizure of the Czechoslovak National Bank after the occupation of
Czechoslovakia (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).
c) At the beginning of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler his services for
negotiations with the United States in regard to the discontinuance of
aid to England and he informed Göring of his offer (PS-3700; USA-780).
d) Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate Hitler
publicly after the signing of armistice with France, although Schacht,
better than anyone else, understood the usurpatory nature of the
armistice (German Documentary Film, USA-635).
e) In his letter to Funk on 17 October 1941, Schacht suggested a more
effective exploitation of occupied territory. In this case, too, Schacht
acted on his own initiative (EC-504; USA-830).
Schacht also participated in the persecution of the Jews:
a) He testified in Court that he “agreed to the policy of the
persecution of the Jews as a matter of principle” (Transcript, Afternoon
Session, 2 May 1946) although, he stated, “to a certain extent” it was a
matter of conscience which, however, “was not serious enough to bring
about a break” between him and the Nazis (Transcript, Afternoon Session,
2 May 1946; USA-616).
b) In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Schacht signed a series of
decrees, in accordance with which the property of the Jews in Germany
was subject to plunder with impunity (USA-832; USA-616). Schacht
confirmed in Court the fact that he had signed a series of anti-Semitic
decrees (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
As to the reasons for Schacht’s resignation from the post of the
Minister of Economy and the Plenipotentiary General for War Economy in
November 1937, and also from the post of the President of the Reichsbank
on 20 November 1939, and finally from the post of the Minister without
Portfolio in January 1943, the evidence submitted establishes the
following:
a) The reason is not Schacht’s disagreement with the economic
preparation for aggressive wars.
Three weeks before leaving the Ministry of Economy and the post of
Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, Schacht wrote to Göring: “. . .
I also don’t consider that my opinion can differ from yours on economic
policy . . . .” (EC-497, USA-775).
In his reply Göring states:
“. . . You promised me your support and collaboration . . . .
You have repeated this promise many times, even after
differences of opinion began to creep up between us.” (EC-493,
USA-642).
Schacht testified in Court that Göring and he only “differed in matters
of procedure” (Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May 1946).
In the preliminary examination Göring testified that Schacht’s leaving
the Reichsbank “had no relation to the program of rearmament” (USA-648).
The vice-president of the Reichsbank, Puhl, confirmed that Schacht’s
resignation from the Reichsbank can be explained by “his desire to
extricate himself from a dangerous situation” which developed as the
result of Schacht’s own crooked financial operations (EC-438, USA-646).
b) The reason is not Schacht’s disapproval of mass terror conducted by
the Hitlerites.
The witness for the Defense, Gisevius, testified that he constantly
informed Schacht of the criminal actions of the Gestapo, created by
Göring, and that nevertheless, right up to the end of 1936, Schacht
looked for “Göring’s support” (Transcript, Morning Session, 24 April
1946).
In his letter to Von Blomberg on 24 December 1935, Schacht suggested
that the Gestapo apply “more cautious methods” since the open terror of
the Gestapo “hinders the objectives of the armament” (Transcript,
Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946).
On 30 January 1937, Schacht was awarded a golden Party insignia by
Hitler (EC-500; Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946). As stated in
an official German publication, “he was able to be of greater help to
the Party than if he were actually a member of the Party” (EC-460,
USA-617).
Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other Germans, the
inevitability of the failure of the Hitlerite regime, did Schacht
establish contact with the opposition circles, however, doing nothing to
help depose this regime. Therefore, it was not by chance that having
found out these connections of Schacht, Hitler still spared Schacht’s
life.
It is thus indisputably established that:
a) Schacht actively assisted in the seizure of power by the Nazis;
b) During a period of 12 years Schacht closely collaborated with Hitler;
c) Schacht provided the economic and financial basis for the creation of
the Hitlerite military machine;
d) Schacht prepared Germany’s economy for the waging of aggressive wars;
e) Schacht participated in the persecution of Jews and in the plunder of
territories occupied by the Germans.
_Therefore, Schacht’s leading part in the preparation and execution of
the common criminal plan is proved._
The decision to acquit Schacht is in obvious contradiction with existing
evidence.