3. Land and soil to feed our Nation.”

The demand for the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany was

to play a large part in the events preceding the seizure of Austria and

Czechoslovakia; the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles was to become

a decisive motive in attempting to justify the policy of the German

Government; the demand for land was to be the justification for the

acquisition of “living space” at the expense of other nations; the

expulsion of the Jews from membership of the race of German blood was to

lead to the atrocities against the Jewish people; and the demand for a

national army was to result in measures of rearmament on the largest

possible scale, and ultimately to war.

On 29 July 1921, the Party which had changed its name to National

Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) was reorganized, Hitler

becoming the first “Chairman”. It was in this year that the

Sturmabteilung or SA was founded, with Hitler at its head, as a private

para-military force, which allegedly was to be used for the purpose of

protecting NSDAP leaders from attack by rival political parties, and

preserving order at NSDAP meetings, but in reality was used for fighting

political opponents on the streets. In March 1923 the Defendant Göring

was appointed head of the SA.

The procedure within the Party was governed in the most absolute way by

the “Leadership Principle” (Führerprinzip).

According to the principle, each Führer has the right to govern,

administer, or decree, subject to no control of any kind and at his

complete discretion, subject only to the orders he received from above.

This principle applied in the first instance to Hitler himself as the

leader of the Party, and in a lesser degree to all other Party

officials. All members of the Party swore an oath of “eternal

allegiance” to the leader.

There were only two ways in which Germany could achieve the three main

aims above-mentioned, by negotiation, or by force. The 25 points of the

NSDAP program do not specifically mention the methods on which the

leaders of the Party proposed to rely, but the history of the Nazi

regime shows that Hitler and his followers were only prepared to

negotiate on the terms that their demands were conceded, and that force

would be used if they were not.

On the night of 8 November 1923, an abortive putsch took place in

Munich. Hitler and some of his followers burst into a meeting in the

Bürgerbräu Cellar, which was being addressed by the Bavarian Prime

Minister Kahr, with the intention of obtaining from him a decision to

march forthwith on Berlin. On the morning of 9 November, however, no

Bavarian support was forthcoming, and Hitler’s demonstration was met by

the armed forces of the Reichswehr and the police. Only a few volleys

were fired; and after a dozen of his followers had been killed, Hitler

fled for his life, and the demonstration was over. The Defendants

Streicher, Frick, and Hess all took part in the attempted rising. Hitler

was later tried for high treason, and was convicted and sentenced to

imprisonment. The SA was outlawed. Hitler was released from prison in

1924 and in 1925 the Schutzstaffeln, or SS, was created, nominally to

act as his personal bodyguard, but in reality to terrorize political

opponents. This was also the year of the publication of _Mein Kampf_,

containing the political views and aims of Hitler, which came to be

regarded as the authentic source of Nazi doctrine.

_The Seizure of Power_

In the eight years that followed the publication of _Mein Kampf_, the

NSDAP greatly extended its activities throughout Germany, paying

particular attention to the training of youth in the ideas of National

Socialism. The first Nazi youth organization had come into existence in

1922, but it was in 1925 that the Hitler Jugend was officially

recognized by the NSDAP. In 1931 Baldur von Schirach, who had joined the

NSDAP in 1925, became Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP.

The Party exerted every effort to win political support from the German

People. Elections were contested both for the Reichstag and the

Landtage. The NSDAP leaders did not make any serious attempt to hide the

fact that their only purpose in entering German political life was in

order to destroy the democratic structure of the Weimar Republic, and to

substitute for it a National Socialist totalitarian regime which would

enable them to carry out their avowed policies without opposition. In

preparation for the day when he would obtain power in Germany, Hitler in

January 1929, appointed Heinrich Himmler as Reichsführer SS with the

special task of building the SS into a strong but elite group which

would be dependable in all circumstances.

On 30 January 1933 Hitler succeeded in being appointed Chancellor of the

Reich by President Von Hindenburg. The Defendants Göring, Schacht, and

Von Papen were active in enlisting support to bring this about. Von

Papen had been appointed Reich Chancellor on 1 June 1932. On 14 June he

rescinded the decree of the Brüning Cabinet of 13 April 1932, which had

dissolved the Nazi para-military organizations, including the SA and the

SS. This was done by agreement between Hitler and Von Papen, although

Von Papen denies that it was agreed as early as 28 May, as Dr. Hans Volz

asserts in “Dates from the History of the NSDAP”; but that it was the

result of an agreement was admitted in evidence by Von Papen.

The Reichstag elections of 31 July 1932 resulted in a great accession of

strength to the NSDAP, and Von Papen offered Hitler the post of Vice

Chancellor, which he refused, insisting upon the Chancellorship itself.

In November 1932 a petition signed by leading industrialists and

financiers was presented to President Hindenburg, calling upon him to

entrust the Chancellorship to Hitler; and in the collection of

signatures, to the petition Schacht took a prominent part.

The election of 6 November, which followed the defeat of the Government,

reduced the number of NSDAP members, but Von Papen made further efforts

to gain Hitler’s participation, without success. On 12 November Schacht

wrote to Hitler:

“I have no doubt that the present development of things can only

lead to your becoming Chancellor. It seems as if our attempt to

collect a number of signatures from business circles for this

purpose was not altogether in vain . . . .”

After Hitler’s refusal of 16 November, Von Papen resigned, and was

succeeded by General Von Schleicher; but Von Papen still continued his

activities. He met Hitler at the house of the Cologne banker Von

Schröder on 4 January 1933, and attended a meeting at the Defendant Von

Ribbentrop’s house on 22 January, with the Defendant Göring and others.

He also had an interview with President Hindenburg on 9 January, and

from 22 January onwards he discussed officially with Hindenburg the

formation of a Hitler Cabinet.

Hitler held his first Cabinet meeting on the day of his appointment as

Chancellor, at which the Defendants Göring, Frick, Funk, Von Neurath,

and Von Papen were present in their official capacities. On 28 February

1933 the Reichstag building in Berlin was set on fire. This fire was

used by Hitler and his Cabinet as a pretext for passing on the same day

a decree suspending the constitutional guarantees of freedom. The decree

was signed by President Hindenburg and countersigned by Hitler and the

Defendant Frick, who then occupied the post of Reich Minister of the

Interior. On 5 March elections were held, in which the NSDAP obtained

288 seats of the total of 647. The Hitler Cabinet was anxious to pass an

“Enabling Act” that would give them full legislative powers, including

the power to deviate from the Constitution. They were without the

necessary majority in the Reichstag to be able to do this

constitutionally. They therefore made use of the decree suspending the

guarantees of freedom and took into so-called “protective custody” a

large number of Communist deputies and Party officials. Having done

this, Hitler introduced the “Enabling Act” into the Reichstag, and after

he had made it clear that if it was not passed, further forceful

measures would be taken, the act was passed on 24 March 1933.

_The Consolidation of Power_

The NSDAP, having achieved power in this way, now proceeded to extend

its hold on every phase of German life. Other political parties were

persecuted, their property and assets confiscated, and many of their

members placed in concentration camps. On 26 April 1933 the Defendant

Göring founded in Prussia the Geheime Staatspolizei, or Gestapo, as a

secret police, and confided to the deputy leader of the Gestapo that its

main task was to eliminate political opponents of National Socialism and

Hitler. On 14 July 1933 a law was passed declaring the NSDAP to be the

only political party, and making it criminal to maintain or form any

other political party.

In order to place the complete control of the machinery of Government in

the hands of the Nazi leaders, a series of laws and decrees were passed

which reduced the powers of regional and local governments throughout

Germany, transforming them into subordinate divisions of the Government

of the Reich. Representative assemblies in the Laender were abolished,

and with them all local elections. The Government then proceeded to

secure control of the Civil Service. This was achieved by a process of

centralization, and by a careful sifting of the whole Civil Service

administration. By a law of 7 April it was provided that officials “who

were of non-Aryan descent” should be retired; and it was also decreed

that “officials who because of their previous political activity do not

offer security that they will exert themselves for the national state

without reservation shall be discharged.” The law of 11 April 1933

provided for the discharge of “all civil servants who belong to the

Communist Party.” Similarly, the judiciary was subjected to control.

Judges were removed from the bench for political or racial reasons. They

were spied upon and made subject to the strongest pressure to join the

Nazi Party as an alternative to being dismissed. When the Supreme Court

acquitted three of the four defendants charged with complicity in the

Reichstag fire, its jurisdiction in cases of treason was thereafter

taken away and given to a newly established “People’s Court” consisting

of two judges and five officials of the Party. Special courts were set

up to try political crimes and only party members were appointed as

judges. Persons were arrested by the SS for political reasons, and

detained in prisons and concentration camps; and the judges were without

power to intervene in any way. Pardons were granted to members of the

Party who had been sentenced by the judges for proved offenses. In 1935

several officials of the Hohenstein concentration camp were convicted of

inflicting brutal treatment upon the inmates. High Nazi officials tried

to influence the Court, and after the officials had been convicted,

Hitler pardoned them all. In 1942 “judges’ letters” were sent to all

German judges by the Government, instructing them as to the “general

lines” that they must follow.

In their determination to remove all sources of opposition, the NSDAP

leaders turned their attention to the trade unions, the churches, and

the Jews. In April 1933 Hitler ordered the late Defendant Ley, who was

then staff director of the political organization of the NSDAP, “to take

over the trade unions.” Most of the trade unions of Germany were joined

together in two large federations, the “Free Trade Unions” and the

“Christian Trade Unions.” Unions outside these two large federations

contained only 15 percent of the total union membership. On 21 April

1933 Ley issued an NSDAP directive announcing a “coordination action” to

be carried out on 2 May against the Free Trade Unions. The directive

ordered that SA and SS men were to be employed in the planned

“occupation of trade union properties and for the taking into protective

custody of personalities who come into question.” At the conclusion of

the action the official NSDAP press service reported that the National

Socialist Factory Cells Organization had “eliminated the old leadership

of Free Trade Unions” and taken over the leadership themselves.

Similarly, on 3 May 1933 the NSDAP press service announced that the

Christian trade unions “have unconditionally subordinated themselves to

the leadership of Adolf Hitler.” In place of the trade unions the Nazi

Government set up a Deutsche Arbeits Front (DAF), controlled by the

NSDAP, and which, in practice, all workers in Germany were compelled to

join. The chairmen of the unions were taken into custody and were

subjected to ill-treatment, ranging from assault and battery to murder.

In their effort to combat the influence of the Christian churches, whose

doctrines were fundamentally at variance with National Socialist

philosophy and practice, the Nazi Government proceeded more slowly. The

extreme step of banning the practice of the Christian religion was not

taken, but year by year efforts were made to limit the influence of

Christianity on the German people, since, in the words used by the

Defendant Bormann to the Defendant Rosenberg in an official letter, “the

Christian religion and National Socialist doctrines are not compatible.”

In the month of June 1941 the Defendant Bormann issued a secret decree

on the relation of Christianity and National Socialism. The decree

stated that:

“For the first time in German history the Führer consciously and

completely has the leadership in his own hand. With the Party,

its components and attached units, the Führer has created for

himself and thereby the German Reich Leadership, an instrument

which makes him independent of the Treaty . . . . More and more

the people must be separated from the churches and their organs,

the pastor . . . . Never again must an influence on leadership

of the people be yielded to the churches. This influence must be

broken completely and finally. Only the Reich Government and by

its direction the Party, its components and attached units, have

a right to leadership of the people.”

From the earliest days of the NSDAP, anti-Semitism had occupied a

prominent place in National Socialist thought and propaganda. The Jews,

who were considered to have no right to German citizenship, were held to

have been largely responsible for the troubles with which the Nation was

afflicted following on the war of 1914-18. Furthermore, the antipathy to

the Jews was intensified by the insistence which was laid upon the

superiority of the Germanic race and blood. The second chapter of Book 1

of _Mein Kampf_ is dedicated to what may be called the “Master Race”

theory, the doctrine of Aryan superiority over all other races, and the

right of Germans in virtue of this superiority to dominate and use other

peoples for their own ends. With the coming of the Nazis into power in

1933, persecution of the Jews became official state policy. On 1 April

1933, a boycott of Jewish enterprises was approved by the Nazi Reich

Cabinet, and during the following years a series of anti-Semitic laws

was passed, restricting the activities of Jews in the civil service, in

the legal profession, in journalism and in the armed forces. In

September 1935, the so-called Nuremberg Laws were passed, the most

important effect of which was to deprive Jews of German citizenship. In

this way the influence of Jewish elements on the affairs of Germany was

extinguished, and one more potential source of opposition to Nazi policy

was rendered powerless.

In any consideration of the crushing of opposition, the massacre of 30

June 1934 must not be forgotten. It has become known as the “Röhm Purge”

or “the blood bath”, and revealed the methods which Hitler and his

immediate associates, including the Defendant Göring, were ready to

employ to strike down all opposition and consolidate their power. On

that day Röhm, the Chief of Staff of the SA since 1931, was murdered by

Hitler’s orders, and the “Old Guard” of the SA was massacred without

trial and without warning. The opportunity was taken to murder a large

number of people who at one time or another had opposed Hitler.

The ostensible ground for the murder of Röhm was that he was plotting to

overthrow Hitler, and the Defendant Göring gave evidence that knowledge

of such a plot had come to his ears. Whether this was so or not it is

not necessary to determine.

On 3 July the Cabinet approved Hitler’s action and described it as

“legitimate self-defense by the State.”

Shortly afterwards Hindenburg died, and Hitler became both Reich

President and Chancellor. At the Nazi-dominated plebiscite, which

followed, 38 million Germans expressed their approval, and with the

Reichswehr taking the oath of allegiance to the Führer, full power was

now in Hitler’s hands.

Germany had accepted the dictatorship with all its methods of terror,

and its cynical and open denial of the rule of law.

Apart from the policy of crushing the potential opponents of their

regime, the Nazi Government took active steps to increase its power over

the German population. In the field of education, everything was done to

ensure that the youth of Germany was brought up in the atmosphere of

National Socialism and accepted National Socialist teachings. As early

as 7 April 1933 the law reorganizing the civil service had made it

possible for the Nazi Government to remove all “subversive and

unreliable teachers”; and this was followed by numerous other measures

to make sure that the schools were staffed by teachers who could be

trusted to teach their pupils the full meaning of the National Socialist

creed. Apart from the influence of National Socialist teaching in the

schools, the Hitler Youth Organization was also relied upon by the Nazi

Leaders for obtaining fanatical support from the younger generation. The

Defendant Von Schirach, who had been Reich Youth Leader of the NSDAP

since 1931, was appointed Youth Leader of the German Reich in June 1933.

Soon all the youth organizations had been either dissolved or absorbed

by the Hitler Youth, with the exception of the “Catholic Youth”. The

Hitler Youth was organized on strict military lines, and as early as

1933 the Wehrmacht was cooperating in providing pre-military training

for the Reich Youth.

The Nazi Government endeavored to unite the Nation in support of their

policies through the extensive use of propaganda. A number of agencies

was set up, whose duty was to control and influence the press, the

radio, films, publishing firms, etc., in Germany, and to supervise

entertainment and cultural and artistic activities. All these agencies

came under Goebbels’ Ministry of the People’s Enlightenment and

Propaganda, which together with a corresponding organization in the

NSDAP and the Reich Chamber of Culture, was ultimately responsible for

exercising this supervision. The Defendant Rosenberg played a leading

part in disseminating the National Socialist doctrines on behalf of the

Party, and the Defendant Fritzsche, in conjunction with Goebbels,

performed the same task for the State.

The greatest emphasis was laid on the supreme mission of the German

People to lead and dominate by virtue of their Nordic blood and racial

purity; and the ground was thus being prepared for the acceptance of the

idea of German world supremacy.

Through the effective control of the radio and the press, the German

People, during the years which followed 1933, were subjected to the most

intensive propaganda in furtherance of the regime. Hostile criticism,

indeed criticism of any kind, was forbidden, and the severest penalties

were imposed on those who indulged in it.

Independent judgment, based on freedom of thought, was rendered quite

impossible.

_Measures of Rearmament_

During the years immediately following Hitler’s appointment as

Chancellor, the Nazi Government set about reorganizing the economic life

of Germany, and in particular the armament industry. This was done on a

vast scale and with extreme thoroughness.

It was necessary to lay a secure financial foundation for the building

of armaments, and in April 1936 the Defendant Göring was appointed

coordinator for raw materials and foreign exchange, and empowered to

supervise all State and Party activities in these fields. In this

capacity he brought together the War Minister, the Minister of

Economics, the Reich Finance Minister, the President of the Reichsbank

and the Prussian Finance Minister to discuss problems connected with war

mobilization, and on 27 May 1936, in addressing these men, Göring

opposed any financial limitation of war production and added that “all

measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging

of war.” At the Party Rally in Nuremberg in 1936, Hitler announced the

establishment of the Four Year Plan and the appointment of Göring as the

Plenipotentiary in charge. Göring was already engaged in building a

strong air force and on 8 July 1938 he announced to a number of leading

German aircraft manufacturers that the German Air Force was already

superior in quality and quantity to the English. On 14 October 1938, at

another conference, Göring announced that Hitler had instructed him to

organize a gigantic armament program, which would make insignificant all

previous achievements. He said that he had been ordered to build as

rapidly as possible an air force five times as large as originally

planned, to increase the speed of the rearmament of the navy and army,

and to concentrate on offensive weapons, principally heavy artillery and

heavy tanks. He then laid down a specific program designed to accomplish

these ends. The extent to which rearmament had been accomplished was

stated by Hitler in his memorandum of 9 October 1939, after the campaign

in Poland. He said:

“The military application of our people’s strength has been

carried through to such an extent that within a short time at

any rate it cannot be markedly improved upon by any manner of

effort . . . .

“The warlike equipment of the German people is at present larger

in quantity and better in quality for a greater number of German

divisions than in the year 1914. The weapons themselves, taking

a substantial cross-section, are more modern than is the case of

any other country in the world at this time. They have just

proved their supreme war worthiness in their victorious campaign

. . . . There is no evidence available to show that any country

in the world disposes of a better total ammunition stock than

the Reich . . . . The A. A. artillery is not equalled by any

country in the world.”

In this reorganization of the economic life of Germany for military

purposes, the Nazi Government found the German armament industry quite

willing to cooperate, and to play its part in the rearmament program. In

April 1933 Gustav Krupp von Bohlen submitted to Hitler on behalf of the

Reich Association of German Industry a plan for the reorganization of

German industry, which he stated was characterized by the desire to

coordinate economic measures and political necessity. In the plan itself

Krupp stated that “the turn of political events is in line with the

wishes which I myself and the board of directors have cherished for a

long time.” What Krupp meant by this statement is fully shown by the

draft text of a speech which he planned to deliver in the University of

Berlin in January 1944, though the speech was in fact never delivered.

Referring to the years 1919 to 1933, Krupp wrote:

“It is the one great merit of the entire German war economy that

it did not remain idle during those bad years, even though its

activity could not be brought to light, for obvious reasons.

Through years of secret work, scientific and basic groundwork

was laid in order to be ready again to work for the German armed

forces at the appointed hour, without loss of time or experience

. . . . Only through the secret activity of German enterprise

together with the experience gained meanwhile through the

production of peace time goods was it possible after 1933 to

fall into step with the new tasks arrived at, restoring

Germany’s military power.”

In October 1933 Germany withdrew from the International Disarmament

Conference and the League of Nations. In 1935 the Nazi Government

decided to take the first open steps to free itself from its obligations

under the Treaty of Versailles. On 10 March 1935 the Defendant Göring

announced that Germany was building a military air force. Six days

later, on 16 March 1935, a law was passed bearing the signatures, among

others, of the Defendants Göring, Hess, Frank, Frick, Schacht, and Von

Neurath, instituting compulsory military service and fixing the

establishment of the German Army at a peace time strength of 500,000

men. In an endeavor to reassure public opinion in other countries, the

Government announced on 21 May 1935 that Germany would, though

renouncing the disarmament clauses, still respect the territorial

limitations of the Versailles Treaty, and would comply with the Locarno

Pacts. Nevertheless, on the very day of this announcement, the secret

Reich Defense Law was passed and its publication forbidden by Hitler. In

this law, the powers and duties of the Chancellor and other Ministers

were defined, should Germany become involved in war. It is clear from

this law that by May of 1935 Hitler and his Government had arrived at

the stage in the carrying out of their policies when it was necessary

for them to have in existence the requisite machinery for the

administration and government of Germany in the event of their policy

leading to war.

At the same time that this preparation of the German economy for war was

being carried out, the German armed forces themselves were preparing for

a rebuilding of Germany’s armed strength.

The German Navy was particularly active in this regard. The official

German Naval historians, Assmann and Gladisch, admit that the Treaty of

Versailles had only been in force for a few months before it was

violated, particularly in the construction of a new submarine arm.

The publications of Captain Schuessler and Colonel Scherff, both of

which were sponsored by the Defendant Raeder, were designed to show the

German People the nature of the Navy’s effort to rearm in defiance of

the Treaty of Versailles.

The full details of these publications have been given in evidence.

On 12 May 1934 the Defendant Raeder issued the Top Secret armament plan

for what was called the “Third Armament Phase”. This contained the

sentence:

“All theoretical and practical A-preparations are to be drawn up

with a primary view to readiness for a war _without any alert

period_.”

One month later, in June 1934, the Defendant Raeder had a conversation

with Hitler in which Hitler instructed him to keep secret the

construction of U-boats and of warships over the limit of 10,000 tons

which was then being undertaken.

And on 2 November 1934, the Defendant Raeder had another conversation

with Hitler and the Defendant Göring, in which Hitler said that he

considered it vital that the German Navy “should be increased as

planned, as no war could be carried on if the Navy was not able to

safeguard the ore imports from Scandinavia”.

The large orders for building given in 1933 and 1934 are sought to be

excused by the Defendant Raeder on the ground that negotiations were in

progress for an agreement between Germany and Great Britain permitting

Germany to build ships in excess of the provisions of the Treaty of

Versailles. This agreement, which was signed in 1935, restricted the

German Navy to a tonnage equal to one-third of that of the British,

except in respect of U-boats where 45 percent was agreed, subject always

to the right to exceed this proportion after first informing the British

Government and giving them an opportunity of discussion.

The Anglo-German Treaty followed in 1937, under which both Powers bound

themselves to notify full details of their building program at least

four months before any action was taken.

It is admitted that these clauses were not adhered to by Germany.

In capital vessels, for example, the displacement details were falsified

by 20 percent, whilst in the case of U-boats, the German historians

Assmann and Gladisch say:

“It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction

that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the

German-British Treaty.”

The importance of these breaches of the Treaty is seen when the motive

for this rearmament is considered. In the year 1940 the Defendant Raeder

himself wrote:

“The Führer hoped until the last moment to be able to put off

the threatening conflict with England until 1944-45. At that

time, the Navy would have had available a fleet with a powerful

U-boat superiority, and a much more favorable ratio as regards

strength in all other types of ships, particularly those

designed for warfare on the High Seas.”

The Nazi Government as already stated, announced on 21 May 1935 their

intention to respect the territorial limitations of the Treaty of

Versailles. On 7 March 1936, in defiance of that Treaty, the

demilitarized zone of the Rhineland was entered by German troops. In

announcing this action to the German Reichstag, Hitler endeavored to

justify the re-entry by references to the recently concluded alliances

between France and the Soviet Union, and between Czechoslovakia and the

Soviet Union. He also tried to meet the hostile reaction which he no

doubt expected to follow this violation of the Treaty by saying:

“We have no territorial claims to make in Europe.”

_The Common Plan of Conspiracy and Aggressive War_

The Tribunal now turns to the consideration of the Crimes against Peace

charged in the Indictment. Count One of the Indictment charges the

defendants with conspiring or having a common plan to commit crimes

against peace. Count Two of the Indictment charges the defendants with

committing specific crimes against peace by planning, preparing,

initiating, and waging wars of aggression against a number of other

States. It will be convenient to consider the question of the existence

of a common plan and the question of aggressive war together, and to

deal later in this Judgment with the question of the individual

responsibility of the defendants.

The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged

aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an

evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent States

alone, but affect the whole world.

To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international

crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other

war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the

whole.

The first acts of aggression referred to in the Indictment are the

seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia; and the first war of aggression

charged in the Indictment is the war against Poland begun on 1 September

1939.

Before examining that charge it is necessary to look more closely at

some of the events which preceded these acts of aggression. The war

against Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise clear sky; the

evidence has made it plain that this war of aggression, as well as the

seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia, was premeditated and carefully

prepared, and was not undertaken until the moment was thought opportune

for it to be carried through as a definite part of the pre-ordained

scheme and plan. For the aggressive designs of the Nazi Government were

not accidents arising out of the immediate political situation in Europe

and the world; they were a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign

policy.

From the beginning, the National Socialist movement claimed that its

object was to unite the German People in the consciousness of their

mission and destiny, based on inherent qualities of race, and under the

guidance of the Führer.

For its achievement, two things were deemed to be essential: the

disruption of the European order as it had existed since the Treaty of

Versailles, and the creation of a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers

of 1914. This necessarily involved the seizure of foreign territories.

War was seen to be inevitable, or at the very least, highly probable, if

these purposes were to be accomplished. The German People, therefore,

with all their resources, were to be organized as a great

political-military army, schooled to obey without question any policy

decreed by the State.

_Preparation for Aggression_

In _Mein Kampf_ Hitler had made this view quite plain. It must be

remembered that _Mein Kampf_ was no mere private diary in which the

secret thoughts of Hitler were set down. Its contents were rather

proclaimed from the house-tops. It was used in the schools and

Universities and among the Hitler Youth, in the SS and the SA, and among

the German People generally, even down to the presentation of an

official copy to all newly-married people. By the year 1945 over 6½

million copies had been circulated. The general contents are well known.

Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief in the necessity of force

as the means of solving international problems, as in the following

quotation:

“The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven

on our forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking their

lives. So also in the future, our people will not obtain

territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favor from

any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a

triumphant sword.”

_Mein Kampf_ contains many such passages, and the extolling of force as

an instrument of foreign policy is openly proclaimed.

The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in

detail. The very first page of the book asserts that “German-Austria

must be restored to the great German Motherland,” not on economic

grounds, but because “people of the same blood should be in the same

Reich.”

The restoration of the German frontiers of 1914 is declared to be wholly

insufficient, and if Germany is to exist at all, it must be as a world

power with the necessary territorial magnitude.

_Mein Kampf_ is quite explicit in stating where the increased territory

is to be found:

“Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line

through the line of conduct followed by pre-war Germany in

foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march

towards the South and West of Europe, and turn our eyes towards

the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and

trade policy of the pre-war times, and pass over to the

territorial policy of the future.

“But when we speak of new territory in Europe today, we must

think principally of Russia and the border states subject to

her.”

_Mein Kampf_ is not to be regarded as a mere literary exercise, nor as

an inflexible policy or plan incapable of modification.

Its importance lies in the unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed

throughout its pages.

_The Planning of Aggression_

Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held four

secret meetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special reference

because of the light they shed upon the question of the common plan and

aggressive war.

These meetings took place on 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August

1939, and 23 November 1939.

At these meetings important declarations were made by Hitler as to his

purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms.

The documents which record what took place at these meetings have been

subject to some criticism at the hands of defending Counsel.

Their essential authenticity is not denied, but it is said, for example,

that they do not propose to be verbatim transcripts of the speeches they

record, that the document dealing with the meeting on 5 November 1937,

was dated five days after the meeting had taken place, and that the two

documents dealing with the meeting of 22 August 1939 differ from one

another, and are unsigned.

Making the fullest allowance for criticism of this kind, the Tribunal is

of opinion that the documents are documents of the highest value, and

that their authenticity and substantial truth are established.

They are obviously careful records of the events they describe, and they

have been preserved as such in the archives of the German Government,

from whose custody they were captured. Such documents could never be

dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate or distorted; they

plainly record events which actually took place.

_Conferences of 23 November 1939 and 5 November 1937_

It will perhaps be useful to deal first of all with the meeting of 23

November 1939, when Hitler called his Supreme Commanders together. A

record was made of what was said, by one of those present. At the date

of the meeting, Austria and Czechoslovakia had been incorporated into

the German Reich, Poland had been conquered by the German Armies, and

the war with Great Britain and France was still in its static phase. The

moment was opportune for a review of past events. Hitler informed the

Commanders that the purpose of the Conference was to give them an idea

of the world of his thoughts, and to tell them his decision. He

thereupon reviewed his political task since 1919, and referred to the

secession of Germany from the League of Nations, the denunciation of the

Disarmament Conference, the order for re-armament, the introduction of

compulsory armed service, the occupation of the Rhineland, the seizure

of Austria, and the action against Czechoslovakia. He stated:

“One year later, Austria came; this step also was considered

doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the

Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia, and Poland. This step

also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of

all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not

possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me

from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the

Sudeten German territory. That was only a partial solution. The

decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the

erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the

action against Poland was laid, but I wasn’t quite clear at that

time whether I should start first against the East and then in

the West or vice versa . . . . Basically I did not organize the

Armed Forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was

always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem.

Under pressure it was decided that the East was to be attacked

first.”

This address, reviewing past events and re-affirming the aggressive

intentions present from the beginning, puts beyond any question of doubt

the character of the actions against Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the

war against Poland.

For they had all been accomplished according to plan; and the nature of

that plan must now be examined in a little more detail.

At the meeting of 23 November 1939 Hitler was looking back to things

accomplished; at the earlier meetings now to be considered, he was

looking forward, and revealing his plans to his confederates. The

comparison is instructive.

The meeting held at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 5 November 1937

was attended by Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach, Hitler’s personal adjutant,

who compiled a long note of the proceedings, which he dated 10 November

1937 and signed.

The persons present were Hitler, and the Defendants Göring, Von Neurath,

and Raeder, in their capacities as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe,

Reich Foreign Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy respectively,

General Von Blomberg, Minister of War, and General Von Fritsch, the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

Hitler began by saying that the subject of the conference was of such

high importance that in other States it would have taken place before

the Cabinet. He went on to say that the subject matter of his speech was

the result of his detailed deliberations, and of his experiences during

his four and a half years of Government. He requested that the

statements he was about to make should be looked upon in the case of his

death as his last will and testament. Hitler’s main theme was the

problem of living space, and he discussed various possible solutions,

only to set them aside. He then said that the seizure of living space on

the continent of Europe was therefore necessary, expressing himself in

these words:

“It is not a case of conquering people but of conquering

agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the

purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe

directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution

would have to be brought into effect for one or two generations

. . . . The history of all times—Roman Empire, British

Empire—has proved that every space expansion can only be

effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks

are unavoidable: neither formerly nor today has space been found

without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the

proprietor.”

He concluded with this observation:

“The question for Germany is where the greatest possible

conquest could be made at the lowest cost.”

Nothing could indicate more plainly the aggressive intentions of Hitler,

and the events which soon followed showed the reality of his purpose. It

is impossible to accept the contention that Hitler did not actually mean

war; for after pointing out that Germany might expect the opposition of

England and France, and analyzing the strength and the weakness of those

powers in particular situations, he continued:

“The German question can be solved only by way of force, and

this is never without risk . . . . If we place the decision to

apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions,

then we are left to reply to the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’. In

this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.”

The first of these three cases set forth a hypothetical international

situation, in which he would take action not later than 1943 to 1945,

saying:

“If the Führer is still living then it will be his irrevocable

decision to solve the German space problem not later than 1943

to 1945. The necessity for action before 1943 to 1945 will come

under consideration in Cases 2 and 3.”

The second and third cases to which Hitler referred show the plain

intention to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in this connection

Hitler said:

“For the improvement of our military-political position, it must

be our first aim in every case of entanglement by war to conquer

Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove any

threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance westwards.”

He further added:

“The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and

politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to

shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel

for other purposes, and the possibility of reconstituting new

armies up to a strength of about twelve divisions.”

This decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia was discussed in some

detail; the action was to be taken as soon as a favorable opportunity

presented itself.

The military strength which Germany had been building up since 1933 was

now to be directed at the two specific countries, Austria and

Czechoslovakia.

The Defendant Göring testified that he did not believe at that time that

Hitler actually meant to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia, and that the

purpose of the conference was only to put pressure on Von Fritsch to

speed up the re-armament of the Army.

The Defendant Raeder testified that neither he, nor Von Fritsch, nor Von

Blomberg, believed that Hitler actually meant war, a conviction which

the Defendant Raeder claims that he held up to 22 August 1939. The basis

of this conviction was his hope that Hitler would obtain a “political

solution” of Germany’s problems. But all that this means, when examined,

is the belief that Germany’s position would be so good, and Germany’s

armed might so overwhelming that the territory desired could be obtained

without fighting for it. It must be remembered too that Hitler’s

declared intention with regard to Austria was actually carried out

within a little over four months from the date of the meeting, and

within less than a year the first portion of Czechoslovakia was

absorbed, and Bohemia and Moravia a few months later. If any doubts had

existed in the minds of any of his hearers in November 1937, after March

1939 there could no longer be any question that Hitler was in deadly

earnest in his decision to resort to war. The Tribunal is satisfied that

Lieutenant Colonel Hossbach’s account of the meeting is substantially

correct, and that those present knew that Austria and Czechoslovakia

would be annexed by Germany at the first possible opportunity.

_The Seizure of Austria_

The invasion of Austria was a pre-meditated aggressive step in

furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars against other countries. As

a result Germany’s flank was protected, that of Czechoslovakia being

greatly weakened. The first step had been taken in the seizure of

“Lebensraum”; many new divisions of trained fighting men had been

acquired; and with the seizure of foreign exchange reserves, the

re-armament program had been greatly strengthened.

On 21 May 1935 Hitler announced in the Reichstag that Germany did not

intend either to attack Austria or to interfere in her internal affairs.

On 1 May 1936 he publicly coupled Czechoslovakia with Austria in his

avowal of peaceful intentions; and so late as 11 July 1936 he recognized

by treaty the full sovereignty of Austria.

Austria was in fact seized by Germany in the month of March 1938. For a

number of years before that date, the National Socialists in Germany had

been cooperating with the National Socialists of Austria with the

ultimate object of incorporating Austria into the German Reich. The

Putsch of 25 July 1934, which resulted in the assassination of

Chancellor Dollfuss, had the seizure of Austria as its object; but the

Putsch failed, with the consequence that the National Socialist Party

was outlawed in Austria. On 11 July 1936 an agreement was entered into

between the two countries, Article 1 of which stated: “The German

Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federated State of

Austria in the spirit of the pronouncements of the German Führer and

Chancellor of 21 May 1935.”

Article 2 declared: “Each of the two Governments regards the inner

political order (including the question of Austrian National Socialism)

obtaining in the other country as an internal affair of the other

country, upon which it will exercise neither direct nor indirect

influence.”

The National Socialist movement in Austria however continued its illegal

activities under cover of secrecy; and the National Socialists of

Germany gave the Party active support. The resulting “incidents” were

seized upon by the German National Socialists as an excuse for

interfering in Austrian affairs. After the conference of 5 November

1937, these “incidents” rapidly multiplied. The relationship between the

two countries steadily worsened, and finally the Austrian Chancellor

Schuschnigg was persuaded by the Defendant Von Papen and others to seek

a conference with Hitler, which took place at Berchtesgaden on 12

February 1938. The Defendant Keitel was present at the conference, and

Dr. Schuschnigg was threatened by Hitler with an immediate invasion of

Austria. Schuschnigg finally agreed to grant a political amnesty to

various Nazis convicted of crime, and to appoint the Nazi Seyss-Inquart

as Minister of the Interior and Security with control of the Police. On

9 March 1938, in an attempt to preserve the independence of his country,

Dr. Schuschnigg decided to hold a plebiscite on the question of Austrian

independence, which was fixed for 13 March 1938. Hitler, two days later,

sent an ultimatum to Schuschnigg that the plebiscite must be withdrawn.

In the afternoon and evening of 11 March 1938 the Defendant Göring made

a series of demands upon the Austrian Government, each backed up by the

threat of invasion. After Schuschnigg had agreed to the cancellation of

the plebiscite, another demand was put forward that Schuschnigg must

resign, and that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart should be appointed

Chancellor. In consequence, Schuschnigg resigned, and President Miklas,

after at first refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor, gave way

and appointed him.

Meanwhile Hitler had given the final order for the German troops to

cross the border at dawn on 12 March and instructed Seyss-Inquart to use

formations of Austrian National Socialists to depose Miklas and to seize

control of the Austrian Government. After the order to march had been

given to the German troops, Göring telephoned the German Embassy in

Vienna and dictated a telegram which he wished Seyss-Inquart to send to

Hitler to justify the military action which had already been ordered.

It was:

“The provisional Austrian Government, which, after the dismissal

of the Schuschnigg Government, considers its task to establish

peace and order in Austria, sends to the German Government the

urgent request to support it in its task and to help it to

prevent bloodshed. For this purpose it asks the German

Government to send German troops as soon as possible.”

Keppler, an official of the German Embassy, replied: “Well, SA and SS

are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet.”

After some further discussion, Göring stated: “Please show him

(Seyss-Inquart) the text of the telegram and do tell him that we are

asking him—well, he doesn’t even have to send the telegram. All he

needs to do is to say ‘Agreed’.”

Seyss-Inquart never sent the telegram; he never even telegraphed

“Agreed”.

It appears that as soon as he was appointed Chancellor, some time after

10 p.m., he called Keppler and told him to call up Hitler and transmit

his protests against the occupation. This action outraged the Defendant

Göring, because “it would disturb the rest of the Führer, who wanted to

go to Austria the next day”. At 11:15 p.m. an official in the Ministry

of Propaganda in Berlin telephoned the German Embassy in Vienna and was

told by Keppler: “Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart

agrees”.

At daybreak on 12 March 1938 German troops marched into Austria, and met

with no resistance. It was announced in the German press that

Seyss-Inquart had been appointed the successor to Schuschnigg, and the

telegram which Göring had suggested, but which was never sent, was

quoted to show that Seyss-Inquart had requested the presence of German

troops to prevent disorder. On 13 March 1938 a law was passed for the

reunion of Austria in the German Reich. Seyss-Inquart demanded that

President Miklas should sign this law, but he refused to do so, and

resigned his office. He was succeeded by Seyss-Inquart, who signed the

law in the name of Austria. This law was then adopted as a law of the

Reich by a Reich Cabinet decree issued the same day, and signed by

Hitler and the Defendants Göring, Frick, Von Ribbentrop, and Hess.

It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of Austria was

justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the union

of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between

the two peoples that made this union desirable; and that in the result

the object was achieved without bloodshed.

These matters, even if true, are really immaterial, for the facts

plainly prove that the methods employed to achieve the object were those

of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany

ready to be used if any resistance was encountered. Moreover, none of

these considerations appear from the Hossbach account of the meetings of

5 November 1937 to have been the motives which actuated Hitler; on the

contrary, all the emphasis is there laid on the advantage to be gained

by Germany in her military strength by the annexation of Austria.

_The Seizure of Czechoslovakia_

The conference of 5 November 1937 made it quite plain that the seizure

of Czechoslovakia by Germany had been definitely decided upon. The only

question remaining was the selection of the suitable moment to do it. On

4 March 1938 the Defendant Von Ribbentrop wrote to the Defendant Keitel

with regard to a suggestion made to Von Ribbentrop by the Hungarian

Ambassador in Berlin, that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia

should be discussed between the German and Hungarian Armies. In the

course of this letter Von Ribbentrop said:

“I have many doubts about such negotiations. In case we should

discuss with Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia,

the danger exists that other parties as well would be informed

about this.”

On 11 March 1938 Göring made two separate statements to M. Mastny, the

Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, assuring him that the developments then

taking place in Austria would in no way have any detrimental influence

on the relations between the German Reich and Czechoslovakia, and

emphasized the continued earnest endeavor on the part of the Germans to

improve those mutual relations. On 12 March Göring asked M. Mastny to

call on him, and repeated these assurances.

This design to keep Czechoslovakia quiet whilst Austria was absorbed was

a typical maneuver on the part of the Defendant Göring, which he was to

repeat later in the case of Poland, when he made the most strenuous

efforts to isolate Poland in the impending struggle. On the same day, 12

March, the Defendant Von Neurath spoke with M. Mastny, and assured him

on behalf of Hitler that Germany still considered herself bound by the

German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention concluded at Locarno in

October 1925.

The evidence shows that after the occupation of Austria by the German

Army on 12 March and the annexation of Austria on 13 March, Conrad

Henlein, who was the leader of the Sudeten German Party in

Czechoslovakia, saw Hitler in Berlin on 28 March. On the following day,

at a conference in Berlin, when Von Ribbentrop was present with Henlein,

the general situation was discussed, and later the Defendant Jodl

recorded in his diary:

“After the annexation of Austria the Führer mentions that there

is no hurry to solve the Czech question, because Austria has to

be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Grün

(that is, the plan against Czechoslovakia) will have to be

carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared

on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the

annexation of Austria.”

On 21 April 1938 a discussion took place between Hitler and the

Defendant Keitel with regard to “Case Grün”, showing quite clearly that

the preparations for the attack on Czechoslovakia were being fully

considered. On 28 May 1938 Hitler ordered that preparations should be

made for military action against Czechoslovakia by the 2nd October, and

from then onwards the plan to invade Czechoslovakia was constantly under

review. On 30 May 1938 a directive signed by Hitler declared his

“unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the

near future”.

In June 1938 as appears from a captured document taken from the files of

the SD in Berlin, an elaborate plan for the employment of the SD in

Czechoslovakia had been proposed. This plan provided that “the SD

follow, if possible, immediately after the leading troops, and take upon

themselves the duties similar to their tasks in Germany . . . .”

Gestapo officials were assigned to co-operate with the SD in certain

operations. Special agents were to be trained beforehand to prevent

sabotage, and these agents were to be notified “before the attack in due

time . . . in order to give them the possibility to hide themselves,

avoid arrest and deportation . . . At the beginning, guerrilla or

partisan warfare is to be expected, therefore weapons are necessary

. . . .”

Files of information were to be compiled with notations as follows: “To

arrest.” “To liquidate.” “To confiscate.” “To deprive of passport.” etc.

The plan provided for the temporary division of the country into larger

and smaller territorial units, and considered various “suggestions”, as

they were termed, for the incorporation into the German Reich of the

inhabitants and districts of Czechoslovakia. The final “suggestion”

included the whole country, together with Slovakia and Carpathian

Russia, with a population of nearly 15 millions.

The plan was modified in some respects in September after the Munich

Conference, but the fact the plan existed in such exact detail and was

couched in such war-like language indicated a calculated design to

resort to force.

On 31 August 1938 Hitler approved a memorandum by Jodl dated 24 August

1938, concerning the timing of the order for the invasion of

Czechoslovakia and the question of defense measures. This memorandum

contained the following:

“Operation Grün will be set in motion by means of an ‘incident’

in Czechoslovakia, which will give Germany provocation for

military intervention. The fixing of the _exact time_ for this

incident is of the utmost importance.”

These facts demonstrate that the occupation of Czechoslovakia had been

planned in detail long before the Munich Conference.

In the month of September 1938 the conferences and talks with military

leaders continued. In view of the extraordinarily critical situation

which had arisen, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain, flew to

Munich and then went to Berchtesgaden to see Hitler. On 22 September Mr.

Chamberlain met Hitler for further discussions at Bad Godesberg. On 26

September 1938 Hitler said in a speech in Berlin, with reference to his

conversation:

“I assured him, moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this

problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for

Germany in Europe; and I further assured him that from the

moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to

say, when the Czechs have come to an arrangement with their

other minorities, peacefully and without oppression, I will be

no longer interested in the Czech State, and that as far as I am

concerned I will guarantee it. We don’t want any Czechs.”

On 29 September 1938, after a conference between Hitler and Mussolini

and the British and French Prime Ministers in Munich, the Munich Pact

was signed, by which Czechoslovakia was required to acquiesce in the

cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. The “piece of paper” which the

British Prime Minister brought back to London, signed by himself and

Hitler, expressed the hope that for the future Britain and Germany might

live without war. That Hitler never intended to adhere to the Munich

Agreement is shown by the fact that a little later he asked the

Defendant Keitel for information with regard to the military force which

in his opinion would be required to break all Czech resistance in

Bohemia and Moravia. Keitel gave his reply on 11 October 1938. On 21

October 1938 a directive was issued by Hitler, and countersigned by the

Defendant Keitel, to the Armed Forces on their future tasks, which

stated:

“Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia. It must be

possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if

her policy should become hostile towards Germany.”

On 14 March 1939 the Czech President Hacha and his Foreign Minister

Chvalkovsky came to Berlin at the suggestion of Hitler, and attended a

meeting at which the Defendants Von Ribbentrop, Göring, and Keitel were

present, with others. The proposal was made to Hacha that if he would

sign an agreement consenting to the incorporation of the Czech people in

the German Reich at once, Bohemia and Moravia would be saved from

destruction. He was informed that German troops had already received

orders to march and that any resistance would be broken with physical

force. The Defendant Göring added the threat that he would destroy

Prague completely from the air. Faced by this dreadful alternative,

Hacha and his Foreign Minister put their signatures to the necessary

agreement at 4:30 in the morning, and Hitler and Ribbentrop signed on

behalf of Germany.

On 15 March German troops occupied Bohemia and Moravia, and on 16 March

the German decree was issued incorporating Bohemia and Moravia into the

Reich as a protectorate, and this decree was signed by the Defendants

Von Ribbentrop and Frick.

_The Aggression against Poland_

By March 1939 the plan to annex Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had

been discussed by Hitler at the meeting of 5 November 1937, had been

accomplished. The time had now come for the German leaders to consider

further acts of aggression, made more possible of attainment because of

that accomplishment.

On 23 May 1939 a meeting was held in Hitler’s study in the new Reich

Chancellery in Berlin. Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland

and gave his reasons, and discussed the effect the decision might have

on other countries. In point of time, this was the second of the

important meetings to which reference has already been made, and in

order to appreciate the full significance of what was said and done, it

is necessary to state shortly some of the main events in the history of

German-Polish relations.

As long ago as the year 1925 an Arbitration Treaty between Germany and

Poland had been made at Locarno, providing for the settlement of all

disputes between the two countries. On 26 January 1934, a German-Polish

declaration of non-aggression was made, signed on behalf of the German

Government by the Defendant Von Neurath. On 30 January 1934, and again

on 30 January 1937 Hitler made speeches in the Reichstag in which he

expressed his view that Poland and Germany could work together in

harmony and peace. On 20 February 1938 Hitler made a third speech in the

Reichstag in the course of which he said with regard to Poland:

“And so the way to a friendly understanding has been

successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with

Danzig, has today, in spite of the attempts of certain mischief

makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the

relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into

a sincere, friendly cooperation . . . . Relying on her

friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save

that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is

ahead of us—peace.”

On 26 September 1938, in the middle of the crisis over the Sudetenland,

Hitler made the speech in Berlin which has already been quoted, and

announced that he had informed the British Prime Minister that when the

Czechoslovakian problem was solved there would be no more territorial

problems for Germany in Europe. Nevertheless, on 24 November of the same

year, an OKW directive was issued to the German Armed Forces to make

preparations for an attack upon Danzig; it stated:

“The Führer has ordered:

(1) . . . Preparations are also to be made to enable the Free

State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise.”

In spite of having ordered military preparations for the occupation of

Danzig, Hitler on 30 January 1939 said in a speech in the Reichstag:

“During the troubled months of the past year, the friendship between

Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the

political life of Europe.”

Five days previously, on 25 January 1939, Von Ribbentrop said in the

course of a speech in Warsaw: “Thus Poland and Germany can look forward

to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual

relations.”

Following on the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany on 15

March 1939, which was a flagrant breach of the Munich Agreement, Great

Britain gave an assurance to Poland on 31 March 1939 that in the event

of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which

the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with

their National Forces, Great Britain would feel itself bound at once to

lend Poland all the support in its power. The French Government took the

same stand. It is interesting to note in this connection, that one of

the arguments frequently presented by the Defense in the present case is

that the Defendants were induced to think that their conduct was not in

breach of international law by the acquiescence of other Powers. The

declarations of Great Britain and France showed, at least, that this

view could be held no longer.

On 3 April 1939 a revised OKW directive was issued to the Armed Forces,

which after referring to the question of Danzig made reference to Fall

Weiss (the military code name for the German invasion of Poland) and

stated:

“The Führer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss.

(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation

can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards.

(2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to

draw up a precise timetable for Fall Weiss and to arrange by

conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches

of the Armed Forces.”

On 11 April 1939 a further directive was signed by Hitler and issued to

the Armed Forces, and in one of the annexes to that document the words

occur:

“Quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland however

adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, ‘a final

settlement’ will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with

Poland. The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength, and

to create in the East a situation which satisfies the

requirements of defense. The Free State of Danzig will be

incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the

latest. Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is

considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France,

and British restraint as a result of this.”

In spite of the contents of those two directives, Hitler made a speech

in the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 in which, after describing the Polish

Government’s alleged rejection of an offer he had made with regard to

Danzig and the Polish Corridor, he stated:

“I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the

Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the

worst is that now Poland like Czechoslovakia a year ago

believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign,

that it must call up its troops, although Germany on her part

has not called up a single man, and had not thought of

proceeding in any way against Poland . . . . The intention to

attack on the part of Germany which was merely invented by the

international press . . . .”

It was four weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on 23 May 1939,

held the important military conference to which reference has already

been made. Among the persons present were the Defendants Göring, Raeder,

and Keitel. The adjutant on duty that day was Lieutenant Colonel

Schmundt, and he made a record of what happened, certifying it with his

signature as a correct record.

The purpose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform the heads of

the Armed Forces and their staffs of his views on the political

situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political situation

and reviewing the course of events since 1933, Hitler announced his

decision to attack Poland. He admitted that the quarrel with Poland over

Danzig was not the reason for this attack, but the necessity for Germany

to enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies. He said:

“The solution of the problem demands courage. The principle by

which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to

circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be

adapted to needs. This is impossible without invasion of foreign

States or attacks upon foreign property.”

Later in his address he added:

“There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are

left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable

opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.

There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of

the isolation will be decisive . . . . The isolation of Poland

is a matter of skillful politics.”

Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt’s record of the meeting reveals that Hitler

fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France coming to

Poland’s assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland could not be

achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should attack Great

Britain and France first, or at any rate should concentrate primarily on

the war in the West, in order to defeat Great Britain and France

quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness. Nevertheless,

Hitler stressed, that war with England and France would be a life and

death struggle, which might last a long time, and that preparations must

be made accordingly.

During the weeks which followed this conference, other meetings were

held and directives were issued in preparation for the war. The

Defendant Von Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a

non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.

On 22 August 1939 there took place the important meeting of that day, to

which reference has already been made. The Prosecution have put in

evidence two unsigned captured documents which appear to be records made

of this meeting by persons who were present. The first document is

headed: “The Führer’s Speech to the Commanders-in-Chief on 22 August

1939.” The purpose of the speech was to announce the decision to make

war on Poland at once, and Hitler began by saying:

“It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come

sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring,

but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few

years, and only afterwards against the East . . . I wanted to

establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to

fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable

to me, could not be executed since essential points have

changed. It became clear to me that Poland would attack us in

case of a conflict with the West.”

Hitler then went on to explain why he had decided that the most

favorable moment had arrived for starting the war:

“Now”, said Hitler, “Poland is in the position in which I wanted

her . . . . I am only afraid that at the last moment some

_Schweinehund_ will make a proposal for mediation . . . . A

beginning has been made for the destruction of England’s

hegemony.”

This document closely resembles one of the documents put in evidence on

behalf of the Defendant Raeder. This latter document consists of a

summary of the same speech, compiled on the day it was made, by one

Admiral Boehm, from notes he had taken during the meeting. In substance

it says that the moment had arrived to settle the dispute with Poland by

military invasion, that although a conflict between Germany and the West

was unavoidable in the long run, the likelihood of Great Britain and

France coming to Poland’s assistance was not great, and that even if a

war in the West should come about, the first aim should be the crushing

of the Polish military strength. It also contains a statement by Hitler

that an appropriate propaganda reason for invading Poland would be

given, the truth or falsehood of which was unimportant, since “the Right

lies in Victory”.

The second unsigned document put in evidence by the Prosecution is

headed: “Second Speech by the Führer on 22 August 1939”, and is in the

form of notes of the main points made by Hitler. Some of these are as

follows:

“Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were

determined from the beginning to fight the Western Powers.

Struggle for life or death . . . destruction of Poland in the

foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the

arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the

West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective.

I shall give a propagandist cause for starting the war—never

mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be

asked later on whether we told the truth or not. In starting and

making a war, not the Right is what matters, but Victory . . . .

The start will be ordered probably by Saturday morning.” (That

is to say, 26 August.)

In spite of it being described as a second speech, there are sufficient

points of similarity with the two previously mentioned documents to make

it appear very probable that this is an account of the same speech, not

as detailed as the other two, but in substance the same.

These three documents establish that the final decision as to the date

of Poland’s destruction, which had been agreed upon and planned earlier

in the year, was reached by Hitler shortly before 22 August 1939. They

also show that although he hoped to be able to avoid having to fight

Great Britain and France as well, he fully realized there was a risk of

this happening, but it was a risk which he was determined to take.

The events of the last days of August confirm this determination. On 22

August 1939, the same day as the speech just referred to, the British

Prime Minister wrote a letter to Hitler, in which he said: “Having thus

made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction

that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that

could occur.”

On 23 August Hitler replied:

“The question of the treatment of European problems on a

peaceful basis is not a decision which rests with Germany, but

primarily on those who since the crime committed by the

Versailles Diktat have stubbornly and consistently opposed any

peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of

the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the

relationship between England and Germany.”

There followed a number of appeals to Hitler to refrain from forcing the

Polish issue to the point of war. These were from President Roosevelt on

24 and 25 August; from his Holiness the Pope on 24 and 31 August; and

from M. Daladier, the Prime Minister of France, on 26 August. All these

appeals fell on deaf ears.

On 25 August, Great Britain signed a pact of mutual assistance with

Poland, which reinforced the undertaking she had given to Poland earlier

in the year. This, coupled with the news of Mussolini’s unwillingness to

enter the war on Germany’s side, made Hitler hesitate for a moment. The

invasion of Poland, which was timed to start on 26 August, was postponed

until a further attempt had been made to persuade Great Britain not to

intervene. Hitler offered to enter into a comprehensive agreement with

Great Britain, once the Polish question had been settled. In reply to

this, Great Britain made a counter-suggestion for the settlement of the

Polish dispute by negotiation. On 29 August Hitler informed the British

Ambassador that the German Government, though skeptical as to the

result, would be prepared to enter into direct negotiations with a

Polish emissary, provided he arrived in Berlin with plenipotentiary

powers by midnight for the following day, 30 August. The Polish

Government were informed of this, but with the example of Schuschnigg

and Hacha before them, they decided not to send such an emissary. At

midnight on 30 August the Defendant Von Ribbentrop read to the British

Ambassador at top speed a document containing the first precise

formulation of the German demands against Poland. He refused, however,

to give the Ambassador a copy of this, and stated that in any case it

was too late now, since no Polish plenipotentiary had arrived.

In the opinion of the Tribunal, the manner in which these negotiations

were conducted by Hitler and Von Ribbentrop showed that they were not

entered into in good faith or with any desire to maintain peace, but

solely in the attempt to prevent Great Britain and France from honoring

their obligations to Poland.

Parallel with these negotiations were the unsuccessful attempts made by

Göring to effect the isolation of Poland by persuading Great Britain not

to stand by her pledged word, through the services of one Birger

Dahlerus, a Swede. Dahlerus, who was called as a witness by Göring, had

a considerable knowledge of England and things English, and in July 1939

was anxious to bring about a better understanding between England and

Germany, in the hope of preventing a war between the two countries. He

got into contact with Göring as well as with official circles in London,

and during the latter part of August, Göring used him as an unofficial

intermediary to try and deter the British Government from their

opposition to Germany’s intentions towards Poland. Dahlerus, of course,

had no knowledge at the time of the decision which Hitler had secretly

announced on 22 August, nor of the German military directives for the

attack on Poland which were already in existence. As he admitted in his

evidence, it was not until 26 September, after the conquest of Poland

was virtually complete, that he first realized that Göring’s aim all

along had been to get Great Britain’s consent to Germany’s seizure of

Poland.

After all attempts to persuade Germany to agree to a settlement of her

dispute with Poland on a reasonable basis had failed, Hitler, on 31

August, issued his final directive, in which he announced that the

attack on Poland would start in the early morning of 1 September, and

gave instructions as to what action would be taken if Great Britain and

France should enter the war in defense of Poland.

In the opinion of the Tribunal, the events of the days immediately

preceding 1 September 1939 demonstrate the determination of Hitler and

his associates to carry out the declared intention of invading Poland at

all costs, despite appeals from every quarter. With the ever increasing

evidence before him that this intention would lead to war with Great

Britain and France as well, Hitler was resolved not to depart from the

course he had set for himself. The Tribunal is fully satisfied by the

evidence that the war initiated by Germany against Poland on 1 September

1939 was most plainly an aggressive war, which was to develop in due

course into a war which embraced almost the whole world, and resulted in

the commission of countless crimes, both against the laws and customs of

war, and against humanity.

_The Invasion of Denmark and Norway_

The aggressive war against Poland was but the beginning. The aggression

of Nazi Germany quickly spread from country to country. In point of time

the first two countries to suffer were Denmark and Norway.

On 31 May 1939 a Treaty of Non-Aggression was made between Germany and

Denmark, and signed by the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. It was there

solemnly stated that the parties to the Treaty were “firmly resolved to

maintain peace between Denmark and Germany under all circumstances.”

Nevertheless, Germany invaded Denmark on 9 April 1940.

On 2 September 1939, after the outbreak of war with Poland, Germany sent

a solemn assurance to Norway in these terms:

“The German Reich Government is determined in view of the

friendly relations which exist between Norway and Germany under

no circumstance to prejudice the inviolability and integrity of

Norway, and to respect the territory of the Norwegian State. In

making this declaration the Reich Government naturally expects,

on its side, that Norway will observe an unimpeachable

neutrality towards the Reich and will not tolerate any breaches

of Norwegian neutrality by any third party which might occur.

Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government differ

from this so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party

occurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled

to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as the

resulting situation might dictate.”

On 9 April 1940, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, Norway was

invaded by Germany.

The idea of attacking Norway originated, it appears, with the Defendants

Raeder and Rosenberg. On 3 October 1939 Raeder prepared a memorandum on

the subject of “gaining bases in Norway”, and amongst the questions

discussed was the question: “Can bases be gained by military force

against Norway’s will, if it is impossible to carry this out without

fighting?” Despite this fact, three days later, further assurances were

given to Norway by Germany, which stated: “Germany has never had any

conflicts of interest or even points of controversy with the Northern

States and neither has she any today.”

Three days later again, the Defendant Dönitz prepared a memorandum on

the same subject of bases in Norway, and suggested the establishment of

a base in Trondheim with an alternative of supplying fuel in Narvik. At

the same time the Defendant Raeder was in correspondence with Admiral

Karls, who pointed out to him the importance of an occupation of the

Norwegian coast by Germany. On 10 October Raeder reported to Hitler the

disadvantages to Germany which an occupation by the British would have.

In the months of October and November Raeder continued to work on the

possible occupation of Norway, in conjunction with the “Rosenberg

Organization.” The “Rosenberg Organization” was the Foreign Affairs

Bureau of the NSDAP, and Rosenberg as Reichsleiter was in charge of it.

Early in December, Quisling, the notorious Norwegian traitor, visited

Berlin and was seen by the Defendants Rosenberg and Raeder. He put

forward a plan for a _coup d’état_ in Norway. On 12 December the

Defendant Raeder and the naval staff, together with the Defendants

Keitel and Jodl, had a conference with Hitler, when Raeder reported on

his interview with Quisling, and set out Quisling’s views. On 16

December Hitler himself interviewed Quisling on all these matters. In

the report of the activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the NSDAP

for the years 1933-43, under the heading of “Political Preparations for

the Military Occupation of Norway”, it is stated that at the interview

with Quisling Hitler said that he would prefer a neutral attitude on the

part of Norway as well as the whole of Scandinavia, as he did not desire

to extend the theater of war, or to draw other nations into the

conflict. If the enemy attempted to extend the war he would be compelled

to guard himself against that undertaking. He promised Quisling

financial support, and assigned to a special military staff the

examination of the military questions involved.

On 27 January 1940 a memorandum was prepared by the Defendant Keitel

regarding the plans for the invasion of Norway. On 28 February 1940 the

Defendant Jodl entered in his diary: “I proposed first to the Chief of

OKW and then to the Führer that Case Yellow (that is the operation

against the Netherlands) and Weser Exercise (that is the operation

against Norway and Denmark) must be prepared in such a way that they

will be independent of one another as regards both time and forces

employed.”

On 1 March Hitler issued a directive regarding the Weser Exercise which

contained the words:

“The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the

making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and

Norway by a part of the German Armed Forces. This operation

should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the

Baltic; further, it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and

give our Navy and Air Force a wider start line against Britain

. . . . The crossing of the Danish border and the landings in

Norway must take place simultaneously . . . . It is most

important that the Scandinavian States as well as the Western

opponents should be taken by surprise by our measures.”

On 24 March the naval operation orders for the Weser Exercise were

issued, and on 30 March the Defendant Dönitz as Commander-in-Chief of

U-boats issued his operational order for the occupation of Denmark and

Norway. On 9 April 1940 the German forces invaded Norway and Denmark.

From this narrative it is clear that as early as October 1939 the

question of invading Norway was under consideration. The defense that

has been made here is that Germany was compelled to attack Norway to

forestall an Allied invasion, and her action was therefore preventive.

It must be remembered that preventive action in foreign territory is

justified only in case of “an instant and overwhelming necessity for

self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation”

(The Caroline Case, Moore’s _Digest of International Law_, II, 412). How

widely the view was held in influential German circles that the Allies

intended to occupy Norway cannot be determined with exactitude. Quisling

asserted that the Allies would intervene in Norway with the tacit

consent of the Norwegian Government. The German Legation at Oslo

disagreed with this view, although the Naval Attaché at that Legation

shared it.

The War Diary of the German Naval Operations Staff for 13 January 1940

stated that the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff thought that the

most favorable solution would be the maintenance of the neutrality of

Norway, but he harbored the firm conviction that England intended to

occupy Norway in the near future relying on the tacit agreement of the

Norwegian Government.

The directive of Hitler issued on 1 March 1940 for the attack on Denmark

and Norway stated that the operation “should prevent British

encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic.”

It is, however, to be remembered that the Defendant Raeder’s memorandum

of 3 October 1939 makes no reference to forestalling the Allies, but is

based upon “the aim of improving our strategical and operational

position.”

The memorandum itself is headed “Gaining of Bases in Norway”. The same

observation applies _mutatis mutandis_ to the memorandum of the

Defendant Dönitz of 9 October 1939.

Furthermore, on 13 March the Defendant Jodl recorded in his diary:

“Führer does not give order yet for ‘W’ (Weser Exercise). He is

still looking for an excuse.” (Justification?)

On 14 March 1940 he again wrote: “Führer has not yet decided what reason

to give for ‘Weser Exercise’”. On 21 March 1940 he recorded the

misgivings of Task Force XXI about the long interval between taking up

readiness positions and the close of the diplomatic negotiations, and

added:

“Führer rejects any earlier negotiations, as otherwise calls for

help go out to England and America. If resistance is put up it

must be ruthlessly broken.”

On 2 April he records that all the preparations are completed; on 4

April the Naval Operational Order was issued; and on 9 April, the

invasion was begun.

From all this it is clear that when the plans for an attack on Norway

were being made, they were not made for the purpose of forestalling an

imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they might prevent an

Allied occupation at some future date.

When the final orders for the German invasion of Norway were given, the

diary of the Naval Operations Staff for 23 March 1940 records: “A mass

encroachment by the English into Norwegian territorial waters . . . is

not to be expected at the present time.”

And Admiral Assmann’s entry for 26 March says: “British landing in

Norway not considered serious.”

Documents which were subsequently captured by the Germans are relied on

to show that the Allied plan to occupy harbors and airports in Western

Norway was a definite plan, although in all points considerably behind

the German plans under which the invasion was actually carried out.

These documents indicate that an altered plan had been finally agreed

upon on 20 March 1940, that a convoy should leave England on 5 April,

and that mining in Norwegian waters would begin the same day; and that

on 5 April the sailing time had been postponed until 8 April. But these

plans were not the cause of the German invasion of Norway. Norway was

occupied by Germany to afford her bases from which a more effective

attack on England and France might be made, pursuant to plans prepared

long in advance of the Allied plans which are now relied on to support

the argument of self-defense.

It was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accordance

with the reservations made by many of the Signatory Powers at the time

of the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, whether preventive action

was a necessity, and that in making her decision her judgment was

conclusive. But whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was

in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to

investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be

enforced.

No suggestion is made by the defendants that there was any plan by any

belligerent, other than Germany, to occupy Denmark. No excuse for that

aggression has ever been offered.

As the German Armies entered Norway and Denmark, German memoranda were

handed to the Norwegian and Danish Governments which gave the assurance

that the German troops did not come as enemies, that they did not intend

to make use of the points occupied by German troops as bases for

operations against England, as long as they were not forced to do so by

measures taken by England and France, and that they had come to protect

the North against the proposed occupation of Norwegian strong points by

English-French forces.

The memoranda added that Germany had no intention of infringing upon the

territorial integrity and political independence of the Kingdom of

Norway then or in the future. Nevertheless, on 3 June 1940, a German

naval memorandum discussed the use to be made of Norway and Denmark, and

put forward one solution for consideration, that the territories of

Denmark and Norway acquired during the course of the war should continue

to be occupied and organized so that they could in the future be

considered as German possessions.

In the light of all the available evidence it is impossible to accept

the contention that the invasions of Denmark and Norway were defensive,

and in the opinion of the Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war.

_The Invasion of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg_

The plan to seize Belgium and the Netherlands was considered in August

1938, when the attack on Czechoslovakia was being formulated, and the

possibility of war with France and England was contemplated. The

advantage to Germany of being able to use these countries for their own

purposes, particularly as air bases in the war against England and

France, was emphasized. In May of 1939, when Hitler made his irrevocable

decision to attack Poland, and foresaw the possibility at least of a war

with England and France in consequence, he told his military commanders:

“Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied . . . .

Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

On 22 August in the same year, he told his military commanders that

England and France, in his opinion, would not “violate the neutrality of

these countries.” At the same time he assured Belgium and Holland and

Luxembourg that he would respect their neutrality; and on 6 October

1939, after the Polish campaign, he repeated this assurance. On 7

October General Von Brauchitsch directed Army Group B to prepare “for

the immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if the political

situation so demands.” In a series of orders, which were signed by the

Defendants Keitel and Jodl, the attack was fixed for 10 November 1939,

but it was postponed from time to time until May of 1940 on account of

weather conditions and transport problems.

At the conference on 23 November 1939 Hitler said:

“We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war

depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France

push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in

the greatest danger . . . . Certainly England and France will

assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed.

England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and

Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and

Holland the sympathies are all for France and England . . . . If

the French Army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it

will be too late for us. We must anticipate them . . . . We

shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared.

This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different

starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can

feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English

coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only

occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland . . . . My

decision is unchangeable; I shall attack France and England at

the most favorable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality

of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that

when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of

neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break

the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack,

the war is not to be ended victoriously.”

On 10 May 1940 the German forces invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, and

Luxembourg. On the same day the German Ambassadors handed to the

Netherlands and Belgian Governments a memorandum alleging that the

British and French Armies, with the consent of Belgium and Holland, were

planning to march through those countries to attack the Ruhr, and

justifying the invasion on these grounds. Germany, however, assured the

Netherlands and Belgium that their integrity and their possessions would

be respected. A similar memorandum was delivered to Luxembourg on the

same date.

There is no evidence before the Tribunal to justify the contention that

the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were invaded by Germany because

their occupation had been planned by England and France. British and

French staffs had been cooperating in making certain plans for military

operations in the Low Countries, but the purpose of this planning was to

defend these countries in the event of a German attack.

The invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg was entirely without

justification.

It was carried out in pursuance of policies long considered and

prepared, and was plainly an act of aggressive war. The resolve to

invade was made without any other consideration than the advancement of

the aggressive policies of Germany.

_The Aggression against Yugoslavia and Greece_

On 12 August 1939 Hitler had a conversation with Ciano and the Defendant

Von Ribbentrop at Obersalzberg. He said then:

“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the

neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process

could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one

partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing with

the uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a

neutral of this kind.”

This observation was made only two months after Hitler had given

assurances to Yugoslavia that he would regard her frontier as final and

inviolable. On the occasion of the visit to Germany of the Prince Regent

of Yugoslavia on 1 June 1939, Hitler had said in a public speech:

“The firmly established reliable relationship of Germany to

Yugoslavia now that owing to historical events we have become

neighbors with common boundaries fixed for all time, will not

only guarantee lasting peace between our two peoples and

countries, but can also represent an element of calm to our

nerve-racked continent. This peace is the goal of all who are

disposed to perform really constructive work.”

On 6 October 1939 Germany repeated these assurances to Yugoslavia, after

Hitler and Von Ribbentrop had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Italy to

enter the war on the side of Germany by attacking Yugoslavia. On 28

October 1940 Italy invaded Greece, but the military operations met with

no success. In November Hitler wrote to Mussolini with regard to the

invasion of Greece, and the extension of the war in the Balkans, and

pointed out that no military operations could take place in the Balkans

before the following March, and therefore Yugoslavia must if at all

possible be won over by other means, and in other ways. But on 12

November 1940 Hitler issued a directive for the prosecution of the war,

and it included the words: “The Balkans: The Commander-in-Chief of the

Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of

the Aegean Sea, in case of need entering through Bulgaria.”

On 13 December he issued a directive concerning the operation “Marita,”

the code name for the invasion of Greece, in which he stated:

“1. The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive.

Because of a dangerous situation in Albania, it is doubly

necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create air

bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be

dangerous above all to Italy as to the Rumanian oilfields.

2. My plan therefore is (a) to form a slowly increasing task

force in Southern Rumania within the next month, (b) after the

setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send a

task force for the occupation of the Aegean north coast by way

of Bulgaria and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek

mainland.”

On 20 January 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Mussolini, at which

the Defendants Von Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, and others were present,

Hitler stated:

“The massing of troops in Rumania serves a threefold purpose:

(a) An operation against Greece;

(b) Protection of Bulgaria against Russia and Turkey;

(c) Safeguarding the guarantee to Rumania . . . .

It is desirable that this deployment be completed without

interference from the enemy. Therefore, disclose the game as

late as possible. The tendency will be to cross the Danube at

the last possible moment, and to line up for attack at the

earliest possible moment.”

On 19 February 1941 an OKW directive regarding the operation “Marita”

stated: “On 18 February the Führer made the following decision regarding

the carrying out of Operation Marita: The following dates are envisaged:

Commencement of building bridge, 28 February; crossing of the Danube, 2

March.”

On 3 March 1941, British troops landed in Greece to assist the Greeks to

resist the Italians; and on 18 March, at a meeting between Hitler and

the Defendant Raeder, at which the Defendants Keitel and Jodl were also

present, the Defendant Raeder asked for confirmation that the “whole of

Greece will have to be occupied, even in the event of a peaceful

settlement,” to which Hitler replied, “The complete occupation is a

prerequisite of any settlement.”

On 25 March, on the occasion of the adherence of Yugoslavia to the

Tripartite Pact at a meeting in Vienna, the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, on

behalf of the German Government, confirmed the determination of Germany

to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at

all times. On 26 March the Yugoslav Ministers, who had adhered to the

Tripartite Pact, were removed from office by a _coup d’état_ in Belgrade

on their return from Vienna, and the new Government repudiated the Pact.

Thereupon on 27 March, at a conference in Berlin with the High Command

at which the Defendants Göring, Keitel, and Jodl were present, and the

Defendant Von Ribbentrop part of the time, Hitler stated that Yugoslavia

was an uncertain factor in regard to the contemplated attack on Greece,

and even more so with regard to the attack upon Russia which was to be

conducted later on. Hitler announced that he was determined, without

waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new Government, to make

all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a

national unit. He stated that he would act with “unmerciful harshness.”

On 6 April German forces invaded Greece and Yugoslavia without warning,

and Belgrade was bombed by the Luftwaffe. So swift was this particular

invasion that there had not been time to establish any “incidents” as a

usual preliminary, or to find and publish any adequate “political”

explanations. As the attack was starting on 6 April, Hitler proclaimed

to the German people that this attack was necessary because the British

forces in Greece (who were helping the Greeks to defend themselves

against the Italians) represented a British attempt to extend the war to

the Balkans.

It is clear from this narrative that aggressive war against Greece and

Yugoslavia had long been in contemplation, certainly as early as August

of 1939. The fact that Great Britain had come to the assistance of the

Greeks, and might thereafter be in a position to inflict great damage

upon German interests was made the occasion for the occupation of both

countries.

_The Aggressive War against the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics_

On 23 August 1939 Germany signed the non-aggression pact with the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The evidence has shown unmistakably that the Soviet Union on their part

conformed to the terms of this pact; indeed the German Government itself

had been assured of this by the highest German sources. Thus, the German

Ambassador in Moscow informed his Government that the Soviet Union would

go to war only if attacked by Germany, and this statement is recorded in

the German War Diary under the date of 6 June 1941.

Nevertheless, as early as the late summer of 1940, Germany began to make

preparations for an attack on the U.S.S.R., in spite of the

non-aggression pact. This operation was secretly planned under the code

name “Case Barbarossa”, and the former Field Marshal Paulus testified

that on 3 September 1940, when he joined the German General Staff, he

continued developing “Case Barbarossa”, which was finally completed at

the beginning of November 1940; and that even then, the German General

Staff had no information that the Soviet Union was preparing for war.

On 18 December 1940 Hitler issued Directive No. 21, initialed by Keitel

and Jodl, which called for the completion of all preparations connected

with the realization of “Case Barbarossa” by 15 May 1941. This directive

stated:

“The German armed forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia

in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England

. . . . Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of

an attack will not be recognized.”

Before the directive of 18 December had been made, the Defendant Göring

had informed General Thomas, chief of the Office of War Economy of the

OKW, of the plan, and General Thomas made surveys of the economic

possibilities of the U.S.S.R., including its raw materials, its power

and transport system, and its capacity to produce arms.

In accordance with these surveys, an economic staff for the Eastern

territories with many military-economic units (inspectorates, commandos,

groups) was created under the supervision of the Defendant Göring. In

conjunction with the military command, these units were to achieve the

most complete and efficient economic exploitation of the occupied

territories in the interest of Germany.

The framework of the future political and economic organization of the

occupied territories was designed by the Defendant Rosenberg over a

period of three months, after conferences with and assistance by the

Defendants, Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Funk, Göring, Von Ribbentrop, and

Frick, or their representatives. It was made the subject of a most

detailed report immediately after the invasion.

These plans outlined the destruction of the Soviet Union as an

independent State, and its partition, the creation of so-called Reich

Commissariats, and the conversion of Estonia, Latvia, Bielorussia, and

other territories into German colonies.

At the same time Germany drew Hungary, Rumania, and Finland into the war

against the U.S.S.R. In December 1940 Hungary agreed to participate on

the promise of Germany that she should have certain territories at the

expense of Yugoslavia.

In May 1941 a final agreement was concluded with Antonescu, the Prime

Minister of Rumania, regarding the attack on the U.S.S.R., in which

Germany promised to Rumania, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the

right to occupy Soviet territory up to the Dnieper.

On 22 June 1941, without any declaration of war, Germany invaded Soviet

territory in accordance with the plans so long made.

The evidence which has been given before this Tribunal proves that

Germany had the design carefully thought out, to crush the U.S.S.R. as a

political and military power, so that Germany might expand to the east

according to her own desire. In _Mein Kampf_, Hitler had written: “If

new territory were to be acquired in Europe, it must have been mainly at

Russia’s cost, and once again the new German Empire should have set out

on its march along the same road as was formerly trodden by the Teutonic

Knights, this time to acquire soil for the German plough by means of the

German sword and thus provide the Nation with its daily bread.” But

there was a more immediate purpose, and in one of the memoranda of the

OKW, that immediate purpose was stated to be to feed the German Armies

from Soviet territory in the third year of the war, even if “as a result

many millions of people will be starved to death if we take out of the

country the things necessary for us.”

The final aims of the attack on the Soviet Union were formulated at a

conference with Hitler on 16 July 1941, in which the Defendants Göring,

Keitel, Rosenberg, and Bormann participated:

“There can be no talk of the creation of a military power west

of the Urals, even if we should have to fight 100 years to

achieve this . . . . All the Baltic regions must become part of

the Reich. The Crimea and adjoining regions (north of the

Crimea) must likewise be incorporated into the Reich. The region

of the Volga as well as the Baku district must likewise be

incorporated into the Reich. The Finns want Eastern Karelia.

However, in view of the large deposits of nickel, the Kola

peninsula must be ceded to Germany.”

It was contended for the defendants that the attack upon the U.S.S.R.

was justified because the Soviet Union was contemplating an attack upon

Germany, and making preparations to that end. It is impossible to

believe that this view was ever honestly entertained.

The plans for the economic exploitation of the U.S.S.R., for the removal

of masses of the population, for the murder of Commissars and political

leaders, were all part of the carefully prepared scheme launched on 22

June without warning of any kind, and without the shadow of legal

excuse. It was plain aggression.

_War against the United States_

Four days after the attack launched by the Japanese on the United States

fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Germany declared war on the

United States.

The Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, had been signed

on 27 September 1940, and from that date until the attack upon the

U.S.S.R. the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, with other defendants, was

endeavoring to induce Japan to attack British possessions in the Far

East. This, it was thought, would hasten England’s defeat, and keep the

United States out of the war.