SHERMAN DESTROYS THE BASE: 1864
Sherman made Atlanta his field headquarters for September and October,
changing it entirely from a Southern city to a Northern camp. The
whole population was removed, every one being given the choice of
going north or south. In his own words, Sherman "had seen Memphis,
Vicksburg, Natchez, and New Orleans, all captured from the enemy,
and each at once garrisoned by a full division, if not more; so
that success was actually crippling our armies in the field by
detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostile population."
In reporting to Washington he said: "If the people raise a howl
against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war,
and not popularity seeking. If they want peace, they and their
relatives must stop the war." He also excluded the swarms of
demoralizing camp-followers that had clogged him elsewhere. One
licensed sutler was allowed for each of his three armies, and no
more. Atlanta thus became a perfect Union stronghold fixed in the
flank of the South.
The balance of losses in action, from May to September, was heavily
against the South: nearly nine to four. The actual numbers did
not greatly differ: thirty-two thousand Federals to thirty-five
thousand Confederates. (And in killed and wounded the Federals
lost many more than the Confederates. It was the thirteen thousand
captured Confederates that redressed the balance.) But, since Sherman
had twice as many in his total as the Confederates had in theirs, the
odds in relative loss were nine to four in his favor. The balance
of loss from disease was also heavily against the Confederates,
who as usual suffered from dearth of medical stores. The losses in
present and prospective food supplies were even more in Sherman's
favor; for his devastations had begun. Yet Jefferson Davis was
bound that Hood should "fight"; and Hood was nothing loth.
Davis went about denouncing Johnston for his magnificent Fabian
defense; and added insult to injury by coupling the name of this
very able soldier and quite incorruptible man with that of Joseph
E. Brown, Governor of Georgia, who, though a violent Secessionist,
opposed all proper unification of effort, and exempted eight thousand
State employees from conscription as civilian "indispensables."
Then, when Sherman approached, Brown ran away with all the food
and furniture he could stuff into his own special train; though
he left behind him all arms, ammunition, and other warlike stores,
besides the confidential documents belonging to the State.
Brown had also weakened Hood's army by withdrawing the State troops
to gather in the harvest and store it where Sherman afterwards used
what he wanted and destroyed the rest. Yet Hood kept operating
in Sherman's rear, admirably seconded by Forrest's and Wheeler's
raiding cavalry. Late in October Forrest performed the remarkable
feat of taking a flotilla with cavalry. He suddenly swooped down on
the Tennessee near Johnsonville and took the gunboat _Undine_ with
a couple of transports. Hood had meanwhile been busy on Sherman's
line of communications, hoping at least to immobilize him round
Atlanta, and at best to bring him back from Georgia for a Federal
defeat in Tennessee.
[Illustration: _GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN_
Photograph by Brady. In the collection of L. C. Handy, Washington]
On the fifth of October the last action near Atlanta was fought thirty
miles northwest, when Hood made a desperate attempt on Allatoona with
a greatly superior force. Twelve miles off, on Kenesaw Mountain,
Sherman could see the smoke and hear the sounds of battle through the
clear, still, autumn air. But as his signalers could get no answer
from the fort he began to fear that Allatoona was already lost, when
the signal officer's quick eye caught the faintest flutter at one of
the fort windows. Presently the letters, C--R--S--E--H--E--R, were
made out; which meant that General John M. Corse, one of the best
volunteers produced by the war, was holding out. He had hurried
over from Rome, on a call from Allatoona, and was withstanding more
than four thousand men with less than two thousand. All morning long
the Confederates persisted in their attacks, while Sherman's relief
column was hurrying over from Kenesaw. Early in the afternoon the
fire slackened and ceased before this column arrived. But Sherman's
renewed fears were soon allayed. For Corse, after losing more than
a third of his men, had repulsed the enemy alone, inflicting on
them an even greater loss in proportion to their double strength.
Corse was still full of fight, reporting back to Kenesaw that though
"short a cheek bone and an ear" he was "able to whip all hell yet."
Sherman thanked the brave defenders in his general orders of the
seventh for "the handsome defense made at Allatoona" and pointed
the moral that "garrisons must hold their posts to the last minute,
sure that the time gained is valuable and necessary to their comrades
at the front."
The situation at the beginning of November was most peculiar. With
the whole Gulf coast blockaded and the three great ports in Union
hands, with the Mississippi a Union stream from source to sea,
and with Sherman firmly set in the northwest flank of Georgia,
Hood made the last grand sortie from the beleaguered South. It was
a desperate adventure to go north against the Federal troops in
Tennessee, with Kentucky and the line of the Ohio as his ultimate
objective, when Lincoln had been returned to power, when Grant
was surely wearing down Lee in Virginia, and when Sherman's
preponderance of force was not only assured in Georgia but in Tennessee
as well. Moreover, Thomas, the "Rock of Chickamauga," had been sent
back to counter Hood from Grant's and Sherman's old headquarters
at Nashville on the Cumberland. And Thomas was soon to have the
usual double numbers; for all the Western depots sent him their
trained recruits, till, by the end of November, his total was over
seventy thousand. Hood's forty thousand could not be increased or
even stopped from dwindling. Yet he pushed on, with the consent
of Beauregard, who now held the general command of all the troops
opposed to Sherman.
The next moves were even more peculiar than the first. For while
Hood hoped to close the breach in Georgia by drawing Sherman back,
and Sherman expected that when he went on to widen the breach he
would draw Hood back, what really happened was that each advanced
on his own new line in opposite directions, Hood north through
Tennessee, Sherman southeast through Georgia. So firm was the grip
of the Union on all the navigable waters that Hood could only cross
the Tennessee somewhere along the shoals. He chose a place near
Florence, Alabama, got safely over and encamped. There, for the
moment, we shall leave him and follow Sherman to the sea.
The region of the Gulf and lower Mississippi being now under the
assured predominance of Union forces, Grant, with equal wisdom
and decision, entirely approved of Sherman's plan to cut loose
from his western base, make a devastating march through the heart
of fertile Georgia, and join the eastern forces of the North at
Savannah, where Fort Pulaski was in Union hands and the Union navy
was, as usual, overwhelmingly strong.
Sherman's March to the Sea at once acquired a popular renown which
it has never lost. This, however, was chiefly because it happened
to catch the public eye while nothing else was on the stage. For
its many admirable features were those about which most people
know little and care less: well-combined grand strategy, perfection
in headquarter orders and the incidental staff work, excellent
march discipline, wonderful coördination between the different
arms of the Service and with all auxiliary branches--especially
the commissariat and transport, and, to clinch everything, a
thoroughness of execution which distinguished each unit concerned.
As a feat of arms this famous march is hardly worth mentioning.
There were no battles and no such masterly maneuvers as those of
the much harder march to Atlanta. Nor was the operational problem
to be mentioned in the same breath with that of the subsequent march
through the Carolinas. Sherman himself says: "Were I to express
my measure of the relative importance of the march to the sea, and
of that from Savannah northward, I would place the former at one,
and the latter at ten--or the maximum."
The Government was very doubtful and counseled reconsideration.
But Grant and Sherman, knowing the factors so very much better,
were sure the problem could easily be solved. Sherman left Atlanta
on the fifteenth of November and laid siege to Savannah on the tenth
of December. He utterly destroyed the military value of Atlanta and
everything else on the way that could be used by the armies in the
field. Of course, to do this he had to reduce civilian supplies to
the point at which no surplus remained for transport to the front;
and civilians naturally suffered. But his object was to destroy the
Georgian base of supplies without inflicting more than incidental
hardship on civilians. And this object he attained. He cut a swath
of devastation sixty miles wide all the way to Savannah. Every
rail was rooted up, made red-hot, and twisted into scrap. Every
road and bridge was destroyed. Every kind of surplus supplies an
army could possibly need was burnt or consumed. Civilians were
left with enough to keep body and soul together, but nothing to
send away, even if the means of transportation had been left.
Sherman's sixty thousand men were all as fit as his own tall sinewy
form, which was the very embodiment of expert energy. Every weakling
had been left behind. Consequently the whole veteran force simply
romped through this Georgian raid. The main body mostly followed the
rails, which gangs of soldiers would pile on bonfires of sleepers.
The mounted men swept up everything about the flanks. But nothing
escaped the "bummers," who foraged for their units every day, starting
out empty-handed on foot and returning heavily laden on horses or
mules or in some kind of vehicle. If Atlanta had been a volcano
in eruption, and the molten lava had flowed to Savannah in a stream
sixty miles wide and five times as long, the destruction could
hardly have been worse, except, of course, that civilians were
left enough to keep them alive, and that, with a few inevitable
exceptions, they were not ill treated.
The fighting hardly disturbed the daily routine. Sherman was never
in danger; though wiseacre Washington, supposing that he ought to
be, used to pester Lincoln, who always replied: "Grant says the
men are safe with Sherman, and that if they can't get out where
they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at."
This seemed to allay anxiety; though the truth was that Sherman's
real safety lay in going ahead to the Union sea, not in retracing
his steps over the devastated line of his advance.
On approaching Savannah a mounted officer was blown up by a land
torpedo, his horse killed, and himself badly lacerated. Sherman
at once sent his prisoners ahead to dig up the other torpedoes
or get blown up by those they failed to find. No more explosions
took place. Savannah itself was strongly entrenched and further
defended by Fort McAllister. Against this fort Sherman detached
his own old Shiloh division of the Fifteenth Corps, now under the
very capable command of General William B. Hazen. As the day wore
on Sherman became very impatient, watching for Hazen's attack, when
a black object went gliding up the Ogeechee River toward the fort.
Presently a man-of-war appeared flying the Stars and Stripes and
signaling, _Who are you?_ On getting the answer, _General Sherman_,
she asked, _Is Fort McAllister taken?_ and immediately received the
cheering assurance, _No; but it will be in a minute._ Then, just
as the signal flags ceased waving, Hazen's straight blue lines
broke cover, advanced, charged through the hail of shot, shell,
and rifle bullets, rushed the defenses, and stood triumphant on
the top.
Before midnight Sherman was writing his dispatches on board the
U.S.S. _Dandelion_ and examining those received from Grant. He
learned now, from Grant's of the third (ten days before), that
Thomas was facing Hood round Nashville and that the Government,
and even Grant, were getting very impatient with Thomas for not
striking hard and at once. A week later the Confederate general,
Hardee, managed to evacuate Savannah before his one remaining line
of retreat had been cut off. He was a thorough soldier. But men
and means and time were lacking; and the civil population hoped
to save all that was not considered warlike stores. Thus immense
supplies fell into Sherman's hands. Savannah was of course placed
under martial law. But as the wax was now nearing its inevitable
end, and the citizens were thoroughly "subjugated," those who wished
to remain were allowed to do so. Only two hundred left, going to
Charleston under a flag of truce.
[Illustration: CIVIL WAR CAMPAIGNS OF 1864]
The following official announcement reached Lincoln on Christmas
Eve.
Savannah, Georgia, December 22, 1864.
TO HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT LINCOLN,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
I beg to present you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah,
with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and
plenty of ammunition,
also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton.
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
In the meantime Hood's desperate sortie had struck north as far
as Franklin, Tennessee. Here, on the last of November, General
John Schofield, commanding the advanced part of Thomas's army,
gallantly withstood a furious attack. On this the closing day of
a lingering Indian summer the massed Confederates charged with
the piercing rebel yell, and charged again; re-formed under cover
of the dense pall of stationary smoke; and returned to the charge
again and again. Many a leader met his death right against the
very breastworks. Another would instantly spring forward, only
to fall in his turn. Thirteen times the gaunt gray lines rushed
madly through the battle smoke and lost their front ranks against
the withering fire before the autumn night closed in. Schofield then
fell back on Brentwood, halfway on the twenty miles to Nashville.
He had lost over two thousand men. But Hood had lost three times
as many; and Hood's were irreplaceable except by a very few local
recruits.
Hood now concentrated every available man for his final attack on
Thomas, who had odds of twenty thousand in his favor. Hood marched
his thirty-five thousand up to Nashville, where he actually invested
the fifty-five thousand Federals. By this time even Grant was so
annoyed at what seemed to him unreasoning delay that he sent Logan
to take command at once and "fight." But on the fifteenth of December
Thomas came out of his works and fought Hood with determined skill
all day. Having gained a decisive advantage already he pressed it
home to the very utmost on the morrow, breaking through Hood's
shaken lines, enveloping whole units with converging fire, and
taking prisoners in mass. After a last wild effort Hood's beaten
army fled, having lost fifteen thousand men, five times as much
as Thomas.
The battle of Nashville came nearer than any other to being a really
annihilating victory. Out of the forty thousand men Hood had at
first in Tennessee not half escaped; and of the remainder not nearly
half were ever seen in arms again. As an organized force his army
simply disappeared. The few thousands saved from the wreckage of
the storm found their painful way east to join all that was left
for the last stand against the overwhelming forces of the North.