GRANT WINS THE RIVER WAR: 1863
We have seen already how the River War of '62 ended in a double
failure of the Federal advance on Vicksburg: how Grant and Sherman,
aided by the flanking force from Helena in Arkansas, failed to
catch Pemberton along the Tallahatchie; and then how Sherman alone,
moving down the Mississippi, was defeated by Pemberton at Chickasaw
Bayou, just outside of Vicksburg.
Leaving Memphis for good, Grant took command in the field again
on the thirtieth of January. His army was strung out along seventy
miles of the Mississippi just north of Vicksburg, so hard was it to
find enough firm ground. The first important move was made when, in
Grant's own words, "the entire Army of the Tennessee was transferred
to the neighborhood of Vicksburg and landed on the opposite or
western bank of the river at Milliken's Bend."
Grant, everywhere in touch with Admiral D. D. Porter's fleet and
plentifully supplied with water transport of all kinds, thus commanded
the peninsula or tongue of low land round which the mighty river took
its course in the form of an elongated U right opposite Vicksburg.
His farthest north base was still at Cairo; and the whole line of
the Mississippi above him was effectively held by Union forces
afloat and ashore. Four hundred miles south lay Farragut and Banks,
preparing for an attack on Port Hudson and intent on making junction
with the Union forces above.
Two bad generals stood very much in Grant's way, one on either
side of him in rank--McClernand, his own second-in-command, and
Banks, his only senior in the Mississippi area. McClernand presently
found rope enough to hang himself. Our old friend Banks, who had
not yet learnt the elements of war, though schooled by Stonewall
Jackson, never got beyond Port Hudson, and so could not spoil Grant's
command in addition to his own. Fortunately, besides Sherman and
other professional soldiers of quite exceptional ability, Grant had
three of the best generals who ever came from civil life: Logan,
Blair, and Crocker. Logan shed all the vices, while keeping all
the virtues, of the lawyer when he took up arms. Blair knew how
to be one man as an ambitious politician and another as a general
in the field. Crocker was in consumption, but determined to die in
his boots and do his military best for the Union service first.
The personnel of the army was mostly excellent all through. The
men were both hardy and handy as a rule, being to a large extent
farmers, teamsters, railroad and steamboat men, well fitted to meet
the emergencies of the severe and intricate Vicksburg campaign.
Throughout this campaign the army and navy of the Union worked
together as a single amphibious force. Grant's own words are no
mere compliment, but the sober statement of a fact. "The navy, under
Porter, was all it could be during the entire campaign. Without
its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made
with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been made
at all, in the way it was, with any number of men, without such
assistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms
of the Service. There never was a request made, that I am aware
of, either of the Flag-Officer or any of his subordinates, that
was not promptly complied with." And what is true of Porter is at
least as true of Farragut, who was the greater man and the senior
of every one afloat.
Grant could take Vicksburg only by reaching good ground, and the
only good ground was below and in rear of the fortress. There was no
foothold for his army on the east bank of the Mississippi anywhere
between Memphis and Vicksburg. This meant that he must either start
afresh from Memphis and try again to push overland by rail or cross
the swampy peninsula in front of him and circle round his enemy. A
retirement on Memphis, no matter how wise, would look like another
great Union defeat and consequently lower a public morale which,
depressed enough by Fredericksburg, was being kept down by the
constant naval reverses that opened '63. Circling the front was
therefore very much to be preferred from the political point of view.
On the other hand, it was beset by many alarming difficulties; for it
meant starting from the flooded Mississippi and working through the
waterlogged lowlands, across the peninsula, till a foothold could be
seized on the eastern bank below Vicksburg. Moreover, this circling
attack, though feasible, might depress the morale of the troops by
the way. Burnside's disastrous "Mud March" through the January
sloughs of Virginia, made in the vain hope of outflanking Lee, had
lowered the morale of the army almost as much as Fredericksburg
itself had lowered the morale of the people.
Through the depth of winter the army toiled "in ineffectual efforts,"
says Grant, "to reach high land above Vicksburg from which we could
operate against that stronghold, and in making artificial waterways
through which a fleet might pass, avoiding the batteries to the
south of the town, in case the other efforts should fail." A wetter
winter had never been known. The whole complicated network of bends
and bayous, of creeks, streams, runs, and tributary rivers, was
overflowing the few slimy trails through the spongy forest and
threatening the neglected levees which still held back the encroaching
waters. There was nothing to do, however, but to keep the men busy
and the enemy confused by trying first one line and then another
for two weary months. By April, writes Grant, "the waters of the
Mississippi having receded sufficiently to make it possible to
march an army across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, I determined
to adopt this course, and moved my advance to a point below the
town."
Meanwhile, far below, Farragut and Banks were at work round Port
Hudson: Farragut to good effect; Banks as usual. On the fourteenth
of March Farragut started up the river with seven men-of-war and
wanted the troops to make a demonstration against Port Hudson from
the rear while the fleet worked its way past the front. But, just
as Farragut was weighing anchor, Banks, who had had ample time
for preparation, sent word to say he was still five miles from
Port Hudson. "He'd as well be at New Orleans," muttered Farragut,
"for all the good he's doing us."
Six of the vessels were lashed together in pairs, the heavier ones
next the enemy, the lighter ones secured well aft so as to mask the
fewest guns. This arrangement also gave each pair the advantage
of having twin screws. Farragut's flagship, the _Hartford_, leading
the line-ahead, suffered least from the dense smoke on that damp,
calm, moonless night. But the others were soon groping blindly up
the tortuous channel. The _Hartford_ herself took the ground for
a critical moment. But, with her own screw going ahead and that
of the _Albatross_ going astern, she drew clear and won through.
Not so, however, the other five ships. Only the _Hartford_ and
_Albatross_ reached the Red River. Yet even this was of great
importance, as it completely cut off Port Hudson from all chance of
relief. Farragut went on up the Mississippi to see Grant, destroying
all riverside stores on the way. Grant was delighted, and, in the
absence of Porter, who was up the Yazoo, sent Farragut an Ellet
ram and some sorely needed coal.
Grant's seventh (and first successful) effort to get a foothold (from
which to carry out one of the boldest and most brilliant operations
recorded in the history of war) began with a naval operation on the
sixteenth of April, when Porter ran past the Vicksburg batteries
by night. Though Porter had the four-knot current in his favor he
needed all his skill and moral courage to take a regular flotilla
round the elongated U made by the Mississippi at Vicksburg, with
such a bend as to keep vessels under more or less distant fire
for five miles, and under much closer fire for nearly nine. At
the bend the vessels could be caught end-on. For nearly five miles
after that they were subject to a plunging fire. Porter led the
way on board the flagship _Benton_. He had seven ironclads, of
which three were larger vessels and four were gunboats built by
Eads, a naval constructor with orignal ideas and great executive
ability. One ram and three transports followed. Coal barges were
lashed alongside or taken in tow. Some of these were lost and one
transport was sunk. But the rest got through, though not unscathed.
It seemed like a miracle to the tense spectators that any flotilla
should survive this dash down a river of death flowing through a
furnace. But the ironclads, magnificently handled, stood up to
their work unflinchingly, fired back with regulated vigor, and
took their terrific pounding without one vital wound.
Porter presently relieved Farragut, who went back to New Orleans.
From this time, till after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson,
Porter commanded three flotillas, each with a base of its own:
first, a flotilla remaining north of Vicksburg for work on the
Yazoo; secondly, the main body between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf;
thirdly, the Red River flotilla. This combined naval force commanded
all lines of communication north, south, and west of Vicksburg,
thus enabling Grant to concentrate entirely against the eastern
side.
On the thirtieth of April Grant landed with twenty thousand men at
Bruinsburg, on the east side of the Mississippi, about sixty miles
below Vicksburg. A week later Sherman reinforced him to thirty-three
thousand. Before the fall of Vicksburg his total strength reached
seventy-five thousand. The Confederate total also fluctuated; but
not so much. There were about sixty thousand Confederates in the
whole strategic area between Vicksburg and Jackson (fifty miles
east) when Grant made his first daring move, and about the same when
Vicksburg surrendered. The scene of action was almost triangular;
for it lay between the three lines joining Jackson, Haynes's Bluff,
Rodney, and Jackson again. The respective lengths of these straight
lines are forty, fifty, and seventy miles. But roundabout ways
by land and water multiplied these distances, and much fighting
and many obstacles vastly increased Grant's difficulties.
An army, however, that had managed to reach Bruinsburg from the
north and west was assuredly fit for more hard work of any kind;
while a commander who had left a safe base above Vicksburg and
landed below, to live on (as well as in) an enemy country till
victory should give him a new land line to the north, must, in
view of the resultant triumph, be counted among the master-minds
of war. Grant's marvelous skill in massing, dividing, forwarding,
and concentrating his forces over a hundred miles of intricate
passages between Milliken's Bend and Bruinsburg was only excelled
by his consummate genius in carrying out this daring operation,
forcing his way through his enemies, into full possession of interior
lines, between their great garrison of Vicksburg and their field
army from Jackson. He had to create two fronts in spite of his
doubled enemy and live on that enemy's country without any land
base of his own.
Grant knew the country was quite able to support his army if he
could only control enough of it. Bread, beef, and mutton would be
almost unobtainable. But chickens, turkeys, and ducks were abundant,
while hard-tack would do instead of bread. Bird-and-biscuit of course
became unpopular; and after weeks of it Grant was not surprised
to hear a soldier mutter "hard-tack" loudly enough for others to
take up the cry. By this time, however, he luckily knew that the
bread ration was about to be resumed; and when he told the men
they cheered as only men on service can--men to whom battles are
rare events but rations the very stuff of daily existence. Coffee,
bacon, beef, and mutton came next in popular favor when full rations
were renewed. So when the Northern land line was reopened towards
the end of the siege, and friends came into camp with presents
from home, they found, to their amazement, that even the tenderest
spring chicken was loathsome to their boys in blue.
Grant set to work immediately on landing. His first objective was
Grand Gulf, which he wanted as a field base for further advance.
But in order to get it he had to drive away the enemy from Port
Gibson, which was by no means easy, even with superior numbers,
because the whole country thereabouts was so densely wooded and
so intricately watered that concerted movements could only be made
along the few and conspicuous roads. On the first of May, however,
the Confederates were driven off before their reinforcements could
arrive. McClernand bungled brigades and divisions out of mutual
support. But Grant personally put things right again.
By the third of May the bridge burnt by the enemy had been repaired
and Grant's men were crossing to press them back on Vicksburg, so
as to clear Grand Gulf. Grant's supply train (raised by impressing
every horse, mule, ox, and wheeled thing in the neighborhood) looked
more like comic opera than war. Fine private carriages, piled high
with ammunition, and sometimes drawn by mules with straw collars
and rope lines, went side by side with the longest plantation wagons
drawn by many oxen, or with a two-wheeled cart drawn by a thoroughbred
horse.
Before any more actions could be fought news came through that
the Federals in Virginia had been terribly beaten by Lee, who was
now expected to invade the North. The South was triumphant; so
much so, indeed, that its Government thought the war itself had
now been won. But Lincoln, Grant, and Lee knew better.
Swiftly, silently, and with a sure strategic touch, Grant marched
northeast on Jackson, to make his rear secure before he turned on
Vicksburg. On the twelfth he won at Raymond and on the fourteenth
at Jackson itself. Here he turned back west again. On the sixteenth
he won the stubborn fight of Champion's Hill, on the seventeenth
he won again at Big Black River, and on the eighteenth he appeared
before the lines of Vicksburg. With the prestige of five victories
in twenty days, and with the momentum acquired in the process, he
then tried to carry the lines by assault on the spot. But the attack
of the nineteenth failed, as did its renewal on the twenty-second.
Next day both sides settled down to a six weeks' siege.
The failure of the two assaults was recognized by friend and foe
as being a mere check; and Grant's men all believed they had now
found the looked-for leader. So they had. Like Lee and Stonewall
Jackson in Virginia, Grant, with as yet inferior numbers (but with
the immense advantage of sea-power), had seized, held, and acted
on interior lines so ably that his forty-three thousand men had
out-maneuvered and out-fought the sixty thousand of the enemy,
beating them in detail on ground of their own besides inflicting a
threefold loss. Grant lost little over four thousand. The Confederates
lost nearly twelve thousand, half of whom were captured.
The only real trouble, besides the failure to carry the lines by
assault, was with the two bad generals, McClernand and Banks. McClernand
had promulgated an order praising his own corps to the skies and
conveying the idea that he and it had won the battles. Moreover,
he hinted that he had succeeded in the assault while the others had
failed. This was especially offensive because Grant, at McClernand's
urgent request, had sent reinforcements from other corps to confirm a
success that he found nonexistent on the spot, except in McClernand's
own words. To crown this, McClernand had sent his official order,
with all its misleading statements, to be published in the Northern
press; and the whole army was now supplied with the papers containing
it. So gross a breach of discipline could not go unpunished; and
McClernand was sent back to Springfield in disgrace.
Banks, unfortunately, was senior to Grant and of course independent
of Farragut; so he could safely vex them both--Grant, by spoiling
the plan of concerting the attacks on Port Hudson and Vicksburg in
May; Farragut, by continual failure in coöperation and by leaving
big guns exposed to capture on the west bank. But things turned out
well, after all. The guns were saved by the naval vessels that beat
off a Confederate attack on Donaldsonville; and Grant's army was saved
from coming under Banks's command by Banks's own egregious failure
in coöperation. This failure thus became a blessing in disguise: a
disguise too good for Halleck, whose reprimand from Washington
on the twenty-third of May shows what dangers lurked beneath the
might-have-been. "The Government is exceedingly disappointed that
you and General Grant are not acting in conjunction. It thought to
secure that object by authorizing you to assume the entire command
as soon as you and General Grant could unite."
In the end the Confederates suffered much more than the Federals
from civilian interference; for the orders of their Government
came through in time to confuse a situation that was already bad
and growing worse. Between Porter afloat and Grant ashore Vicksburg
was doomed unless "Joe" Johnston came west with sufficient force
to relieve it in time. Johnston did come early enough, but not
in sufficient force; so the next best thing was to destroy all
stores, abandon Vicksburg, and save the garrison. The Government,
however, sent positive orders to hold Vicksburg to the very last
gasp. Johnston had meanwhile sent Pemberton (the Vicksburg commander)
orders to combine with him in free maneuvering for an attack in
the field. But Pemberton's own idea was to await Grant on the Big
Black River, where, with Johnston's help, he thought he could beat
him. Then followed hesitation, a futile attempt to harmonize the
three incompatible schemes; and presently the division of the
Confederates into separated armies, driven apart by Grant, whose
own army soon dug itself in between them and quickly grew stronger
than both.
Grant's lines, facing both opponents, from Haynes's Bluff to Warrenton,
were fifteen miles long, which gave him one man per foot when his
full strength was reached Pemberton's were only seven; and his
position was strong, both towards the river, where the bluffs rose
two hundred feet, and on the landward side, where the slopes were
sharp and well fortified. Grant closed in, however, and pressed
the bombardment home. Except for six 32-pounders and a battery of
big naval guns he had nothing but field artillery. Yet the abundance
of ammunition, the closeness of the range, and the support of his
many excellent snipers, soon gave him the upper hand. Six hundred
yards was the farthest the lines were apart. In some places they
nearly touched.
All ranks worked hard, especially at engineering, in which there
was such a dearth of officers that Grant ordered every West Pointer
to do his turn with the sappers and miners as well as his other
duty. This brought forth a respectful protest from the enormously
fat Chief Commissary, who said he could only be used as a sap-roller
(the big roller sappers shove protectingly before them when snipers
get their range). The real sap-rollers came to grief when an ingenious
Confederate stuffed port-fires with turpentined cotton and shot them
into rollers only a few yards off. But after this the Federals
kept their rollers wet; and sapped and burrowed till the big mine
was fully charged and safe from the Confederate countermine, which
had missed its mark.
While trying to blow each other up the men on both sides exchanged
amenities and chaff like the best of friends. Each side sold its
papers to the other; and the wall-paper newsprint of Vicksburg
made a good war souvenir for both. There was a steady demand for
Federal bread and Confederate tobacco. When market time was over the
Confederates would heave down hand-grenades, which agile Federals,
good at baseball, would heave uphill again before they exploded. And
woe to the man whose head appeared out of hours; for snipers were
always on the watch, especially that prince of snipers, Lieutenant H.
C. Foster, renowned as "Coonskin" from the cap he wore. A wonderful
stalker and dead shot he was a terror to exposed Confederates at
all times; but more particularly towards the end, when (their front
artillery having been silenced by Grant's guns) Coonskin built a
log tower, armored with railway iron, from which he picked off
men who were safe from ordinary fire.
On the twenty-first of June Pemberton planned an escape across the
Mississippi and built some rough boats. But Grant heard of this;
the flotilla grew more watchful still; and before any attempt at
escape could be made the great mine was fired on the twenty-fifth.
The whole top of the hill was blown off, and with it some men who
came down alive on the Federal side. Among these was an unwounded
but terrified colored man, who, on being asked how high he had
gone, said, "Dunno, Massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile." An immense
crater was formed. But there was no practicable breach; so the
assault was deferred. A second mine was exploded on the first of
July. But again there was no assault; for Grant had decided to
wait till several huge mines could be exploded simultaneously.
In the meantime an intercepted dispatch warned him that Johnston
would try to help Pemberton to cut his way out. But by the time
the second mine was exploded Pemberton was sounding his generals
about the chances of getting their own thirty thousand to join
Johnston's thirty thousand against Grant's seventy-five thousand.
The generals said No. Negotiations then began.
On the third of July Grant met Pemberton under the "Vicksburg Oak,"
which, though quite a small tree, furnished souvenir-hunters with
many cords of sacred wood in after years. Grant very wisely allowed
surrender on parole, which somewhat depleted Confederate ranks in
the future by the number of men who, returning to their homes,
afterwards refused to come back when the exchange of prisoners
would have permitted them to do so.
That was a great week of Federal victory--the week including the
third, fourth, and eighth of July. On the third Lee was defeated at
Gettysburg. On the now doubly "Glorious Fourth" Vicksburg surrendered
and the last Confederate attack was repulsed at Helena in Arkansas. On
the eighth Port Hudson surrendered. With this the whole Mississippi
fell into Federal hands for good. On the first of August Farragut
left New Orleans for New York in the battle-scarred _Hartford_
after turning over the Mississippi command to Porter's separate
care.
Meanwhile the Confederates in Tennessee, weakened by reinforcing
Johnston against Grant, had been obliged to retire on Chattanooga.
To cover this retirement and make what diversion he could, Bragg sent
John H. Morgan with twenty-five hundred cavalry to raid Kentucky,
Indiana, and Ohio. Perplexing the outnumbering Federals by his
daring, "Our Jack Morgan" crossed the Ohio at Brandenburg, rode
northeast through Indiana, wheeled south at Hamilton, Ohio, rode
through the suburbs of Cincinnati, reached Buffington Island on the
border of West Virginia, and then, hotly pursued by ever-increasing
forces, made northeast toward Pennsylvania. On the twenty-sixth of
July he surrendered near New Lisbon with less than four hundred
men left.
The Confederate main body passed the summer vainly trying to stem
the advance of the Army of the Cumberland, with which Rosecrans and
Thomas skillfully maneuvered Bragg farther and farther south till
they had forced him into and out of Chattanooga. In the meantime
Burnside's Army of the Ohio cleared eastern Tennessee and settled
down in Knoxville.
But in the middle of September Longstreet came to Bragg's rescue;
and a desperate battle was fought at Chickamauga on the nineteenth
and twentieth. The Confederates had seventy thousand men against
fifty-six thousand Federals: odds of five to four. They were determined
to win at any price; and it cost them eighteen thousand men, killed,
wounded, and missing; which was two thousand more than the Federals
lost. But they felt it was now or never as they turned to bay with,
for once, superior numbers. As usual, too, they coveted Federal
supplies. "Come on, boys, and charge!" yelled an encouraging sergeant,
"they have cheese in their haversacks!" Yet the pride of the soldier
stood higher than hunger. General D. H. Hill stooped to cheer a
very badly wounded man. "What's your regiment?" asked Hill. "Fifth
Confederate, New Orleans, and a damned good regiment it is," came
the ready answer.
Rosecrans, like many another man who succeeds halfway up, failed
at the top. He ordered an immediate general retreat which would
have changed the hard-won Confederate victory into a Federal rout.
But Thomas, with admirable judgment and iron nerve, stood fast
till he had shielded all the others clear. From this time on both
armies knew him as the "Rock of Chickamauga."
The unexpected defeat of Chickamauga roused Washington to immediate,
and this time most sensible, action. Grant was given supreme command
over the whole strategic area. Thomas superseded Rosecrans. Sherman
came down with the Army of the Tennessee. And Hooker railed through
from Virginia with two good veteran corps. Meanwhile the Richmond
Government was more foolish than the Washington was wise; for it let
Davis mismanage the strategy without any reference to Lee. Bragg also
made a capital mistake by sending Longstreet off to Knoxville with
more than a third of his command just before Grant's final advance.
The result was that Bragg found himself with only thirty thousand men
at Chattanooga when Grant closed in with sixty thousand, and that
Longstreet was useless at Knoxville, which was entirely dependent
on Chattanooga. Whoever won decisively at Chattanooga could have
Knoxville too. Davis, as the highest authority, and Bragg, as the
most responsible subordinate, ensured their own defeat.
Chattanooga was the key to the whole strategic area of the upper
Tennessee; for it was the best road, rail, and river junction between
the lower Mississippi and the Atlantic ports of the South. It had
been held for some time by a Federal garrison which had made it
fairly strong. But toward the end of October it was short of supplies;
and Hooker had to fight Longstreet at Wauhatchie in the Lookout
Valley before it could be revictualed. When Hooker, Thomas, and
Sherman were there together under Grant in November it was of course
perfectly safe; and the problem changed from defense to attack. The
question was how to drive Bragg from his commanding positions on
Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain. The woods and hills offered
concealment to the attack in some places. But Lookout Mountain
was a splendid observation post, twenty-two hundred feet high and
crested with columns of rock. The Ridge was three miles east, the
Mountain three miles south, of Cameron Hill, which stood just west
of Chattanooga, commanding the bridge of boats that crossed the
Tennessee.
The battle, fought with great determination on both sides, lasted
three days--the twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth of
November. Sherman made the flank attack on Missionary Ridge from the
north and Thomas the frontal attack from the west. Hooker attacked
the western flank of Lookout Mountain.
Thomas did the first day's fighting, which was all preliminary
work, by advancing a good mile, taking the Confederate lines on the
lower slopes of the Ridge, and changing their defensive features
to face the Ridge instead of Chattanooga.
At two the next morning Giles Smith's brigade dropped down the
Tennessee in boats and surprised the extreme north pickets placed
by Bragg at the mouth of the South Chickamauga to cover the right
of the Ridge. By noon Sherman's men were over the Tennessee ready
to coöperate with Thomas. Sherman had hidden his camp among the
hills on the other side so well that his movements could not be
observed, even from the commanding height of Lookout Mountain. The
night surprise of Bragg's pickets and the drizzling rain of the
morning prevented the Confederates from hearing or seeing anything
of Sherman's attack in the early afternoon; so he found himself on
the northern flank of Missionary Ridge before Bragg's main body
knew what he was doing. When the Confederates did attack it was too
late; and the twenty-fourth ended with Sherman entrenched against
the flank on even higher ground than Thomas held against the center.
Sherman's cavalry had meanwhile moved round the flank, on the lower
level and much farther off, to cut Bragg's right rear connection
with Chickamauga Station, whence the rails ran east to Cleveland,
Knoxville, and Virginia.
Hooker's work this second day was to feel the Confederate force
on Lookout Mountain while keeping the touch with Thomas, who kept
the touch with Sherman. Mists hid his earlier maneuvers. He closed
in successfully, handled his men to admiration, and gained more
ground than either he or Grant had expected. Having succeeded so
well he changed his demonstration into a regular attack, which
became known as the "Battle above the Clouds." Step by step he
fought his way up, over breastworks and rifle pits, felled trees
and bowlders, through ravines and gullies, till the vanguard reached
the giant palisades of rock which ramparted the top. The roar of
battle was most distinctly heard four miles away, on Orchard Knob,
where Grant and Thomas were anxiously waiting. But nothing could
be seen until a sudden breeze blew the clouds aside just as the
long blue lines charged home and the broken gray retreated. Then,
from thirty thousand watching Federals, went up a cheer that even
cannon could not silence.
At midnight Grant sent a word of encouragement to Burnside at Knoxville.
He then wrote his orders for what he now hoped would be a completely
victorious attack. The twenty-fifth of November broke beautifully
clear, and the whole scene of action remained in full view all day
long. Fearful of being cut off from their main body on Missionary
Ridge the Confederates had left Lookout Mountain under cover of
the dark. But by destroying the bridges across the Chattanooga
River, which ran through the valley between the Mountain and the
Ridge, they delayed Hooker till late that afternoon, thus saving
their left from an even worse disaster than the one that overtook
their center and their right.
Sherman had desperate work against their right, as Bragg massed
every available gun and man to meet him. This massing, however,
was just what Grant wanted; for he now expected Hooker to appear
on the other flank, which Bragg would either have to give up in
despair or strengthen at the expense of the center, which Thomas
was ready to charge. But with Hooker not appearing, and Sherman
barely holding his own, Grant slipped Thomas from the leash. The
two centers then met hand to hand. But there was no withstanding
the Federal charge. Back went the Confederates, turning to bay
at their second line of defense. Here again they were overborne
by well-led superior numbers and soon put to flight. Sheridan,
of whom we shall hear again in '64, took up the pursuit. Bragg
lost all control of his men. Stores, guns, and even rifles were
abandoned. Thousands of prisoners were taken; and most of the others
were scattered in flight. The battle, the whole campaign, and even
the war in the Tennessee sector, were won.
Vicksburg meant that the trans-Mississippi South would thenceforth
wither like a severed branch. Chattanooga meant that the Union
forces had at last laid the age to the root of the tree.