FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR
The Allied navies were harrowing the submarines not only under the water
and on the surface, but from the air. In the anti-submarine campaign the
several forms of aircraft--airplane, seaplane, dirigible, and kite
balloon--developed great offensive power. Nor did the fact that our
fighters in the heavens made few direct attacks which were successful
diminish the importance of their work. The records of the British
Admiralty attribute the destruction of five submarines to the British
air service; the French Admiralty gives the American forces credit for
destroying one on the French coast. These achievements, compared with
the tremendous efforts involved in equipping air stations, may at first
look like an inconsiderable return; yet the fact remains that aircraft
were an important element in defeating the German campaign against
merchant shipping.
Like the subchaser and the submarine, the seaplane operated most
successfully in coastal waters. I have already indicated that one
advantage of the convoy system was that it forced the U-boats to seek
their victims closer to the shore. In our several forms of aircraft we
had still another method of interfering with their operation in such
quarters. In order to use these agencies effectively we constructed
aircraft stations in large numbers along the coast of France and the
British Isles, assigned a certain stretch of coastline to each one of
these stations, and kept the indicated area constantly patrolled. The
advantages which were possessed by a fleet of aircraft operating at a
considerable height above the water are at once apparent. The great
speed of seaplanes in itself transformed them into formidable foes. The
submarine on the surface could make a maximum of only 16 knots an hour,
whereas an airplane made anywhere from 60 to 100; it therefore had
little difficulty, once it had sighted the under-water boat, in catching
up with it and starting hostilities. Its great speed also made it
possible for an airplane or dirigible to patrol a much greater area of
water than a surface or a subsurface vessel. An observer located several
hundred feet in the heavens could see the submarine much more easily
than could his comrades on other craft. If the water were clear he could
at once detect it, even though it were submerged; in any event, merely
lifting a man in the air greatly extended his horizon, and made it
possible for him to pick up hostile vessels at a much greater distance.
Moreover, the airplane had that same advantage upon which I have laid
such emphasis in describing the anti-submarine powers of the submarine
itself: that is, it was almost invisible to its under-water foe. If the
U-boat were lying on the surface, a seaplane or a dirigible was readily
seen; but if it were submerged entirely, or even sailing at periscope
depth, the most conspicuous enemy in the heavens was invisible. After
our submarines and our aircraft had settled down to their business of
extermination, existence for those Germans who were operating in coastal
waters became extremely hazardous and nerve-racking; their chief anxiety
was no longer the depth bomb of a destroyer; they lived every moment in
the face of hidden terrors; they never knew when a torpedo would explode
into their vitals, or when an unseen bomb, dropped from the heavens,
would fall upon their fragile decks.
I have said that the destructive achievements of aircraft figure only
moderately in the statistics of the war; this was because the greater
part of their most valuable work was done in co-operation with war
vessels. Aircraft in the Navy performed a service not unlike that which
it performed in the Army. We are all familiar with the picture of
airplanes sailing over the field of battle, obtaining information which
was wirelessed back to their own forces, "spotting" artillery positions,
and giving ranges. The seaplanes and dirigibles of the Allied navies
performed a similar service on the ocean. To a considerable extent they
became the "eyes" of the destroyers and other surface craft, just as the
airplanes on the land became the "eyes" of the army. As part of their
equipment all the dirigibles had wireless telegraph and wireless
telephone; as soon as a submarine was "spotted," the news was
immediately flashed broadcast, and every offensive warship which was
anywhere in the neighbourhood, as well as the airplane itself, started
for the indicated scene. There are several cases in which the sinking of
submarines by destroyers was attributed to information wirelessed in
this fashion by American aircraft; and since the air service of the
British navy was many times greater than our own, there are many more
such "indirect sinkings" credited to the British effort.
The following citation, which I submitted to the Navy Department in
recommending Lieutenant John J. Schieffelin for the Distinguished
Service Medal, illustrates this co-operation between air and surface
craft:
This officer performed many hazardous reconnaissance flights, and
on July 9th, 1918, he attacked an enemy submarine with bombs and
then directed the British destroyers to the spot, which were
successful in seriously damaging the submarine. Again, on July
19th, 1918, Lieutenant Schieffelin dropped bombs on another enemy
submarine, and then signalled trawlers to the spot, which delivered
a determined attack against the submarine, which attack was
considered highly successful and the submarine seriously damaged,
if not destroyed. This officer was at all times an example of
courageous loyalty.
Besides scouting and "spotting" and bombing, the aerial hunters of the
submarine developed great value in escorting convoys. A few dirigibles,
located on the flanks of a convoy, protected them almost as effectively
as the destroyers themselves; and even a single airship not infrequently
brought a group of merchantmen and troopships safely into port.
Sometimes the airships operated in this way as auxiliaries to
destroyers, while sometimes they operated alone. In applying this
mechanism of protection to merchant convoys, we were simply adopting the
method which Great Britain had been using for three years in the narrow
passages of the English Channel. Much has been said of the skill with
which the British navy transported about 20,000,000 souls back and forth
between England and France in four years; and in this great movement
seaplanes, dirigibles, and other forms of aircraft played an important
part. In the same way this scheme of protection was found valuable with
the coastal convoys, particularly with the convoys which sailed from one
French port to another, and from British ports to places in Ireland,
Holland, or Scandinavia. I have described the dangers in which these
ships were involved owing to the fact that the groups were obliged to
break up after entering the Channel and the Irish Sea, and thus to
proceed singly to their destinations. Aircraft improved this situation
to a considerable extent, for they could often go to sea, pick up the
ships, and bring them safely home. The circumstance that our seaplanes,
perched high in the air, could see the submarine long before they had
reached torpedoing distance, and could, if necessary, signal to a
destroyer for assistance, made them exceedingly valuable for this kind
of work.
Early in 1918, at the request of the British Government, we took over a
large seaplane base which had been established by the British at
Killingholme, England, a little sea-coast town at the mouth of the
Humber River. According to the original plan we intended to co-operate
from this point with the British in a joint expedition against enemy
naval bases, employing for this purpose especially constructed towing
lighters, upon which seaplanes were to be towed by destroyers to within
a short flying distance of their objectives. Although this project was
never carried out, Killingholme, because of its geographical location,
became a very important base for seaplanes used in escorting mercantile
convoys to and from Scandinavian ports, patrolling mine-fields while on
the lookout for enemy submarines and making those all-important
reconnaissance flights over the North Sea which were intended to give
advanced warning of any activity of the German High Seas Fleet. These
flights lasted usually from six to eight hours; the record was made by
Ensigns S. C. Kennedy and C. H. Weatherhead, U.S.N., who flew for nine
hours continuously on convoy escort duty. For a routine patrol, this
compares very favourably indeed with the flight of the now famous
trans-Atlantic _NC-4_.
I can no better describe the splendid work of these enthusiastic and
courageous young Americans than by quoting a few extracts from a report
which was submitted to me by Ensign K. B. Keyes, of a reconnaissance
flight in which he took part, while attached temporarily to a British
seaplane station under post-graduate instruction. The picture given by
Ensign Keyes is typical of the flights which our boys were constantly
making:
On June 4, 1918, we received orders to carry out a reconnaissance
and hostile aircraft patrol over the North Sea and along the coast
of Holland. It was a perfect day for such work, for the visibility
was extremely good, with a light wind of fifteen knots and clouds
at the high altitude of about eight or ten thousand feet.
Our three machines from Felixstowe rose from the water at twelve
o'clock, circled into patrol formation, and proceeded north-east by
north along the coast to Yarmouth. Here we were joined by two more
planes, but not without some trouble and slight delay because of a
broken petrol pipe which was subsequently repaired in the air. We
again circled into formation, Capt. Leckie, D.S.O., of Yarmouth,
taking his position as leader of the squadron.
At one o'clock the squadron proceeded east, our machine, being in
the first division, flew at 1,500 feet and at about half a mile in
the rear of Capt. Leckie's machine, but keeping him on our
starboard quarter.
We sighted nothing at all until about half-past two, when the Haaks
Light Vessel slowly rose on the horizon, but near this mark and
considerably more to the south we discovered a large fleet of Dutch
fishing smacks. This fleet consisted of more than a hundred smacks.
Ten minutes later we sighted the Dutch coast, where we changed our
course more to the north-east. We followed the sandy beaches of the
islands of Texel and Vlieland until we came to Terschelling. In
following the coast of Vlieland we were close enough to distinguish
houses on the inside of the island and even to make out breakers
rolling up on the sandy beach.
At Terschelling we proceeded west in accordance with our orders,
but soon had to turn back because of Capt. Leckie's machine which
had fallen out of formation and come to the water. This machine
landed at three fifteen and we continued to circle around it,
finding that the trouble was with a badly broken petrol pipe, until
about fifteen minutes later, when we sighted five German planes
steering west, a direction which would soon bring them upon us.
At this time Capt. Barker had the wheel, Lt. Galvayne was seated
beside him, but if we met the opposing forces he was to kneel on
the seat with his eyes above the cowl, where he could see all the
enemy planes and direct the pilot in which direction to proceed. I
was in the front cockpit with one gun and four hundred rounds of
ammunition. In the stern cockpit the engineer and wireless ratings
were to handle three guns.
We at once took battle formation and went forward to meet the
enemy, but here we were considerably surprised to find that when we
were nearly within range they had turned and were running away from
us. At once we gave chase, but soon found that they were much too
fast for us. Our machine had broken out of the formation and, with
nose down, had crept slightly ahead of Capt. Leckie, and we being
the nearest machine to the enemy, I had the satisfaction of trying
out my gun for a number of rounds. It was quite impossible to tell
whether I had registered any hits or not.
Our purpose in chasing these planes was to keep them away from the
machine on the water which, if we had not been there, would have
been shot to pieces. Finding that it was useless to follow them, as
they could easily keep out of our range, we turned back and very
shortly we were again circling around our machine on the water.
It was not long before the enemy again came very close, so we gave
chase the second time. This time, instead of five machines as
before, there were only four, and one small scout could be seen
flying in the direction of Borkum.
It was the fourth time that we went off in pursuit of the enemy
that we suddenly discovered that a large number of hostile planes
were proceeding towards us, not in the air with the other four
planes but very close to the water. There were ten planes in this
first group, but they were joined a few minutes later by five more.
We swung into battle formation and steered for the middle of the
group. When we were nearly within range four planes on the port
side and five planes on the starboard side rose to our level of
fifteen hundred feet. Two planes passed directly beneath us firing
upward. Firing was incessant from the beginning and the air seemed
blue with tracer smoke. I gave most of my time to the four planes
on our port side, because they were exactly on the same level with
us and seemed to be within good range, that is about two hundred
yards. When we had passed each other I looked around and noticed
that Lt. Galvayne was in a stooping position, with head and one arm
on his seat, the other arm hanging down as if reaching for
something. I had seen him in this position earlier in the day so
thought nothing of it. All this I had seen in the fraction of a
second, for I had to continue firing. A few minutes later I turned
around again and found with a shock that Lt. Galvayne was in the
same position. It was then that the first inkling of the truth
dawned upon me. By bending lower I discovered that his head was
lying in a pool of blood.
From this time on I have no clear idea of just what our
manoeuvring was, but evidently we put up a running fight steering
east, then circled until suddenly I found our machine had been cut
off from the formation and we were surrounded by seven enemy
seaplanes.
This time we were steering west or more to the south-west. We
carried on a running fight for ten miles or so until we drove the
seven planes off. During the last few minutes of the fight our
engine had been popping altogether too frequently and soon the
engineer came forward to tell us that the port engine petrol pipe
had broken.
By this time I had laid out Lt. Galvayne in the wireless cockpit,
cleaned up the second pilot's seat, and taken it myself.
The engagement had lasted about half an hour, and the closest range
was one hundred yards while the average range was two hundred. The
boat with Ensign Eaton in it landed between the Islands of Texel
and Vlieland, while the other boat, which had not taken any part in
the fight, was last seen two miles off Vlieland and still taxiing
in toward the beach.
We descended to the water at five forty-five, ten miles north-west
of Vlieland. During the ten minutes we were on the water I loosened
Lt. Galvayne's clothing, made his position somewhat easier, and
felt for his heart which at that time I was quite sure was beating
feebly.
When we rose from the water and ascended to fifteen hundred feet,
we sighted two planes which later proved to be the two Yarmouth
boats. We picked them up, swung into formation, and laid our course
for Yarmouth.
At ten minutes to seven we sighted land and twenty minutes after we
were resting on the water in front of Yarmouth slipway.
We at once summoned medical aid but found that nothing could be
done. The shot had gone through his head, striking the mouth and
coming out behind his ear, tearing a gash of about two inches in
diameter.
The boat had been more or less riddled, a number of shots tearing
up the top between the front cockpit and the beginning of the cowl.
The total duration of the flight was seven hours and ten minutes.
American naval aviation had a romantic beginning; indeed, the
development of our air service from almost nothing to a force which, in
European waters, comprised 2,500 officers and 22,000 men, is one of the
great accomplishments of the war. It was very largely the outcome of
civilian enterprise and civilian public spirit. In describing our
subchasers I have already paid tribute to the splendid qualities of
reserve officers; and our indebtedness to this type of citizen was
equally great in the aviation service. I can pay no further tribute to
American youth than to say that the great aircraft force which was
ultimately assembled in Europe had its beginnings in a small group of
undergraduates at Yale University. In recommending Mr. Trubee Davison
for a Distinguished Service Medal, the commander of our aviation forces
wrote: "This officer was responsible for the organization of the first
Yale aviation unit of twenty-nine aviators who were later enrolled in
the Naval Reserve Flying Corps.... This group of aviators formed the
nucleus of the first Naval Reserve Flying Corps, and, in fact, may be
considered as the nucleus from which the United States Aviation Forces,
Foreign Service, later grew." This group of college boys acted entirely
on their own initiative. While the United States was still at peace,
encouraged only by their own parents and a few friends, they took up the
study of aviation. It was their conviction that the United States would
certainly get into the war, and they selected this branch as the one in
which they could render greatest service to their country. These young
men worked all through the summer of 1916 at Port Washington, Long
Island, learning how to fly: at this time they were an entirely
unofficial body, paying their own expenses. Ultimately the unit
comprised about twenty men; they kept constantly at work, even after
college opened in the fall of 1916, and when war broke out they were
prepared--for they had actually learned to fly. When the submarine
scares disturbed the Atlantic seaboard in the early months of the war
these Yale undergraduates were sent by the department scouting over Long
Island Sound and other places looking for the imaginary Germans. In
February, 1917, Secretary Daniels recognized their work by making
Davison a member of the Committee on Aeronautics; in March practically
every member of the unit was enrolled in the aviation service; and their
names appear among the first one hundred aviators enrolled in the
Navy--a list that ultimately included several thousand. So proficient
had these undergraduates become that they were used as a nucleus to
train our aircraft forces; they were impressed as instructors at
Buffalo, Bayshore, Hampton Roads, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Key West and Moorhead City. They began to go abroad in the
summer of 1917, and they were employed as instructors in schools in
France and England. These young men not only rendered great material
service, but they manifested an enthusiasm, an earnestness, and a
tireless vigilance which exerted a wonderful influence in strengthening
the _moral_ of the whole aviation department. "I knew that whenever we
had a member of the Yale unit," says Lieutenant-Commander Edwards, who
was aide for aviation at the London headquarters in the latter part of
the war, "everything was all right. Whenever the French and English
asked us to send a couple of our crack men to reinforce a squadron, I
would say, 'Let's get some of the Yale gang.' We never made a mistake
when we did this."
There were many men in the regular navy to whom the nation is likewise
indebted. Captain T. T. Craven served with very marked distinction as
aide for aviation on the staff of Admiral Wilson, and afterward, after
the armistice was signed, as the senior member of the Board which had
been appointed to settle all claims with the French Government.
Lieutenant (now Commander) Kenneth Whiting was another officer who
rendered great service in aviation. Commander Whiting arrived in St.
Nazaire, France, on the 5th of June, 1917, in command of the first
aeronautic detachment, which consisted of 7 officers and 122 men.
Such were the modest beginnings of American aviation in France. In a
short time Commander Whiting was assigned to the command of the large
station which was taken over at Killingholme, England, and in October,
1917, Captain Hutch I. Cone came from the United States to take charge
of the great aviation programme which had now been planned. Captain Cone
had for many years enjoyed the reputation of being one of the Navy's
most efficient administrators; while still a lieutenant-commander, he
had held for a considerable time the rank of rear-admiral, as chief of
the Bureau of Steam Engineering; and in 1917 he was commanding naval
officer of the Panama Canal, a position which required organizing
ability of the highest order. It was at my request that he was ordered
abroad to organize our European air forces. Captain Cone now came to
Paris and plunged into the work of organizing naval aviation with all
his usual vigour.
It subsequently became apparent, however, that London would be a better
place for his work than Paris, and Captain Cone therefore took up his
headquarters in Grosvenor Gardens. Under his administration naval
aviation foreign service grew to the proportions I have indicated and
included in France six seaplane stations, three dirigible stations, two
kite balloon stations, one school of aerial gunnery, one assembly and
repair base, and the United States Naval Northern Bombing Group. In the
British Isles there were established four seaplane stations and one kite
balloon station in Ireland; one seaplane station and one assembly and
repair base in England; and in Italy we occupied, at the request of the
Italian Government, two seaplane stations at Pescara and Porto Corsini
on the Adriatic. From these stations we bombed to good effect Austrian
naval bases in that area. To Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Callan,
U.S.N.R.F., is due much of the credit for the cordial relations which
existed between the Italians and ourselves, as well as for the efficient
conduct of our aviation forces in Italy under his command.
Probably the most completely equipped aviation centre which we
constructed was that at Pauillac, France, under the command of Captain
F. T. Evans, U.S.N.; here we built accommodation for 20,000 men; we had
here what would have eventually been a great airplane factory; had the
war continued six months longer, we would have been turning out planes
in this place on a scale almost large enough to supply our needs. The
far-sighted judgment and the really extraordinary professional ability
of civil engineers D. G. Copeland and A. W. K. Billings made such work
possible, but only, I might add, with the hearty co-operation of
Lieutenant-Commander Benjamin Briscoe and his small band of loyal and
devoted co-workers. Another great adventure was the establishment of our
Northern Bombing Group, under the command of Captain David C. Hanrahan,
U.S.N.; here we had 112 planes, 305 officers, and more than 2,000
enlisted personnel, who devoted all of their attention to bombing German
submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. This enterprise was a joint one
with the marines under the command of Major A. A. Cunningham, an
experienced pilot and an able administrator, who performed all of his
various duties not only to my entire satisfaction but in a manner which
reflected the greatest credit to himself as well as to the Marine Corps
of which he was a worthy representative. Due to the fact that the
rapidity of our construction work had exceeded that with which airplanes
were being built at home, we entered into an agreement with the Italian
Government whereby we obtained a number of Caproni planes in exchange
for raw materials. Several of these large bombing airplanes were
successfully flown over the Alps to the fields of Flanders, under the
direction of Lieutenant-Commander E. O. MacDonnell, who deserves the
greatest credit for the energetic and resourceful manner in which he
executed this difficult task.
In September, 1918, Captain Cone's duties took him to Ireland; the ship
on which he sailed, the _Leinster_, was torpedoed in the Irish Sea;
Captain Cone was picked up unconscious in the water, and, when taken to
the hospital, it was discovered that both his legs were broken. It was
therefore necessary to appoint another officer in his stead, and I
selected Lieutenant W. A. Edwards, who had served with credit on the
destroyer _Cushing_, and who, for some time, had been second in command
to Captain Cone in the aviation section. It was almost unprecedented to
put at the head of such an important branch a young lieutenant who had
only been out of the naval academy for a few years; ordinarily the
duties would have required a man of Admiral's rank. Lieutenant Edwards,
however, was not only extremely capable, but he had the gift of getting
along splendidly with our Allies, particularly the British, with whom
our intercourse was necessarily extensive, and with whom he was very
popular. He remained in charge of the department for the rest of the
war, winning golden opinions from his superiors and his subordinates,
and the Distinguished Service Order from King George.
The armistice was signed before our aviation work had got completely
into running order. Yet its accomplishments were highly creditable; and
had the war lasted a little longer they would have reached great
proportions. Of the thirty-nine direct attacks made on submarines, ten
were, in varying degrees, "successful." Perhaps the most amazing hit
made by any seaplane in the war was that scored by Ensign Paul F. Ives;
he dropped a bomb upon a submarine, striking it directly on its deck;
the result was partly tragical, partly ludicrous, for the bomb proved to
be a "dud" and did not explode! In commenting upon this and another
creditable attack, the British Admiralty wrote as follows:
I beg to enclose for your information reports of attacks made on
two enemy submarines on the 25th March by Pilot Ensign J. F.
McNamara, U.S.N., and Pilot Ensign P. F. Ives, U.S.N.
The Admiralty are of opinion that the submarine attacked by Pilot
Ensign McNamara was damaged and that the attack of Pilot Ensign
Ives might also have been successful had not his bombs failed to
explode, which was due to no fault of his own.
I should add that Wing Commander, Portsmouth Group has expressed
his appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the United
States Pilots.
At the cessation of hostilities we had a total of more than 500 planes
of various descriptions actually in commission, a large number of which
were in actual operation over the North Sea, the Irish Sea, the Bay of
Biscay, and the Adriatic; our bombing planes were making frequent
flights over enemy submarine bases, and 2,500 officers and 22,000
enlisted men were making raids, doing patrols, bombing submarines,
bombing enemy bases, taking photographs, making reconnaissance over
enemy waters, and engaging enemy aircraft. There can be no doubt but
that this great force was a factor in persuading the enemy to
acknowledge defeat when he did. A few simple comparisons will
illustrate the gigantic task which confronted us and the difficulties
which were successfully overcome in the establishment of our naval
aviation force on foreign service. If all the buildings constructed and
used for barracks for officers and men were joined end to end, they
would stretch for a distance of twelve miles. The total cubic contents
of all structures erected and used could be represented by a box 245 ft.
wide, 300 ft. long, and 1,500 ft. high. In such a box more than ten
Woolworth buildings could be easily placed. Twenty-nine telephone
exchanges were installed, and in addition connections were made to
existing long-distance lines in England and France, and approximately
800 miles of long-distance lines were constructed in Ireland, so that
every station could be communicated with from London headquarters. The
lumber used for construction work would provide a board-walk one foot
wide, extending from New York City to the Isle of Malta--a distance of
more than 4,000 miles.
When we consider the fact that during the war naval aviation abroad grew
in personnel to be more than one-half the size of the entire pre-war
American navy, it is not at all astonishing that all of those regular
officers who had been trained in this service were employed almost
exclusively in an administrative capacity, which naturally excluded them
from taking part in the more exciting work of bombing submarines and
fighting aircraft. To their credit be it said that they chafed
considerably under this enforced restraint, but they were so few in
number that we had to employ them not in command of seaplanes, but of
air stations where they rendered the most valuable service.
For the reserves I entertain the very highest regard and even personal
affection. Collectively they were magnificent and they reflected the
greatest credit upon the country they served so gallantly and with such
brilliant success. I know of no finer individual exploit in the war than
that of Ensign C. H. Hammon who, while attached to our Air Station at
Porto Corsini, took part in a bombing raid on Pola, in which he engaged
two enemy airplanes and as a result had his plane hit in several places.
During this engagement a colleague, Ensign G. H. Ludlow, was shot down.
Ensign Hammon went to his rescue, landed his boat on the water just
outside of Pola harbour, picked up the stricken aviator, and flew back
to Porto Corsini, a distance of seventy-five miles. A heavy sea made it
highly probable that his frail boat, already damaged by his combat with
the enemy, would collapse and that he would be drowned or captured and
made a prisoner of war. For this act of courageous devotion to duty I
recommended Ensign Hammon for the Congressional Medal of Honour.
The mention of this officer calls to my mind the exploits of
Lieutenant-Commander A. L. Gates, who was the second of only three
officers attached to the Naval Forces in Europe whom I recommended for
the Congressional Medal of Honour. The citation in the case of Gates
reads as follows and needs no elaboration to prove the calibre of the
man: "This officer commanded the U.S. Naval Air Station, Dunkirk,
France, with very marked efficiency and under almost constant shell and
bomb fire from the enemy. Alone and unescorted he rescued the crew of a
British airplane wrecked in the sea off Ostend, for which he was awarded
the Distinguished Flying Cross by the British Government. This act of
bravery was actually over and above the duties required of this officer
and in itself demonstrates the highest type of courage.
Lieutenant-Commander Gates took part in a number of flights over the
enemy lines and was shot down in combat and taken prisoner by the enemy.
He made several heroic and determined attempts to escape. During all of
his service this officer was a magnificent example of courage, modesty,
and energetic devotion to duty. He at all times upheld the very highest
traditions of the Naval Service."
Volumes could well be written about the work of these splendid young
Americans--of how Ensign Stephen Potter shot down in flames an enemy
seaplane from a position over Heligoland Bight; unfortunately he made
the supreme sacrifice only a month later when he in turn was shot down
in flames and fell to his resting-place in the North Sea; and of De
Cernea and Wilcox and Ludlow. Theirs was the spirit which dominated the
entire Force and which made it possible to accomplish what seemed at
times to be almost the impossible. It was the superior "will to victory"
which proved to be invincible.