DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is attached to the Czech report, USSR-60,
and is not in my document book. I was only referring to that.
Apart from these two actions which were decreed by Hitler personally,
did other arrests take place on a rather large scale during the time of
your office?
VON NEURATH: No, but single instances of arrest did take place
recurrently, and I continually intervened anew to have them investigated
and perhaps rescinded, at the suggestion of the Czech Government and
private people.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to read a few more sentences
from the document of the Czech Prosecution, USSR-60, to be found on Page
59 of the English text. I quote:
“Immediately after the occupation representatives of the ‘Sokol’
(Falcon) athletic association, which had 1 million members,
joined a movement for the liberation of the country; this
included the underground movement at home and the movement
abroad. The idea of the ‘Sokol’ united the army members abroad
and gave strength and enthusiasm even in the hardest time. This
was true at home to an even larger extent. The Gestapo was aware
of this danger, and therefore proceeded with the utmost
severity. In the beginning, their measures were moderate, but
when they realized the firm resolve of the ‘Sokols,’ they began
to use force. The first arrests took place on the day of the
occupation of Czechoslovakia, and a further large number of
arrests on 1 September 1939. Then extensive arrests of single
individuals and of organizations followed.”
Will you please comment on this.
VON NEURATH: The “Sokol” was the most dangerous organization hostile to
the State in the Protectorate. The extent of its activity can be seen
especially from the sentences of the Czech Indictment which have just
been read. It was taken for granted that machinations of this kind could
not be tolerated, especially in war, and the report itself characterizes
the first police measures as “still moderate.” I am convinced that in no
other country would such intrigues (underground movements) have been
treated any differently. In such cases of undoubted high treason or
cases of sabotage, I could not possibly intervene for the people
responsible, and moreover, the Czech Government quite understood this.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czech report further mentions shootings under
martial law. Did such shootings occur during your period of office?
VON NEURATH: No, apart from the case of the nine students which has
already been mentioned I know of no shootings under martial law during
my time in office.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Frank, aside from his disastrous activity as
Higher SS and Police Leader, as your State Secretary try to use his
influence in the policy and administration of the Protectorate, and did
you work closely with him in that respect?
VON NEURATH: Frank represented one-sided, radical German interests. That
was the old Sudeten-German hatred of the Czechs. I repeatedly curbed
these tendencies, but as my representative he, in practice, took part in
the general policy and in the administration.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal relationship to Frank?
VON NEURATH: From the very beginning it was bad because of the fact that
he was so radical, and beyond that, I quite soon realized that very
frequently he did not tell me the truth.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your personal and official relationship
to President Hacha and to the Czech Government?
VON NEURATH: In general, good. The Czech Government at that time was
convinced of the fact that my intentions for fair and just treatment of
the Czech population were quite sincere, and that I did everything
within my power to realize my intentions. On the other hand, I fully
understood and recognized in every respect the efforts of the Czech
Government to represent primarily the interests of the people. As to my
personal relationship to President Hacha, I might go so far as to say it
was very good. I always tried to facilitate Mr. Hacha’s difficult task
as far as I could, for I knew that he, too, through his assumption of
the post of President and through his remaining in office was making a
great personal sacrifice. He and the members of the Government were
always invited to all occasions which did not have a purely German
character, and were treated with distinction in accordance with their
rank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was the manner of work of your office in
Prague? Were you quite independent in your work or were you in your
office bound by directives from Berlin?
VON NEURATH: My answer in this respect is a rather tedious matter. The
fundamentals of policy and the administration of the departments were
determined in Berlin as far as they applied to the Protectorate, that
is, by Hitler himself or by department ministers. My field was the
supervision of the execution and application of these principles as they
applied to the Protectorate, always considering the special
circumstances which arose from the ethical, cultural, and economic
structure of the country. Obviously, above all in war, the Protectorate,
which was situated in the center of the Reich, could not be treated as
an independent unit but had to be incorporated into the general pattern.
As I have already stated, the various branches of my authority had been
established by the central offices in Berlin. The officials of these
branches, therefore, from the beginning, had certain practical
connections with their parent ministries, even though they were later
subordinate to me. The individual heads of the branches received their
directives in regard to specific problems direct from their department
ministries in Berlin. Then those directives were submitted to Under
State Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was the head of the administration,
or, if they were very fundamental matters, also to me. The carrying-out
of these measures in the Protectorate was in that way discussed, and
subsequently settled with the Czech Minister. Thus were established the
decrees and basic directives which were signed by me or by my deputy.
Frequently these dealt with the introduction of legal or administrative
measures which already existed in the Reich, or which were newly issued
in the Reich. Apart from that, a series of directives applying to the
Protectorate were issued directly by the competent Berlin ministries.
The Reich Minister of the Interior had been designated as the so-called
central agency for the release of these Reich directives.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to
refer to the following documents to be found in my Document Book 5:
Documents Number 145, a decree from the Führer and Reich Chancellor
dealing with the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, supplementing the
decree of 22 March 1939; Number 146, extracts from basic regulations
applying to the Protectorate, dealing with commercial transactions with
the Protectorate, dated 28 March 1939; Number 147, a directive as to the
administration of criminal justice in the Protectorate, dated 14 April
1939; Number 148, a directive dealing with statutory law in the
Protectorate, dated 7 June 1939; and I should like to refer to a
document which has already been submitted, Number 149, the regulation
dealing with the structure of the administration and the German Security
Police. In this connection I should like to remark that all these
directives were signed, not by the Reich Protector, but rather by the
competent Reich department minister, and sometimes also by Reich Marshal
Göring as Chairman of the Reich Defense Council. The legal basis for the
authority of the Protector is the decree by the Führer and Reich
Chancellor in regard to the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia dated 16
March 1939, signed by Hitler, Frick...
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask the defendant to clear up what his concern
was with these decrees of the Reichsführer and of the Defendant Göring.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, Mr. President, I wanted to show that he had
nothing to do with these matters but that he was obliged to carry them
out. According to the decree which put him in office it was his duty to
supervise these measures, which were issued by agencies in the Reich.
That was what I wanted to prove, that all these directives did not
originate with him, but rather with the Reichsführer.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, Defendant?
VON NEURATH: Yes. I should like to remark that I was chiefly concerned
with seeing that these matters were duly published in the Protectorate,
and then having my agencies supervise their execution.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How far did the autonomy of the Protectorate reach
in all these decisions?
VON NEURATH: The extent of autonomy was not clearly defined. Basically
the Protectorate was autonomous, and it was administered by its own
Czech authorities and Czech officials. But in the course of time
considerable restrictions were placed on this state of autonomy, as was
provided for in the decree which you have just read. The introduction of
these restrictions was regarded as practical by the Reich Government and
resulted, in part, from general tendencies toward centralization in
Berlin, but it was also necessitated to a large extent by the general
political development in view of the war and of the so-called
totalization of the war effort. I constantly objected to these
restrictions insofar as in my opinion they did not correspond with the
vital needs of the Protectorate and of its people.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to
refer to Article 3 of the order which has already been quoted, a decree
issued by the Führer and Reich Chancellor dealing with the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia; Number 144 of my Document Book 5. This reads:
“1.) The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and
administers itself.
“2.) Its sovereign rights as a Protectorate are exercised on the
basis of the political, military, and economic interests of the
Reich.
“3.) These sovereign rights are upheld by its own organizations,
its own authorities, and with its own officials.”
How about the Armed Forces offices in the Protectorate? Were you
connected with them?
VON NEURATH: No, they were subordinate to a special Plenipotentiary of
the Armed Forces who was to keep me advised about the basic military
questions.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, I should like to turn to specific points
which are mentioned in the Czech report, USSR-60, and of which you are
accused.
To which extent were you competent for administering criminal justice in
the Protectorate? Specifically, did you have to confirm death sentences
against the Czechs?
VON NEURATH: The criminal justice of the German courts was under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice in Berlin. The Czech courts were
not under my jurisdiction at all. I was concerned only with decisions in
cases of appeals for clemency against verdicts of German courts in the
Protectorate, which were submitted to me by the President of the
Provincial Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht).
These, in special cases, might also apply to Czechs. However, they did
not concern political crimes. Political proceedings against Czechs were,
as far as I recall, handled by the Peoples’ Court (Volksgerichtshof) in
Berlin, insofar as they dealt with high treason. As far as I know, in
these proceedings against Czechs the same basic principles were applied
as against Germans.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the right to grant pardon when the
Peoples’ Court gave decisions against Czechs?
VON NEURATH: No, I had no possibility of influence, and I did not have
the right to pardon.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In your time did you know anything about the
activity of special courts in the Protectorate?
VON NEURATH: No, I cannot recall that special courts were active during
the time I was there. In my opinion, this could apply only to German
courts for the prosecution of specific offenses, for example, violations
of radio regulations; such courts were established at the beginning of
the war in the Reich. However, these courts were not under my
jurisdiction, but directly subordinate to the Reich Minister of Justice.
He appointed the judges, gave them their directives, and the judges
reported directly to him. I had no opportunity of using influence in any
way.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Regarding the activity of these special courts, I
should like to quote one sentence from the Czech report, USSR-60. This
may be found on Page 106 of the German text and Page 92 of the English
text. It deals with orders and decrees that were to be applied by these
special courts. I quote:
“A large number of these orders and decrees violate principles
that all civilized countries consider irrevocable.”
Is that report correct?
VON NEURATH: Yes, in this case I agree entirely with the Czech
Prosecution report. But I should imagine that in the latest developments
this principle has been considerably attenuated even among civilized
peoples.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to know something about the
alleged plans dealing with the Germanization of the areas in the
Protectorate inhabited by Czechs. You said previously that, when you
assumed office, you knew nothing about such plans. Who later revealed
the pattern of these plans to you?
VON NEURATH: These plans in part originated with Sudeten-German circles,
but in the main they could be traced back to the organizations of
Himmler and also to suggestions on the part of the Gauleiter of Lower
Danube.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In regard to this problem of alleged efforts at
Germanization, I should like to read to you a report to the OKW dated 15
October 1940 by the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary General in the
Protectorate, General Friderici. This is the document which has been
submitted by the Prosecution under Document Number 862-PS, Exhibit
Number USA-313; and it is concerned with statements about basic policy
pursued in the Protectorate, which State Secretary Frank made in an
official discussion with your office. In this document Frank mentions a
memorandum in which, after careful investigation, the Reich Protector
had defined his attitude toward the various plans of numerous offices.
He mentions three possibilities of solution to the question of the
possible Germanization of the Czech territory. You probably know this
document and I do not believe that it is necessary for me to read it.
What do you know about this memorandum? Did you compose it yourself?
Tell us what you have to say about it.
VON NEURATH: The memorandum refers to the proposals which I just
mentioned on the part of various Party offices for the possible
resettlement of the Czechs. I objected to this plan from the very
beginning as being quite absurd and incapable of execution. Frank, who
agreed with me on this point, therefore at my direction drew up this
memorandum which you have just mentioned, in which the radical measures
of the SS and of the Party were rejected and in which the so-called
gradual assimilation was considered as the only possible solution of
this problem. In this way I wanted to postpone the matter and thwart the
plans of the SS. Since these plans for resettlement had already been put
by Himmler before the Führer, I required a rather stringent directive
from the latter in order to quash them. However, for tactical reasons I
had to make some sort of proposal: Hence, that of the policy of
assimilation, because with this suggestion the matter was in practice
postponed. In order to forestall countermeasures by the SS and Himmler,
I reported to the Führer personally about the matter and asked him to
issue a stringent directive, which he did. Thus the matter was buried
and was not taken up again. The sentence found in this memorandum to the
effect that “....Germanization would have to be carried out for a number
of years by the office of the Reich Protector....” means specifically
that the SS could no longer interfere in this matter. The Reich
Protector alone was to be the competent authority, and the Reich
Protector did nothing. Moreover, the statement of General Friderici, who
was equally opposed to radical fantasy, to the effect that “....as far
as the Armed Forces were concerned there would be no important
consequences, since he had always adhered to this concept....” goes to
show the same. If after this report Frank said that “....the elements
which were working contrary to the intended Germanization would have to
be handled roughly and would have to be eliminated....”; these were
merely his words and the type of language that was used in speeches of
that kind. Actually, as I have said, nothing further was done to
assimilate the people.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I now ask your permission to quote
a few sentences from the affidavit that we have mentioned, which was
made by Baroness Ritter, Number 3 in my Document Book 1. They are found
on Page 18. It says there:
“With regard to the plans for the Germanization, that is, the
gradual assimilation, of the Czechs, Neurath stated as follows
in a letter:
“‘Quite aside from the sensible point of view, the people who
are simply to be resettled arouse pity in one’s soul. However, I
believe I have discovered a way now to prevent the disaster.
Time won is everything won, and frequently to postpone a thing
is to do away with it!’”
Mr. President, if it is permissible for me to make a suggestion, I would
ask that we stop now, since the problem of Germanization is now
completed.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are going to be? You have
already been a day and a half.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the Indictment contained in the
Czech report is not well substantiated and not very concrete, so that I
must mention each individual point contained therein. I have
approximately 20 more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: One hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will expect you to conclude in an
hour.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I hope so, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
TRANSCRIBER NOTES
Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, etc. throughout.
Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and Russian documents presented in
the trial.
An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.
[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal Vol. 16_, by Various.]