Book 2, and reads:

“During the years 1933 and 1934 the Nazi Government left the

German Foreign Office for the most part in charge of

conservative officials of the old school. Generally speaking,

this situation continued throughout the period during which

Baron Von Neurath was Foreign Minister. After Von Ribbentrop

became chief of the Foreign Office, the situation gradually

changed as regards the political officials. During Von Neurath’s

incumbency, the German Foreign Office had not been brought into

line with Nazi ideology, and Von Neurath and his assistants can

hardly be blamed for acts of German foreign policy during this

period, though his continuation in office may appear to indicate

his agreement with National Socialist aims. In defense of these

activities Von Neurath might easily adduce reasons of patriotic

motives.”

Then, in regard to these trips and the policy of the defendant in the

Southeast, I am submitting the three communiqués on Von Neurath’s visit

to Belgrade, Sofia, and Budapest in June 1937 under Numbers 122, 123,

and 124 in my Document Book 4. I ask the Court to take judicial notice

of them.

Herr Von Neurath, the Prosecution is using your speech of 29 August

1937, made in Stuttgart at a demonstration of Germans living abroad, to

bring a charge against you, inasmuch as it sees in one of your remarks

the aggressive intentions of your policy. It quotes the following words

which you are alleged to have used in your speech:

“The unity of the heroic national will created by National

Socialism in its unparalleled _élan_ has made possible a foreign

policy by which the terms of the Versailles Dictate are

exploded, freedom to arm is regained, and sovereignty is

restored throughout the state. We are again masters in our own

house, and we have created the power to remain so in the future.

In our foreign political actions we have taken nothing from

anyone. From the words and deeds of Hitler the world should see

that he has no aggressive desires.”

I should like to point out that these sentences can be understood only

if taken with their context. I should like to ask the permission of the

Court to state briefly what the context is. This excerpt from the speech

is submitted by me in Document Book 4, Number 126. I quote:

“We have again become masters in our own house. We have created

the means to remain so....”

THE PRESIDENT: You have just read that. You have read it once.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I should like to read the sentence in

between.

THE PRESIDENT: You may read anything which is relevant and which was

omitted, of course.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The quotation that I am submitting reads:

“But this attitude of the new German Reich is in reality the

strongest bulwark for safeguarding peace, and will always prove

itself as such in a world in turmoil. Just because we have

recognized the danger of certain destructive tendencies which

are attempting to assert themselves in Europe, we are not

looking for differences between countries and peoples, but are

trying to find connecting links. We are not thinking of

political isolation. We want political co-operation between

governments, a co-operation which, if it is to be successful,

cannot be based on theoretical ideas of collectivity, but on

living reality, and which must devote itself to the concrete

tasks of the present. We can state with satisfaction that in

pursuing such a realistic peace policy, we are working hand in

hand with our friend Italy. This justifies the hope that we may

also reach a friendly understanding with other governments

regarding important questions of foreign policy.”

Do you, Herr Von Neurath, wish to add any comment to this?

THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, just before the recess I

confronted you with a quotation from your speech of 29 August 1937 and I

asked you whether you wished to make any statement.

VON NEURATH: I should think this statement shows exactly the opposite of

what the Prosecution is trying to make out. The peaceful character of my

speech could hardly have been brought out in a more convincing way.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As proof for their assertion that your whole

policy could be summarized as the breaking of a treaty, the Prosecution

adduces further from the following sentences in a speech made by you

before the Academy for German Law on 30 October 1937, when you said; and

I quote:

“Realizing these fundamental facts, the Reich Cabinet was always

in favor of handling each concrete international problem by the

methods which are appropriate, and was against merging it

unnecessarily with other problems and thus complicating matters,

and insofar as problems exist between two powers only, of

choosing the way for an immediate understanding between these

two powers. We are in a position to state that these methods

have proved to be good ones, not only in the interests of

Germany, but also in the general interests.”

What is your comment on this?

VON NEURATH: First of all this quotation is torn completely from its

context. The entire speech was a presentation of the reasons why I,

representing Germany’s policy, considered the conclusion of bilateral

agreements to work better in the interests of peace than the so-called

collective agreements, and only from this angle can the passage just

quoted be understood. Therefore, I would ask that you quote the passage

with its context.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: This speech of Herr Von Neurath on the League of

Nations and international law, which he delivered on 30 October 1937

before the Academy of German Law, will be found under Number 128 of my

Document Book 4. With the permission of the Tribunal I should like to

quote this particular passage in its entirety and we shall see that the

passage selected by the Prosecution has not the meaning which the

Prosecution has given it. It says here:

“I am convinced that the same or similar considerations will

also arise in other cases where it is intended to set up a

schematic structure, such as an absolutely mutual system of

assistance for a more or less large group of states. Such

projects, even in favorable cases, namely, when intended to be

an equal guarantee by all participants, will only remain as a

piece of paper....”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it not sufficient to refer to the document? The

defendant has just said that the speech contained the reasons why he

considered bilateral rather than general agreements possible. He said

that. The document appears to confirm that. Could you not refer to the

document without reading the words?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I read it because it was torn from its context and

I believed that I would be permitted to quote the context as well.

However, if the Tribunal wish to read the matter I shall not continue

quoting it.

THE PRESIDENT: It does not seem to me to add to it. It is just the words

which the defendant has quoted the substance of.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I omitted one sentence as I thought it was

superfluous. But it may be seen from the context. If the Tribunal

prefers to read the entire speech with reference to my quotations, then,

of course, I shall be satisfied.

Herr Von Neurath, under Number L-150, USA-65, the Prosecution have

submitted a note by Mr. Bullitt, who was American Ambassador in Paris at

that time, regarding a discussion he had with you in May 1936, and the

Prosecution adduced, on Page 8 of the English trial brief, that as

Foreign Minister you participated in the planning of aggressive war

against Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Will you please comment on this document which is known to you, and on

this accusation which is leveled against you?

VON NEURATH: At first the occupation of the Rhineland had naturally

created unrest in the cabinets and public opinion and among the

signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles. This applied especially to

France and Czechoslovakia. Therefore it was natural, if a reasonable

German foreign policy was to be conducted, to allow this unrest to die

down, so as to convince the world that Germany was not pursuing

aggressive plans, but only wanted to restore full sovereignty in the

Reich. The erection of fortifications was to serve only to decrease the

temptation to our highly armed neighbors to march at any time they saw

fit into German territory, lying there unprotected. Despite all the

negotiations and efforts, it had not been possible to get them to

observe the disarmament clause in the Treaty of Versailles.

As I have already said, France and Czechoslovakia especially, instead of

disarming, continued to arm, and by concluding agreements with Soviet

Russia increased their military superiority.

In my discussion with Mr. Bullitt I attempted to bring all this out when

I said that we would not start any further diplomatic actions for the

time being. By making any military attack more difficult I hoped to get

France and Czechoslovakia to change their policy, which was hostile to

Germany, and to create better relations with both these countries in the

interests of peace. These hopes and views which I held can be seen

clearly in the last part of Mr. Bullitt’s report—and with this Mr.

Bullitt was in full agreement.

As to the remark about British policy on Page 2, Paragraph 2 of this

report, at that time Great Britain was trying to prevent a

_rapprochement_ between Germany and Italy, with whom her relations were

strained to a breaking-point because of the Abyssinian question.

The Foreign Office thought the _rapprochement_ could be prevented by

making it known that it would no longer oppose the Anschluss between

Germany and Austria. At that time Mussolini was still entirely opposed

to the Anschluss. The realization of this specious intention on the part

of Britain was one of the motives for the conclusion of the

German-Austrian Agreement of 11 July 1936. The British statement which I

had hinted at and expected was forthcoming in November 1937 on the

occasion of the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin. Lord Halifax told me at

that time—and I took care to make a note of his statement, which I

quote in English word for word:

“People in England would never understand why they should go to

war only because two German countries wish to unite.”

But at the same time, the Foreign Office, in a directive to the British

Minister in Vienna, the wording of which is now well known, called upon

the Austrian Government to offer stubborn resistance to the Anschluss,

and promised every support.

The Bullitt report also shows that I said that Hitler’s greatest wish

was a real understanding with France. Apart from that I also told Mr.

Bullitt—and he himself states that right from the beginning—that the

German Government would do everything to prevent an uprising of the

National Socialists in Austria.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I ask the Tribunal to take special notice of these

notes of Mr. Bullitt, so that we can save time by not quoting this

paragraph. This is Document Book 1, Neurath Document Number 15, Page 60,

last paragraph.

What was your own personal attitude and opinion about the policy to be

pursued by Germany with reference to Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: Czech policy towards us was always characterized by a

profound mistrust. This was to be explained partly by the geographical

position of the country between Germany and Austria, and partly by the

diversity of nationalities within the country. These were swayed by

strong feelings. The country’s being drawn into the Franco-Russian

military and friendship pact did not contribute to the establishment of

closer relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

As Reich Foreign Minister I always worked to improve political

relations. I also tried to strengthen our economic connections, which

were of manifest importance. In so doing I no more thought of using

force, or of military occupation, than I did in our relations with all

the other neighboring states.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was your attitude to the Sudeten-German

question?

VON NEURATH: I have to be a little more explicit in this case.

The Germans living in the Sudetenland as a compact group had been given

the assurance, at the peace negotiations in 1919 when they were attached

to the Czechoslovak State, that they would be given autonomy on the

model of the Swiss Confederation, as expressly stated by Mr. Lloyd

George in the House of Commons in 1940. The Sudeten-German delegation at

that time, as well as Austria, had demanded an Anschluss with the Reich.

The promise of autonomy was not kept by the Czech Government. Instead of

autonomy, there was a vehement policy of “Czechification.” The Germans

were forbidden to use their own German language in the courts, as well

as in their dealings with administrative authorities, et cetera, under

threat of punishment.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, can not the defendant go on to the

time with which we have to deal, namely, 1938, and tell us what his

policy was then, without telling us all these facts beforehand about

1919?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I just wanted to show the background for his later

policy. However, if the Tribunal thinks that this is unnecessary,

because it is well known, then I shall be satisfied with the testimony

which has already been given.

Herr Von Neurath, what were your official and personal relations with

Hitler during your time as Foreign Minister?

VON NEURATH: From the personal point of view I had no close connection

of any kind with Hitler. I did not belong to his close circle either. In

the beginning I had frequent discussions with him concerning foreign

policy and on the whole, found him open to my arguments. However, in the

course of time this changed when other organizations, especially the

Party, began to concern themselves with foreign policy and came to

Hitler with their plans and their ideas. This applied especially to the

so-called Ribbentrop Bureau. Ribbentrop became more and more a personal

adviser of Hitler in matters of foreign policy, and gained more and more

influence. It was often difficult to dissuade Hitler from proposals

which had been submitted to him through these channels. German foreign

policy was to a certain extent going two different ways. Not only in

Berlin but also in its offices abroad the Foreign Office had constantly

to contend with difficulties caused by the working methods and the

sources of information of this Ribbentrop Bureau. I personally was

always opposed to the Party exercising any influence on foreign policy.

I was especially opposed to Ribbentrop’s direct handling of important

questions and his official interference in matters of foreign policy in

cases where they had not been removed from my control. For that reason I

handed in my resignation several times, and for a time I succeeded in

getting Hitler to dispense with Ribbentrop’s meddlesome methods which he

had hitherto supported.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to submit, and

have the Tribunal take judicial notice of, an extract from an article in

the American periodical _Time_ dated 10 April 1933, Number 9 of my

Document Book 1, Page 44. I should also like to refer...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that mere newspaper reports

or comments are in the nature of evidence.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In addition, I have submitted in my Document Book

1, under Number 17, an extract from the well-known book by Henderson,

the former British Ambassador in Berlin, _Failure of a Mission_, and I

ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it so that I shall not have

to read it, paying special attention to Paragraph 2, Page 69.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that this document—the article from

_Time_—may be admitted, but it is not necessary to refer to it.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Thank you. This is Document Number 9, Mr.

President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is Document Number 9. I say it may be

admitted.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Thank you.

Finally, I should like to submit and call the attention of the Tribunal

to Document Number 16 which is a communication addressed by Defendant

Von Neurath to Hitler, dated 27 July 1936, requesting to be relieved of

his post because of the intended appointment of Herr Von Ribbentrop as

State Secretary. It is not necessary to read this document, but I should

like to call the Tribunal’s attention not only to the contents, but also

to the mode of address and the ending. Hitler is addressed only as

“Esteemed Reich Chancellor,” and the ending is “Yours very

respectfully.”

I mention this because the Prosecution has often made the accusation

that flowery phrases were used in addressing letters to Hitler which

exceeded ordinary courtesy. Herr Von Neurath has never done so.

I also call your attention to Document 14, which will be found in my

Document Book 1. That is also an offer to resign, dated 25 October 1935,

and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well.

Herr Von Neurath, apart from your official policy, were there not other

offices which took independent action, which signed treaties, in which

you had no part?

VON NEURATH: Yes. That was the case, for instance, in the so-called

Berlin-Rome-Tokyo policy. Hitler pursued this plan stubbornly, and

Ribbentrop supported him in this. I rejected this policy, as I

considered it detrimental and in some ways fantastic, and I refused to

allow my staff to carry this through. Ribbentrop therefore, in his

capacity as Ambassador with a special mission, carried on these

negotiations independently, and on Hitler’s instructions concluded the

so-called Anti-Comintern Pact. Hence this pact bore Ribbentrop’s

signature and not my own, even though I was still Foreign Minister at

that time and in the ordinary way would have had to sign the pact.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: We now come to the change in policy. Herr Von

Neurath, when did you realize that Hitler’s foreign policy plans, above

all the achieving of equal rights for Germany, went beyond peaceful

means, and that the waging of wars and the use of violence began to be

considered as a possibility?

VON NEURATH: I realized it for the first time when I heard Hitler’s

speech to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 5 November

1937, which has been mentioned here frequently, and at which I was

present. It is true that the notes on the contents of this speech, as we

have seen from the Hossbach minutes, were made from memory 5 days later

as an excerpt from a speech which lasted 2 or 3 hours.

Although the plans set forth by Hitler in that long speech had no

concrete form, and various possibilities were envisaged, it was quite

obvious to me that the whole tendency of his plans was of an aggressive

nature. I was extremely upset at Hitler’s speech, because it knocked the

bottom out of the whole foreign policy which I had consistently

pursued—the policy of employing only peaceful means. It was evident

that I could not assume responsibility for such a policy.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In connection with this I should like to refer to

the affidavit of Baroness Ritter already mentioned by me as Number 3 in

Document Book 1. From this affidavit I should like to quote a paragraph

under Figure 17 of my document book, a paragraph which seems to me to be

so important that I should like to ask the Tribunal to grant me

permission to quote this paragraph. I quote:

“When for the first time Herr Von Neurath recognized from

Hitler’s statement on 5 November 1937 that the latter wanted to

achieve his political aims by the use of force toward the

neighboring states, he was so severely shaken that he suffered

several heart attacks.

“He discussed this with us in detail on the occasion of his

visit on New Year’s Day 1938, and we saw that this had affected

him both physically and spiritually. Above all, he was very

upset because meanwhile Hitler had refused to receive him and in

these circumstances he could not see how Hitler was to be

dissuaded from his plans, which he severely condemned. He often

said ‘It is horrible to play the part of Cassandra.’ He

categorically declared that on no account could he support this

policy, and that he would face the issue. He did not falter in

this decision when on 2 February 1938, on the occasion of his

sixty-fifth birthday, Hitler told him that he could not do

without him as Foreign Minister. He told us about this the same

evening in a telephone conversation when we sent him birthday

greetings.”

What did you do when this speech forced you to realize these things?

VON NEURATH: About 2 days after this speech I went to see General Von

Fritsch, who had also been present on the occasion of this speech; and

together with him and the Chief of the General Staff, Beck, I discussed

what could be done to get Hitler to change his ideas. We agreed that

first of all General Von Fritsch, who was due to report to Hitler during

the next few days, should explain to him all the military considerations

which made this policy inadvisable. Then I intended to explain the

political reasons to him.

Unfortunately Hitler left for the Obersalzberg soon afterward and could

not or did not wish to receive me before his departure. I could not see

Hitler until 14 or 15 January. On that occasion I tried to show him that

his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part in

it. Many of his plans could be realized by peaceful means, even if the

process was slower. He answered that he could not wait any longer. I

called his attention to the danger of war and to the serious warnings of

the generals. I reminded him of his speech to the Reichstag in 1933 in

which he himself had declared every new war to be sheer madness, and so

forth. When despite all my arguments he still held to his opinions, I

told him that he would have to find another Foreign Minister, and that I

would not be an accessory to such a policy. At first Hitler refused to

accept my resignation, but I insisted, and on 4 February he granted my

release without further comment.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression, Herr Von Neurath,

that Hitler decided to grant your release with reluctance, or that by

your request to be allowed to resign you met his wishes halfway?

VON NEURATH: I believe the latter was the case. I believe Hitler had

been wanting this for some time...

THE PRESIDENT: That is not evidence. You cannot say what you think

another man thought.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, simultaneously with your resignation as

Foreign Minister, you were made president of the newly instituted Secret

Cabinet Council. What did that appointment mean?

VON NEURATH: As the witness Göring has already stated here, the Secret

Cabinet Council was set up for the sole purpose of masking the

reorientation in foreign policy and the changes on the military side.

Several witnesses have testified to the fact that the Secret Cabinet

Council never convened. I might add that in actual practice it would not

have been able to function, for after my resignation on 4 February I was

cut off from all access to news concerning foreign policy.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, after your resignation as Foreign Minister

you kept your title as Reich Minister. But were you still a member of

the Reich Cabinet or not?

VON NEURATH: No. Apart from the fact that as far as I know the Reich

Cabinet no longer functioned, because there were no longer any sessions

of the Reich Cabinet, the title “Reich Minister” was just a title of

form, which was not connected with any activity or with any Government

department. Unlike the members of the Reich Government, I did not

receive any legislative bills for signature.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution states that in March of 1938 you

represented Ribbentrop as Foreign Minister during his absence and they

adduce this from an entry in the diary of General Jodl which says,

“Neurath in the meantime is taking over the Foreign Office.” Will you

please comment on this?

VON NEURATH: After my resignation on 4 February I was quite out of touch

with my former colleagues and I withdrew completely. However, I still

remained in Berlin. On 11 March 1938, late in the afternoon, Hitler

suddenly rang me up in my apartment and asked me to come and see him. In

the anteroom I met, besides Herr Von Papen, General Von Brauchitsch and

a number of other high officials and officers of his immediate

entourage. Göring was also in the room with Hitler when I came in.

Hitler told me that the Anschluss with Austria was a fact, and that

German troops would cross the border during the night of the 11th and

12th. When I raised the question whether that had to be, Hitler told me

the reason why he did not wish to wait any longer. He asked me what the

Foreign Office should do, as the Foreign Minister was absent and in

London at the time. I told him quite clearly that we would probably

receive protests to which a reply would have to be sent. Apart from that

we on our part should make a statement to the powers. There should be no

formal negotiations. I also told him that the Foreign Minister should be

immediately recalled from London. Göring opposed this. Finally Hitler

asked me to tell the State Secretary of the Foreign Office what he had

just told me, so that the Foreign Office would know what was happening.

On 12 March, in the morning, I did as Hitler had instructed me, and

passed on his description of events to the State Secretary, who was the

official representative of Ribbentrop. Göring was appointed by Hitler to

be his deputy during the time he was absent. On 12 March I personally

told the former about the letter addressed to me by the British

Ambassador containing the British protest against the occupation of

Austria. I told him that the Foreign Office would submit a note of

reply.

When the draft of this note had been prepared I told Göring about the

contents of the note over the telephone. Göring as Hitler’s deputy asked

me to sign the reply in his stead, since the British Ambassador’s letter

had been addressed to me. Göring has already stated this as a witness

here in this courtroom; hence the phrase in this letter which says “in

the name of the Reich Government.”

I repeatedly asked Göring to have Ribbentrop recalled from London and to

keep him informed. From the telephone conversation between Göring and

Ribbentrop, which has already been mentioned here, it appears that

Göring did this. The explanation why the British note was addressed to

me I learned only here through the testimony of Göring, when he said

that on the evening of the 11th he himself had told the British

Ambassador that he, Göring, was representing Hitler during his absence

and that Hitler had asked me to advise him, if need be, on matters of

foreign policy.

The entry in Jodl’s diary, about which I heard only here in this Court,

and which, strangely enough, is dated 10 March—a time when I had not

even put in an appearance—can probably be attributed to the fact that

somebody had seen me on 11 March in the Reich Chancellery. In any case,

I was not active in any other way as Ribbentrop’s deputy.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Also you did not use stationery with the heading

“Foreign Office,” or the signature of the Foreign Office.

VON NEURATH: The fact that I used stationery with the heading “President

of the Secret Cabinet Council,” which I found in a room of the

Chancellery, and which was the only indication that this legendary

institution actually existed, also proves that I did not represent the

Foreign Office or the Foreign Minister, otherwise I would have used

Foreign Office stationery.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You answered the note of the British Ambassador on

12 March by the letter just described. The Prosecution reproaches you,

asserting that the reasons given by you in this letter and the

description of events in Austria which preceded the entry into the

country, are not correct. As I assume the Tribunal is familiar with the

passages which form the subject of this accusation, I think it is not

necessary to quote them. You also know these passages and I should like

to have your opinion.

VON NEURATH: The accusation that the contents of this reply are partly

incorrect is quite true. This is explained by the fact that I had no

other information except Hitler’s communications and the note is based

on these communications. This is the information which I had transmitted

to the Foreign Office, which was completely ignorant of the events. That

was the basis of the draft.

I should like to add that the incidents which led to the Austrian

Anschluss were never planned during my period of office, and nothing of

the kind was ever mentioned. Hitler never had any definite foreign

policy plans at all, rather did he take decisions very suddenly and

immediately translated them into action, so that even his closest

associate had knowledge of them only a few days in advance. The

expression “Austrian Anschluss,” as it is used here and generally, does

not express that which actually happened later, which was in fact the

incorporation of Austria. It is this incorporation of Austria that we

are now concerned with. This incorporation of Austria was conceived by

Hitler at the very last moment, in Linz, as the troops were marching in.

A further proof that the plan for invasion had not been made in advance

is the fact that Hitler a few days earlier had sent his Foreign Minister

to London to clear up some diplomatic formalities.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to an

excerpt from the book by Sir Nevile Henderson, _Failure of a Mission_,

which has already been mentioned. This excerpt is Number 129 in my

Document Book 4. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this

document.

During the Austrian crisis, on 12 March, the day after the marching-in,

you made a statement to the Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin regarding

the measures taken in respect to Austria, and their effects on

Czechoslovakia. According to a report made by Dr. Mastny, the

Czechoslovakian Minister in Berlin, about this discussion, you declared

that the German Government did not intend to take any steps against

Czechoslovakia, but to uphold the arbitration treaty concluded in the

twenties with Czechoslovakia. Will you please comment on this report,

which is known to you and which is to be found under Number 141 in my

Document Book 5.

VON NEURATH: It is quite correct that on 12 March I made the said

statement to M. Mastny. Only the reason for the conversation and its

gist were somewhat different from the way he has described it. On 12

March Ministerial Director Von Weizsäcker telephoned me at my home,

telling me that the Czechoslovakian Minister Mastny was with him and

wanted to know whether he could see me sometime during the course of the

day. I asked M. Mastny to come to my apartment during the afternoon. M.

Mastny asked me whether I believed that Hitler, after the Austrian

Anschluss, would now undertake something against Czechoslovakia as well.

I replied that he could set his mind at rest, that Hitler had told me on

the previous evening, in reply to my suggestion that the Austrian

Anschluss might create unrest in Czechoslovakia, that he had no thoughts

of undertaking anything against Czechoslovakia. Mastny then asked me

whether Germany still considered herself bound by the agreement

concluded in 1925. On the strength of the answer given to me by Hitler I

was able to confirm this with a clear conscience. Hitler had added in

this connection that he believed the relations with Czechoslovakia would

even improve considerably. The settlement of the Austrian Anschluss was

after all a domestic affair.

M. Mastny’s report states that I spoke on Hitler’s instructions.

However, that is not true. I merely referred to my discussion with

Hitler which was fresh in my mind. When M. Mastny in this report

stresses the fact that I spoke as the president of the Secret Cabinet

Council, he may have been using a manner of speech in order to give more

weight to his report.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution alleges a certain divergence

between the statement made by you and the plans as expounded by Hitler

in November 1937 and accuses you, asserting that you knew very well what

these plans were, of being somewhat credulous when you made that

reassuring statement to Mastny.

VON NEURATH: In this discussion Hitler talked about war plans only in a

general way. There was no talk about an aggressive plan against

Czechoslovakia. Hitler said that if events led to a war, Czechoslovakia

and Austria would have to be occupied first so that our right flank be

kept free. The form of this or any other attack on Czechoslovakia, and

whether there would be any conflict at all in the East, was doubtful and

open to discussion.

In effect, the Sudetenland, which strategically held the key position of

the Czech defense, was subsequently ceded in a peaceful manner by

agreement with the Western Powers. Concrete plans for a war against

Czechoslovakia, as General Jodl has testified, were not given to the

General Staff for elaboration until the end of May 1938. I learned for

the first time here about the existence of these plans. For the rest,

when Hitler told me that he would undertake nothing against

Czechoslovakia, I could not but believe that this was his real

intention; in other words, that he had relinquished his plans for

alternative action as set forth on 5 November 1937.

That is all I can say about the Czechoslovakian question.

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we break off?

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Herr Von Neurath, in the Indictment there is

mention of a conference of 28 May 1938 at which Hitler, Von Ribbentrop,

Göring, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces branches were

present, at which it is asserted in the affidavit of Herr Wiedemann that

you also attended.

VON NEURATH: I cannot at all remember any such conference, nor the

statement of Hitler which was mentioned by Wiedemann. Moreover, Keitel,

Ribbentrop, Göring, and Raeder knew nothing of this conference. Perhaps

it is a mistake or it is being confused with the conference mentioned by

Schmundt of 22 or 28 April 1938, but I was not present at this

conference; I was not in Berlin at all.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After your resignation, you had withdrawn

completely to private life. In the Sudeten crisis, in the autumn of

1938, did you take an active part and advocate a peaceful policy?

VON NEURATH: Yes. After my dismissal in February 1938 I lived on my

estate. On about 26 September I received a telephone call from one of my

former ministerial colleagues informing me that Hitler had instructed

the Armed Forces to be ready to march by 28 September. Apparently he

wanted to solve the Sudeten question by force. I was asked to come to

Berlin immediately and attempt to dissuade Hitler from this intention.

During the night I went to Berlin. After my arrival I inquired at the

Foreign Office about the situation and reported to Hitler that I was

there. I was sent away. Nevertheless, on the 28th I went to the Reich

Chancellery and there I met Hitler’s entire entourage ready to march. I

inquired for Hitler and was told that he was in his room, but would

receive no one. Nevertheless, I went to the door and entered Hitler’s

room. When he saw me he asked, in a harsh voice: “What do you want

here?” I answered that I wanted to point out to him the consequences of

his intended step. I explained to him that he would bring on a European

war, and probably a world war, if he were to march into Czechoslovakia

while negotiations were still in progress on the Sudeten problem; that

Czechoslovakia would doubtless resist and that it would not be an easy

struggle, and in any case it would involve France and England and

Poland. I told him that it would be a crime he could never answer for to

shed so much blood unless all possibilities of peaceful settlement had

been exhausted. I knew that Mr. Chamberlain was prepared to come to an

agreement and that he was also prepared to induce the Czechs to turn

over the Sudetenland if that could prevent war.

THE PRESIDENT: How did you know that Mr. Chamberlain would be willing to

come?

VON NEURATH: Because I had met the British Ambassador on the street.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

VON NEURATH: Hitler refused to consider such a conference. During our

talk, however, Göring had appeared and he supported me in my efforts to

persuade Hitler to have a conference. Finally Hitler agreed, if I could

bring Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini to Berlin by the next day.

Since that was impossible for Mussolini, I suggested Munich as the place

for negotiations. I immediately established contact with the British and

French Ambassadors, who were both on their way to see Hitler. Hitler

himself telephoned directly to Mussolini, and by 6 o’clock the promises

and answers had been received.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to ask the Court to take judicial

notice of Document Number 20 in my Document Book 1, Page 72b, an excerpt

from the book by Ambassador Henderson, _Failure of a Mission_.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Did you personally take part in the Munich

Conference which then took place?

VON NEURATH: Yes. In view of Hitler’s irritated frame of mind, I was

concerned about the course of the conference and I told him that I

considered it expedient that I should go to Munich too, since I knew the

foreign representatives personally and for that reason could serve as

mediator. When he agreed, Göring invited me to come along in his special

train. Later, in the course of the long session, I frequently talked to

the three persons and to Hitler and tried to mediate in the differences

which arose.

Mr. Chamberlain, at the end of this discussion, asked me to arrange a

talk with the Führer alone, without Ribbentrop, on the next day, since

he would like to make a new suggestion. The Führer did not want to at

first, but finally I persuaded him. At this talk, a “consultation

agreement” was reached between England and Germany, which France later

joined. Chamberlain, who was staying at the same hotel as I was, showed

me this agreement with great joy after the talk, and I also was glad to

see it. I hoped that Anglo-German relations, which had suffered in the

Godesberg and Berchtesgaden meetings, might be brought back to normal by

this agreement and that the way would be opened for further conferences.

As in the summer of 1937, Chamberlain invited me to visit him in

England. I immediately told him that I did not believe that Hitler, who

had forbidden me to go to England in the summer of 1937, would now give

his approval, especially since I was no longer Foreign Minister. In

January 1938 the British Ambassador repeated the invitation, but I had

to tell him that I had had no opportunity of obtaining Hitler’s

approval.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to

submit Document 21 in my document book. It is a letter of the French

Ambassador at that time, François-Poncet, dated 18 October 1938, a few

weeks after the Munich Conference. I should like to quote only two

sentences from it.

“But of the two of us it is I who have contracted the greater

debt of gratitude. I have always had from you, even at the most

delicate moments, the most kind, the most considerate and the

most confident reception. You made a difficult task easy for me.

I shall never forget what I owe you.”

Mr. President, at this point I should like to submit a letter from the

Ambassador Poncet, which was received only a few days ago and which I

mentioned with the same request at the beginning of my case. I asked

that the French Ambassador be called as a witness, and in answer to this

a letter from the Ambassador of 7 June was addressed to the French

Prosecution, of which I received a copy through the General Secretary’s

office last week—I believe Thursday or Friday.

In spite of the fact that this letter is not in the prescribed form of

an affidavit but is a private letter to the Prosecution, I would ask

that you accept it as if it were in the form of an affidavit. The

original of this letter is in the possession of the French Prosecution,

and the French Prosecution has promised to submit the original on the

request of the Court. I take the liberty to submit the certified copy.

THE PRESIDENT: The original document should be presented to the Court

now, or as soon as it conveniently can be.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The day before yesterday I talked to a member of

the French Prosecution who said they did not have it here at the moment.

I do not know where they have it. Therefore, I ask that it be submitted;

otherwise I would already have submitted it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, but it must be submitted as soon as possible.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You wish to offer it in evidence, do you?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What number is it?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 162.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection, I take it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No objection, My Lord.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: This letter reads, if I may quote at least one

brief passage:

“He”—that is Herr Von Neurath—“never aggravated the incidents;

on the contrary, he always sought a personal and peaceful

solution. He made every effort to facilitate the task of the

foreign diplomats in the German capital. They, like myself, were

grateful to him. I do not doubt that he often pointed out to

Hitler the dangers to which he was exposing Germany by the

excesses of his regime, and that he let him hear the voice of

prudence and moderation.”

Now I come to another subject, and I should like to present the

following:

The documents presented by the Prosecution show that during your period

in office as Reich Foreign Minister, a representative of the Foreign

Office took part in sessions of the Reich Defense Council, and by the

Reich Defense Law of 1938, you, as president of the Secret Cabinet, were

a member of this Reich Defense Council.

Will you comment on this?

VON NEURATH: Neither as Reich Foreign Minister nor as president of the

Secret Cabinet did I have anything to do with the affairs of the Reich

Defense Council. I never took part in any session or talk. As has been

stated here, all ministries from the time before 1933 had so-called

Reich defense experts who were to deal with interministerial questions

resulting from possible mobilization in case of a defensive war. As Dr.

Schacht has already testified, the Reich Defense Council of 1935 was

nothing but the legalization of a committee which had existed before

1933.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the existence of such a committee or council

for the defense of the Reich, did you see signs of preparation for a war

of aggression?

VON NEURATH: No, in no way. The designation already indicates that it

had to do with preparations for the defense of the Reich against attack,

and not preparations for attack. Moreover, I know that in France, as

well as in England, such arrangements had existed for a long time.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to submit Document

78, which is on Page 213 of my Document Book 3. It is an excerpt from a

statement made by the French War Minister, Pétain, on 6 June 1934 before

the Army Commission of the French Chamber, which mentions the necessity

of a defense council or committee.

THE PRESIDENT: Just wait a minute. The Tribunal doesn’t think that any

evidence that other countries had other organizations is really relevant

to this case.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Prosecution asserts that Hitler awarded you

more honors than some of the Nazi leaders themselves, and concludes that

you were especially close to Hitler. Will you please comment on this.

VON NEURATH: That is a rather remarkable assumption. It was clear that,

being the oldest minister who had served the State for over 40 years,

Hitler could not overlook me in awarding honors and honorary titles, but

they were limited to what is customary for incumbents of high State

positions.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to name the individual awards on

which a charge is made against you. You held the Order of the German

Eagle and the War Merit Cross First Class.

VON NEURATH: Yes. The Order of the German Eagle was founded in 1937 and

was to be awarded only to foreigners. It would however have had no great

value abroad but would have been considered more a type of special

order, such as a colonial order, if no German had held it. For that

reason in my capacity as Foreign Minister, immediately when the order

was founded, Hitler awarded me the Grand Cross of the order and thus

also heightened the value of this order...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Von Lüdinghausen, is it not sufficient for the

defendant to have said that it was usual to give these titles? It is not

necessary for us to investigate the particular merits of the particular

order, is it? It seems to me to be very remote.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I mentioned it only because the

Prosecution also brought it out especially.

The further charge is made by the Prosecution that on 30 January 1937,

in that well-known Cabinet meeting, you received the golden Party

insignia from Hitler and thus became a member of the Nazi Party. What

about that?

VON NEURATH: As to the way in which this was awarded, Herr Schacht as

well as Raeder have testified here. I was not a member of any party.

Between 1933 and 1937 I had several times been requested to join the

Party but had refused. My attitude toward the Party was generally known.

For that reason I was repeatedly attacked by the Party. I believe that

the reason why I—why this insignia was awarded on 30 January 1937 to

various members of the Cabinet, and also to generals who were not

allowed to become members of the Party at all, I believe that has been

described in enough detail and that I need not go into it again.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, surprisingly, Hitler also made you an

honorary Obergruppenführer of the SS.

VON NEURATH: Yes, that was a complete surprise to me. In September 1937

Mussolini had announced his visit to Germany. For some days just before

this visit I was not in Berlin. When I returned in the morning I found

my tailor at the entrance of my house with the uniform of an SS

Gruppenführer. I asked him what that meant. He told me the Reich

Chancellery had instructed him to make me a uniform immediately. I then

went to Hitler and asked him why he had done this. He said he wanted all

the people who were to be present at the reception of Mussolini to be in

uniform. I told him that was not very agreeable to me and I had to

explain that in no case would I be subordinate to Himmler and I did not

want to have anything to do with the SS. Hitler assured me solemnly that

this would not be asked of me and that I need have no obligation to the

SS; and this actually did not happen. Moreover, I had no power to issue

orders, and my later appointment as Obergruppenführer was apparently

done in the course of general promotions without any special emphasis.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you wear this uniform at all?

VON NEURATH: Only twice as far as I can recall; at the reception of

Mussolini and then when in 1938 I was sent to Ankara for the funeral of

Kemal Pasha. On official occasions I always wore the uniform of a civil

servant without any insignia, which had been designed in the meantime.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On your seventieth birthday, on 2 February 1943,

you received congratulations and other expressions of appreciation of

your person and your activities from various sources. You were

congratulated, among others, by Hitler and you received, besides, a

check for 250,000 marks. Will you please tell us what was the

significance of this donation, if one may call it that.

VON NEURATH: The American prosecutor recently mentioned this gift. Only

he forgot to add that I refused it. The events were as follows:

On the day of my seventieth birthday, in the morning, an envoy of Hitler

called on me and brought me a congratulatory letter from Hitler and an

oil painting by a young German painter, showing an Italian landscape.

The letter contained a check for 250,000 marks. I was painfully

surprised and immediately told the envoy that I considered this

so-called donation an insult, that I was not a lackey whom one paid with

a tip, and that he should take the check back with him. He said he was

not authorized to do so. The next morning I went to the Reich Finance

Minister to give him the check for the Reich treasury. He said that for

formal reasons—I believe because the check was on a special account of

Hitler’s—he could not accept it. At his advice I turned the check over

to the Reich Credit Association to a special account and informed the

competent finance office in writing. I never touched one penny of this

sum. The painting, the value of which was not especially great, I did

not refuse, because it was entirely within the limits of a normal

birthday gift and sending it back would have been considered a

deliberate insult.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission in this

connection, to submit two letters of the Reich Credit Association, which

I received from them on Saturday upon my request. They contain

confirmation that this sum of 250,000 marks in its full extent, plus the

interest which has accumulated, is still today in a special account with

the Reich Credit Association. This is proof that Herr Von Neurath did

not, in fact, withdraw a penny of this so-called donation, or use it in

any other way.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number of it?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 160 and 161. Mr. President, in my haste I have

only been able to have the English translation made in my office. The

French and Russian translations will be given to the French and the

Russian Prosecution in the next few days. As I have said, I received it

myself only on Saturday afternoon.

The further charge is made against you that in the conservative circles

of Germany you worked as a sort of member of a Fifth Column to induce

them to reconcile themselves with and agree to the National Socialist

regime, because the fact that you remained in the Government would be

considered an example by them. What have you to say about that?

VON NEURATH: That statement is nonsense, because it was known throughout

Germany and abroad that I was no National Socialist, but rather that I

combated National Socialist excesses against the Church and the Jews and

that, in addition, I obstructed any policy which endangered peace. This

was clearly shown by my dismissal in February 1938, and the fact that

the general consternation about this was not publicly expressed in the

German press was simply because there was no press available for this.

It is therefore completely absurd that these conservative circles could

have assumed that I was with all my heart with the Nazis, as the

Indictment says. Other countries knew this just as well and saw in me an

obstacle to Nazi policy. That I was not regarded as a blind adherent to

Nazi theories, as is stated in the Indictment, is best known to the

foreign diplomats in Berlin, since they could observe my constant

struggle against the Party from close at hand.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit in this connection an

excerpt from the magazine _Archiv_, of 1937, and an excerpt from an

article in the _Pester Lloyd_, containing the speech which the doyen of

the Berlin Diplomatic Corps made in the name of the whole Diplomatic

Corps to Herr Von Neurath on his sixty-fifth birthday on 2 February

1938. Both documents are contained in my Document Book 4, Number 127,

and in Document Book 1, Number 18.

With this I have finished the part dealing with foreign politics, and

the personal points in the charge against Herr Von Neurath. Now I come

to the second aspect of the charge, your activity as Reich Protector for

Bohemia and Moravia.

After the settlement of the Sudeten crisis you had withdrawn completely

from political life; is that true?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I was very rarely in Berlin. For the most part I was

on my estate in Württemberg or in the mountains.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In September 1939, were you in Berlin, and did you

have any knowledge of Hitler’s plans for an invasion of Czechoslovakia?

VON NEURATH: You mean in the late winter of 1939?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In the late winter, yes.

VON NEURATH: No, I had kept aloof. The differences between Germany,

Czechoslovakia...

THE PRESIDENT: September 1939?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: That was my mistake. I meant in the late winter.

THE PRESIDENT: Of 1938, you mean?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1939.

VON NEURATH: 1938-1939.

The differences between us and Czechoslovakia on the treatment of the

Sudeten Germans by the Czechs had been solved by the separation of the

Sudetenland. The way to friendly co-operation was paved. One of the

focal points of danger for the peace of Europe had been eliminated.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then there came the famous dispute between Hitler

and the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Hacha, in the night

of 14 to 15 March 1939 in Berlin. This conference has already been

discussed here. I do not believe I need go into it in much detail.

Anyhow you know of it.

I should like to ask you, did you know of these events as described,

particularly as given in Document Number 2798-PS?

VON NEURATH: No, I did not know of them. I learned of them only much

later. I only learned here of the notes of Herr Hewel, but after I

learned of these events I disapproved strongly, and I would not have

taken office as Reich Protector under any circumstances if I had known

of these things at the time. I was completely surprised by the events in

March 1939. I no longer received any foreign political information, as I

have already said. I was dependent upon the radio and the newspapers.

The preparation for attack on Czechoslovakia in 1938 I considered to

have been eliminated after the Munich Agreement.

I learned of Hacha’s visit to Berlin, like every other German, by radio

and newspapers the next morning. The official statement of the taking

over of protection of the remainder of Czechoslovakia seemed not

improbable to me after Slovakia had become independent, and after I

learned that the Czech Foreign Minister, Chvalkovsky, in the course of

the winter 1938-39 had said in Berlin that Czechoslovakia’s former

policy must be completely changed and that closer connections would have

to be sought with Germany. However, I was concerned about how the

signatory powers of Munich would react to this development, which was in

contravention of the agreement which had been reached in Munich. My

first question to Hitler, when I went to Vienna at his request, was

whether England and France had been informed beforehand and had given

their approval. When he said no, that that was quite unnecessary, and

that the Czech Government itself had asked us to take over the

protection, I immediately realized how dangerous the situation was, and

said so to Hitler.

However, at the time I still believed that it had, in fact, been a free

decision of the Czech Government. Hitler’s request that I should take

the post of Reich Protector was a complete surprise to me, the more so

since I had discovered that he had very much taken amiss my spontaneous

intervention in September 1938, which led to the Munich conference. I

had misgivings about taking the office, which I also expressed to

Hitler. I realized that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would, at the very

least, strongly offend the signatory powers of the Munich Agreement,

even if Hacha had asked for protection of his own accord, and it was

also clear to me that any aggravation of the situation through bad

treatment of the Czechs would bring about an immediate danger of war.

The patience of England and France must surely be exhausted. I mentioned

this to Hitler, too. Hitler’s answer was that that was precisely the

reason why he was asking me to take over the post—to show that he did

not wish to carry on a policy hostile to Czechoslovakia. I was generally

known abroad as a peaceful and moderate man, and he would give me the

most extensive powers to oppose all excesses, especially by the Sudeten

German element. When I still hesitated and said that I did not know

conditions in Czechoslovakia and that I was not an administrator, Hitler

said that I should try it, that it could be changed at any time. He gave

me two experienced men who knew the conditions. I did not realize at the

time that the fact that the Police and the SS were not subordinate to

any higher authority, already a practice then, would make it impossible

for me to prevent the rule by force of Himmler and his agencies.

But I cannot refrain from pointing out that great responsibility for

further developments lies with the other powers, especially the

signatory powers of Munich. Instead of making protest on paper, I had

expected that they would at least recall their ambassadors. Then,

perhaps, the tension might have increased for the moment, but the German

people would have realized how serious the situation was, and Hitler

would have avoided taking further aggressive steps and the war could

have been prevented.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The charge is made that you took this office so

that by misuse of your humane and diplomatic reputation the impression

could be given to the world that the Czechs were to be treated

moderately, while the contrary was to be the case. Will you comment

briefly on this point?

VON NEURATH: That is absolutely wrong. Hitler said that I was to attempt

to reconcile the Czechs to the new conditions and to keep from excesses

the German population which was filled with hatred by the years of

struggle over nationality and measures of suppression.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What assurances did Hitler give you with regard to

your office?

VON NEURATH: He assured me that he would support me in every way and at

all times in my work of settling the national conflicts justly and

winning over the Czechs by a conciliatory and moderate policy. In

particular, he would protect my administration from all attacks by

political radicals, above all by the SS and Police and Sudeten Germans;

I had pointed out this danger particularly.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were you convinced at that time that, in making

these assurances of humane treatment for the Czechs, Hitler was serious

and honest?

VON NEURATH: Yes, I definitely had that impression.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then you believed that he would abide by the

assurances he gave you?

VON NEURATH: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: At that time did you know of any plans or even

intention with regard to forcible Germanization of the Czechs?

VON NEURATH: No, that was completely unknown to me. I would have

considered that such nonsense that I would not have believed that anyone

could have such an idea.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you still believe that Hitler’s assurances and

expressed intentions at that time were meant honestly, and that they

were only made illusory through further developments?

VON NEURATH: Yes, they were certainly meant honestly at that time.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to a

document in my Document Book 5, under Number 142, which contains an

excerpt from Henderson’s _Failure of a Mission_. I should like to ask

the Court to take judicial notice of that.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In connection with that period, the

conclusion of the German-Slovakian Treaty of March 1939 concerning the

independence of Slovakia is charged against you by the Prosecution.

Did you have anything at all to do with drawing up this treaty or with

declaring Slovakia autonomous?

VON NEURATH: No. I learned of the declaration of autonomy for Slovakia

and of all these events only after they had been made public.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the principles of your program for your

administration in Prague?

VON NEURATH: It was quite clear to me that reconciliation of the Czech

people with the newly created conditions could be brought about only

gradually, by sparing their national feelings as far as possible, and

without radical measures. Under more favorable circumstances that would

have taken several generations. I therefore attempted a gradual

adjustment and a diminishing of the previously hostile policies.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to

Document 143 in my Document Book 5. This is a reproduction of an article

which Herr Von Neurath published about the aims of his administration in

Prague in the _Europäische Revue_ at the end of March 1939. I ask the

Court to take judicial notice of this.

This article shows quite clearly with what intentions and with what

tendencies Herr Von Neurath took up his office at that time. I ask the

Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.

What were the conditions which you found in Prague when you took over

your office in April?

VON NEURATH: The Czechs were generally disillusioned by the conduct of

their former allies in the autumn of 1938. To a large extent they seemed

ready to be loyal and to co-operate. However, the influence of

anti-Czech and Sudeten-German circles, supported by Himmler and the SS,

was considerable. This influence was personified especially in the

Sudeten leader Karl Hermann Frank, who had been appointed my State

Secretary at Himmler’s instigation. I had the greatest difficulty with

him from the very beginning, because he favored a completely different

policy toward the Czechs.

The office of the Reich Protector was still being built up. The head of

the administration was an experienced administration official, State

Secretary Von Burgsdorff, who was examined here. Under him were the

various departments, which were built up directly by the Berlin

ministries.

In the provincial administration German “Oberlandräte” were appointed as

supervisory officers for each Czech district. They were appointed by the

Reich Ministry of the Interior.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were the Police subordinate?

VON NEURATH: The police force was completely independent of my office.

It was directly under the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German

Police; that is to say, Himmler.

Himmler appointed my own State Secretary Frank as Higher SS and Police

Chief, who thus had a double position. Under Frank, in turn, was the

commander of the Security Police. All police measures were ordered by

Frank or directly by Himmler and the Reich Security Main Office without

a request for my approval, without my even having been informed

previously. From this fact resulted most of the difficulties with which

I constantly had to struggle in Prague.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The treatment of the position of the Police in a

Czechoslovakian report under Number USSR-60, which was submitted by the

Prosecution, presents the matter in a somewhat different light. Do you

adhere to the description which you have just given?

VON NEURATH: Yes, absolutely.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You were informed of police measures only

afterward, but were not asked for your approval beforehand?

VON NEURATH: Yes, and I was informed afterward only sporadically. I

frequently learned only from the Czech Government, or through private

persons, of incidents which I was not informed about by the Police even

afterward; then I had to inquire of Frank.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I refer in this connection to the

decree of 1 September 1939, which I have submitted verbatim as Number

149 in my Document Book 5, and I should like to point out the following:

This order is divided into two completely separate sections. Part I

concerns the building up of the administration of the Reich Protector;

and Part II, completely separated therefrom, deals with the

establishment of the German Security Police, which is directly under the

Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police. Already this external

form of the order, this ostentatious separation of the two

administrative branches, if I may express it in that way, proves that

the Police and the police power were only under Himmler or under his

Berlin authorities. This already emphasized the fact that the Reich

Protector could exert no influence on them. This is the great tragedy of

Herr Von Neurath’s activities as Reich Protector. Matters are

automatically charged against him for which he never can and never did

take the responsibility. The Prosecution refers particularly to

Paragraph 13 in this order, which mentions administrative measures

according to which the Reich Protector, and the Reichsführer SS in

agreement with the former, can take administrative measures necessary

for the maintenance of security and public order in the Protectorate

even beyond the limits determined for this purpose.

What does this mean?

VON NEURATH: I do not know what this order means by “administrative

measures.” It seems to me to be a very general order, presumably

referring to the issuing of general instructions. At any rate, as long

as I was in Prague, neither I nor the Reichsführer SS made any use of

this power. Arrests were all made without informing me previously, on

the basis of Paragraph 11 of the order which has just been read, and

which does not in any way subordinate the Police in the Protectorate to

me.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Hitler not assure you, in Vienna, that you

were to have full executive powers in the Protectorate, and that that

would include the Police?

VON NEURATH: No; I have already mentioned that.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you attempt to change this situation and to

obtain from Hitler control over the Police, or at least exert influence

over the Police?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I repeatedly made representations to Hitler in

connection with the recurring violations and excesses of the Police. He

promised me repeatedly that he would investigate these circumstances,

but nothing was changed. The influence of Himmler, who considered the

Police throughout the Reich to be his own domain, was too powerful.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian report on which the Indictment

is based, in addition to the Police Chief, also holds the Reich

Protector until September 1941—that is you— responsible for the terror

acts of the Gestapo. On the basis of the statements which you have just

made, do you assume such responsibility to any extent?

VON NEURATH: No. I must deny it very emphatically. I have already

explained what the real circumstances were, that I had no influence

whatever.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two or three sentences in

this connection from Document 153 in my Document Book 5, which consist

of minutes from the examination of former State Secretary Frank by the

Czechoslovakian delegation on 30 May 1945. These minutes from Frank’s

testimony say:

“Neither the Reich Protector nor I myself was responsible for

the actions of the Police. The highest responsibility was with

Heinrich Himmler as Chief of the German Police. The Gestapo

received its instructions directly from Berlin, either from

Hitler himself or from the Reich Security Main Office.”

By your presence in Prague could you actually do anything in practice to

modify at least the worst measures inflicted by the Police or the

Gestapo, or to minimize the most severe effects afterward? Will you

please describe how you intervened and how you attempted to influence

Frank in these matters?

VON NEURATH: I received continual requests from President Hacha, the

Czech Government, and private persons. My office was for the most part

busy working on these cases. I had every request presented to me

personally, and in all cases in which intervention was at all justified,

I had Frank or the commander of the Security Police report to me and

tried to influence them in favor of releasing the arrested person. It

was, however, an incessant struggle with Frank and the Police, although

it was successful in many cases. In the course of time many hundreds of

persons who had been arrested were released at my instigation. In

addition many sentences were mitigated with respect to postal

communication, sending of food, and so forth.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Soon after you took office did you not prevent the

arrest and subjection to so-called atonement measures of the members of

the families remaining in Prague of the Ministers Netschas and

Feierabend, who had fled abroad?

VON NEURATH: Yes, that is right. Frank had ordered the arrest of the

members of the families of these two ministers. When I learned about it

I induced him to desist from taking this step.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I make a suggestion to break

off now, because this section is finished and I come now to individual

questions?

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, first of all, I should like to refer to

individual police measures for which you have been held responsible to a

greater or lesser degree by the Prosecution. Were there many arrests of

Czechoslovak nationals already in the summer of 1939?

VON NEURATH: No; the activity of the Police in the summer of 1939 was

slight, and I hoped that it would be possible to restrict these police

measures increasingly.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: The Czechoslovakian Indictment, under USSR-60, in

Appendix Number 6, Supplement 1, submits a proclamation which you, as

Reich Protector, issued in August 1939, that is, just prior to the

outbreak of the war. This is a proclamation which was to serve as a

warning to the people of the Protectorate against acts of sabotage. I

shall have this proclamation submitted to you at this point.

I should like you to comment on it. This appendix is attached to the

Document USSR-60 as Appendix 1. The proclamation, which I have just had

given to the defendant, reads as follows—if I may, with the permission

of the Tribunal, read the most important part:

“1.) Each act of sabotage against the interests of the Greater

German Reich, against German administration in the Protectorate,

and against the German Wehrmacht will be prosecuted with

unrelenting harshness, and will be punished most severely.

“2.) By sabotage as described in Paragraph 1, is meant all

disturbances of the public and economic life, particularly the

damaging of essential installations such as railroads,

telephones, and so forth, lines of communication, waterworks,

electrical works, gas works, and factories, as well as the

hoarding of consumer goods, raising of prices, and the spreading

of rumors by word or in writing.

“3.) The population must observe all special directives of the

organs of the Reich working in the Protectorate such as have

been published or such as will be published in the future.

Refusal to obey or acting against any organs of the Reich will

be considered as sabotage and punished accordingly.

Responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be placed not only

on the person who is committing the act, but rather on the

entire Czechoslovakian population.

“I expect under all circumstances that the Czechoslovakian

population, through a loyal, peaceful, and quiet demeanor, will

prove themselves worthy of the autonomy which the Führer has

guaranteed to the countries of Bohemia and Moravia.”

Will you please comment on this?

VON NEURATH: I cannot imagine from what point of view the release of

this public warning against sabotage can be used as the basis of an

accusation against me. At this period of the greatest political tension,

it was to be feared that radical elements would exploit the situation in

order to commit acts of sabotage which could damage public services. In

my opinion, this would not have been tolerated in any state at such a

time without severe punishment. Through this warning we wanted to try to

eliminate all incentives for committing acts of sabotage. Moreover, as

far as I recall, this warning had the desired effect and practically no

acts of sabotage actually took place. Besides, the threat of special

punishment is not contained in this warning at all, but it refers only

to provisions for severe punishment which already existed.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Shortly after the publication of this proclamation

the war broke out. What was your attitude toward this war?

VON NEURATH: I considered this war the greatest piece of stupidity, for

on the basis of my knowledge of British psychology and politics, I was

convinced that England would keep her promise to Poland, and that

therewith the war against England and France would also commence, in

which the United States, with its tremendous production capacity, would

stand behind these powers. That was clear to me from all the statements

made by President Roosevelt before the beginning of the war. I also

rejected and condemned the rather reckless beginning of this war because

of my ethical convictions and my ideology.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For what reasons did you remain in your office

instead of resigning?

VON NEURATH: I told myself that during the war, on the one hand, the

Czechs would try, if not to throw off German rule, at least to disturb,

either openly or secretly, through uprisings, sabotage, _et cetera_, the

military measures of the Armed Forces taken in the Protectorate and that

on the other hand due to this the severest measures would be taken

against the population on the part of Germany, which would cause the

Police, above all the Gestapo, to proceed with all kinds of terrorist

acts. Through my remaining in office I wanted to prevent both of these

things, and I also wanted to prevent a harsher treatment of the Czech

population by the policy of conciliation and compromise which I

followed.

To lay down my office at a moment like that would have been desertion.

But, on the other hand, I believed that in a war in which the existence

of the German people was at stake I could not, as a German—which I am,

with full devotion—refuse my services and my knowledge. After all, it

was not a question of Hitler or the Nazi regime, but rather of my people

and their existence.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Therefore, by remaining in office you did not wish

to indicate your approval of this war, which was brought about by

Hitler?

VON NEURATH: Never. For it was an accomplished fact, to which I had not

contributed; and I told Hitler my attitude and my opinion about the

insanity of the war quite clearly. But I would have considered myself a

traitor to the German and Czech peoples if, in this hour of need, I had

abandoned the difficult task which I had undertaken for the benefit and

welfare of both peoples, as long as I could even in a restricted measure

live up to my task. I do not believe that any decent person would have

acted differently, for, above all, and beyond personal wishes, there is

one’s duty to one’s own people.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On the day of the outbreak of the war, in the

Protectorate as well as everywhere in the Reich, so-called preventive

measures were taken in the form of numerous arrests, involving at any

rate more than a thousand persons, especially representatives of the

intelligentsia insofar as they were considered politically unreliable.

Were you advised of these arrests in advance, as should have been done

according to Paragraph 11 of the order of 1 September 1939, which has

been quoted earlier?

VON NEURATH: No, not even afterward. I learned of these arrests through

President Hacha.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What did you have done then?

VON NEURATH: First of all, I had Frank come to me and remonstrated with

him. He said that he had not been informed either, and that this was a

general police preventive measure.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Which came directly from Berlin?

VON NEURATH: Yes, which Himmler had ordered the Gestapo and SD to take.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you now try to have the people liberated who

had been arrested, and who had for the most part been taken into the

Reich?

VON NEURATH: Yes. I constantly exerted pressure on Frank, and on Himmler

and Heydrich in Berlin, to that end.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how successful were your efforts?

VON NEURATH: Hundreds of these people who had been arrested—whose names

I had to get from the Czechs with great difficulty as the German Police

refused to give me these names—were released in the course of time.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: On 28 October 1939 public demonstrations occurred

in Prague for the first time on the occasion of the Czech Independence

Day. On this occasion, some of the demonstrators and some policemen were

either killed or injured; for the Police took rather strong measures

against the people demonstrating.

Regarding these police measures before, during, and after this

demonstration, did you have knowledge of them and did you endorse them?

VON NEURATH: At that time I was not in Prague, and only on 29 October

did Frank inform me over the telephone about the unrest. The details I

did not learn until I returned on 30 or 31 October. I told Frank that

through his personal interference on the streets and through the use of

the SS he had intensified the tumult instead of leaving the restoration

of order to the Czech police.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Frank sent a report dealing with these cases of

unrest to Berlin, which he mentioned when he was interrogated by the

Czech delegation on 5 May 1945.

I have submitted an excerpt from the record of this interrogation which

will be found in my Document Book 5 under Number 152. I should like to

quote a few sentences from this report:

“This was the first time that the population demonstrated

publicly and that these slogans”—that were mentioned

earlier—“were heard in the open. This matter was therefore

taken seriously, and I personally reported to Berlin about all

incidents. I should like to say that I was an eyewitness to

these demonstrations and that I had the impression that they

were of a dangerous nature. In the report which I sent to Berlin

I stated specifically that these were the first demonstrations,

and that, therefore, special importance was to be attached to

them since they took place in the open street. I asked for

directives which I received immediately from the Führer’s

headquarters. These directives were sent from Berlin direct to

the Security Police and I received knowledge of their contents.

The entire program was carried through directly by the Police.”

Did you have knowledge of this report of Frank’s, and the measures which

are mentioned therein, before it was sent off, or afterward?

VON NEURATH: No. This report was completely unknown to me until now in

Nuremberg; but Frank always reported directly to Berlin. Apart from

that, I was never of the opinion that this demonstration, which was

carried on mostly by young people, should be considered especially

important or that it should necessitate special police measures.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: At the funeral on 15 November of one of the

students who was killed on 28 October there were fresh demonstrations in

Prague, in the course of which numerous students were shot, others

arrested, and the universities closed. What do you know about these

incidents?

VON NEURATH: When this student, Opletal, who was injured in the fracas,

died of his wounds, the Police, in order to prevent new demonstrations,

prohibited the participation of students at the funeral, which was to

take place on 15 November. Despite this, crowds collected, and when the

Police attempted to disperse them, renewed demonstrations and shootings

resulted. When this was reported to Hitler by Frank, Hitler was greatly

enraged and called me, Frank, and the Military Plenipotentiary, General

Friderici, to a conference to be held in Berlin. Hitler had also asked

the Czech Minister, Chvalkovsky, the former Foreign Minister, to be

present at this conference. Hitler was in a rage. I tried to calm him,

but despite that he made serious charges against the Czech Minister and

gave him instructions to tell the Czech Government that if such events

should recur he would take the most severe measures against the people

who were disturbing the peace and, furthermore, that he would hold the

entire Czech Government liable. The language used by Hitler was quite

uncontrolled and the proceeding was extremely distressing to us who were

listening. After the Czech Minister had left, we stayed with Hitler for

a few minutes longer. He asked me how long I would remain in Berlin and

I told him 1 to 2 days. Then we were asked to dinner, but there was no

further discussion about these incidents. Hitler asked State Secretary

Frank to come back later. Hitler said no word about the shooting of the

leaders of the demonstration or taking the students to concentration

camps; neither did he mention the closing of the universities.

When, toward evening, I asked after the pilot of my airplane in order to

give him instructions, I was told at the airport that he had flown back

to Prague in my airplane together with Frank. The following day I

returned to Prague by train and only then did I learn that Hitler had

decreed the closing of all Czech universities for 3 years, the arrest of

some 1,200 students and their transfer to a concentration camp, as well

as the shooting of the ringleaders of the demonstration. At the same

time a proclamation, which was signed with my name, was submitted to me

in which these orders were announced which had been published in the

press and had been posted publicly. I had Frank summoned immediately and

challenged him with these unheard-of things which had taken place

without my knowledge. He referred to a specific decree of Hitler’s. I

had not even seen this proclamation. My name had been affixed to it

illegally by Frank. Even as my deputy, he was not justified in doing

this; but later, through an official in my office, I learned that Frank

often misused my name in this way. If I had had any advance knowledge of

these decrees of Hitler—and, of course, he had the opportunity to reach

me by telephone in Berlin—I would naturally have objected to these

decrees and at that time would have asked to resign.

Immediately I tried to have these students released. I tried with Hitler

personally and tried going to Himmler, and gradually most of them were

released, I believe more than 800 in all, the last of their number being

released in the summer of 1941.

Shortly after this incident, when I was again present in Berlin, I

complained bitterly to Hitler about his conduct toward me. He evaded an

answer, as far as I recall, but he promised me that the students would

be released very soon and that the Czech universities would be reopened

after 1 year. Neither of these promises did he keep.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to read to you the answer of

Legation Counsellor Von Holleben, who at that time participated in the

Protectorate Government, to Question 21 of his interrogatory of 18 May

1946. This interrogatory may be found under Number 158 in my Document