DISENGAGING RHEIMS

The race-horse division in another spearhead action--Regulars and

Marines--A division that had learned coördination--Trying for

Blanc-Mont--One attack that cost nothing--An exhausted division

reinforced by the new Southwestern division--Which keeps up with the

Marines--The 36th learns fast--And pursues the enemy to the Aisne.

Ever the demand from all parts of the Allied line was for American

troops. Their speed in attack had become a recognized factor in

the plans of the unified command, which moved them about with an

inconsiderate rapidity which was hard on shoe-leather and most

uncomfortable. The very sight of the soldiers of our young army moving

into a sector of their line before an action quickened the spirits of

the veterans of the old armies.

If Sir Douglas Haig had two American divisions for storming the

Hindenburg line, then General Gouraud, whose Fourth Army had broken

the trench line for gains west of the Argonne Forest, in conjunction

with our advance between the Forest and the Meuse, must have two

divisions for the next step in the general offensive movement which

was to disengage Rheims, in a drive northward from Somme-Py to the

Aisne. These two included the 2nd, Marines and Regulars, the race-horse

division, which had the longest experience in France of any regular

division except the pioneers of the 1st. Our sore need of its veteran

skill in the Meuse-Argonne had to yield to an urgent request, which

amounted to a command, from higher authority. Naturally, the 2nd would

have preferred being with our own army; but wherever it was it would

fight well. It was to add to its laurels now in the rolling country

of Champagne, where the deep strata of chalk under the light subsoil

formed solid walls for defenses, accrued through four years of digging,

as distinct on the background of the landscape as the white tape on a

tennis court or the base-lines on a baseball diamond. Soldiers in blue

or khaki, after fighting in this region in rainy weather, looked like

men who had just come from work in a flour-mill, where they had been

wrestling with the splashing mill-wheel. It was a custom to rub helmets

with the chalk of parapets for the sake of invisibility.

The action in which the 2nd was again, as on July 18th, to play the

part of the spearhead was to cut the Rheims salient by thrusts on the

sides, much as one would push in the roofless walls of a house on a man

within, which is much more reasonable than trying to break up through

the floor to get at him. The third German offensive of May had all but

encircled Rheims from the west; had the last and unsuccessful offensive

attained its end of a deep advance east of the city, Rheims would

have been far behind the enemy's line. As it was, heroic resistance

had saved the city, at the price of leaving it for four months in a

salient as pronounced and as dangerous as the Ypres salient, which

must be reversed and then broken. The reversal which would put the

enemy in turn into a salient was started west of Rheims, on September

30th, by General Berthelot's Fifth Army; in a three days' advance his

line, pivoting on the city, swung up from an east-west direction to a

northwest-southeast direction, effectively turning the salient inside

out. The line now ran for some twenty miles southeast past the edge

of Rheims, turned east through Champagne for another fifteen miles to

Aubérive, and then, as a result of General Gouraud's advances from

September 26th, turned northeast to the northern end of the Argonne.

A simultaneous attack by Berthelot, on the west face of this flat arc

with a thirty-mile chord, and by Gouraud on the east face, would send

the enemy scurrying back to a maximum depth of twenty-five miles to the

line of the Aisne river, which here runs roughly east and west.

From just north of Somme-Py, in the center of the up-slanting east face

of the salient, the 2nd Division, attached with French divisions to

the Twenty-first Corps, was to strike over chalk ridges and through

woods northwest toward Machault. The attack was first set for October

2nd, but was postponed while the division spent this day in cleaning

German recalcitrants out of a portion of the trench system taken over

from a French division which had captured it. The Corps orders for the

attack were then issued so late that there was not time to have them

translated and written out, as the custom was, for the sake of accuracy

which was considered indispensable to the team-play of units; but they

had to be sent orally to our two brigades.

In the center of the field of attack was the Vipère Wood, which was

known to hold many machine-gun nests. By a converging movement the

Marine brigade was to pass this wood on the left, and the Regular

brigade to pass it on the right in flank, and form line beyond

it,--which was not a mission a general would assign to tyros who had

not yet learned to maintain the _liaison_ of their units in difficult

fighting. In order to go into position, the Regular brigade had a

night march around the rear of the line. Happily the men of the 2nd

Division had had experience of this sort of thing. They had gone in on

the run at Château-Thierry, and again in the crucial drive at Soissons

on July 18th. It had been said that they did things best in a hurry,

which may have led to their being relied on as "hit-and-run"-experts;

nevertheless they had an idea of their own that if they might have

moved into line and looked over the ground a few hours before going

into an attack, instead of charging when they were breathless from

sprinting, they might have done equally well with slightly less nerve

strain.

As the French guides who were to meet the Regular brigade at dark and

show it the way did not appear, which was a common failing with guides,

the brigade had to grope about among shell-craters and communication

trenches to find its jumping-off place, which was still partly occupied

by the enemy. By 5 A.M. only six companies were in position; but by

5.50, the hour for attack, thanks to the owl's eyes and instinct of

direction which seemed to be a part of the equipment of the 2nd, every

company was up in order, ready for the charge. With tanks assisting

against its machine-gun nests, they swept past the Vipère Wood. A loss

of twenty per cent of their infantry did not interfere with their

reaching their two-mile objective on schedule time at 8.30.

The race-horse proclivities of the 2nd, having been developed on no

level speedway but over all the hurdles of modern defense against

all arms of fire, were accentuated by the rivalry of the Regular and

Marine brigades. The Marine was the better brigade of the two. All the

Marines say so. I agree with them. The Regular brigade was also the

better. All the Regulars say so. I agree with them. If the Marines

were up to their objective, the Regulars must be; and if the Regulars

were up the Marines must be, or die in the attempt. No ifs, or buts,

or excuses of any kind except casualties were ever accepted in the

2nd for not advancing. And you must not lose life unskillfully, or

your brigade might be convicted of not being as professional as the

other,--and that would be a disgrace. The 2nd had been fortunate in

its commanders. Major-General Harbord, a Regular, had leaned backward

toward the Marines; and Major-General Lejeune, a Marine officer, who

was now in command, leaned backward toward the Regulars. They were wise

men, occupied with making the 2nd the "best" division in the army.

Despite the trouble it met on the way from cross-fire and machine-gun

nests in the Somme-Py Wood, the Marine brigade was also up on schedule

time at 8.30. The two brigades had not been thinking much of their

flanks; they were concerned in racing each other. While either

considered the other incapable of its own stride, neither thought that

any brigade in the world except itself could keep pace with the other.

They were not surprised to find that the French were not up on their

flanks; and the fact that the French were not, interfered with the

success of another advance planned for 11 A.M., unless the 2nd were

to drive into a salient which increasing machine-gun fire indicated as

an unprofessional effort,--suicide not being professional with the 2nd

unless one brigade should make it a custom which the other would have

to follow.

Though the French on the right might hold up their end in a further

attack before noon, there was no chance that the French on the left

could: with the Marine front line more than two miles in advance, the

French were still occupied in trying to conquer the sinuous warrens

of the Essen trench, which was acting an assassin's part in the rear

of the Marines. Indeed, the Germans were counter-attacking, further

intensifying the seriousness of the situation. The reserve regiment of

Marines had other work to do than assisting the front-line regiment in

a further advance. While its men, in helping the French division, were

breaching dugouts, using their bayonets, throwing and dodging bombs

as they rushed around traverses and met counter-rushes in an infernal

hand-to-hand wrestle, and sending out chalk-plastered Germans in torn

uniforms to join the groups of prisoners and wounded coming from the

front, Marshal Foch sent a telegram of congratulation to the Corps,

with word to press the advance.

At 4 P.M., when the reserve regiment of the Marines had finished its

task in applying in savage hand-to-hand fighting, characteristic of

the old days before open warfare became the rule, all its training in

trench warfare, an order was given to obey that of the Marshal; but

it hardly concerned the front regiment of Marines, which was without

the support of the reserve regiment, while the retarded French on the

flank, still fighting hard for their gains, were well to the rear. The

reserve regiment of the Regulars, passing through the front regiment,

made three-quarters of a mile, where it met machine-gun fire from both

flanks. At 7.30, the French on the left having made progress, the

reserve regiment of Marines, passing through the front regiment, made

another hard-won gain against flanking fire, and in the darkness had to

repulse two counter-attacks.

It had been a great day even for the 2nd Division, with four miles

of advance and a toll of two thousand prisoners; a day of systematic

and masterly fighting which had added to its list of honors that of

forcing the Germans forever out of the deep maze of the Champagne

trenches. The trucks and the rolling kitchens as well as the artillery,

which had never been far behind the infantry, were up that night;

and the ambulances, in keeping with the race-horse spirit, running

close up to the front, had made a record in their expeditious care of

the wounded, who had been gathered with a promptness, in the fields

under fire, worthy of a show drill at maneuvers. For if we had any

division which knew how, and had reasons of long service for knowing

how, to coördinate all its branches in action, it was the division

which had learned its lessons in the taking of Belleau Wood, Vaux, and

Vauxcastille.

It need not be said that the program was to continue the advance the

next day; but the Germans had been preparing overnight to impede its

fulfillment with something of the same ferocity they had shown in the

Essen trench. As usual in these days, after the Allied attack had spent

its initial momentum in breaking them out of their fortifications, the

Germans reacted by applying open warfare tactics on a second line of

resistance. While the French were striving to come up on both flanks,

the whole line was being deluged with shells and machine-gun fire.

On the afternoon of the first day, the Marines by their customarily

swift tactics had taken a portion of Blanc-Mont--the adjective being

used before the name, contrary to modern French fashion--a hill which

ran back in an irregular shelf covered by patches of sparse woods.

Well-made trenches, dugouts, and communicating trenches so easily

dug and kept up in the firm chalk, were evidence of the German's

appreciation of the hill's importance in the defense of their positions

east of Rheims.

A congeries of machine-gun nests on its west slope, which was still

untaken, by its enfilade fire from our sector had stopped the advance

of the French on the left. Without waiting for them, and with a view

to clearing the way for them, the Marines on the afternoon of the 4th,

supported by their artillery, attacked this position. They tested out

its strength well enough, in face of withering blasts, to learn that

they must devise another plan of assault. This was a wise precaution,

as the event was to prove. They spent the night in tireless and

canny preparations for the next day's effort. Early in the morning a

battalion started over the ridge. They did not want for shields; and

their confidence in the accuracy of their veteran artillery led them to

keep close behind the smothering fire of the barrage with a speed and

agility in the systematic advance of their units which made a record

even for the race-horse division. The German machine-gunners, as they

saw that hurricane of bursting shells approaching, rushed to cover,

which they hugged in desperate and prayerful intimacy as it passed over

them. They rose, to find that a human whirlwind in its train was upon

them. Without a single casualty the battalion had taken 213 prisoners

and 75 machine-guns. The thing seemed miraculous; but there were the

machine-guns, and there were the startled Germans who had thrown

up their hands. When I went over the ground, still littered with

equipment and scattered cartridge cases, that commanded every avenue

of approach, I had an example which might well be quoted in all future

text-books of how speed and skill may get "the jump" on an enemy. Here

was certainly something, not to tell the Marines, but for the Marines

to tell those Regulars, who, holding a large section of the line, could

respond that though they had no theatrical exhibits to please the

gallery gods they were having an affair of their own which might make

any Marine thankful for his health's sake that he was climbing hills.

On the right of the Regular brigade the French had not yet taken

Médéah farm, which was a perfect haven for machine-guns bearing on

the Regulars' flank. The Germans, in this section, were fighting

hard enough to atone for the easy surrender of their comrades on

Blanc-Mont in their defense of the ridges in front of the village of

Saint-Etienne-à-Arnes, the next landmark in the path of the 2nd's

progress. The Marines found a thorn in the flesh in a strong point near

Blanc-Mont, whose defenders refused to be stampeded. Enemy artillery

fire was furious throughout the 5th. On the morning of the 6th, at

6.30, under another hurricane barrage, a regiment of Regulars and

one of Marines side by side set out to take the last ridge before

Saint-Etienne. This meant that something had to break. It was one of

the occasions when professional spirit did not consider the folly of

suicide, as the rival units charged side by side. They took the ridge

with a loss that was estimated at thirty per cent, and dug in. The

French on the left had forged ahead. Meanwhile, with the French on

the right valiantly struggling against Médéah farm, and our Regulars

checked, our line was at a sharp angle.

It had been a grueling day for a division which notably never spared

itself in its high-strung intensity; and four or five days seem to

have been the limit of endurance for soldiers who were continuously

fighting. Relief for the 2nd was due. On the night of the 6th the

36th Division, National Guard of Texas and Oklahoma, under command

of Major-General William R. Smith, which was lately from home and

had never been under fire before, began arriving. Its fresh and

inexperienced battalions were now mixed with the tired battalions of

the 2nd to learn the art of war at first hand from old masters, who

included not only their comrades of the Regulars and Marines but the

Germans in a very ugly mood. After a day of reorganizing and digging,

while the French were in the outskirts of Saint-Etienne, the Marines on

the left and a regiment of the 36th on the right charged Saint-Etienne

on the morning of the 8th. The French were reported to have patrols

in the town, but a portion of it at least seemed to be very much in

the hands of the enemy. At least his machine-gunners, in the course of

their supple infiltrations, had established themselves in the adjoining

cemetery, which gave them a free sweep of fire across the ground of

our advance, which was open fields without any more cover than a house

floor. For half a kilometer the men of the 36th kept their line even

with the veterans. The Marines entered the town while the men of the

36th were still in the open.

It was the Southwesterners' first taste of machine-gun nests. They had

no standards of previous experience for judgment as to the density of

fire which would warrant a halt. Their orders were to keep on going;

and they kept on. In front of them, as they crossed the open, was a

wooded ravine. Our guns could not bombard it with any appreciable

effect upon its nests, which were sending a tornado of bullets into

the 36th's charge in addition to the shower of shells from the German

guns. The Southwesterners who were meeting both bullets and shells

for the first time did not fall back before this deadly combination

of artillery and machine-gun fire, which would have dismayed hardened

veterans at their best, until they had kept faith with Alamo traditions

by losing a third of their numbers.

The 2nd's engineers now came up for a fighting part in protecting our

hard-pressed flanks. We withdrew our front to the town, which we held.

Meanwhile, though the French had taken Médéah farm, the division's

right was still well back of the line of Saint-Etienne. All day of the

9th was spent in re-forming our position after the see-sawing conflict

of the 8th; but the Germans, far from showing any signs of withdrawal,

made a counter-attack on the French beyond Médéah farm and on our

Regulars, who repulsed it with their rifle fire.

The race-horse division, which had been hurried from the mud of

the Saint-Mihiel sector without time to rest, had been doing a

steeple-chase for nine days. Physical exhaustion claimed it for its

own. As it withdrew, with casualties of 4,771 and the capture of 1,963

prisoners from eight German divisions, the Regulars and Marines and the

French of the Twenty-first Corps had the satisfaction of knowing that

German guns had fired their last shot at the cathedral and the ruins of

the city of Rheims.

The Texans and Oklahomans who now took up the battle were assigned the

tired artillery of the 2nd, as they had no guns of their own. They

lacked horses, transport, and nearly everything a division should have,

except rifles, which were in the hands of men who knew how to use them.

On the morning of the 10th their reconnaissance in force showed that

the enemy artillery and machine-gun fire was as powerful as ever. It

was hardly in the books that an inexperienced division should begin

a movement in the dark; but the French being ready to advance on the

left, the 36th began an attack that evening.

The Germans, already preparing for retreat, still had large forces

of field artillery in range. Evidently they were determined to take

revenge on these new troops by expending in the rapid fire of a

prolonged bombardment all they could of their ammunition, instead of

leaving it behind to be captured. The accurate and moving sheet of

death which was laid down upon the advancing infantry of the 36th

was the kind from which men will withdraw in the sheer instinct of

self-preservation. Indeed, a panic would have been excusable. But the

lean tall Texans and Oklahomans had not come all the way from home

to be in a battle at last with any idea of celebrating the occasion,

or gratifying the Germans, by a retreat, because of a display of

fireworks. Among the leaping flashes in the dark, with voices unheard

and men revealed for an instant in shadowy outline, with officers who

had the direction of units being killed and wounded, with gaps being

torn in the line, there was bound to be some disorganization. But

there was no faltering. The Texans and Oklahomans are not by nature

panicky. They accepted stoically this screaming tumult of destruction.

Particularly it was not the nature of the Indians among them to be

distracted by a "heap big noise." Officers agreed that there was no

problem except that of keeping units together. All the men wanted was

to "get back" at the German, straight into his barrage. Pressing on as

they closed up their gaps, the charging groups with the bit in their

teeth took the village of Machault.

The enemy resistance had suddenly broken. After this final spasm of

splenetic reprisal, all the German guns were moving fast toward the

Aisne. The Texans and Oklahomans did not waste much time over the

machine-gunners who attempted a rearguard action, but "hiked" ahead

for fifteen miles in a single day, as a reminder to the 2nd, which

had considered them "tenderfeet," that in the matter of long-distance

racing they yielded the honor to nobody. Bridges destroyed, machine-gun

nests established on the north of the river, the German served notice

that he was to make another stand. The Texans and Oklahomans enjoyed

themselves in swimming across on scouting trips and in a period of

active sniping gratifying to ranger inheritance. The last day they

were in line they completed their brief service by cleaning up Forest

farm, east of Attigny, in an uninterrupted rush which gave them the

opportunity to make the most of their qualities, and in ejecting the

enemy from a bend in the river which he still held. Their casualties

were 2,651, and they had taken 813 prisoners and an engineer depot

worth ten millions of dollars, which had supplied that section of the

German line for four years. It was their only battle, but they had

fought it in a way to make the most of it, in attest to the enemy of

what might be expected of such a new division, if, fully equipped, it

should take to the war-path again.

Our Greatest Battle (The Meuse-Argonne) · 第 35 / 76 题