CHAPTER XXXIV

THE TENTATIVE CHARACTER OF PROGRESS

PROGRESS IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH GROWTH OF INTELLIGENT CONTROL—NOR IS IT

DEMONSTRABLE—IT IS ESSENTIALLY TENTATIVE

I cannot accept the view that progress is nothing more or other than the

growth of intelligent control. No doubt this is a large part of it; an

enlightened and organized public will is, perhaps, our most urgent need;

but, after all, life is more than intelligence, and a conception that

exalts this alone is sure to prove inadequate. Progress must be at least

as many-faceted as the life we already know. Moreover, it is one of

those ideas, like truth, beauty and right, which have an outlook upon

the infinite, and cannot, in the nature of the case, be circumscribed by

a definition.

The truth is that it is often one of the requisites of progress that we

trust to the vague, the instinctive, the emotional, rather than to what

is ascertained and intellectual. The spirit takes on form and clarity

only under the stress of experience: its newer outreachings are bound to

be somewhat obscure and inarticulate. The young man who does not trust

his vague intuitions as against the formulated wisdom of his elders will

do nothing original.

The opinion sometimes expressed that social science should set forth a

definite, tangible criterion of progress is also, I think, based on a

false conception of the matter, derived, perhaps, from mechanical

theories of evolution. Until man himself is a mechanism the lines of his

higher destiny can never be precisely foreseen. It is our part to form

ideals and try to realize them, and these ideals give us a working test

of progress, but there can be nothing certain or final about them.

The method of our advance is, perhaps, best indicated by that which

great individuals have used in the guidance of their own lives. Goethe,

for example, trusted to the spontaneous motions of his spirit, studying

these, however, and preparing for and guiding their expression. Each of

his works represented one of these motions, and he kept it by him for

years to work upon when the impulse should return. So the collective

intelligence must wait upon the motions of humanity, striving to

anticipate and further their higher working, but not presuming to impose

a formal programme upon them.

The question whether, after all, the world really does progress is not

one that can be settled by an intellectual demonstration of any kind. It

is possible to prove that mankind has gained and is gaining in material

power, in knowledge, and in the extent and diversity of social

organization; that history shows an enlarging perspective and that the

thoughts of men are, in truth, “broadened with the process of the suns”:

but it is always possible to deny that these changes are progress. We

seem to mean by this term something additional, a judgment, in fact,

that the changes, whatever they may be, are on the whole _good_. In

other words progress, as commonly understood, is essentially a moral

category, and the question whether it takes place or not is one of moral

judgment. Nothing of this kind is susceptible of incontrovertible

demonstration, because the moral judgment is not bound by definite

intellectual processes, nearly the same in all minds, but takes in the

most obscure and various impulses of human nature.

Suppose you compare the state of the first white settlers in America,

narrow and hard, physically, mentally, and socially, with the

comparatively easy and spacious life of their descendants at the present

time; or contrast the life of a European peasant, dwelling in mediæval

ignorance and bondage, with that of the same peasant and his family

after they have emigrated to the United States and come to a full share

in its intelligence and prosperity. It may seem clear to most people

that these changes, which are like those the world in general has been

undergoing, are for the better; but the matter is quite debatable. The

simpler lot of the pioneer and the peasant can easily be made to appear

desirable, and there are, and no doubt always will be, those who

maintain that we are no better off than we were.

Development, I should say, can be proved. That is, history reveals,

beyond question, a process of enlargement, diversification, and

organization, personal and social, that seems vaguely analogous to the

growth of plant and animal organisms; but whether we are to write our

moral indorsement on the back of all this is another matter. Is it

better to be man or the marine animal, “resembling the larvæ of existing

Ascidians,”[83] from which he is believed to have descended? In the end

it comes down to this: is life itself a good thing? We see it waxing and

shining all about us, and most of us are ready to pronounce that it is

good; but the pessimist can always say: “To me it is an evil thing, and

the more of it the worse.” And there is no way of convincing him of

error.

In short, the reality of progress is a matter of faith, not of

demonstration. We find ourselves in the midst of an onward movement of

which our own spirits are a part, and most of us are glad to be in it,

and to ascribe to it all the good we can conceive or divine. This seems

the brave thing to do, the hopeful, animating thing, the only thing that

makes life worth while, but it is an act rather of faith than of mere

intelligence.

I hold, then, that progress, like human life in every aspect, is

essentially tentative, that we work it out as we go along, and always

must; that it is a process rather than an attainment. The best is

forever indefinable; it is growth, renewal, onwardness, hope. The higher

life seems to be an upward struggle toward a good which we can never

secure, but of which we have glimpses in a hundred forms of love and

joy. In childhood, music, poetry, in transient hours of vision, we know

a fuller, richer life of which we are a part, but which we can grasp

only in this dim and flitting way. All history is a reaching out for, a

slow, partial realization of, such perceptions. The thing for us is to

believe in the reality of this larger life, seen or unseen, to cling to

all persons and activities that help to draw us into it, to trust that

though our individual hold upon it relax with age and be lost, yet the

great Whole, from which we are in some way inseparable, lives on in

growing splendor. _I_ may perish, but _We_ are immortal.

I look with wonder and reverence upon the great spirits of the past and

upon the expression of human nature in countless forms of art and

aspiration. It seems to me that back of all this must be a greater Life,

high and glorious beyond my imagination, which is trying to work itself

out through us. But this is in the nature of religion, and I do not

expect to impose it upon others by argument.

As regards the proximate future I see little to justify any form of

facile optimism, but conceive that, though the world does move, it moves

slowly, and seldom in just the direction we hope. There is something

rank and groping about human life, like the growth of plants in the

dark: if you peer intently into it you can make out weird shapes, the

expression of forces as yet inchoate and obscure; but the growth is

toward the light.

Social process · 第 34 / 35 章