CHAPTER XX

ECONOMIC FACTORS; THE CLASSES ABOVE POVERTY

INCOME AND PROPAGATION IN THE WELL-TO-DO CLASS—CIVILIZATION AND RACE

EXHAUSTION—DOES SUCCESS INDICATE EUGENIC VALUE?—THE INTERMEDIATE

CLASS OR “PLAIN PEOPLE”

In order to discuss the economic factors affecting the propagation of

different types of men it may be well to divide the population roughly

into three classes: the well-to-do at one extreme, those in actual want

at the other, and the vast intermediate class who come under neither

description. Such a division is arbitrary, but may serve to indicate

certain influences bearing upon our question. Let us include in the

first, families whose income is $2,000 or more, in the second, those

whose income is less than $600, and in the third, families whose income

is between these amounts.[54]

The first class is the successful class, judged by pecuniary standards,

and includes not only prosperous business men, but the better paid of

the professional class, and of men living on salaries. The prevailing

tendency in this part of society, subject of course to many exceptions

and modifications, appears to be to sacrifice the size of the family to

other interests. This is the class which easily forms habits of luxury,

and develops costly and exacting ideals regarding the nurture and

education of its children. For the money spent upon them no pecuniary

return is expected, and the hardship and responsibility inseparable from

the rearing of a family appear greater by contrast with habits of ease.

It is also in this class that personal choice is most cultivated, and

the sophistication that applies this to limiting the number of children,

so that, although the death-rate is low, the birth-rate is scarcely

sufficient to offset it. Relatively to other and more prolific parts of

the population the stocks represented in this class may be regarded as

tending to decline.[55]

The biological significance of this depends upon the value of these

stocks, upon what distinctive biological traits, if any, are to be found

in well-to-do families as a group. The prevalent view among eugenic

writers, led by Galton, has been that the successful class, on the

whole, represents the ablest stocks, and that eugenic progress depends

mainly upon securing a high rate of increase among them. Galton himself

held that all other eugenic aims were of secondary importance. It should

be noted, however, that he did not propose to measure success merely by

income, but rather by established reputation among the group best able

to judge of a particular kind of merit. His eugenic aristocracy would

consist, for example, of those lawyers, artists, men of letters, men of

science, and even of those skilled artisans, who are regarded by their

colleagues as able men of their kind. The business group would no doubt

be included but would not be allowed an importance at all corresponding

to its wealth. At the apex of this aristocracy would be men of genius,

the test of genius being great and enduring reputation.[56]

This view of the eugenic superiority of the successful class, in

conjunction with the smallness of the families in this class, has led to

pessimistic views regarding the future of the race. Some writers hold

that civilization necessarily exhausts a stock, that such exhaustion has

been the main cause of the decay of great nations in the past, and that

the process was never so rapid as in our own time. Others think that,

although the decline is real, it has not yet gone very far, and that we

may be saved from it by a rational eugenics.

The argument that civilization, especially modern civilization, tends to

race deterioration is simple and, to say the least, plausible.

Civilization selects the best stocks and uses them up. The ablest types

of men, incited by ambition, achieve success and carry on the more

intellectual and exhausting functions of the social order. At the same

time their success subjects them to the upper-class conditions of luxury

and exacting ideals. The result is infecundity of the successful class,

and of the superior stocks which it represents. The best grain is eaten

and the next crop raised from inferior seed.

This process may be peculiarly rapid in a democracy like ours, because

it is our tendency, and indeed our ideal, to make the rise of natural

ability as free and rapid as possible. When life in general was

traditional, functions inherited or customary, and opportunity confined

to a few, the process by which natural ability rose to the top and

evaporated was slow and uncertain. But now, with our universal spurring

of ambition, our racial resources are rapidly spent, and, short of a

change in the ideals and way of life of the successful class, it is not

apparent how they can be saved.[57]

The opinion upon which all this depends, that the successful class

represents the best stocks, is, however, open to question. One criticism

of it is that opportunity and success are still mainly a matter of

privilege rather than of natural ability; and many assert that in spite

of our ideal of equal opportunity the ascendancy of privilege is

increasing, and that nothing short of a revolution can overthrow it. If

this view is at all correct it undermines the whole idea that the

present successful class represents an aristocracy of natural ability,

or has especial eugenic significance of any kind.

It is worth noting, however, that one may allow much present dominance

of privilege, but hold that, in spite of it, there is a continuous flow

of able stocks toward the top, so that the upper strata probably have a

considerable eugenic superiority. And if we believe that improvements in

education are increasing opportunity as against privilege, this

superiority should be growing. In that case it would be a great object

to insure fecundity in these strata.

Another line of criticism would question whether the hereditary traits

that make for success, as we now understand it, are after all the ones

we need to increase. Many feel a lively dissatisfaction with the people

who rule our economic and political institutions; they are criticised as

selfish, unsocial, predatory. “The successful man, it is alleged, is not

a success.” Indeed, as a matter of theory, it is by no means clear that

those who gain the economic prizes are those who are doing most for the

welfare of the race. The question might be put in this way: Is not the

desirable type the Christian type, using the term to designate those who

are swayed by a large fellow-feeling? And is the successful type

conspicuously Christian? The affirmative of this does not seem very

evident. “Many that are first shall be last.”

Besides selfish ambition, there are other traits that might push a man

upward but not be desirable to increase. Is not the successful class

deficient in domestic impulses? They appear to be unprolific, and this

may indicate that the instincts are weak, causing the sacrifice of

family life to ambition. Perhaps the infecundity of this class is only

the wholesome elimination of an unsocial type. The best type of man may

be too broadly human for economic success.

On the other hand, there is good sense in the view that success is

usually attained by qualities of general value, such as energy,

initiative, tenacity, and intelligence; and that, so far as it is

accompanied by selfishness, lack of domesticity, and the like, we may

ascribe this rather to environment than to any defect in the hereditary

type. There is much in success to make a man selfish.

The eugenic superiority of the upper economic class may also be

questioned on the ground that the conditions for _maintaining_ a

superior stock are not so good in this class as in a less prosperous

part of society. The tests are not so rigid; people who are supported by

inherited wealth may raise families whether they have shown any natural

ability or not. Their position is somewhat like that of the chronic

paupers at the other economic extreme, who raise degenerate families by

the aid of charity. Certainly there are many marriages of the sons and

daughters of the rich which do not seem based on personal merit, either

biologic or social.

I suppose the reader will feel, as I do, that it is hardly possible, in

view of these conflicting considerations, to form any precise idea of

the relative eugenic value of the upper economic class. My own

impression, derived mainly from general observation, is that it does,

after all, contain a large number of exceptionally able families, many

of which are becoming unprolific under the influences of prosperity. If

we can increase the fecundity of such families by diffusing a higher

sense of race obligation we shall be doing excellent work for the next

generation.

If we embrace in the intermediate class those who maintain themselves in

tolerable comfort, but only by steady work and close economy, never

being able to accumulate much surplus, it is by far the largest class of

the three, and one in which the conditions of survival seem favorable to

the increase of good types. The excess of births over deaths is greater

than among the upper class, on the one hand, or among the misery class

on the other.

The measure of success attained requires solid qualities, such as

intelligence and tenacity, in as great measure, often, as a more

brilliant career; and as there is no inherited “independence,” these

must be kept in constant operation. Helpmates and “good providers” are

appreciated in marriage, though sexual intuitions also play a large

part. Domestic sentiment is strong and seldom overshadowed by

extravagant ambition.

It seems that the selection of types and the maintenance of a sound

eugenic standard—so far as it is maintained—is chiefly accomplished

here. Writers on eugenics have given most of their attention to

extremes, as Galton in his work on Hereditary Genius, and Dugdale and

later writers in monographs on degenerate families; but while conditions

in these extremes are important they probably count less than those in

the far more numerous intermediate class. Galton’s argument that the

paramount eugenic object is to increase the fecundity of the highly

successful types rests entirely upon his premise that these types have

an all-around superiority proportionate to their success. If we reject

this and deny that it is possible to locate the source of future

supermen in a small class, then the “plain people” deserve our chief

attention. The type of man that can and will raise a family under medium

conditions is the type that must prevail in numbers, and there is little

reason to doubt that this is, on the whole, a good type, or rather a

variety of good types. The mass of men we wish to be, first of all,

well-proportioned in mind and body, with health, sound nerves,

intelligence, perseverance, adaptability, and strong social impulses.

All these are qualities favorable to normal success and fecundity.

The higher evolution of the hereditary type is also, in my judgment, to

be looked for mainly through the slow working of the requirements for

mediocre success. If the conditions of life are changing in such a

manner as to require greater intelligence, initiative, stability, and

force of character, as it seems to me likely that they are, it would

seem that these traits, so far as they are hereditary, should be

increased by the process of selection actually going on. In this way we

may hope that the human stock will improve in the future as it probably

has in the past. A higher type of society develops a higher type of man

to work it, biological as well as social. This view is somewhat

speculative, as I am aware that there is no proof that the breed of men

has changed at all during historic time,[58] but it seems to me the most

probable speculation.

And, as regards practical eugenics, I should say that one of our main

aims should be to uphold the comparatively healthy influences dominant

in the great intermediate class, as against the demoralizing ideals

prevalent among the rich.

Social process · 第 20 / 35 章