SECTION V.

ON HUME'S ARGUMENT, AS AFFECTED BY THE PURPOSE.

This topic is so impressive, and indeed awful, in its relation to

Christianity, that we shall not violate its majesty by doing more

than simply stating the case. All the known or imagined miracles

that ever were recorded as flowing from any Pagan origin,

were miracles--1, of ostentation; 2, of ambition and rivalship;

3, expressions of power; or, 4, were blind accidents. Not even

in pretence were any of them more than that. First and last came

the Christian miracles, on behalf of a _moral_ purpose. The

purpose was to change man's idea of his own nature; and to change

his idea of God's nature. Many other purposes might be stated; but

all were moral. Now to any other wielder of supernatural power,

real or imaginary, it never had occurred by way of pretence even,

that in working miracles he had a moral object. And here, indeed,

comes in the argument of Christ with tremendous effect--that, whilst

all other miracles might be liable to the suspicion of having been

effected by alliance with darker agencies, his only (as sublime

moral agencies for working the only revolution that ever was worked

in man's nature) could not be liable to such a suspicion; since,

if an evil spirit would lend himself to the propagation of good in

its most transcendent form, in that case the kingdom of darkness

would be 'divided against itself.'

Here, then, is an _a posteriori_ reason, derived from the whole

subsequent life and death of the miracle-worker, for diminishing

the value of _x_ according to the _Lemma_.

Theological Essays and Other Papers — Volume 1 · 第 4 / 7 章