He then adds:—_Marriage with a deceased wife's sister Leviticus XVIII. 18, considered in connection with the Law of the Levirate

“The next remark I have to make on this, which is God’s own table of

prohibited marriages, is one which it seems to me that no fair mind

can deny. Indeed, one is half ashamed to enounce it, it is so

obvious: yet the reasoning on the other side appears to be mainly

based on the denial of it. It is simply this: that nearness of kin

not being affected by sex, what is forbidden to a man is forbidden to

a woman in the same degree of kindred or affinity, though it be not

set down in words. For instance, in v. 7, a man is forbidden to

marry his mother: then, by the same rule, a woman is forbidden to

marry her father, though the prohibition is not expressed. Surely it

would be fearful paltering with God’s law, not to accept and obey

such a plain rule as this. And it is to be observed, that these

Canons are all addressed to men only: the woman’s duty and the

woman’s sin are left to be inferred in each case: but what should we

think of the woman who should therefore account herself left at

liberty, so far as the Levitical laws are concerned?

“Now look at v. 16; which, being expressed in such English as we now

commonly talk, would run, I suppose, as follows: ‘Thou shalt not

marry thy brother’s widow: she is one flesh with thy brother, and is

therefore thine own sister.’ Can any other interpretation be put

upon it? and if this be the right interpretation, are not marriages

with a brother’s widow plainly forbidden among the Canaanitish

abominations?” {8}

All this appears to me not only a fair and right explanation, with no

unwarrantable deductions or inferences, but one absolutely irrefutable,

unless God Himself have marked in some other place a dispensation or

exception to be made to it. I know such dispensation or exception is

just what is claimed. To deal with such allegation is the very object of

my addressing you, and I shall shortly come to that part of my subject.

But it may not be amiss here just to call attention to the fact that Dr.

M’Caul himself (whom I think I may designate as the most learned and able

of the advocates for the change of the law in question) seems to admit

that, were there no other Scripture to override the law as thus

proclaimed, he should acknowledge the force of this part of the xviii.

chapter of Leviticus as conclusive on the unlawfulness of marriage with

the deceased wife’s sister; for he says expressly, in his first letter on

the subject, addressed to the Rev. W. H. Lyall, “On some points, I think,

we agree; as, for instance, that the final appeal in questions relating

to marriage must be to the Word of God. . . . I also am convinced that

the laws in Leviticus xviii., being a part of the moral law, stand on a

totally different footing from circumcision, or the Jewish Sabbaths, or

abstinence from meats. Indeed, I believe that this marriage law was

given to the Gentile Churches in the famous decree of the Council of

Jerusalem. On this ground, I believe that the prohibitions of Leviticus

xviii. are binding on all Christians.” That is, he believes, that the

general law then given, as being of a moral nature, and intended for all

men, was distinctly re-enacted, and re-decreed for the sake of greater

perspicuity, by the Christian Church in the Council at Jerusalem. And he

goes on—“I agree, further, with those who interpret ‘woman’ or ‘wife’ in

these prohibitions as comprehending widowhood, so that these females are

prohibited, not only during the lives of their husbands, but absolutely

and forever.” And he adds—“And, lastly, I admit that from the prohibited

marriages enumerated, compared with other parts of the Divine

legislation, others not enumerated may be pronounced unlawful.” {9}

Where we may see that, although with a certain reserve, yet the principle

of arguing from analogy, and from a case to its converse, in regard to

sex, appears to be admitted. And I think I do not misrepresent the whole

tone and sense of the two letters of Dr. M’Caul, when I say that I am

convinced, but for the 18th verse of the xviii. chapter, he would himself

readily have allowed the full weight of Mr. Keble’s statement, and

considered these unions to be absolutely prohibited.

But next as to the exception claimed. It is true that there is an

exception to the working of the law laid down in verse 16, concerning the

brother’s wife, by a positive enactment in Deuteronomy (chap. xxv. v.

5–10), where provision is made for a man “raising up seed unto his

brother,” by taking to him his widow to wife, if the brother have died

childless, that “the first-born which she beareth” may “succeed in the

name of his brother, which is dead, that his name be not put out of

Israel” (v. 6.) But I feel justified in saying that this alone would

have been no difficulty to Dr. M’Caul (nor to any man of his reasoning

powers), as to the prevalence of the general law in all cases but the

special one excepted, and that but for the 18th verse of the xviii.

chapter of Leviticus, our 99th Canon and the table of prohibited degrees

would have been almost or quite universally accepted as the true

enunciation of the will and law of God in this matter of unlawful

marriages.

It is, then, to that particular passage of Holy Scripture that it is

necessary to draw attention. And here, my lord, I must take up a word,

which I find in your speech before referred to, which seems to me to be

emphatically a word “of truth and soberness.” You say, “To over-ride a

command, which is distinct and precise, you must have a very clear verse

and a very clear interpretation.” {10} Dr. M’Caul quotes these words,

with a distinct approval of their statement, though with exactly the

converse of their application. “You believe,” he says, “that a very

clear verse and a very clear interpretation might over-ride a command,

even though it be distinct and precise, and you are right.” He goes on,

“Lev. xviii. 16, the verse on which you chiefly rest your Scriptural

arguments, is, so far as relates to marriage with a brother’s wife,

distinct and precise, and enunciates a command absolutely and without any

limitation; and yet it is over-ridden by Deut. xxv. 5.” He means, of

course, over-ridden as to the particular case of “a man’s raising up seed

unto his brother;” but not so as to sanction the brother taking the

brother’s wife in any other contingency. And this we, as well as he,

allow and admit, for who shall limit the Almighty’s right, and power to

grant or make any special exceptions to His general laws, which He may

think fit? But we should have deemed it strange indeed if the whole law

enacted in one place were definitely repealed in another, whilst that law

was in force among those for whom it was given and designed. But so far

we can well go with Dr. M’Caul. He proceeds, where, as I hope presently

to shew, we have no need to follow him, and where, indeed, if his view

were correct, there _would be_ the total repeal of what is stated as the

law in one verse, in the second verse after it. However, to go on,—Dr.

M’Caul adds, “And therefore, _a fortiori_, your inferential prohibition

with regard to a wife’s sister may be over-ridden also by a clear verse

and a clear interpretation. If weight of authority is to decide, Lev.

xviii. 18, is just such a verse, and its interpretation has the required

condition. Here, then, the controversy narrows itself into that which is

the common and popular view of the matter: whether the inferential

prohibition from verse 16 is to over-ride the expressed command of verse

18, or the plain letter of this latter verse to over-ride the inference

from the former.” {11} Now, I shall have something further to say

presently as to “the expressed command,” and the “plain letter of this

latter verse;” but at present let me merely remark, that we have, at any

rate, Dr. M’Caul’s admission that between these two verses there _is a

conflict and an over-riding_. In his view even, there is discrepancy.

What is, in the one, he tells us, at least inferentially prohibited, is,

in the other, expressly commanded; and this, not in a case or manner

parallel to the variation between the 16th verse, _prohibiting_ as the

general law, and the passage in Deut. xxv. 5, _enjoining_ in the

exceptional contingency named, but, on the contrary, in a case of a

universal negative met and confronted, two verses afterwards, by a case

of a, not exceptional, contradictory affirmative. And the only

palliation of such a startling discrepancy in Holy Scripture is, we are

to understand, that it is inadmissible to draw the inference from the

woman being forbidden to marry two brothers, that the man is forbidden to

marry two sisters. Although throughout the restrictions this principle

is necessary to prevent the most revolting permissions under the law, and

although, but for the 18th verse, no one, we believe, would have dreamed

of questioning it in the particular of the man and two sisters, yet here

it must be at once ignored, or you have an absolute contradiction of

commands, in the same enunciation of law, within two verses. {12} I

notice this point expressly, because I think we cannot too strongly

entertain the conviction of the _unlikelihood_ of such a thing occurring

thus in the word and law of God; and therefore, as a reason for the most

careful examination, whether we may not have overlooked the real scope

and object of this 18th verse, even if we admit the correctness of the

translation and of the sense. Observe, there is a great distinction

between the sense and the application. Admitting the sense, I must deny

the application, as I shall presently shew. But here let me repeat, if

there be but a fairly reasonable account to be given of the existence and

application of the 18th verse, without its running us into the difficulty

of this over-riding, and collision with itself of God’s law, and if we

hereby avoid the gross unlikelihood which I have mentioned, then surely

such account and such application ought to commend itself to every candid

mind, as at least worthy of the most serious consideration.

My Lord, I venture to think such account and application of the 18th

verse there is; and though it has been touched upon by others, and Dr.

M’Caul himself came very near it, yet it appears to have been too little

dwelt upon by any, and strangely overlooked by him. {13a}

Let me here bring the matter once more to the point of divergence. We

have first the general law, “None of you shall approach to any that is

near of kin to him” (v. 6). We have then the general catalogue of

prohibitions which come under this head, and form the divine comment on

the terms “near of kin:” and these dealing, with cases of affinity, in a

majority of the prohibitions expressed, as compared with those of blood

relationship (v. 7–17.) All these, moreover, be it observed, put in the

statement as commands upon the _man_, leaving the obligation upon the

_woman_ to be inferred. Upon this statement we have Archbishop Parker’s

table of degrees, and of the forbidden unions, extending exactly to the

parallel cases of all those named;—with the like witness also of the 99th

Canon, declaring all such alliances to be incestuous;—and this table

required by our law, both of Church and State, to be set up in all Parish

Churches. {13b} But we have then the 18th verse making, as is alleged,

not merely an exception, but a contradiction to the parallel case of what

is forbidden in verse 16 as to the brother’s wife, and permitting the

union with a wife’s sister, so that it be not in the lifetime of the

former. We thus come to what Dr. M’Caul himself considers to be a case

of _over-riding_, where we must determine whether (to use again his own

words) “the inferential prohibition from verse 16 is to over-ride the

expressed command of verse 18, or the plain letter of this latter verse

to over-ride the inference from the former.” {14}

Now, what I am anxious to see is, whether there is any need to force upon

us this _over-riding_ at all. I think not.

To show what I mean, I ask this—Take the prohibition of the brother’s

wife first in its plain literal terms, verse 16, and then is there,

independently of the 18th verse, any direct exception to it? Certainly

there is. When we come to the further explication of the Jewish polity,

and God’s designs in reference to it, we find a special provision in the

law of the Levirate, (that is, the law of raising up seed to the deceased

brother), which will clash with that prohibition; for the brother is

required to take his brother’s wife and raise up seed to a house in

danger of becoming extinct in Israel. “If brethren dwell together, and

one of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry

without unto a stranger: her husband’s brother shall go in unto her, and

take her to him to wife, and perform the duty of an husband’s brother

unto her. And it shall be, that the firstborn which she beareth shall

succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name be not

put out of Israel. And if the man like not to take his brother’s wife,

then let his brother’s wife go up to the gate unto the elders, and say,

My husband’s brother refuseth to raise up unto his brother a name in

Israel, he will not perform the duty of my husband’s brother. Then the

elders of his city shall call him, and speak unto him: and if he stand to

it, and say, I like not to take her; then shall his brother’s wife come

unto him in the presence of the elders, and loose his shoe from off his

foot, and spit in his face, and say, So shall it be done unto that man

that will not build up his brother’s house. And his name shall be called

in Israel, The house of him that hath his shoe loosed.” Deut. xxv.,

5–10.

In this passage there is, not what I should call a contradiction to the

general law, but an exception in a particular case, and for a particular

case only. It is no general permission over-riding and making of none

effect the general prohibition, but a particular injunction for a special

purpose in one defined contingency. If a man’s brother die childless,

his brother shall take his wife and raise up seed unto his brother. As

it was exactly quoted in the gospel: “Master, Moses said, If a man die,

having no children, his brother shall marry his wife, and raise up seed

unto his brother.” {15}

We have already observed that the authority of Him who gave the

prohibitory law is sufficient to give also the permissive, or more than

permissive, exception, so that we come into no difficulty as to the one,

in such measure, _over-riding_ (to use again the term) the other.

But of course the opponent’s rejoinder is: Are you not in the very same

case as to the other over-riding? Is not the authority which gave the

prohibition of the 16th verse equal to give the permission of the 18th?

Granting that it is so, yet I must again call attention to this; how

wholly unlikely it is that, without making any special exception, for any

suggested or defined cause, there should be within two verses of each

other two general laws exactly contradictory, for so they are, if the

argument from parallelism is allowed. And therefore I must again urge

how probable this makes it, if there be any other reasonable sense or

application of the second passage not involving this contradiction, that

such sense and application should be the true one, and there should be

thus no over-riding at all between those two verses.

Is there then any such reasonable sense and application of the

prohibition of the 18th verse? I think there is. To see what it is, go

back to the exception under the law of the Levirate, {16} and ask whether

the application of that law might not involve a man’s marrying two

sisters. Undoubtedly it might. Suppose two brothers to have married two

sisters, and the one brother to die, leaving no child, if, by the

Leviratical law the brother, as he would do under that law simply, took

his brother’s widow to raise up seed unto his brother, he would also be

taking to wife his own wife’s sister, and this, it would seem under the

injunction in Deuteronomy, he would not only be permitted but enjoined to

do. But was this to be without exception? I answer, No! If his own

wife, the sister of the other were still alive, the Almighty did not

intend this rule to be carried out in such case. He, the surviving

brother, in that contingency, should _not_ “take a wife to her sister to

vex her, . . . beside the other in her life-time.” The prohibition of

the 18th verse of the xviii. chapter of Leviticus comes in. It comes, in

the translation of the authorized version. It comes, in the sense

contended for, as prohibitory if both sisters are alive together. It

comes, as tacitly sanctioning the union if they are not; but it comes as

limited in its application to this one case and one contemplated

contingency, as God’s own exception touching the two sisters “in their

life-time:”—His exception, as to both sisters alive together; the

exception to the exception contained in the law of the Levirate, but as

having nothing at all to do with the general law: as therefore in no way

interfering with or over-riding the general law of the 16th verse; in no

way making its general provision of none effect, as it would do if taken

in the sense and application of these reformers of our marriage law. And

the above-mentioned sense and application which everyone must allow the

18th verse will bear, nay, which Dr. M’Caul tells us all Jewish

authorities claim and sanction, as at least included in its legislation,

is, I must contend, ample and sufficient to explain the standing of the

18th verse, and its full meaning, without supposing any other application

whatsoever.

And let it be observed that this statement of such application to the

case of two brothers having married two sisters, and the consequent duty,

in the case of one brother dying childless, of the other brother to take

his widow under the law of Deuteronomy, modified by the exception of the

18th verse of Lev. xviii, that such union is not to take place, if his

own wife be still alive, is not mine, but Dr. M’Caul’s, in a full

examination of certain passages in the Mishna upon this subject. Indeed

it was Dr. M’Caul’s own statement, in his Letter addressed, my Lord, to

yourself in 1860, which brought to my mind the main line of argument

which I am endeavouring to unfold. I asked myself;—If all this in the

Mishna and in Dr. M’Caul’s explication of the matter, be true, why is it

not the sufficient truth and the whole explanation needed? Why go on to

make a conflict between the two verses in Leviticus when the 18th verse

is acknowledged to be the enunciation of an exception to the law of the

Levirate, and when this is a full and sufficient account of it?

It will, I think, be no waste of time to extract the passage to which I

refer from Dr. M’Caul’s letter, as this will serve both to make what I

have here said the more distinct, and shew also, how entirely both the

Mishna and Dr. M’Caul maintain all which I have advanced as to the

application of the verse in Leviticus to the case of the two brothers

having married two sisters, though they refuse (at least the latter) to

stop at this point.

I ought to say thus much as introduction to the Extract. In his first

letter Dr. M’Caul had mentioned the Mishna as confirming his view. “The

Mishna compiled in the second century testifies that it (this permission

of the marriage) was the common and received sense of the Hebraizing

Jews.” {18} This drew some remarks from the writer of one of the Tracts

published by the Marriage Law Defence Association, (Tract 8, p. 4, and

Appendix, quoted also by yourself in the Appendix to your speech,) upon

the statements of the Mishna, which again caused Dr. M’Caul in rejoinder

to examine those statements and to comment upon them afresh in his letter

to yourself. I need not go back to the first two pamphlets. Dr.

M’Caul’s explanations in his second letter will shew all which I want to

exhibit. Complaining of inaccurate quotation on the part of the writer

of Tract 8, he says,

“I will give the passages as they stand in the Mishna, and you, Sir,

may judge of the faithfulness of this writer in making quotations.

The words of the Mishna are:—

“‘Suppose three brothers, two of them married to two sisters, and one

of them married to a stranger—one of the sister’s husbands dies, and

he who is married to the stranger takes his widow—then the wife of

the second dies, and after that he that is married to the stranger

dies, behold this _widow_, (_i.e._, the surviving sister) is

prohibited to him for ever, because she was prohibited to him for

_one hour_.’

“Now, Sir, you will perceive several differences between this

statement of the Mishna and that of the Appendix. 1st, The Appendix

says,—‘It is declared, that if that _brother’s wife is his own wife’s

sister_, _he may not marry her_.’ The Mishna makes no such general

statement, but confines itself to a particular case. 2dly, The

reason the Mishna gives for the prohibition of the surviving sister

is that ‘she had been prohibited to him _for one hour_,’ which the

Appendix omits altogether. 3rdly, The Appendix says, ‘And the reason

assigned is, that _the man and his wife’s sister_ are related _within

the degrees forbidden by the holy law_ to intermarry,’ not one word

of which is in the text of the Mishna, as you see. The Mishna gives

the reason correctly, _she had been prohibited to the second brother

for one hour_, _i.e._, her widowhood commenced whilst her sister was

still alive and the wife of the other brother, in which case the

_Rabbis_ rule that she is prohibited for ever.

“To make this plain, I will put letters as in the Appendix:—

“Two brothers | A/B | marry | M/N | Two sisters.

“A third brother, C, marries S, a stranger, _i.e._, no relation.

“A dies; M is left a widow.

“C marries M, A’s Widow, to fulfil a brother-in-law’s duty, which B

could not do, because to marry two sisters simultaneously is

forbidden by Lev. xviii. 18. This is the ‘one hour’ during which M

is prohibited to B.

“N then dies, and B is left a widower; but he is not allowed to marry

M, left a second time a widow, because on the death of A, whilst N,

his wife, was alive, M was prohibited. Out of this particular case,

by putting in words not in the Mishna, and by leaving out the words

‘one hour,’ which are in the Mishna, the writer has made a new

Rabbinic law, unknown to the Mishna and its commentators, and from a

particular case has drawn a general conclusion, opposed to Jewish law

and practice. For, take the deaths in a different order, so as to

avoid the ‘one hour,’ and then B might marry M. Thus:—

“Two brothers | A/B | marry | M/N | Two sisters.

“A third brother, C, marries S, a stranger.

“Suppose that N dies first, and after she is dead A dies without

children, then B may marry M, because she had not been ‘prohibited to

him for _one hour_,’ _i.e._, she had not been a widow whilst his own

wife was alive. The second case alluded to is exactly similar:—

“Mishna III. 9.—‘Suppose two brothers [A and B] married two sisters

[M and N]. If one of the brothers [A] die, and afterwards the wife

of the second [N] die, then the widow [M] is prohibited to the

surviving brother [B] because she had been prohibited to him _one

hour_.’

“But suppose that N had died first, and then A died without children,

then it would have been lawful for B to marry M, as may be seen in

Maimonides, Yad Hachazakah, Hilchoth Yibbum, ch. vii., § 3, 4, where

there is an analogous case. The prohibition in the one case, and the

permission in the other, depends, not upon the words of the law, but

upon a general rule _laid down by the Rabbis_; that the lawfulness or

unlawfulness, as well as the obligation to perform the duty of a

brother-in-law, is regulated by the state of things existing at the

moment when the brother died.” {20}

I have extracted the above at full length, because at the same time that

it shews all I want and even more than I want for my purpose, it yet also

shews no contradiction to what I want, whilst it shews also that I

suppress no part of Dr. M’Caul’s statement or argument. I say that it

shews something more than I want, though nothing contradictory to it;

because I have no need to consider either the third case of a brother

marrying a stranger, or the case of the _one hour_ commented upon by the

Mishna, or at least this case no further than as it brings out into the

plainest prominence Dr. M’Caul’s own witness to the sense of Lev. xviii.

18, that it forbids “B to marry A’s widow, because _to marry two sisters

simultaneously is forbidden by Lev. xviii._ 18.” That is, by the law of

the Levirate simply, this would have been required, but by the exception

of the above verse it is forbidden. {21}

And this is what I mean by saying the passage shews all I want. It

proves incontestably that according to the Mishna, according to the

Jewish Rabbis, according to Dr. M’Caul, the enactment of the 18th verse

of the xviii. of Leviticus was inserted, for the very purpose which I

have all along supposed:—that it was the declaration of God’s will, that

when the operation of the law of the Levirate _per se_ would bring about

the brother taking his own wife’s sister to wife to raise up seed unto

his brother, _then_ the exception to the exception came in and forbade

him to do so, if her sister, his own wife, were alive. And this is what

made me say (p. 13) that Dr. M’Caul came very near to the application of

that text which I have been unfolding, though I was obliged to add, he

overlooked its importance in interpreting the law as contained in

Leviticus, for he allows that the 18th verse of Leviticus xviii. reaches

to, is intended to reach to, and to forbid, this especial union, which

otherwise would have been enjoined by the law in Deut. xxv., but it

appears never to have occurred to him that this is the ample and

sufficient explanation of the existence of that 18th verse. He never

seems to have conceived it possible that it should be restricted to being

the exception to the Leviratical Law, and not be a general Law itself.

I would, my Lord, for many reasons, had it so pleased God, that Dr.

M’Caul were alive. His ability and learning, his strong sense and true

piety, and not least his willing readiness to join with those who might

differ from him in many points in the defence of our common Church and

common faith against the assaults of infidelity and rationalism, make his

death a no ordinary loss to us in days like these. But beyond this, I

own, had it so been possible, I should have liked to point out to him how

his own statements, his own authorities, and his own reasoning had been

the very means to lead me to the conclusion, that we find a very complete

and sufficient explanation of the existence and meaning of the 18th verse

of Lev. xviii., without any occasion to resort to so violent an

over-riding one statement of Scripture by another, as he has advocated.

And this too without having to question the ordinary translation of the

verse, or to find any difficulty in the sense of the words, “in her

lifetime.” All this, at any rate for the sake of argument, I seem able

to concede to Dr. M’Caul, to take his own account of _an_ application of

the passage, and only add, that it seems to me to be _the_ application,

and the only application needed. I cannot forbear adding, that if there

be but a chance of this being so, it makes it a most serious thing for

anyone to speak lightly of the restrictions in question—not merely of

this one of the brother’s wife, but of all those laid down in this

chapter of Leviticus, or to _think_ even of relaxing that code; for who

shall say that we shall not thus “haply be found to fight against God,”

and be bringing ourselves and our country under the curse of His Word,

denounced against all who defile themselves in these things: “Ye shall

therefore keep My statutes and My judgments; and shall not commit any of

these abominations, neither any of your own nation, nor any stranger that

sojourneth among you: (for all these abominations have the men of the

land done which were before you, and the land is defiled:) that the land

spue not you out also, as it spued out the nations that were before you.

For whosoever shall commit any of these abominations, even the souls that

commit them shall be cut off from among their people. Therefore shall ye

keep Mine ordinance, that ye commit not any of these abominable customs

which were committed before you, and that ye defile not yourselves

therein: I am the Lord.” {23} In these days, my lord, we have many

things to make us anxious—many things, I do not go too far in saying, to

make us tremble; but I hardly know anything which should fill us more

with anxiety, fear and trembling, than the thought that our legislature

should bring us under this terrible curse of God, by sanctioning, as the

act of a people among whom “Christianity is” still “the law of the land,”

any one of those abominations, for which even the nations of Canaan were

cut off and spued out. And as to individuals, I must say, there are to

me few things more calculated to raise mixed feelings of pity, contempt

and horror, than the levity and recklessness of some of those who are

advocating the change—pity for the ignorance of many who have been misled

by mere bold assertion, contempt for the reasoning powers of others who

seem never to dream of looking at any side of the question except that on

which their own passions, prejudices, or wishes are enlisted, and horror

at the fearful temerity of those who dare approach and argue upon such a

subject, without at least a sense of its importance, of the reverence

with which all discussion relative to it should be conducted, and an awe,

at any rate, as to the possibility, after all, of God’s law and will

being in accordance with the Church’s interpretation of it for so long a

time, and wholly against the “new thing” which the spirit of modern

lawlessness seems anxious to introduce!

My Lord, I have not designed or attempted to go through the whole

argument on the question of the alteration of the Marriage law as now

proposed, but have sought to confine myself to these points:

I. That the whole strength of the case of the promoters of the change,

so far as Holy Scripture is concerned, rests upon the text, Lev. xviii.

18, this text being taken to override the prohibition of Lev. xviii. 16.

II. That the contradiction of two general laws in God’s Word, the one to

the other, in the course of three verses is highly unlikely and

improbable; so improbable that we are justified in expecting to find some