LORD COCHRANE'S VOYAGE TO CHILI.—HIS RECEPTION AT VALPARAISO AND
SANTIAGO.—THE DISORGANIZATION OF THE CHILIAN FLEET.—FIRST SIGNS
OF DISAFFECTION.—THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE CHILIANS AND THE
SPANIARDS.—LORD COCHRANE'S FIRST EXPEDITION TO PERU.—HIS ATTACK ON
CALLAO.—"DRAKE THE DRAGON" AND "COCHRANE THE DEVIL."—LORD COCHRANE'S
SUCCESSES IN OVERAWING THE SPANIARDS, IN TREASURE-TAKING, AND
IN ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE PERUVIANS TO JOIN IN THE WAR OF
INDEPENDENCE.—HIS PLAN FOE ANOTHER ATTACK ON CALLAO.—HIS
DIFFICULTIES IN EQUIPPING THE EXPEDITION.—THE FAILURE OF
THE ATTEMPT.—HIS PLAN FOR STORMING VALDIVIA.—ITS SUCCESSFUL
ACCOMPLISHMENT.
[1818-1820.]
Having accepted, in May, 1817, the offer conveyed to him by the
Chilian Government through Don Jose Alvarez, Lord Cochrane's departure
from England was delayed for more than a year. This was chiefly on
account of the war-steamer, the _Rising Star_, which it was arranged
to build and equip in London under his superintendence. But the work
proceeded so slowly, in consequence of the difficulty experienced by
Alvarez in raising the requisite funds, that, at last, Lord Cochrane,
being urgently needed in South America, where the Spaniards were
steadily gaining ground, was requested to leave the superintendence
of the _Rising Star_ in other hands, and to cross the Atlantic without
her.
Accompanied by Lady Cochrane and his two children, he went first from
Rye to Boulogne, and there, on the 15th of August, 1818, embarked in
the _Rose_, a merchantman which had formerly been a warsloop. The long
voyage was uninteresting until Cape Horn was reached. There, and in
passing along the rugged coast-line of Tierra del Fuego, Lord Cochrane
was struck by its wild scenery. He watched the lazy penguins that
crowded on the rocks, among evergreens that showed brightly amid the
imposing mass of snow, and caught with hooks the lazier sea-pigeons
that skimmed the heavy waves and hovered round the bulwarks and got
entangled among the rigging of the _Rose_. He shot several of the
huge albatrosses that floated fearlessly over the deck, but was not
successful in his efforts to catch the fish that were seen coming to
the surface of the troubled sea. The sea was made so boisterous by
rain and snow, and such a stiff wind blew from the west, that for two
or three days the _Rose_ could not double the Cape. She was forced to
tack towards the south until a favourable gale set in, which carried
her safely to Valparaiso.
Valparaiso was reached on the 28th of November, after ten weeks passed
on shipboard. There and at Santiago, the seat of government, to which
he proceeded as soon as the congratulations of his new friends
would allow him, Lord Cochrane was heartily welcomed. So profuse and
prolonged were the entertainments in his favour—splendid dinners,
at which zealous patriots tendered their hearty compliments, being
followed by yet more splendid balls, at which handsome women showed
their gratitude in smiles, and eagerly sought the honour of being led
by him through the dances which were their chief delight—that he had
to remind his guests that he had come to Chili not to feast but to
fight.
There was prompt need of fighting. The Spaniards had a strong land
force pressing up from the south and threatening to invest Santiago.
Their formidable fleet swept the seas, and was being organized for an
attack on Valparaiso. Admiral Blanco Encalada had just returned from
a cruise in which he had succeeded in capturing, in Talcuanho Bay, a
fine Spanish fifty-gun frigate, the Maria Isabel; but his fleet
was ill-ordered and poorly equipped, quite unable, without thorough
re-organization, to withstand the superior force of the enemy. An
instance of the bad state of affairs was induced by Lord Cochrane's
arrival, and seemed likely to cause serious trouble to him and worse
misfortune to his Chilian employers. One of the republican vessels was
the _Hecate_, a sloop of eighteen guns which had been sold out of the
British navy and bought as a speculation by Captains Guise and Spry.
Having first offered her in vain to the Buenos Ayrean Government,
they had brought her on to Chili, and there contrived to sell her with
advantage and to be themselves taken into the Chilian service. They
and another volunteer, Captain Worcester, a North American, liking
the ascendancy over Admiral Bianco which their experience had won
for them, formed a cabal with the object of securing Admiral Blanco's
continuance in the chief command, or its equal division between him
and Lord Cochrane. Nothing but the Chilian admiral's disinterested
patriotism prevented a serious rupture. He steadily withstood all
temptations to his vanity, and avowed his determination to accept no
greater honour—if there could be a greater—than that of serving as
second in command under the brave Englishman who had come to fight
for the independence of Chili. Thus, though some troubles afterwards
sprang from the disaffections of Guise, Spry, and Worcester, the
mischief schemed by them was prevented at starting.
A few days after his arrival Lord Cochrane received his commission as
"Vice-Admiral of Chili, Admiral, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Naval Forces of the Republic." His flag was hoisted, on the 22nd
of December, on board the _Maria Isabel_, now rechristened the
_O'Higgins_, and fitted out as the principal ship in the small Chilian
fleet. The other vessels of the fleet were the _San Martin_, formerly
an Indiaman in the English service, of fifty-six guns; the _Lautaro_,
also an old Indiaman, of forty-four guns; the _Galvarino_, as the
_Hecate_ of Captains Cruise and Spry was now styled, of eighteen guns;
the _Chacabuco_, of twenty guns; the _Aracauno_, of sixteen guns; and
a sloop of fourteen guns named the _Puyrredon_.
The Spanish fleet, which these seven ships had to withstand, comprised
fourteen vessels and twenty-seven gunboats. Of the former three were
frigates, the _Esmeralda_, of forty-four guns, the _Venganza_, of
forty-two guns, and the _Sebastiana_, of twenty-eight guns; four were
brigs, the _Maypeu_, of eighteen guns, the _Pezuela_, of twenty-two
guns, the _Potrilla_, of eighteen guns, and another, whose name is not
recorded, also of eighteen guns. There was a schooner, name unknown,
which carried one large gun and twenty culverins. The rest were armed
merchantmen, the _Resolution_, of thirty-six guns; the _Cleopatra_, of
twenty-eight guns; the _La Focha_, of twenty guns; the _Guarmey_, of
eighteen guns; the Fernando, of twenty-six guns, and the San Antonio,
of eighteen guns. Only ten out of the fourteen, however, were ready
for sea; and before the whole naval force could be got ready for
service, it had been partly broken up by Lord Cochrane.
There was delay, also, in getting the Chilian fleet under sail. After
waiting at Valparaiso as long as he deemed prudent, Lord Cochrane left
the three smaller vessels to complete their equipment under Admiral
Blanco's direction, and passed out of port on the 16th of January,
with the O'Higgins, the San Martin, the Lautaro, and the Chacabuco. He
had hardly started before a mutiny broke out on board the last-named
vessel, which compelled him to halt at Coquimbo long enough to try
and punish the mutineers. Resuming the voyage, he proceeded along the
Chilian and Peruvian coast as far northward as Callao Bay, where he
cruised about for some days, awaiting an opportunity of attacking the
Spanish shipping there collected in considerable force.
While thus waiting he employed his leisure in observations, great and
small, of the sort and in the way characteristic of him all through
life. One of his rough notes runs thus:—"Cormorants resort in
enormous nights, coming in the morning from the northward to Callao
Bay, and proceeding along shore to the southward, diving in regular
succession one after another on the fish which, driven at the same
time from below by shoals of porpoises, seem to have no chance but to
be devoured under water or scooped up in the large bags pendent from
the enormous bills of the cormorants." "Prodigious seals," we read in
another note, "inhabit the rocks, whose grave faces and grey beards
look more like the human countenance than the faces of most other
animals. They are very unwieldy in their movements when on shore, but
most expert in the water. There is a small kind of duck in the bay,
which, from the clearness of the water, can be seen flying with its
wings under water in chase of small fry, which it speedily overtakes
from its prodigious speed."
From note-making of that sort, Lord Cochrane turned to more serious
business. The batteries of Callao and of San Lorenzo, a little island
in the bay which helped to form the port, mounted one hundred and
sixty guns, and more than twice as many were at the command of vessels
there lying-to. Direct attack of a force so very much superior to
that of the Chilian fleet seemed out of the question. Therefore
Lord Cochrane bethought him of a subterfuge. Learning that two North
American war-ships were expected at Callao, he determined to personate
them with the _O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, and so enter the port under
alien colours. It was then carnival-time, and on the 21st of February,
deeming that the Spaniards were more likely to be off their guard, he
proposed "to make a feint of sending a boat ashore with despatches,
and in the mean time suddenly to dash at the frigates and cut them
out." Unfortunately a dense fog set in, which lasted till the 28th,
and made it impossible for him to effect his purpose before the
carnival was over. Let the sequel be told in his own words.
"On the 28th, hearing heavy firing and imagining that one of the ships
was engaged with the enemy, I stood with the flag-ship into the
bay. The other ships, imagining the same thing, also steered in the
direction of the firing, when, the fog clearing for a moment, we
discovered each other, as well as a strange sail near us. This proved
to be a Spanish gunboat, with a lieutenant and twenty men, who, on
being made prisoners, informed us that the firing was a salute
in honour of the Viceroy, who had that morning been on a visit of
inspection to the batteries and shipping, and was then on board the
brig-of-war _Pezuela_, which we saw crowding sail in the direction
of the batteries. The fog, again coming on, suggested to me the
possibility of a direct attack. Accordingly, still maintaining our
disguise under American colours, the _O'Higgins_ and _Lautaro_ stood
towards the batteries, narrowly escaping going ashore in the fog. The
Viceroy, having no doubt witnessed the capture of the gunboat, had,
however, provided for our reception, the garrison being at their guns,
and the crews of the ships-of-war at their quarters. Notwithstanding
the great odds, I determined to persist in an attack, as our
withdrawing, without firing a shot, would produce an effect upon the
minds of the Spaniards the reverse of that intended. I had sufficient
experience in war to know that moral effect, even if the result of a
degree of temerity, will not unfrequently supply the place of superior
force.
"The wind falling light, I did not venture on laying the flag-ship and
the _Lautaro_ alongside the Spanish frigates, as I at first intended,
but anchored with springs on our cables, abreast of the shipping,
which was arranged in a half-moon of two lines, the rear-rank being
judiciously disposed so as to cover the intervals of the ships in the
front line. A dead calm succeeded, and we were for two hours exposed
to a heavy fire from the batteries, in addition to that from the
two frigates, the brigs _Pezuela_ and _Maypeu_, and seven or eight
gunboats. Nevertheless the northern angle of one of the principal
forts was silenced by our fire. As soon as a breeze sprang up, we
weighed anchor, standing to and fro in front of the batteries,
and returning their fire, until Captain Guise, who commanded the
_Lautaro_, being severely wounded, that ship sheered off and never
again came within range. As, from want of wind, or doubt of the
result, neither the _San Martin_ nor the _Chacabuco_ had ever got
within fire, the flag-ship was thus left alone, and I was reluctantly
compelled to relinquish the attack. I withdrew to the island of San
Lorenzo, about three miles distant from the forts; the Spaniards,
though nearly quadruple our numbers, exclusive of their gunboats, not
venturing to follow us.
"The action having been commenced in a fog, the Spaniards imagined
that all the Chilian vessels were engaged. They were not a little
surprised, as it again cleared, to find that their own frigate, the
quondam _Maria Isabella_, was almost their only opponent. So much were
they dispirited by this discovery that, as soon as possible after the
close of the contest, their ships-of-war were dismantled, the topmasts
and spars being formed into a double boom across the anchorage, so as
to prevent approach. The Spaniards were also previously unaware of my
being in command of the Chilian squadron. On becoming acquainted with
this fact, they bestowed upon me the not very complimentary title of
'El Diablo,' by which I was afterwards known amongst them."
Two hundred and forty years before, almost to a day, Sir Francis
Drake—whom, of all English seamen, Lord Cochrane most resembled in
chivalrous daring and in chivalrous hatred of oppression—had secretly
led his little _Golden Hind_ into the harbour of Callao, and there
despoiled a Spanish fleet of seventeen vessels; for which and for his
other brave achievements he won the nickname of El Dracone. Drake the
Dragon and Cochrane the Devil were kinsmen in noble hatred, and noble
punishment, of Spanish wrong-doing.
Retiring to San Lorenzo, after the fight in Callao Bay on the 28th
of February, Lord Cochrane occupied the island, and from it blockaded
Callao for five weeks. On the island he found thirty-seven Chilian
soldiers, whom the Spaniards had made prisoners eight years before.
"The unhappy men," he said, "had ever since been forced to work in
chains under the supervision of a military guard—now prisoners in
turn; their sleeping-place during the whole of this period being a
filthy shed, in which they were every night chained by one leg to an
iron bar." Yet worse, as he was informed by the poor fellows whom he
freed from their misery, was the condition of some Chilian officers
and seamen imprisoned in Lima, and so cruelly chained that the fetters
had worn bare their ankles to the bone. He accordingly, under a flag
of truce, sent to the Spanish Viceroy, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela,
offering to exchange for these Chilian prisoners a larger number of
Spaniards captured by himself and others. This proposal was bluntly
refused by the Viceroy, who took occasion, in his letter, to avow
his surprise that a British nobleman should come to fight for a
rebel community "unacknowledged by all the powers of the globe."
Lord Cochrane replied that "a British nobleman was a free man, and
therefore had a right to assist any country which was endeavouring to
re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity." "I have," he added,
"adopted the cause of Chili with the same freedom of judgment that I
previously exercised when refusing the offer of an admiral's rank in
Spain, made to me not long ago by the Spanish ambassador in London."
Except in blockading Callao and repairing his ships little was done by
Lord Cochrane during his stay at San Lorenzo. On the 1st of March he
went into the harbour again and opened a destructive fire upon
the Spanish gunboats, but as these soon sought shelter under the
batteries, which the _O'Higgins_ and the _Lautaro_ were not strong
enough to oppose, the demonstration did not last long. Unsuccessful
also was an attempt made upon the batteries, with the aid of an
explosion-vessel, on the 22nd of March. The explosion-vessel, when
just within musket-range, was struck by a round shot, and foundered,
thus spoiling the intended enterprise. But other plans fared better.
At the beginning of April, Lord Cochrane left San Lorenzo and
proceeded to Huacho, a few leagues north of Callao. Its inhabitants
were for the most part in sympathy with the republican cause, and the
Spanish garrison fled at almost the first gunshot, leaving a large
quantity of government property and specie in the hands of the
assailants. Much other treasure, which proved very serviceable to
the impoverished Chilian exchequer, was captured by the little fleet
during a two months' cruise about the coast of Peru, both north and
south of Callao. Everywhere, too, the Spanish cause was weakened,
and the natives were encouraged to share in the great work of South
American rebellion against a tyranny of three centuries' duration. "It
was my object," said Lord Cochrane, "to make friends of the Peruvian
people, by adopting towards them a conciliatory course, and by strict
care that none but Spanish property should be taken. Confidence was
thus inspired, and the universal dissatisfaction with Spanish rule
speedily became changed into an earnest desire to be freed from it."
Having cruised about the Peruvian coast during April and May, Lord
Cochrane returned to Valparaiso on the 16th of June. "The objects of
the first expedition," he said, "had been fully accomplished, namely,
to reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron
should be rendered efficient; but more especially to ascertain the
inclinations of the Peruvians—a point of the first importance to
Chili, as being obliged to be constantly on the alert for her own
newly-acquired liberties so long as the Spaniards were in undisturbed
possession of Peru. To the accomplishment of these objects had been
superadded the restriction of the Spanish naval force to the
shelter of the forts, the defeat of their military forces wherever
encountered, and the capture of no inconsiderable amount of treasure."
That was work enough to be done by four small ships, ill-manned and
ill-provisioned, during a five months' absence from Valparaiso; and
the Chilians were not ungrateful.
Their gratitude, however, was not strong enough to make them zealous
co-operators in his schemes for their benefit. Lord Cochrane was eager
to start upon another expedition, in which he hoped for yet greater
success. But for this were needed preparations which the poverty and
mismanagement of the Chilian Government made almost impossible. He
asked for a thousand troops with which to facilitate a second attack
on Callao. This force, certainly not a large one, was promised, but,
when he was about to embark, only ninety soldiers were ready, and even
then a private subscription had to be raised for giving them decent
clothing instead of the rags in which they appeared. For the assault
on Callao, also, an ample supply of rockets was required. An engineer
named Goldsack had gone from England to construct them, and, that
there might be no stinting in the work, Lord Cochrane offered to
surrender all his share of prize-money. The offer was refused; but, to
save money, their manufacture was assigned to some Spanish prisoners,
who showed their patriotism in making them so badly that, when tried,
they were found utterly worthless. There were other instances of false
economy, whereby Lord Cochrane's intended services to his Chilian
employers were seriously hindered. The vessels were refitted, however,
and a new one, an American-built corvette, named the _Independencia_,
of twenty-eight guns, was added to the number.
After nearly three months' stay at Valparaiso, he again set sail on
the 12th of September, 1819. Admiral Blanco was his second in command,
and his squadron consisted of the _O'Higgins_, the _San Martin_, the
_Lautaro_, the _Independencia_, the _Galvarino_, the _Araucano_, and
the _Puyrredon_, mounting two hundred and twenty guns in all. There
were also two old vessels, to be used as fireships.
The fleet entered Callao Roads on the 29th of September. On this
occasion there was no subterfuge. On the 30th Lord Cochrane despatched
a boat to Callao with a flag of truce, and a challenge to the Viceroy
to send out his ships—nearly twice as strong as those of Chili in
guns and men—for a fair fight in the open sea. The challenge was
bluntly rejected, and an attack on the batteries and the ships in
harbour was then planned. On the 1st of October, the smaller vessels
reconnoitred the bay, and there was some fighting, in which the
_Araucano_ was damaged. Throughout the night of the 2nd, a formidable
attack was attempted, in which the main reliance was placed in the
Goldsack rockets; but, in consequence of the treacherous handling
of the Spanish soldiers who had filled them, they proved worse than
useless, doing nearly as much injury to the men who fired them as
to the enemy. Only one gunboat was sunk by the shells from a raft
commanded by Major Miller, who also did some damage to the forts and
shipping. On the night of the 4th, Lord Cochrane amused himself, while
a fireship was being prepared, by causing a burning tar-barrel to be
drifted with the tide towards the enemy's shipping. It was, in the
darkness, supposed to be a much more formidable antagonist, and
volleys of Spanish shot were spent upon it. On the following evening
a fireship was despatched; but this also was a failure. A sudden calm
prevented her progress. She was riddled through and through by the
enemy's guns, and, rapidly gaining water in consequence, had to be
fired so much too soon that she exploded before getting near enough to
work any serious mischief among the Spanish shipping.
By these misfortunes Lord Cochrane was altogether disheartened. The
rockets, on which he had chiefly relied, had proved worthless, and,
one fireship having been wasted, he did not care to risk the loss of
the other. He found too that the Spaniards, profiting by the warning
which he had previously given, had so strengthened their booms that it
was quite impossible, with the small force at his command, to get at
them or to reach the port. His store of provisions, also, was nearly
exhausted, and the fresh supply promised from Chili had not arrived.
He therefore reluctantly, for the time, abandoned his project for
taking Callao.
He continued to watch the port for a few weeks, however, hoping for
some chance opportunity of injuring it; and, in the interval, sent
three hundred and fifty soldiers and marines, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Charles and Major Miller, in the _Lautaro_, the _Galvarino_, and the
remaining fireship, commanded by Captain Guise, to attack Pisco and
procure from it and the neighbourhood the requisite provisions. This
was satisfactorily done; but the sickness of many of his men caused
his further detention at Santa, whither he had gone from Callao. On
the 21st of November the sick were sent to Valparaiso, in the charge
of the _San Martin_, the _Independencia_, and the _Araucano_. With the
remaining ships, the _O'Higgins_, the _Lautaro_, the _Galvarino_, and
the _Puyrredon_, Lord Cochrane proceeded to the mouth of the River
Guayaquil. There, on the 28th of the month, he captured two large
Spanish vessels, one of twenty and the other of sixteen guns, laden
with timber, and took possession of the village of Puna. At Guayaquil
there was another delay of a fortnight, owing to a mutiny attempted
by Captains Guise and Spry, whose treacherous disposition has already
been mentioned.
Not till the middle of December was he able to escape from the
troubles brought upon him by others, and to return to work worthy of
his great name and character. Then, however, sending one of his ships,
with the prizes, to Valparaiso, and leaving two others to watch
the Peruvian coast, he started, with only his flag-ship, upon an
enterprise as brilliant in conception and execution as any in his
whole eventful history. "The Chilian people," he said, "expected
impossibilities; and I. had for some time been revolving in my mind
a plan to achieve one which should gratify them, and allay my own
wounded feelings. I had now only one ship, so that there were no
other inclinations to consult; and I felt quite sure of Major Miller's
concurrence where there was any fighting to be done. My design was,
with the flag-ship alone, to capture by a _coup de main_ the
numerous forts and garrison of Valdivia, a fortress previously deemed
impregnable, and thus to counteract the disappointment which would
ensue in Chili from our want of success at Callao. The enterprise
was a desperate one; nevertheless, I was not about to do anything
desperate, having resolved that, unless I was fully satisfied as to
its practicability, I would not attempt it. Rashness, though often
imputed to me, forms no part of my composition. There is a rashness
without calculation of consequences; but with that calculation
well-founded, it is no longer rashness. And thus, now that I was
unfettered by people who did not second my operations as they ought
to have done, I made up my mind to take Valdivia, if the attempt came
within the scope of my calculations."
Valdivia was the stronghold and centre of Spanish attack upon Chili
from the south, just as were Lima and Callao on the north. To reach it
Lord Cochrane had to sail northwards along the coast of Peru and Chili
to some distance below Valparaiso. This he did without loss of time,
to work out an excellent strategy which will be best understood from
his own report of it.
"The first step," he said, "clearly was to reconnoitre Valdivia. The
flag-ship arrived on the 18th of January, 1820, under Spanish colours,
and made a signal for a pilot, who—as the Spaniards mistook the
_O'Higgins_ for a ship of their own—promptly came off, together with
a complimentary retinue of an officer and four soldiers, all of whom
were made prisoners as soon as they came on board. The pilot was
ordered to take us into the channels leading to the forts, whilst the
officer and his men, knowing there was little chance of their finding
their way on shore again, thought it most conducive to their interests
to supply all the information demanded, the result being increased
confidence on my part as to the possibility of a successful attack.
Amongst other information obtained was the expected arrival of the
Spanish brig _Potrillo_, with money on board for the payment of the
garrison.
"As we were busily employing ourselves in inspecting the channels, the
officer commanding the garrison began to suspect that our object might
not altogether be pacific, a suspicion which was confirmed by the
detention of his officer. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon
us from the various forts, to which we did not reply, but, our
reconnoissance being now complete, withdrew beyond its reach. Two days
were occupied in reconnoitring. On the third day the _Potrillo_ hove
in sight, and she, being also deceived by our Spanish colours, was
captured without a shot, twenty thousand dollars and some important
despatches being found on board."
That first business having been satisfactorily achieved, Lord Cochrane
proceeded to Concepcion, there to ask and obtain from its Chilian
governor, General Freire, a force of two hundred and fifty soldiers,
under Major Beauchef, a French volunteer. In Talcahuano Bay, moreover,
he found a Chilian schooner, the _Montezuma_, and a Brazilian brig,
the _Intrepido_. He attached the former to his service, and accepted
the volunteered aid of the latter. With this augmented but still
insignificant force, very defective in some important respects, he
returned to Valdivia. "The flag-ship," he said, "had only two naval
officers on board, one of these being under arrest for disobedience
of orders, whilst the other was incapable of performing the duty of
lieutenant; so that I had to act as admiral, captain and lieutenant,
taking my turn in the watch—or rather being constantly on the
watch—as the only available officer was so incompetent."
"We sailed from Talcahuano on the 25th of January," the narrative
proceeds, "when I communicated my intentions to the military officers,
who displayed great eagerness in the cause—alone questioning their
success from motives of prudence. On my explaining to them that, if
unexpected projects are energetically put in execution, they almost
invariably succeed in spite of odds, they willingly entered into my
plans.
"On the night of the 29th, we were off the island of Quiriquina, in
a dead calm. From excessive fatigue in the execution of subordinate
duties, I had lain down to rest, leaving the ship in charge of
the lieutenant, who took advantage of my absence to retire also,
surrendering the watch to the care of a midshipman, who fell asleep.
Knowing our dangerous position, I had left strict orders that I was
to be called the moment a breeze sprang up; but these orders were
neglected. A sudden wind took the ship unawares, and the midshipman,
in attempting to bring her round, ran her upon the sharp edge of a
rock, where she lay beating, suspended, as it were, upon her keel;
and, had the swell increased, she must inevitably have gone to pieces.
"We were forty miles from the mainland, the brig and schooner being
both out of sight. The first impulse, both of officers and crew, was
to abandon the ship, but, as we had six hundred men on board, whilst
not more than a hundred and fifty could have entered the boats, this
would have been but a scramble for life. Pointing out to the men that
those who escaped could only reach the coast of Arauco, where they
would meet nothing but torture and inevitable death at the hands of
the Indians, I with some difficulty got them to adopt the alternative
of attempting to save the ship. The first sounding gave five feet
of water in the hold, and the pumps were entirely out of order. Our
carpenter, who was only one by name, was incompetent to repair them;
but, having myself some skill in carpentry, I took off my coat, and
by midnight, got them into working order, the water in the meanwhile
gaining on us, though the whole crew were engaged in baling it out
with buckets.
"To our great delight, the leak did not increase, upon which I got
out the stream anchor and commenced heaving off the ship; the officers
clamoured first to ascertain the extent of the leak; but this I
expressly forbade, as calculated to damp the energy of the men,
whilst, as we now gained on the leak, there was no doubt the ship
would swim as far as Valdivia, which was the chief point to be
regarded, the capture of the fortress being my object, after which the
ship might be repaired at leisure. As there was no lack of physical
force on board, she was at length floated; but the powder magazine
having been under water, the ammunition of every kind, except a little
upon deck and in the cartouche-boxes of the troops, was rendered
unserviceable; though about this I cared little, as it involved the
necessity of using the bayonet in our anticipated attack; and to
facing this weapon the Spaniards had, in every case, evinced a rooted
aversion."
The _O'Higgins_, thus bravely saved from wreck, was soon joined by the
_Intrepido_ and the _Montezuma_, and these vessels being now most fit
for action, as many men as possible were transferred to them, and the
_O'Higgins_ was ordered to stand out to sea, only to be made use of in
case of need. The _Montezuma_ now became the flag-ship, and with her
and her consort Lord Cochrane sailed into Valdivia Harbour on the 2nd
of February.
"The fortifications of Valdivia," he said, "are placed on both sides
of a channel three quarters of a mile in width, and command the
entrance, anchorage, and river leading to the town, crossing their
fire in all directions so effectually that, with proper caution on the
part of the garrison, no ship could enter without suffering severely,
while she would be equally exposed at anchor. The principal forts on
the western shore are placed in the following order:—El Ingles, San
Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo, Alto, and Corral Castle. Those on the
eastern side are Niebla, directly opposite Amargos, and Piojo; whilst
on the island of Manzanera is a strong fort mounted with guns of large
calibre, commanding the whole range of the entrance channel. These
forts and a few others, fifteen in all, would render the place in the
hands of a skilful garrison almost impregnable, the shores on
which they stand being inaccessible by reason of the surf, with the
exception of a small landing-place at Fort Ingles.
"It was to this landing-place that we first directed our attention,
anchoring the brig and schooner off the guns of Fort Ingles on the
afternoon of February the 3rd, amidst a swell which rendered immediate
disembarkation impracticable. The troops were carefully kept below;
and, to avert the suspicion of the Spaniards, we had trumped up a
story of our having just arrived from Cadiz and being in want of a
pilot. They told us to send a boat for one. To this we replied that
our boats had been washed away in the passage round Cape Horn.
Not being quite satisfied, they began to assemble troops at the
landing-place, firing alarm-guns, and rapidly bringing up the
garrisons of the western forts to Fort Ingles, but not molesting us.
"Unfortunately for the credit of the story about the loss of the
boats, which were at the time carefully concealed under the lee of the
vessels, one drifted astern, so that our object became apparent, and
the guns of Fort Ingles, under which we lay, forthwith opened upon
us, the first shots passing through the sides of the _Intrepido_ and
killing two men, so that it became necessary to land in spite of the
swell. We had only two launches and a gig. I directed the operation in
the gig, whilst Major Miller, with forty-four marines, pushed off in
the first launch, under the fire of the party at the landing-place,
on to which they soon leaped, driving the Spaniards before them at
the point of the bayonet. The second launch then pushed off from the
_Intrepido_, while the other was returning; and in this way, in less
than an hour, three hundred men had made good their footing on shore.
"The most difficult task, the capture of the forts, was to come. The
only way in which the first, Fort Ingles, could be approached, was
by a precipitous path, along which the men could only pass in single
file, the fort itself being inaccessible except by a ladder, which the
enemy, after being routed by Major Miller, had drawn up.
"As soon as it was dark, a picked party, under the guidance of one
of the Spanish prisoners, silently advanced to the attack. This party
having taken up its position, the main body moved forward, cheering
and firing in the air, to intimate to the Spaniards that their
chief reliance was on the bayonet. The enemy, meanwhile, kept up
an incessant fire of artillery and musketry in the direction of the
shouts, but without effect, as no aim could be taken in the dark.
"Whilst the patriots were thus noisily advancing, a gallant young
officer, Ensign Vidal, got under the inland flank of the fort, and,
with a few men, contrived to tear up some pallisades, by which a
bridge was made across the ditch. In that way he and his small party
entered and formed noiselessly under cover of some branches of trees,
while the garrison, numbering about eight hundred soldiers, were
directing their whole attention in an opposite direction.
"A volley from Vidal's party convinced the Spaniards that they had
been taken in flank. Without waiting to ascertain the number of those
who had outflanked them, they instantly took to flight, filling with a
like panic a column of three hundred men drawn up behind the fort.
The Chilians, who were now well up, bayoneted them by dozens as they
attempted to gain the forts; and when the forts were opened to receive
them the patriots entered at the same time, and thus drove them from
fort to fort into the Castle of Corral, together with two hundred more
who had abandoned some guns advantageously placed on a height at Fort
Chorocomayo. The Corral was stormed with equal rapidity, a number
of the enemy escaping in boats to Valdivia, others plunging into the
forest. Upwards of a hundred fell into our hands, and on the following
morning the like number were found to have been bayoneted. Our loss
was seven men killed and nineteen wounded.
"On the 5th, the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, which had been left near
Fort Ingles, entered the harbour, being fired at in their passage by
Fort Niebla, on the eastern shore. On their coming to an anchor at the
Corral, two hundred men were again embarked to attack Forts Niebla,
Carbonero, and Piojo. The _O'Higgins_ also appeared in sight off the
mouth of the harbour. The Spaniards thereupon summarily abandoned the
forts on the eastern side; no doubt judging that, as the western forts
had been captured without the aid of the frigate, they had, now that
she had arrived, no chance of successfully defending them.
"On the 6th, the troops were again embarked to pursue the flying
garrison up the river, when we received a flag of truce, informing us
that the enemy had abandoned the town, after plundering the private
houses and magazines, and with the governor, Colonel Montoya, had
fled in the direction of Chiloe. The booty which fell into our
hands, exclusive of the value of the forts and public buildings, was
considerable, Valdivia being the chief military depôt in the southern
side of the continent. Amongst the military stores were upwards of 50
tons of gunpowder, 10,000 cannon-shot, 170,000 musket-cartridges, a
large quantity of small arms, 128 guns, of which 53 were brass and the
remainder iron, the ship _Dolores_ —afterwards sold at Valparaiso for
twenty thousand dollars—with public stores sold for the like value,
and plate, of which General Sanchez had previously stripped the
churches of Concepcion, valued at sixteen thousand dollars."
Those prizes compensated over and over again for the loss of the
_Intrepido_, which grounded in the channel, and the injuries done to
the _O'Higgins_ on her way to Valdivia.
But the value of Lord Cochrane's capture of this stronghold was not to
be counted in money. By its daring conception and easy completion
the Spaniards, besides losing their great southern starting-point for
attacks on Chili and the other states that were fighting for their
freedom, lost heart, to a great extent, in their whole South American
warfare. They saw that their insurgent colonists had now found a
champion too bold, too cautious, too honest, and too prosperous for
them any longer to hope that they could succeed in their efforts to
win back the dependencies which were shaking off the thraldom of three
centuries.