difficult to discover, he was true to the British interest, and remained
obstinately deaf to the seductive animosity of the Sikh council, which
was prone to take advantage of the disasters in Caubul, and to attack
the avenging army of Sir George Pollock in its passage to Peshawer.
Loyalty to England was little less than an act of treason to the Sikh
chieftains and the Sikh soldiery, which, added to the Maharajah's total
neglect of public business, accelerated a fatal conspiracy by his
brother-in-law Ajeet Singh, and Dhyan Singh, "the close contriver of all
harms." Shere Singh, being invited to inspect his brother-in-law's
cavalry at a short distance from Lahore, was there shot by Ajeet. The
assassin, riding quietly back to the city, met on the way the carriage
of Dhyan Singh, dismounted, and, seating himself beside his accomplice
in guilt, stabbed him to the heart. Now came confusion worse confounded.
The nobles were divided; while the troops, as their inclinations or
their hopes of pillage prompted them, flocked to the conflicting
standards. Ajeet, after murdering the whole of the late Maharajah's
family, including an infant one day old, fortified himself in the
citadel of Lahore, from which he was dislodged to be immediately
beheaded by Heera Singh, the son of the Rajah Dhyan Singh.
Then it was, that, under the auspices of Heera Singh, the present
Maharajah, Dhuleep Singh, a mere boy, and the alleged offspring of old
Runjeet Singh, was raised to the throne of the Sikhs. The army again
renewed the formidable pretensions which had formerly distracted and
wasted the Punjaub, and with which Heera Singh was now forced to comply.
But the powers of the throne were prostrate. The infant Maharajah, a
puppet in the hands of intriguing kinsmen, or of the ungovernable army,
passively witnessed the slaughter of a succession of his principal
rajahs who aspired to be his ministers, and each of whom raised himself
a step nearer the summit of his desire upon the butchered body of his
predecessor. A glow, perhaps, of undefinable pleasure may have warmed
the heart of the child, who wore
"upon his baby brow the round
And top of sovereignty,"
when he saw the horrible drama apparently closed by his mother taking
upon herself the responsibility and duties of the administration of
affairs. She was a more helpless slave than himself. There was but one
man in the Punjaub who could have aided her in her extremity. Neither of
them could trust the other. Goolab Singh, a brother of Dhyan Singh, had
been playing a safe game throughout the complicated troubles in which so
many were overwhelmed. Bad as the worst, unscrupulously villanous,
profoundly treacherous, detestably profligate and exciting behind the
scenes discontent, mutiny, tumult, and massacre, he appeared
occasionally on the stage to check or perplex the plot, as it suited his
purposes. His arm never visibly reached to any point from which it could
not be safely drawn back; but his hand was stirring every mischief. He
was well aware of the insane and unappeasable passion for a war with the
British which had long infected the whole Sikh army. He saw, we believe,
the inevitable collision and the inevitable issue. With an infant on the
throne, and a woman as prime-minister, the barrier to the torrent was a
shadow. And so it happened. The voice of authority was drowned by the
thundering tread of thousands and tens of thousands on their march to
the Sutlej. Goolab Singh, folding himself in the cloak of neutrality,
crouched, cat-like, to watch the vicissitudes of the contest.
The condition of the Punjaub necessarily attracted the anxious attention
of our Indian government. The horizon grew blacker every hour, as the
total inability of the authorities at Lahore to subdue or restrain the
refractory and warlike spirit of the Sikh army, was made more and more
manifest in unmistakable characters of blood and violence. Upon the 22d
of last November, the Governor-General of India, while moving from Delhi
to join the Commander-in-Chief in his camp at Umballah, received from
the political agent, Major Broadfoot, an official despatch, dated the
20th November, detailing the sudden intention of the Sikh army to
advance in force to the frontier, for the avowed purpose of invading the
British territories. This despatch was succeeded by a private
communication of the following day, stating the same facts, and
inclosing news, letters, and papers of intelligence received from
Lahore, which professed to give an account of the circumstances which
had led to the movement, which would appear (if these papers are to be
depended upon) to have originated with the Ranee and certain of the
sirdars, who felt the pressure of the demands of the army to be so
urgent, and its present attitude and temper so perilous to their
existence, that they desired to turn the thoughts of the troops to
objects which might divert their attention from making extortionate
demands for higher pay, by employing their energies in hostile
operations against the British government.[13]
We shall quote the substance of Major Broadfoot's letters, presenting,
as they do, a curious picture of the chaos of matters on the other side
of the Sutlej, and forming, likewise, important links in the narrative.
The following extracts are taken from his communications on the 20th and
21st of November to the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief:--
"I have received Lahore letters of the 18th instant (morning).
"During the night of the 17th the chiefs had agreed on, and the
Durbar had ordered in writing, the following plan of operations:--
"The army was to be divided into seven divisions, one to remain at
Lahore, and the rest to proceed against Roopar and our hills,
Loodianah, Hurreekee, Ferozepore, and Seinde, while one was to
proceed to Peshawer; and a force under Rajah Goolab Singh was to be
sent to Attock.
"Each division was to be of 8,000 to 12,000 men against Ferozepore,
under Sham Singh Attareewallah, whose estates adjoin the place
against which it was to act. Against Hurreekee is to go Rajah Lal
Singh; against Loodianah, Sirdar Tej Singh, the new
commander-in-chief; and against Roopar, a brother of Sena Singh
Mujeeteea.
"The force under Sham Singh is to be 4,000 horse, and two brigades
of infantry, with guns; under Raja Lal Singh, 4,500 horse, and two
infantry brigades; under Sirdar Tej Singh, four brigades of
infantry (one of them irregulars, and one new levies) and 1,000
horse, &c; but till the plans of the Durbar are in actual
execution, they cannot be considered fixed, and therefore I do not
trouble our Excellency with further details.
"With respect to the probability of their actually moving, I must
say that my correspondents in Lahore seem to doubt it, though they
are perplexed."
* * * * *
"The Durbar of the forenoon of the 18th was protracted till 2
o'clock, but I have not the details of the afternoon Durbar.
"11 A.M. was the hour found by the astrologers as auspicious for
the march of the troops; not a chief stirred from his house. The
officers and punchayets of the troops, regular and irregular, to
the number of a couple of thousand, crowded to the Durbar and
demanded the reason; the Ranee tried to soothe them, saying, that
the fortunate hour being passed, the march could not be undertaken
till the astrologers found another. The crowd demanded that this
should be instantly done, and the court astrologer was ordered into
their presence to find the proper time. He pored through his tables
for two or three hours, while the Ranee sought to divert the
attention of the military mob; at length he announced that the
most favourable day was not till the 15th Mujsur (28th November).
The military were furious, and declared that he was an impostor,
and that they had to get from him two crores of rupees which he had
made from the public money; the pundit implored mercy, and said the
7th Mujsur (20th) was also a good day; the military were still
angry, and the poor pundit left amidst their menaces.
"They proposed that the Ranee and her son should march, and
intimated that till they made an example of some chief no march
would take place.
"The Ranee complained that whilst the troops were urging the march,
they were still going home to their villages as fast as they got
their pay; and Sirdar Sham Singh Attareewallah declared his belief,
that unless something was done to stop this, he would find himself
on his way to Ferozepore with empty tents. The bait of money to be
paid, and to accompany them, was also offered, and at length the
Durbar broke up at 2 P.M. Great consultations took place in the
afternoon, but I know only one result, that the Ranee had to give
to her lover his formal dismissal, and that he (Rajah Lal Singh)
actually went into the camp of the Sawars he is to command, and
pitched his tent.
"What the Ranee says is quite true of the sepoys dispersing to
their houses; the whole affair has so suddenly reached its present
height, that many of the men themselves think it will come to
nothing, and still more who had taken their departure do not
believe it serious enough to go back. On the day after this scene
took place, _i. e._, the 19th, the usual stream of sepoys, natives
of the protected states, who had got their pay, poured across the
Sutlej, at Hurreekee, on their way to their homes. Every
preparation, however, for war is making with probably more energy
than if it had been a long-planned scheme; for every person of
whatever party must show his sincerity by activity and virulent
professions of hatred to the English."
It is proper to add, that Major Broadfoot also announces, that when the
Sikh intrigues and commotions assumed a serious form, he had addressed
an official letter of remonstrance through the proper channel to Lahore.
Five days after these letters were written, on the 26th of November, the
Commander-in-Chief and Major Broadfoot joined, at Kurnaul, the
Governor-General, who shall be the exponent of his own impressions,
intentions, and plans:--
"I had the satisfaction of concurring in all the orders which his
Excellency had given, to hold the troops in readiness to move at
the shortest notice, and in the instructions which he had sent to
the officers in command of the stations at Ferozepore and
Loodianah. The force at the former post consists of one European
regiment, seven regiments of native infantry, two regiments of
native cavalry, and twenty-four field-guns, exclusive of heavy
ordnance. The force at Loodianah consists of one regiment of
Europeans, five regiments of native infantry, one regiment of
native cavalry, and two troops of horse artillery.
"After a full and satisfactory consultation with his Excellency,
and taking into consideration the improbability of the Sikh army
crossing the Sutlej, I determined that no movement should be made
towards the river by the forces from Umballah and Meerut, and I
postponed for further consideration with his Excellency any change
in the present distribution of the troops; eventually some
alterations will be made, which, when they have been finally
determined upon between me and the Commander-in-Chief, will be
reported to you. At the present moment, his Excellency coincides
with me, that no forward movement is required.
"In the midst of much hesitation and irresolution, the enterprise
ordered by the Sikh government does not appear to have been
formally abandoned; the intelligence received by Major Broadfoot on
the day of his joining my camp, showed that the three brigades of
the Sikh force had actually left Lahore a few miles in advance, to
be followed the next morning by three other brigades including one
of artillery. This was on the 24th ultimo. The intelligence
received from that date has been communicated to me by Major
Broadfoot each day, as it arrives.
"It is said they intend, in reply to Major Broadfoot's
remonstrance, to allege that the fact of our having collected so
large a force, with all the munitions of war, on the frontier, is
the cause of the concentration of their forces on the Sutlej; that
they intend to demand the reasons of our preparations; to insist on
the surrender to the Lahore government of the treasure which
belonged to the late Rajah Soocheyt Singh; the restoration by the
Rajah of Nabba of the village of Mowran, escheated by the Rajah,
and the escheat confirmed by us; and henceforth the free passage of
their troops into the Lahore possessions on this side the Sutlej.
"I need only remark, on the first and most essential point, that
the Sikh army did in the beginning of last January prepare to move
to the Sutlej. The political agent remonstrated, and the troops
were withdrawn; the reason then assigned for the movement being the
same as that now intended to be brought forward, namely, the state
of our military preparations on the frontier. The Governor-General
in Council, in a despatch to Major Broadfoot of the 25th January
1845, entered into very full explanations, which were conveyed to
the Lahore Vakeel.
"As regards the past, it is clear that no cause of complaint has
been given by the government of India. If it should be asserted
that our military preparations this autumn have given offence, the
assertion is equally unfounded, and is a mere pretext for hostile
proceedings, which have originated in the political weakness and
the internal dissensions of the Lahore government; and, above all,
in their desire to be released, on any terms, from the terror which
the ferocity of their own troops has inspired. The proof is to be
found in the fact, that at the time these disorderly movements
commenced, no additional British troops had reached our frontier
stations. The additional regiment of native infantry, destined for
the reinforcement of Ferozepore, had not arrived. At Loodianah one
of the two regiments of native cavalry had actually marched for
Scinde before it was relieved, leaving that post, as it is at
present, with one regiment, instead of the usual complement of two
regiments of cavalry. At the other stations no alterations had been
made, and the troops which had marched were peaceably engaged in
completing the annual reliefs according to custom at this season.
"Such is the state of affairs at the present moment, and although
my conviction is strong that the Sikh army will be deterred from
acts of aggression, on account of the state of our military
preparation, yet it is by no means impossible that we may be forced
at any moment into war, and that operations, on a very extended
scale, may be immediately necessary.
"My views and measures will be anxiously directed to avoid a
recourse to arms, as long as it may be possible. On this point my
determination is fixed. At the same time it is very apparent, from
the general aspect of affairs, that the period is fast approaching
when further changes will take place at Lahore, and that the weak
government of the regent will be subverted by the violence of the
troops, instigated by the intrigues of the party favourable to the
Rajah Goolab Singh.
"I shall not consider the march of the Sikh troops in hostile array
towards the banks of the Sutlej as a cause justifying hostilities,
if no actual violation of our frontier should occur. The same
privilege which we take to adopt precautionary measures on our side
must be conceded to them. Every forbearance shall be shown to a
weak government, struggling for assistance against its own soldiers
in a state of successful mutiny."[14]
A week later, no act of open hostility having yet been committed, the
Governor-General, then in the camp at Umballah, was informed that the
authorized agent of the court of Lahore had joined the camp. Major
Broadfoot was immediately directed to see the Vakeel, and to require
from him a reply to the remonstrance, which, as we have said, had been
previously made against the proceedings that had taken place at the time
it was written. At this conference the Vakeel asserted that he had
received no reply from the Durbar at Lahore. The Governor-General acted
with the utmost temperance:--
"When Major Broadfoot reported to me, in the evening, the result of
this interview, I immediately directed him to address to the Vakeel
the written communication, a copy of which is inclosed.
"I considered that it was absolutely necessary, on my arrival at
Umballah, to take decided notice of the extraordinary proceedings
that had taken place, and were stated to be still in progress. It
was evident I could not permit the political agent's
communications, in the face of what was going on at Lahore, to be
treated with disregard. I took the mildest course in my power,
consistently with the dignity, position, and interests of the
British government. I purposely left an opening to the Lahore
government to remedy, through its Vakeel, the discourtesy it had
shown, by affording to that government the facility of making any
explanation it might desire. The plain construction to be put on
the silence of the Lahore government, in reply to the demand for
explanation, evidently was, that the intentions of that government
were hostile, in which case I did not deem it to be expedient to
give to that government the leisure to complete their hostile
preparations; whilst, on my part, I had abstained from making any
movement, expressly for the purpose of avoiding any cause of
jealousy or alarm; thus according to the Maharajah's government the
strongest proof of the good faith and forbearance of the British
government.
"I am satisfied that the course I have adopted was imperatively
required; and before I authorize any precautionary movements to be
made, I shall give full time for a reply to be received from
Lahore."
The letter which narrates these proceedings concludes thus:--
"This morning, news up to the 1st inst. has been received. The
Ranee and sirdars are becoming more and more urgent that the army
should advance to the frontier, believing that, in the present
posture of affairs, the only hope of saving their lives and
prolonging their power is to be found in bringing about a collision
with the British forces. The Sikh army moves with evident
reluctance, and is calling for Goolab Singh, who is collecting
forces at Jumboo, and is watching the progress of events.
"My own impression remains unaltered. I do not expect that the
troops will come as far as the banks of the Sutlej, or that any
positive act of aggression will be committed; but it is evident
that the Ranee and chiefs are, for their own preservation,
endeavouring to raise a storm, which, when raised, they will be
powerless either to direct or allay.
"I shall, as I have before said, await the reply from Lahore to
Major Broadfoot's last communication to the Vakeel.
"If the reply from the ostensible government, acting under the
control and at the discretion of the army, is hostile, I shall at
once order up troops from Meerut, and other stations, to the
support of our advanced positions, persevering up to the last
moment in the sincere desire to avoid hostilities."[15]
We cannot, with any honesty, suppress our conviction that forbearance
was here pushed to the very verge of safety. The sullen silence of the
Lahore government, as its only answer to our most legitimate demand for
an explanation of its menacing attitude, it seems to us, would have been
a complete justification of such a movement of our forces as might have
concentrated them, by a march of one day, instead of six days, on the
banks of the Sutlej, and in the face of the enemy. Had such a step
hastened the rupture, who could righteously blame us for the result?
But, as it happened, the trumpet of the Sikhs which summoned us to the
dreadful appeal of battle could not have sounded sooner than it did, and
we should have entered the mortal lists every way at less disadvantage,
without the odds against us, which the disparity of numbers rendered
formidable enough, being multiplied an hundred-fold by the physical
exhaustion of each individual soldier in our ranks.
The disbelief in the probability of any serious hostility still filled
the mind of the Governor-General, when, upon the 6th of December, he
moved from Umballah towards Loodianah, peaceably prosecuting his
visitation of the Sikh protected states, according to the usual custom
of his predecessors. "In common with the most experienced officers of
the Indian government," he writes,
"I was not of opinion that the Sikh army would cross the Sutlej
with its infantry and artillery.
"I considered it probable that some act of aggression would be
committed by parties of plunderers, for the purpose of compelling
the British government to interfere, to which course the Sikh
chiefs knew I was most averse; but I concurred with the
Commander-in-Chief, and the chief Secretary to the Government, as
well as with my political agent, Major Broadfoot, that offensive
operations, on a large scale, would not be resorted to.
"Exclusive of the political reasons which induced me to carry my
forbearance as far as it was possible, I was confident, from the
opinions given by the Commander-in-Chief and Major-general Sir John
Littler, in command of the forces at Ferozepore, that that post
would resist any attack from the Sikh army as long as its
provisions lasted; and that I could at any time relieve it, under
the ordinary circumstances of an Asiatic army making an irruption
into our territories, provided it had not the means of laying siege
to the fort and the intrenched camp.
"Up to this period no act of aggression had been committed by the
Sikh army. The Lahore government had as good a right to reinforce
their bank of the river Sutlej, as we had to reinforce our posts on
that river.
"The Sikh army had, in 1843 and 1844, moved down upon the river
from Lahore, and, after remaining there encamped a few weeks, had
returned to the capital. These reasons, and above all my extreme
anxiety to avoid hostilities, induced me not to make any hasty
movement with our army, which, when the two armies came into each
other's presence, might bring about a collision.
"The army had, however, been ordered to be in readiness to move at
the shortest notice; and, on the 7th and 8th December, when I heard
from Lahore that preparations were making on a large scale for
artillery, stores, and all the munitions of war, I wrote to the
Commander-in-Chief, directing his Excellency, on the 11th, to move
up the force from Umballah, from Meerut, and some other stations in
the rear.
"Up to this time no infantry or artillery had been reported to have
left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutlej.
Nevertheless, I considered it prudent no longer to delay the
forward movement of our troops, having given to the Lahore
government the most ample time for a reply to our remonstrance."
During the four days following the 8th of December, the fluctuating
intelligence from Lahore, although, on the whole, more cloudy than
formerly, was not of a character to shake the prevalent opinion that no
Sikh movement, on a large scale, was intended, and that the Sikh army
would not cross the Sutlej. On the 13th, the Governor-General first
received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej,
and was forming in great force on the left bank of the river, in order
to attack Ferozepore, which was occupied by a British force of little
more than five thousand men. He immediately issued a proclamation, on
the part of the British government, which set forth, that--
"In the year 1809 a treaty of amity and concord was concluded
between the British government and the late Maharajah Runjeet
Singh, the conditions of which have always been faithfully observed
by the British government, and were scrupulously fulfilled by the
late Maharajah.
"The same friendly relations have been maintained with the
successors of Maharajah Runjeet Singh by the British government up
to the present time.
"Since the death of the late Maharajah Shere Singh, the
disorganized state of the Lahore government has made it incumbent
on the Governor-General in council to adopt precautionary measures
for the protection of the British frontier; the nature of these
measures, and the cause of their adoption, were at that time fully
explained to the Lahore Durbar.
"Notwithstanding the disorganized state of the Lahore government
during the last two years, and many most unfriendly proceedings on
the part of the Durbar, the Governor-General in council has
continued to evince his desire to maintain the relations of amity
and concord which had so long existed between the two states, for
the mutual interests and happiness of both. He has shown on every
occasion the utmost forbearance, from consideration to the helpless
state of the infant Maharajah Dhuleep Singh, whom the British
government had recognised as the successor to the late Maharajah
Shere Singh.
"The Governor-General in council sincerely desired to see a strong
Sikh government re-established in the Punjaub, able to control its
army and to protect its subjects. He had not, up to the present
moment, abandoned the hope of seeing that important object effected
by the patriotic efforts of the Sikhs and people of that country.
"The Sikh army recently marched from Lahore towards the British
frontier, as it was alleged by the orders of the Durbar, for the
purpose of invading the British territory.
"The Governor-General's agent, by direction of the
Governor-General, demanded an explanation of this movement, and no
reply being returned within a reasonable time, the demand was
repeated. The Governor-General, unwilling to believe in the hostile
intentions of the Sikh government, to which no provocation had been
given, refrained from taking any measures which might have a
tendency to embarrass the government of the Maharajah, or to induce
collision between the two states.
"When no reply was given to the repeated demand for explanation,
and while active military preparations were continued at Lahore,
the Governor-General considered it necessary to order the advance
of troops towards the frontier to reinforce the frontier posts.
"The Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded
the British territories.
"The Governor-General must, therefore, take measures for
effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the
authority of the British government, and for punishing the
violators of treaties, and the disturbers of public peace.
"The Governor-General hereby declares the possessions of Maharajah
Dhuleep Singh on the left or British banks of the Sutlej
confiscated, and annexed to the British territories."
In the mean time the Umballah division of our troops had been in
movement towards the Sutlej for three days; but as this force, if
intercepted by a large Sikh army, was not considered sufficiently strong
to force its way to the relief of Ferozepore, the Governor-General
directed the whole garrison, amounting to five thousand men and
twenty-one guns, of Loodianah, even at the risk of leaving that town and
its cantonments exposed to capture and plunder, to effect a junction
with the Umballah division. By a rapid march the Loodianah troops formed
the advanced column of the army, and secured the supplies which had been
laid in at Busseean, an important point, where the roads from Umballah
and Kurnaul meet. On the 18th of December the British forces, having
moved up by double marches on alternate days, reached, and, with the
exception of two European and two native regiments, were concentrated at
MOODKEE, twenty miles from Ferozepore. How easy it is for us to
describe, in a single sentence, the results of the irrepressible spirit
and indefatigable exertions of those gallant men! In seven days they had
traversed, over roads of heavy sand, a distance of upwards of one
hundred and fifty miles, while their perpetual toil allowed them
scarcely leisure to cook what scanty food they could procure, and hardly
an hour for sleep. Four-and-twenty hours had elapsed since their parched
lips were moistened by a single drop of water, when these exhausted but
indomitable troops, a little after mid-day, took up their encamping
ground in front of Moodkee. But their toil had not begun. Never, surely,
were the harassing fatigues of so laborious a march alleviated by a more
terrible refreshment. The way-worn warriors had not halted two hours,
and were engaged in cooking their meals, when they were startled by a
sudden order to get under arms, and move to their positions. The Sikh
army was at hand in battle array. Instantly our horse artillery and
cavalry pushed forward, while the infantry, accompanied by the
field-batteries, advanced to their support, and, scarcely two miles off,
confronted the enemy, nearly forty thousand strong, with forty guns,
preparing for action. To resist the attack, and to cover the formation
of the infantry, the cavalry, dashing rapidly to the front in columns of
squadrons, occupied the plain, and were speedily followed by the troops
of horse artillery, who took up their position with the cavalry on their
flanks.
"The country," writes the Commander-in-Chief, "is a dead flat,
covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places thick
jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened
their infantry and cavalry behind this jungle, and such undulations
as the ground afforded; and, whilst our twelve battalions formed
from echelon of brigade into line, opened a very severe cannonade
upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the
battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon
joined by the two light field-batteries. The rapid and
well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that
of the enemy; and as it was necessary to complete our infantry
dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the
jungle, I directed the cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to
make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of
threatening and turning that flank, if possible. With praiseworthy
gallantry, the 3d light dragoons, with the 2d brigade of cavalry,
consisting of the body-guard and 5th light cavalry, with a portion
of the 4th lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and, sweeping
along the whole rear of its infantry and guns, silenced for a time
the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this
movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the
remainder of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry under
Brigadier Mactier, with a light field-battery, to threaten their
right. This manoeuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry
and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant
charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater
effect.
"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly
pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the
cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major
Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked
in echelon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst
wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the
enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had
every thing at stake, and who had long vaunted of being
irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great
superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was
counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of
the infantry now commenced; and the roll of fire from this powerful
arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they
little expected; and their whole force was driven from position
after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen
pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry
using that never-failing weapon the bayonet, whenever the enemy
stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster; for this stout
conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight,
amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more
obscured every object."
The more awful combats of Ferozeshah and Sobraon must not eclipse the
brightness of Moodkee, which revealed so vividly, even under that "dim
starlight," the elastic vigour of the British spirit.
Hunger, and thirst, and weariness vanished at once, as, with the
alacrity and precision of a peaceful parade, our enthusiastic regiments
moved into their positions, and impetuously advanced to encounter an
enemy who mustered his host in myriads. On they swept like a hurricane.
"The only fault found," are the words of an officer present in the
engagement, "was, that the men were too fresh, and could not be kept
from running at the enemy." Outflanking us by masses of infantry and
swarms of cavalry--tearing us to tatters by the swift destruction from
their immense and beautiful artillery--it fared with the Sikhs, before
the stemless tide of British ardour, as with the Philistines before
Samson--
"When unsupportably his foot advanced,"
--"In scorn of their proud arms and warlike tools,"
"Spurn'd them to death by troops."--
The moral effect upon our soldiers of this battle, we may believe to
have been decisive of the campaign. The prodigious preponderance of the
Sikhs in numerical strength; the weight, and celerity, and accuracy of
their batteries; their stanch and obstinate courage, which often went
down only before the intolerable contact of the bayonet, had been made
undeniably manifest. What had they availed against our imperturbable
intrepidity, under circumstances and at a moment in which we might have
thrown, almost without dishonour, the blame of discomfiture upon
physical infirmities, that overmaster the brave and the strong as
relentlessly as the timid and feeble? What would they avail, when the
chances were fairer for us--the collision more even? When the fight at
Moodkee was done, there was not, of the surviving victors, a Queen's
soldier or a sepoy who had not already settled to his own satisfaction
the whole campaign of the Sutlej, in the pithy but comprehensive
conviction, that he should drub the Sikhs whenever he met them. The
logician smiles at the vulnerable reasoning; the soldier smiles, too,
and feels himself clad in better armour than steel or brass. There had
been a reciprocal amicable emulation every where prevalent throughout
the battle, between the officers and the men, between our Indian and our
European troops. The Governor-General shared all the perils of the
field; Sale and M'Caskill "foremost fighting fell;" while our native
regiments vied with, and were not excelled by, their British comrades in
active daring or unswerving steadiness. One temper, one will, and a
universal mutual confidence, thrilled through, cemented, and fired the
whole mass.
On the day after the battle, the Sikhs having retired upon their
intrenchments at Ferozeshah, orders were sent to direct Sir John
Littler, with the Ferozepore force, to join as soon as possible the main
army. The relief of Ferozepore--threatened, according to the first
reports received by the Governor-General, by the Sikh army _en
masse_--had been his primary object in those rapid marches which brought
him to Moodkee. It now appears that, on the 13th of December, Sir John
Littler had moved out of Ferozepore into camp, and on the 15th took up a
strong position at a village about two miles to the southeast of his
encampment, in order to intercept the anticipated attack on the city.
The Sikh camp was distinctly visible, and supposed to contain 60,000
men, with 120 guns. Three days passed without even a demonstration of
active hostility; and on the night of the 17th, the Sikhs were moving
away to meet the Governor-General. On the evening of the 20th,
therefore, Sir John Littler had no difficulty in instantly obeying the
orders from Moodkee, and in arriving next morning at headquarters in
time to share the peril and the glory of one of the most dreadful
contests in which we were ever engaged in Europe or in Asia. The
inaction of the Sikhs at Ferozepore is, in the present state of our
information, unintelligible; but it would be an idle waste of time and
space to speculate upon the consequences of a peril which did not assail
us, or harrow our minds with the probability of disasters and
difficulties from which we never suffered.
At Moodkee, our army, for most needful repose, and fully to prepare for
a more gigantic effort, rested two days. In this interval the
Governor-General took a step which has not escaped comment, in offering
to the Commander-in-Chief his services as second in command of the army.
He did right. Battalions and brigades could hardly have strengthened the
hands of the general, and invigorated the spirits of the troops, so much
as the active accession of Hardinge. Prim etiquette may pucker its thin
lips, and solemn discretion knit its ponderous brows; but neither
discipline nor prudence ran any risk of being injured or affronted by
the veteran of the Peninsula. What the exigency required, he knew; what
the exigency exacted, he performed. That those who censure would not
have imitated his conduct, in defiance of the admonitions of the
hundred-throated Sikh ordnance, we may allowably imagine. Such critics,
being themselves governors-general, would probably have received beneath
the cool verandas of Calcutta the news of the tempestuous bivouacs of
Ferozeshah. For ourselves, we learn with pride and satisfaction, that
when offensive operations were resumed on the morning of the 21st of
December, the charge and direction of the left wing of the army was
committed to Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge.
"Breaking up on that morning from Moodkee, our columns of all arms"
(so writes the Commander-in-Chief) "debouched four miles on the
road to Ferozeshah, where it was known that the enemy, posted in
great force and with a most formidable artillery, had remained
since the action of the 18th, incessantly employed in intrenching
his position. Instead of advancing to the direct attack of their
formidable works, our force manoeuvred to their right; the second
and fourth divisions of infantry in front, supported by the first
division and cavalry in second line, continued to defile for some
time out of cannon-shot between the Sikhs and Ferozepore. The
desired effect was not long delayed: a cloud of dust was seen on
our left, and, according to the instructions sent him on the
preceding evening, Major-General Sir John Littler, with his
division, availing himself of the offered opportunity, was
discovered in full march to unite his force with mine. The junction
was soon effected, and thus was accomplished one of the great
objects of all our harassing marches and privations, in the relief
of this division of our army from the blockade of the numerous
forces by which it was surrounded.
"Dispositions were now made for a united attack on the enemy's
intrenched camp. We found it to be a parallelogram, of about a mile
in length, and half a mile in breadth, including within its area
the strong village of Ferozeshah; the shorter sides looking towards
the Sutlej and Moodkee, and the longer towards Ferozepore and the
open country. We moved against the last-named face, the ground in
front of which was, like the Sikh position in Moodkee, covered with
low jungle.
"A very heavy cannonade was opened by the enemy, who had dispersed
over their position upwards of one hundred guns, more than forty of
which were of battering calibre: these kept up a heavy and
well-directed fire, which the practice of our far less numerous
artillery, of much lighter metal, checked in some degree, but could
not silence; finally, in the face of a storm of shot and shell, our
infantry advanced and carried these formidable intrenchments; they
threw themselves upon their guns, and with matchless gallantry
wrested them from the enemy; but when the batteries were partially
within our grasp, our soldiery had to face such a fire of musketry
from the Sikh infantry, arrayed behind their guns, that, in spite
of the most heroic efforts, a portion only of the intrenchment
could be carried. Night fell while the conflict was every where
raging.
"Although I now brought up Major-General Sir Harry Smith's
division, and he captured and long maintained another point of the
position, and her Majesty's 3d light dragoons charged and took some
of the most formidable batteries, yet the enemy remained in
possession of a considerable portion of the great quadrangle;
whilst our troops, intermingled with theirs, kept possession of the
remainder, and firmly bivouacked upon it, exhausted by their
gallant efforts, greatly reduced in numbers, and suffering
extremely from thirst, yet animated by an indomitable spirit. In
this state of things the long night wore away.
"Near the middle of it, one of their heavy guns was advanced, and
played with deadly effect upon our troops. Lieutenant-General Sir
Henry Hardinge immediately formed her Majesty's 80th foot and the
1st European light infantry. They were led to the attack by their
commanding-officers, and animated in their exertions by
Lieutenant-Colonel Wood, (aide-de-camp to the Lieutenant-General,)
who was wounded in the outset. The 80th captured the gun, and the
enemy, dismayed by this counter-check, did not venture to press on
further. During the whole night, however, they continued to harass
our troops by a fire of artillery, wherever moonlight discovered
our position."[16]
The ghastly horrors of that awful night we should hopelessly struggle to
describe. The attack began about three o'clock in the afternoon, and was
urged incessantly for six hours in the face of the devastating storm of
the Sikh batteries, which, with one continuous roar of thunder, blurted
forth agony, and mutilation, and death upon their assailants. On the
bare cold earth--the night was bitterly, intensely cold--with no food
and no water--the living and the dying, in their exhaustion and torture,
lay with the dead in their tranquillity. Broadfoot, with a happier fate,
had already yielded up his spirit; Somerset, sensible, but helplessly
benumbed, was lingering through the tedious hours, to die in the
morning, knolled by the shouts of victory. All night long "the havoc did
not cease." In the very noon of darkness, a sleepless rest was invaded
and broken by such extraordinary efforts as those to which the
Governor-General in person excited the 80th and 1st European light
infantry. And it well merits remembrance, what we know from other
sources, that in these midnight charges, the men fell into the ranks so
noiselessly and swiftly, that they were ready to advance before their
officers were aware of their commands being generally understood.
"But with daylight of the 22d came retribution. Our infantry formed
line, supported on both flanks by horse artillery, whilst a fire
was opened from our centre by such of our heavy guns as remained
effective, aided by a flight of rockets. A masked battery played
with great effect upon this point, dismounting our pieces, and
blowing up our tumbrils. At this moment Lieutenant-General Sir
Henry Hardinge placed himself at the head of the left, whilst I
rode at the head of the right wing.
"Our line advanced, and, unchecked by the enemy's fire, drove them
rapidly out of the village of Ferozeshah and their encampment;
then, changing front to its left, on its centre, our force
continued to sweep the camp, bearing down all opposition, and
dislodged the enemy from their whole position. The line then
halted, as if on a day of manoeuvre, receiving its two leaders,
as they rode along its front, with a gratifying cheer, and
displaying the captured standards of the Khalsa army. We had taken
upwards of seventy-three pieces of cannon, and were masters of the
whole field.
"The force assumed a position on the ground which it had won; but
even here its labours were not to cease. In the course of two
hours, Sirdar Tej Singh, who had commanded in the last great
battle, brought up from the vicinity of Ferozopore fresh battalions
and a large field of artillery, supported by 30,000 Ghorepurras,
hitherto encamped near the river. He drove in our cavalry parties,
and made strenuous efforts to regain the position at Ferozeshah:
this attempt was defeated; but its failure had scarcely become
manifest, when the Sirdar renewed the contest with more troops and
a large artillery. He commenced by a combination against our left
flank, and when this was frustrated, made such a demonstration
against the captured village as compelled us to change our whole
front to the right. His guns during this manoeuvre maintained an
incessant fire, whilst, our artillery ammunition being completely
expended in those protracted combats, we were unable to answer him
with a single shot.
"I now directed our almost exhausted cavalry to threaten both
flanks at once, preparing the infantry to advance in support, which
apparently caused him suddenly to cease his fire, and abandon the
field.
* * * * *
"The loss of this army has been heavy; how could a hope be formed
that it should be otherwise? Within thirty hours this force stormed
an intrenched camp, fought a general action, and sustained two
considerable combats with the enemy. Within four days it has
dislodged from their positions, on the left bank of the Sutlej,
60,000 Sikh soldiers, supported by upwards of 150 pieces of cannon,
108 of which the enemy acknowledge to have lost, and 91 of which
are in our possession.
"In addition to our losses in the battle, the captured camp was
found to be every where protected by charged mines, by the
successive springing of which many brave officers and men have been
destroyed."[17]
Was there ever harder fighting? No--not even a month afterwards at
Sobraon. For two-and-twenty hours, from three o'clock on the afternoon
of the 21st till one o'clock after mid-day of the 22d, the
combat--unremitted, as we have seen, even beneath the shade of
night--endured, and deepened as it endured, having raged with appalling
fury in its very termination. The intrenched Sikh camp was literally a
fortress, occupied by a great army not untutored in European discipline,
and protected by enormous batteries of heavy ordnance, which were served
so rapidly, and pointed so truly, as to elicit the unqualified
admiration of the victims of their efficiency. Against this bristling
rock, while, wave after wave, our sea of battle surged and reverberated,
dark clouds of Sikh cavalry, hovering on all sides, sent forth at
opportune conjunctures their sweeping whirlwinds, which either destroyed
those ranks, whose compact array was broken by eagerness and the nature
of the ground, or more frequently forced our infantry suddenly to form
into squares beneath the iron tempest of a demolishing artillery. With
difficulty and labour our heroic soldiers had but breached, and
surmounted, and gained footing within the fortifications, when the
earth, heaving and opening with the successive explosion of charged
mines, hurled into fragments scores of those who had passed unscathed
through the ordeal of manly warfare with confronting foes. But moat and
mound, cannon and cavern, were at length overleapt, silenced and
exhausted. Still was it "double, double, toil and trouble." With fresh
reinforcements of men, backed as ever by a massive artillery, the enemy
repeatedly attempted to retrieve his loss, and regain his camp. To his
incessant fire, _we could not answer with a single shot_; our ammunition
was gone. Frustrating his manoeuvres, what else remained to do was
done with the hard steel of the bayonet, and hand to hand with the good
sword. And thus were earned the laurels of Ferozeshah.
Over the carnage of such battle-fields, we would glance hastily. At
Moodkee, of the British, fell two hundred and fifteen; at Ferozeshah,
six hundred and ninety-four, gallant men and faithful soldiers. The long
lists, also, of the wounded, which catalogue six hundred and fifty-seven
sufferers at Moodkee, and swell to one thousand seven hundred and
twenty-one at Ferozeshah, painfully attest the severity of the struggle,
and the deadly precision of the foe. But the foe! who has numbered his
dead? None; nor ever will. The pall of a decent oblivion has been
tacitly cast upon the incalculable amount of his loss, which has
exceeded the utmost extent of British loss, as much as his hordes of
living warriors outnumbered by tens of thousands the British force at
the dawn of the eventful day which looked on Moodkee--the Agincourt of
India. "Is it not lawful," asks honest Fluellen, "to tell how many is
killed?" "Yes," is the answer of our Fifth Harry--"Yes, captain; but
with this acknowledgment, that God fought for us."
The route of the Sikhs at Ferozeshah was succeeded by nearly a month
employed, as we are now aware, by both sides in making preparations,
offensive and defensive, for further serious exertions. The Sikh army,
upon its overthrow, retired, not in confusion and haste, but steadily
and easily, towards the Sutlej, which they crossed about the 27th of
December. They recrossed, however, soon after, and worked indefatigably
in rearing those magnificent and powerful fortifications at Sobraon,
with which we are yet destined in the course of our narrative to come
into rude collision. The Governor-General, on the other hand, was busy
in collecting and amassing the munitions of war of every description,
for the purpose of forcing, if opposed, the passage of the Sutlej, and
carrying his victorious standard into the heart of the Punjaub. But
fortune was now about to shower her smiles upon a peculiar favourite.
Pressed for supplies on their own bank, the Sikhs were endeavouring to
draw them from the British side of the Upper Sutlej. In the fort and
town of Dhurrumkote, which were filled with grain, they maintained a
small garrison. Against this place, Major-General Sir Harry Smith was
ordered, on the 18th of January, to move, with one brigade of his
division, and a light field-battery. In the mean time, the
Commander-in-Chief received information that the Sirdar Runjoor Singh,
crossing from Philour at the head of a numerous force of all arms, had
established himself between the old and new sources of the Sutlej, and
threatened the rich and populous city of Loodianah. Sir Harry Smith was
accordingly directed to advance by Jugraon towards Loodianah, with the
brigade which had accompanied him to Dhurrumkote, while his second
brigade, under Brigadier Wheeler, moved on to support him. "Then
commenced," we learn from the Commander-in-Chief, "a series of very
delicate combinations."
"The Major-General, breaking up from Jugraon, moved towards
Loodianah; when the Sirdar, relying on the vast superiority of his
forces; assumed the initiative, and endeavoured to intercept his
progress, by marching in a line parallel to him, and opening upon
his troops a furious cannonade. The Major-General continued coolly
to manoeuvre; and when the Sikh Sirdar, bending round one wing
of his army, enveloped his flank, he extricated himself, by
retiring, with the steadiness of a field-day, by echelon of
battalions, and effected his communication with Loodianah, but not
without severe loss.
"Reinforced by Brigadier Godby, he felt himself to be strong; but
his manoeuvres had thrown him out of communication with Brigadier
Wheeler, and a portion of his baggage had fallen into the hands of
the enemy. The Sikh Sirdar took up an intrenched position at
Budhowal, supporting himself on its fort; but, threatened on either
flank by General Smith and Brigadier Wheeler, finally decamped, and
moved down to the Sutlej. The British troops made good their
junction, and occupied the abandoned position of Budhowal; the
Shekawattee brigade and her Majesty's 53d regiment, also added to
the strength of the Major-General, and he prepared to attack the
Sikh Sirdar on his new ground. But, on the 26th, Runjoor Singh was
reinforced from the right bank with four thousand regular troops,
twelve pieces of artillery, and a large force of cavalry.
"Emboldened by this accession of strength, he ventured on the
measure of advancing towards Jugraon, apparently with the view of
intercepting our communications by that route."[18]
The audacity of the Sikhs was doomed to meet a rough check. Wheeler
having joined Sir Harry by long marches on the 26th of January, the
troops required one day's rest. And now we have our hand upon the most
delightful official despatch, and the most admirable picture of a
battle, which has stirred our blood for many a day. Not a sentence of
explanation do the words of Sir Harry Smith need, nor with a syllable of
observation shall we rashly dare to gild his gold. Let us hear Cæsar
dictating his commentary.
"At daylight on the 28th, my order of advance was, the cavalry in
front, in contiguous columns of squadrons of regiments; two troops
of horse artillery in the interval of brigades; the infantry in
contiguous columns of brigades at intervals of deploying distance;
artillery in the intervals, followed by two eight-inch howitzers,
on travelling carriages, brought into the field from the fort of
Loodianah by the indefatigable exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel
Lane, horse artillery. Brigadier Godby's brigade, which I had
marched out from Loodianah the previous evening, on the right, the
Shekawattee infantry on the left, the 4th irregular cavalry and the
Shekawattee cavalry considerably to the right, for the purpose of
sweeping the banks of the wet mullah on my right, and preventing
any of the enemy's horse attempting an inroad towards Loodianah, or
any attempt upon the baggage assembled round the fort of Budhowal.
"In this order the troops moved forward towards the enemy, a
distance of six miles, the advance conducted by Captain Waugh, 16th
lancers, the Deputy-assistant Quartermaster of cavalry; Major
Bradford of the 1st cavalry, and Lieutenant Strachey of the
engineers--who had been jointly employed in the conduct of patrols
up to the enemy's position, and for the purpose of reporting upon
the facility and points of approach. Previously to the march of the
troops, it had been intimated to me by Major Mackeson, that the
information by spies led to the belief the enemy would move,
somewhere at daylight, either on Jugraon, my position of Budhowal,
or Loodianah. On a near approach to his outposts, this rumour was
confirmed by a spy, who had just left his camp, saying the Sikh
army was actually in march towards Jugraon. My advance was steady,
my troops well in hand; and if he had anticipated me on the Jugraon
road, I could have fallen upon his centre with advantage.
"From the tops of the houses of the village of Poorein, I had a
distant view of the enemy. He was in motion, and appeared directly
opposite my front on a ridge, of which the village of Aliwal may be
regarded as the centre. His left appeared still to occupy its
ground in the circular intrenchment; his right was brought forward
and occupied the ridge. I immediately deployed the cavalry into
line, and moved on. As I neared the enemy, the ground became most
favourable for the troops to manoeuvre, being open and hard grass
land. I ordered the cavalry to take ground to the right and left by
brigades, thus displaying the heads of the infantry columns, and
as they reached the hard ground I directed them to deploy into
line. Brigadier Godby's brigade was in direct echelon to the rear
of the right--the Shekawattee infantry in like manner to the rear
of my left. The cavalry in direct echelon on, and well to the rear
of both flanks of the infantry. The artillery massed on the right,
and centre, and left. After deployment, I observed the enemy's left
to outflank me; I therefore broke into open columns and took ground
to my right. When I had gained sufficient ground, the troops
wheeled into line; there was no dust, the sun shone brightly. The
manoeuvres were performed with the celerity and precision of the
most correct field-day. The glistening of the bayonets and swords
of this order of battle was most imposing, and the line advanced.
Scarcely had it moved forward 150 yards, when at 10 o'clock the
enemy opened a fierce cannonade from his whole line. At first his
balls fell short, but quickly reached us. Thus upon him, and
capable of better ascertaining his position, I was compelled to
halt the line, though under fire, for a few moments, until I
ascertained that by bringing up my right and carrying the village
of Aliwal, I could with great effect precipitate myself upon his
left and centre. I therefore quickly brought Brigadier Godby's
brigade, and with it and the 1st brigade under Brigadier Hicks,
made a rapid and noble charge, carried the village, and two guns of
large calibre. The line I ordered to advance--her Majesty's 31st
foot and the native regiments contending for the front, and the
battle became general. The enemy had a numerous body of cavalry on
the heights to his left, and I ordered Brigadier Cureton to bring
up the right brigade of cavalry; who, in the most gallant manner,
dashed in among them, and drove them back upon their infantry.
Meanwhile a second gallant charge to my right was made by the light
cavalry and the body-guard. The Shekawattee brigade was moved well
to the right, in support of Brigadier Cureton. When I observed the
enemy's encampment, and saw it was full of infantry, I immediately
brought upon it Brigadier Godby's brigade, by changing front, and
taking the enemy's infantry _en reverse_. They drove them before
them, and took some guns without a check.
"While these operations were going on upon the right, and the
enemy's flank was thus driven back, I occasionally observed the
brigade under Brigadier Wheeler, an officer in whom I have the
greatest confidence, charging and carrying guns and every thing
before it, again connecting his line and moving on in a manner
which ably displayed the coolness of the brigadier, and the
gallantry of his irresistible brigade--her Majesty's 50th foot, the
48th native infantry, and the Sirmoor battalion, although the loss
was, I regret to say, severe in the 50th. Upon the left, Brigadier
Wilson, with her Majesty's 53d and 30th native infantry, equalled
in celerity and regularity their comrades on the right, and this
brigade was opposed to the 'Aieen' troops, called Avitabile's, when
the fight was fiercely raging.
"The enemy, well driven back on his left and centre, endeavoured to
hold his right to cover the passage of the river and he strongly
occupied the village of Bhoondee. I directed a squadron of the 16th
lancers, under Major Smith and Captain Pearson, to charge a body to
the right of the village; which they did in the most gallant and
determined style, bearing every thing before them, as a squadron
under Captain Bere had previously done, going through a square of
infantry, wheeling about and re-entering the square in the most
intrepid manner with the deadly lance. This charge was accompanied
by the 3d light cavalry, under Major Angelo, and as gallantly
sustained. The largest gun upon the field, and seven others, were
then captured; while the 53d regiment carried the village by the
bayonet, and the 30th N.I. wheeled round to the rear in a most
spirited manner. Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander's and Captain
Turton's troops of horse artillery, under Major Lawrenson, dashed
almost among the flying infantry, committing great havoc, until
about eight hundred or one thousand men rallied under the high bank
of a nullah, and opened a heavy but ineffectual fire from below the
bank. I immediately directed the 30th native infantry to charge
them, which they were able to do upon their left flank, while in a
line in rear of the village. This native corps nobly obeyed my
orders, and rushed among the Avitabile troops, driving them from
under the bank, and exposing them once more to the deadly fire of
twelve guns within 300 yards. The destruction was very great, as
may be supposed from guns served as these were. Her Majesty's 53d
regiment moved forward in support of the 30th N.I., by the right of
the village. The battle was won--our troops advancing with the most
perfect order to the common focus, the passage of the river. The
enemy, completely hemmed in, were flying from our fire, and
precipitating themselves in disordered masses into the ford and
boats, in the utmost confusion and consternation. Our eight-inch
howitzers soon began to play upon their boats, when the 'debris' of
the Sikh army appeared upon the opposite and high bank of the
river, flying in every direction, although a sort of line was
attempted to countenance their retreat, until all our guns
commenced a furious cannonade, when they quickly receded. Nine guns
were on the verge of the river by the ford. It appears as if they
had been unlimbered to cover the ford. These, being loaded, were
fired once upon our advance. To others were sticking in the river;
one of them, we got out. Two were seen to sink in the quicksands;
two were dragged to the opposite bank and abandoned. These, and the
one in the middle of the river, were gallantly spiked by Lieutenant
Holmes, of the 11th irregular cavalry, and Gunner Scott, of the 1st
troop 2nd brigade horse artillery, who rode into the stream, and
crossed for the purpose, covered by our guns and light infantry.
"Thus ended the battle of Aliwal, one of the most glorious
victories ever achieved in India. By the united efforts of her
Majesty's and the Hon. Company's troops, every gun the enemy had
fell into our hands, as I infer from his never opening one upon us
from the opposite bank of the river, which is high and favourable
for the purpose; 52 guns are now in the ordnance park, two sank in
the bed of the Sutlej, and two were spiked on the opposite
bank--making a total of 56 pieces of cannon captured or
destroyed.[19] Many jingalls, which were attached to Avitabile's
corps, and which aided in the defence of the village of Bhoondee,
have also been taken. The whole army of the enemy has been driven
headlong over the difficult ford of a broad river; his camp,
baggage, stores of ammunition, and of grain--his all, in
fact--wrested from him by the repeated charges of cavalry and
infantry, aided by the guns of Alexander, Turton, Lane, Mill,
Boileau, and of the Shekawattee brigade, and by the eight-inch
howitzers--our guns literally being constantly ahead of every
thing. The determined bravery of all was as conspicuous as noble. I
am unwont to praise when praise is not merited, and I here most
avowedly express my firm opinion and conviction, that no troops in
any battle on record ever behaved more nobly. British and native
(no distinction) cavalry all vying with her Majesty's 16th lancers,
and striving to head in the repeated charges. Our guns and gunners,
officers and men, may be equalled, but cannot be excelled, by any
artillery in the world. Throughout the day no hesitation--a bold
and intrepid advance; and thus it is that our loss is comparatively
small, though I deeply regret to say severe. The enemy fought with
much resolution; they maintained frequent rencounters with our
cavalry hand to hand. In one charge of infantry upon her Majesty's
16th lancers, they threw away their muskets, and came on with their
swords and targets against the lance."[20]
"There was no dust, the sun shone brightly." Unquestionably, not a
particle of dust, and all bright sunshine, from the first paragraph to
the last of this unrivalled production. It is a diorama and a panorama
of the battle. Truly, oh reader!
"Duller shouldst thou be than the fat weed
That rots itself in ease on Lethe wharf,--
Would'st thou not stir in this!"
In the luminous rays of such a description, we are made eye-witnesses of
the stirring dashing scene in all its circumstantial variety and general
grandeur. What a sight it is, that steady advance with his "troops well
in hand!" But for a peculiar flashing of the eyes, and sternness in the
features, of the men, we should have fancied them in the Home Park at
Windsor, encircled, not by ferocious Sikhs in the horrid harness of war,
but by the graceful array of gentler--though, in sooth, more
irresistible--foes. Sir Harry Smith has disappeared--very likely hidden
himself behind a baggage waggon or a huge drum. Sapient speculator!
behold him yonder on the house-top, darting his eagle vision down into
the centre of the distant enemy, and unmasking and anticipating their
movements with unerring foresight. Many serious things his vigilance
must watch; but, without distracting his attention, the "glistening of
the bayonets and swords of his order of battle," fills his heart with
boyish glee. The fierce cannonade from the whole hostile line has begun,
and, although the balls fall short at first, quickly reaches us. Under
this murderous shower, he _halts his line_ for a minute's pregnant
reflection, as an elderly gentleman, playing golf on a rainy day, takes
his spectacles from his nose, and wipes the water-drops away, before
venturing the decisive stroke of the game. Nothing escapes him; every
thing is done in the nick of time. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery,
charge to the right or the left, or straight before them, dash through
the enemy's front, or scour the flanks, or sweep the rear, perambulate
squares, and perforate encampments, just as if the serried ranks of the
Sikhs had been unsubstantial creatures of the imagination, or
mist-wreaths from the "wet nullah," which a lively fancy had invested
with human form and warlike panoply. But one hundred and fifty-one
gallant men killed, and four hundred and thirteen wounded, sufficiently
proved that "one of the most glorious victories ever achieved in India,"
had not been won in a combat with phantoms.
The current of the Sutlej hurried melancholy and portentous tidings from
Aliwal to the Sikhs at Sobraon. The bodies of their slaughtered
countrymen rolling down in hundreds, announced, in terms too dismally
unequivocal, another tremendous blow of British might. In the breasts of
such a people--ay, or of any people--these ominous visitations could
hardly be the harbingers of hope, to cheer them in the final
death-struggle, which they knew to be hourly approaching. The
fortifications at Sobraon had been repeatedly reconnoitred by the
Commander-in-Chief, who satisfied himself that not fewer than thirty
thousand men, the best of the Khalsa troops, were covered by these
formidable intrenchments, guarded by seventy pieces of cannon, and
united by a good bridge to a reserve on the opposite bank, where the
enemy had a considerable camp and some artillery, commanding and
flanking his fieldworks on the British bank. On the 8th of February, Sir
Harry Smith's triumphant division having rejoined headquarters, it was
resolved to attack, on the morning of the 10th, the Sikh intrenchments.
"The battering and disposed field artillery was then put in
position in an extended semicircle, embracing within its fire the
works of the Sikhs. It had been intended that the cannonade should
have commenced at daybreak; but so heavy a mist hung over the plain
and river, that it became necessary to wait until the rays of the
sun had penetrated it and cleared the atmosphere. Meanwhile, on the
margin of the Sutlej on our left, two brigades of Major-General Sir
R. Dick's division, under his personal command, stood ready to
commence the assault against the enemy's extreme right. His 7th
brigade, in which was the 10th foot, reinforced by the 53d foot,
and led by Brigadier Stacey, was to head the attack, supported, at
two hundred yards' distance, by the 6th brigade, under Brigadier
Wilkinson. In reserve was the 5th brigade, under Brigadier the Hon.
T. Ashburnham, which was to move forward from the intrenched
village of Kodeewalla, leaving, if necessary, a regiment for its
defence. In the centre, Major-General Gilbert's division was
deployed for support or attack, its right resting on and in the
village of the little Sobraon. Major-General Sir Harry Smith's was
formed near the village of Guttah, with its right thrown up towards
the Sutlej. Brigadier Cureton's cavalry threatened, by feigned
attacks, the ford at Hurreekee and the enemy's horse, under Lall
Singh Misr, on the opposite bank. Brigadier Campbell, taking an
intermediate position in the rear, between Major-General Gilbert's
right and Major-General Sir Harry Smith's left, protected both.
Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, under whom was Brigadier Scott,
held in reserve on our left, ready to act as circumstances might
demand, the rest of the cavalry.
"Our battery of nine-pounders, enlarged into twelves, opened near
the little Sobraon with a brigade of howitzers formed from the
light field-batteries and troops of horse artillery, shortly after
daybreak. But it was half-past six before the whole of our
artillery fire was developed. It was most spirited and
well-directed. I cannot speak in terms too high of the judicious
disposition of the guns, their admirable practice, or the activity
with which the cannonade was sustained; but notwithstanding the
formidable calibre of our iron guns, mortars, and howitzers, and
the admirable way in which they were served, and aided by a rocket
battery, it would have been visionary to expect that they could,
within any limited time, silence the fire of seventy pieces behind
well-constructed batteries of earth, plank, and fascines, or
dislodge troops covered either by redoubts or epaulements, or
within a treble line of trenches. The effect of the cannonade was,
as has since been proved by an inspection of the camp, most
severely felt by the enemy; but it soon became evident that the
issue of this struggle must be brought to the arbitrament of
musketry and the bayonet.
"At nine o'clock Brigadier Stacey's brigade, supported on either
flank by Captains Horsford's and Fordyce's batteries, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troop of horse artillery, moved to the
attack in admirable order. The infantry and guns aided each other
correlatively. The former marched steadily on in line, which they
halted only to correct when necessary. The latter took up
successive positions at the gallop, until at length they were
within three hundred yards of the heavy batteries of the Sikhs;
but, notwithstanding the regularity, and coolness, and scientific
character of this assault, which Brigadier Wilkinson well
supported, so hot was the fire of cannon, musketry, and zumboorucks
kept up by the Khalsa troops, that it seemed for some moments
impossible that the intrenchments could be won under it; but soon
persevering gallantry triumphed, and the whole army had the
satisfaction to see the gallant Brigadier Stacey's soldiers driving
the Sikhs in confusion before them within the area of their
encampment. The 10th foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, now for
the first time brought into serious contact with the enemy, greatly
distinguished themselves. This regiment never fired a shot till it
got within the works of the enemy. The onset of her Majesty's 53d
foot was as gallant and effective. The 43d and 59th N.I., brigaded
with them, emulated both in cool determination.
"At the moment of this first success, I directed Brigadier the Hon.
T. Ashburnham's brigade to move on in support, and Major-General
Gilbert's and Sir Harry Smith's divisions to throw out their light
troops to threaten their works, aided by artillery. As these
attacks of the centre and right commenced, the fire of our heavy
guns had first to be directed to the right, and then gradually to
cease, but at one time the thunder of full 120 pieces of ordnance
reverberated in this mighty combat through the valley of the
Sutlej; and as it was soon seen that the weight of the whole force
within the Sikh camp was likely to be thrown upon the two brigades
that had passed its trenches, it became necessary to convert into
close and serious attacks the demonstrations with skirmishers and
artillery of the centre and right; and the battle raged with
inconceivable fury from right to left. The Sikhs, even when at
particular points their intrenchments were mastered with the
bayonet, strove to regain them by the fiercest conflict, sword in
hand. Nor was it until the cavalry of the left, under Major-General
Sir Joseph Thackwell, had moved forward, and ridden through the
openings of the intrenchments made by our sappers, in single file,
and re-formed as they passed them, and the 3d dragoons, whom no
obstacle usually held formidable by horse appears to check, had on
this day, as at Ferozeshah, galloped over and cut down the
obstinate defenders of batteries and fieldworks, and until the full
weight of three divisions of infantry, with every field artillery
gun which could be sent to their aid, had been cast into the scale,
that victory finally declared for the British. The fire of the
Sikhs first slackened and then nearly ceased; and the victors then
pressing them on every side, precipitated them in masses over the
bridge, and into the Sutlej, which a sudden rise of seven inches
had rendered hardly fordable. In their efforts to reach the right
bank, through the deepened water, they suffered from our horse
artillery a terrible carnage. Hundreds fell under this cannonade;
hundreds upon hundreds were drowned in attempting the perilous
passage. Their awful slaughter, confusion, and dismay, were such as
would have excited compassion in the hearts of their generous
conquerors, if the Khalsa troops had not, in the early part of the
action, sullied their gallantry by slaughtering and barbarously
mangling every wounded soldier whom, in the vicissitudes of attack,
the fortune of war left at their mercy. I must pause in this
narrative especially to notice the determined hardihood and bravery
with which our two battalions of Goorkhas, the Sirmoor and
Nusseree, met the Sikhs wherever they were opposed to them.
Soldiers of small stature, but indomitable spirit, they vied in
ardent courage in the charge with the grenadiers of our own nation,
and, armed with the short weapon of their mountains, gave a terror
to the Sikhs throughout this great combat.
"Sixty-seven pieces of cannon, upwards of two hundred camel
swivels, (zumboorucks,) numerous standards, and vast munitions of
war, captured by our troops, are the pledges and trophies of our
victory. The battle was over by eleven in the morning, and in the
forenoon I caused our engineers to burn a part and to sink a part
of the vaunted bridge of the Khalsa army, across which they had
boastfully come once more to defy us, and to threaten India with
ruin and devastation."[21]
This stupendous battle--the climax and the close of a campaign
unparalleled in many of its circumstances in modern history--was in
itself an epitome of every thing most dreadful and most imposing, most
destructive and most heroic, which had distinguished its predecessors.
Here fell gloriously, at the moment of victory, DICK, the veteran of the
Peninsula and Waterloo, "displaying the same energy and intrepidity as
when, thirty-five years ago, in Spain, he was the distinguished leader
of the 42d Highlanders." No better man--no better soldier--sleeps the
sleep of the brave. The lists of our loss show 320 dead, while 2063
wounded bear additional testimony to the desperation and havoc of this
sanguinary action. Ancient times involuntarily rush back upon us,
recalling the youthful Conqueror of Macedon, who, radiant with the
triple glories of the Granicus, of Issus, and of Arbela, vanquished
Porus at the Hydaspes, and paused in his career, with a sigh, not far
from the banks of the Sutlej. He was wont, and justly, to attribute his
Asiatic triumphs to his faithful Macedonians. Does not Britain attribute
her Asiatic triumphs to her faithful sons? Yes; with the important
explanation, that Europeans and Indians are alike British. Between them
no demarcation was made, or seen, or felt, in the majestic spectacle of
the campaign of the Sutlej. Their toil and their perils were in
common--so shall be their honours and their fame: and while all men
agree that every excellence which can illuminate and dignify the
character of a British soldier, was displayed in stainless brightness by
our European regiments on these colossal battle-fields, all men will
also agree that the exact and cloudless counterpart of such merit shone
in the indefatigable hardihood, the indomitable valour, the immoveable,
incorruptible fidelity of our native Indian troops.
The banners of our country have crossed the Sutlej, and advanced to
Lahore. But our present task is done. The policy which has now to
regulate the internal condition of a great country, will be better
discussed hereafter. We have simply narrated the course of a terrible
necessity, which, against the desires of this country, has made the
ravages of war a bloody but unavoidable prelude to the beneficent
functions of peace. The conflict was not of our seeking. Be the
consequences what they may, the Sikhs will have themselves to blame,
should it so happen, for the illustration of the maxim, that "when
lenity and cruelty play for a kingdom, the gentler gamester is the
soonest winner."
FOOTNOTES:
[13] Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 2d December 1845.
[14] Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 2d December 1845.
[15] Governor-General to the Secret Committee, 4th December 1845.
[16] Commander-in-Chief to the Governor-General, December 22, 1845.
[17] Commander-in-Chief to Governor-General, 22d December 1845.
[18] Commander-in-Chief to Governor-General, 1st February 1846.
[19] Eleven guns since ascertained to be sunk in the river--total 67; 30
odd jingalls fell into our hands.
[20] Sir Harry Smith to the Adjutant-General, 30th January 1846.
[21] Commander-in-Chief to Governor-General, 13th February 1846.
_Edinburgh. Printed by Ballantyne and Hughes, Paul's Work._