CHAPTER I

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_THE ROMANCE OF SCIENCE_

THE MACHINERY OF THE UNIVERSE

MECHANICAL CONCEPTIONS OF

PHYSICAL PHENOMENA

BY

A. E. DOLBEAR, A.B., A.M., M.E., PH.D.

PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS AND ASTRONOMY, TUFTS COLLEGE, MASS.

PUBLISHED UNDER GENERAL LITERATURE COMMITTEE.

LONDON:

SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE,

NORTHUMBERLAND AVENUE, W.C.;

43, QUEEN VICTORIA STREET, E.C.

BRIGHTON: 129, NORTH STREET.

NEW YORK: E. & J. B. YOUNG & CO.

1897.

PREFACE

For thirty years or more the expressions "Correlation of the Physical

Forces" and "The Conservation of Energy" have been common, yet few

persons have taken the necessary pains to think out clearly what

mechanical changes take place when one form of energy is transformed

into another.

Since Tyndall gave us his book called _Heat as a Mode of Motion_ neither

lecturers nor text-books have attempted to explain how all phenomena are

the necessary outcome of the various forms of motion. In general,

phenomena have been attributed to _forces_--a metaphysical term, which

explains nothing and is merely a stop-gap, and is really not at all

needful in these days, seeing that transformable modes of motion, easily

perceived and understood, may be substituted in all cases for forces.

In December 1895 the author gave a lecture before the Franklin Institute

of Philadelphia, on "Mechanical Conceptions of Electrical Phenomena," in

which he undertook to make clear what happens when electrical phenomena

appear. The publication of this lecture in _The Journal of the Franklin

Institute_ and in _Nature_ brought an urgent request that it should be

enlarged somewhat and published in a form more convenient for the

public. The enlargement consists in the addition of a chapter on the

"_Contrasted Properties of Matter and the Ether_," a chapter containing

something which the author believes to be of philosophical importance in

these days when electricity is so generally described as a phenomenon of

the ether.

A. E. DOLBEAR.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

Ideas of phenomena ancient and modern, metaphysical and

mechanical--Imponderables--Forces, invented and

discarded--Explanations--Energy, its factors, Kinetic

and Potential--Motions, kinds and transformations

of--Mechanical, molecular, and atomic--Invention of

Ethers, Faraday's conceptions p. 7

CHAPTER II

Properties of Matter and Ether compared--Discontinuity

_versus_ Continuity--Size of atoms--Astronomical

distances--Number of atoms in the universe--Ether

unlimited--Kinds of Matter, permanent qualities

of--Atomic structure; vortex-rings, their

properties--Ether structureless--Matter

gravitative, Ether not--Friction in Matter, Ether

frictionless--Chemical properties--Energy in

Matter and in Ether--Matter as a transformer

of Energy--Elasticity--Vibratory rates and

waves--Density--Heat--Indestructibility of

Matter--Inertia in Matter and in Ether--Matter

not inert--Magnetism and Ether waves--States

of Matter--Cohesion and chemism affected by

temperature--Shearing stress in Solids and in

Ether--Ether pressure--Sensation dependent upon

Matter--Nervous system not affected by Ether

states--Other stresses in Ether--Transformations

of Motion--Terminology p. 24

CHAPTER III

Antecedents of Electricity--Nature of what is

transformed--Series of transformations for the

production of light--Positive and negative

Electricity--Positive and negative twists--Rotations

about a wire--Rotation of an arc--Ether a

non-conductor--Electro-magnetic waves--Induction

and inductive action--Ether stress and atomic

position--Nature of an electric current--Electricity

a condition, not an entity p. 94

CHAPTER I

Ideas of phenomena ancient and modern, metaphysical and

mechanical--Imponderables--Forces, invented and

discarded--Explanations--Energy, its factors, Kinetic

and Potential--Motions, kinds and transformations

of--Mechanical, molecular, and atomic--Invention of

Ethers, Faraday's conceptions.

'And now we might add something concerning a most subtle spirit

which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies, by the force

and action of which spirit the particles of bodies attract

each other at near distances, and cohere if contiguous, and

electric bodies operate at greater distances, as well repelling

as attracting neighbouring corpuscles, and light is emitted,

reflected, inflected, and heats bodies, and all sensation is

excited, and members of animal bodies move at the command of

the will.'--NEWTON, _Principia_.

In Newton's day the whole field of nature was practically lying fallow.

No fundamental principles were known until the law of gravitation was

discovered. This law was behind all the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and

Galileo, and what they had done needed interpretation. It was quite

natural that the most obvious and mechanical phenomena should first be

reduced, and so the _Principia_ was concerned with mechanical principles

applied to astronomical problems. To us, who have grown up familiar with

the principles and conceptions underlying them, all varieties of

mechanical phenomena seem so obvious, that it is difficult for us to

understand how any one could be obtuse to them; but the records of

Newton's time, and immediately after this, show that they were not so

easy of apprehension. It may be remembered that they were not adopted in

France till long after Newton's day. In spite of what is thought to be

reasonable, it really requires something more than complete

demonstration to convince most of us of the truth of an idea, should the

truth happen to be of a kind not familiar, or should it chance to be

opposed to our more or less well-defined notions of what it is or ought

to be. If those who labour for and attain what they think to be the

truth about any matter, were a little better informed concerning mental

processes and the conditions under which ideas grow and displace others,

they would be more patient with mankind; teachers of every rank might

then discover that what is often called stupidity may be nothing else

than mental inertia, which can no more be made active by simply willing

than can the movement of a cannon ball by a like effort. We _grow_ into

our beliefs and opinions upon all matters, and scientific ideas are no

exceptions.

Whewell, in his _History of the Inductive Sciences_, says that the

Greeks made no headway in physical science because they lacked

appropriate ideas. The evidence is overwhelming that they were as

observing, as acute, as reasonable as any who live to-day. With this

view, it would appear that the great discoverers must have been men who

started out with appropriate ideas: were looking for what they found.

If, then, one reflects upon the exceeding great difficulty there is in

discovering one new truth, and the immense amount of work needed to

disentangle it, it would appear as if even the most successful have but

indistinct ideas of what is really appropriate, and that their

mechanical conceptions become clarified by doing their work. This is not

always the fact. In the statement of Newton quoted at the head of this

chapter, he speaks of a spirit which lies hid in all gross bodies, etc.,

by means of which all kinds of phenomena are to be explained; but he

deliberately abandons that idea when he comes to the study of light, for

he assumes the existence and activity of light corpuscles, for which he

has no experimental evidence; and the probability is that he did this

because the latter conception was one which he could handle

mathematically, while he saw no way for thus dealing with the other. His

mechanical instincts were more to be trusted than his carefully

calculated results; for, as all know, what he called "spirits," is what

to-day we call the ether, and the corpuscular theory of light has now no

more than a historic interest. The corpuscular theory was a mechanical

conception, but each such corpuscle was ideally endowed with qualities

which were out of all relation with the ordinary matter with which it

was classed.

Until the middle of the present century the reigning physical philosophy

held to the existence of what were called imponderables. The phenomena

of heat were explained as due to an imponderable substance called

"caloric," which ordinary matter could absorb and emit. A hot body was

one which had absorbed an imponderable substance. It was, therefore, no

heavier than before, but it possessed ability to do work proportional to

the amount absorbed. Carnot's ideal engine was described by him in terms

that imply the materiality of heat. Light was another imponderable

substance, the existence of which was maintained by Sir David Brewster

as long as he lived. Electricity and magnetism were imponderable fluids,

which, when allied with ordinary matter, endowed the latter with their

peculiar qualities. The conceptions in each case were properly

mechanical ones _part_ (but not all) _of the time_; for when the

immaterial substances were dissociated from matter, where they had

manifested themselves, no one concerned himself to inquire as to their

whereabouts. They were simply off duty, but could be summoned, like the

genii in the story of Aladdin's Lamp. Now, a mechanical conception of

any phenomenon, or a mechanical explanation of any kind of action, must

be mechanical all the time, in the antecedents as well as the

consequents. Nothing else will do except a miracle.

During the fifty years, from about 1820 to 1870, a somewhat different

kind of explanation of physical events grew up. The interest that was

aroused by the discoveries in all the fields of physical science--in

heat, electricity, magnetism and chemistry--by Faraday, Joule,

Helmholtz, and others, compelled a change of conceptions; for it was

noticed that each special kind of phenomenon was preceded by some other

definite and known kind; as, for instance, that chemical action preceded

electrical currents, that mechanical or electrical activity resulted

from changing magnetism, and so on. As each kind of action was believed

to be due to a special force, there were invented such terms as

mechanical force, electrical force, magnetic, chemical and vital forces,

and these were discovered to be convertible into one another, and the

"doctrine of the correlation of the physical forces" became a common

expression in philosophies of all sorts. By "convertible into one

another," was meant, that whenever any given force appeared, it was at

the expense of some other force; thus, in a battery chemical force was

changed into electrical force; in a magnet, electrical force was changed

into magnetic force, and so on. The idea here was the _transformation of

forces_, and _forces_ were not so clearly defined that one could have a

mechanical idea of just what had happened. That part of the philosophy

was no clearer than that of the imponderables, which had largely dropped

out of mind. The terminology represented an advance in knowledge, but

was lacking in lucidity, for no one knew what a force of any kind was.

The first to discover this and to repudiate the prevailing terminology

were the physiologists, who early announced their disbelief in a vital

force, and their belief that all physiological activities were of purely

physical and chemical origin, and that there was no need to assume any

such thing as a vital force. Then came the discovery that chemical

force, or affinity, had only an adventitious existence, and that, at

absolute zero, there was no such activity. The discovery of, or rather

the appreciation of, what is implied by the term _absolute zero_, and

especially of the nature of heat itself, as expressed in the statement

that heat is a mode of motion, dismissed another of the so-called forces

as being a metaphysical agency having no real existence, though standing

for phenomena needing further attention and explanation; and by

explanation is meant _the presentation of the mechanical antecedents for

a phenomenon, in so complete a way that no supplementary or unknown

factors are necessary_. The train moves because the engine pulls it; the

engine pulls because the steam pushes it. There is no more necessity for

assuming a steam force between the steam and the engine, than for

assuming an engine force between the engine and the train. All the

processes are mechanical, and have to do only with ordinary matter and

its conditions, from the coal-pile to the moving freight, though there

are many transformations of the forms of motion and of energy between

the two extremes.

During the past thirty years there has come into common use another

term, unknown in any technical sense before that time, namely, _energy_.

What was once called the conservation of force is now called the

conservation of energy, and we now often hear of forms of energy. Thus,

heat is said to be a form of energy, and the forms of energy are

convertible into one another, as the so-called forces were formerly

supposed to be transformable into one another. We are asked to consider

gravitative energy, heat energy, mechanical energy, chemical energy, and

electrical energy. When we inquire what is meant by energy, we are

informed that it means ability to do work, and that work is measurable

as a pressure into a distance, and is specified as foot-pounds. A mass

of matter moves because energy has been spent upon it, and has acquired

energy equal to the work done on it, and this is believed to hold true,

no matter what the kind of energy was that moved it. If a body moves, it

moves because another body has exerted pressure upon it, and its energy

is called _kinetic energy_; but a body may be subject to pressure and

not move appreciably, and then the body is said to possess potential

energy. Thus, a bent spring and a raised weight are said to possess

potential energy. In either case, _an energized body receives its energy

by pressure, and has ability to produce pressure on another body_.

Whether or not it does work on another body depends on the rigidity of

the body it acts upon. In any case, it is simply a mechanical

action--body A pushes upon body B (Fig. 1). There is no need to assume

anything more mysterious than mechanical action. Whether body B moves

this way or that depends upon the direction of the push, the point of

its application. Whether the body be a mass as large as the earth or as

small as a molecule, makes no difference in that particular. Suppose,

then, that _a_ (Fig. 2) spends its energy on _b_, _b_ on _c_, _c_ on

_d_, and so on. The energy of _a_ gives translatory motion to _b_, _b_

sets _c_ vibrating, and _c_ makes _d_ spin on some axis. Each of these

has had energy spent on it, and each has some form of energy different

from the other, but no new factor has been introduced between _a_ and

_d_, and the only factor that has gone from _a_ to _d_ has been

motion--motion that has had its direction and quality changed, but not

its nature. If we agree that energy is neither created nor annihilated,

by any physical process, and if we assume that _a_ gave to _b_ all its

energy, that is, all its motion; that _b_ likewise gave its all to _c_,

and so on; then the succession of phenomena from _a_ to _d_ has been

simply the transference of a definite amount of motion, and therefore of

energy, from the one to the other; for _motion has been the only

variable factor_. If, furthermore, we should agree to call the

translatory motion [alpha], the vibratory motion [beta], the

rotary [gamma], then we should have had a conversion of [alpha]

into [beta], of [beta] into [gamma]. If we should consider

the amount of transfer motion instead of the kind of motion, we should

have to say that the [alpha] energy had been transformed into

[beta] and the [beta] into [gamma].

[Illustration: FIG. 1.]

[Illustration: FIG. 2.]

What a given amount of energy will do depends only upon its _form_, that

is, the kind of motion that embodies it.

The energy spent upon a stone thrown into the air, giving it translatory

motion, would, if spent upon a tuning fork, make it sound, but not move

it from its place; while if spent upon a top, would enable the latter to

stand upon its point as easily as a person stands on his two feet, and

to do other surprising things, which otherwise it could not do. One can,

without difficulty, form a mechanical conception of the whole series

without assuming imponderables, or fluids or forces. Mechanical motion

only, by pressure, has been transferred in certain directions at certain

rates. Suppose now that some one should suddenly come upon a spinning

top (Fig. 3) while it was standing upon its point, and, as its motion

might not be visible, should cautiously touch it. It would bound away

with surprising promptness, and, if he were not instructed in the

mechanical principles involved, he might fairly well draw the conclusion

that it was actuated by other than simple mechanical principles, and,

for that reason, it would be difficult to persuade him that there was

nothing essentially different in the body that appeared and acted thus,

than in a stone thrown into the air; nevertheless, that statement would

be the simple truth.

[Illustration: FIG. 3.]

All our experience, without a single exception, enforces the proposition

that no body moves in any direction, or in any way, except when some

other body _in contact_ with it presses upon it. The action is direct.

In Newton's letter to his friend Bentley, he says--"That one body

should act upon another through empty space, without the mediation of

anything else by and through which their action and pressure may be

conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I

believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of

thinking can ever fall into it."

For mathematical purposes, it has sometimes been convenient to treat a

problem as if one body could act upon another without any physical

medium between them; but such a conception has no degree of rationality,

and I know of no one who believes in it as a fact. If this be granted,

then our philosophy agrees with our experience, and every body moves

because it is pushed, and the mechanical antecedent of every kind of

phenomenon is to be looked for in some adjacent body possessing

energy--that is, the ability to push or produce pressure.

It must not be forgotten that energy is not a simple factor, but is

always a product of two factors--a mass with a velocity, a mass with a

temperature, a quantity of electricity into a pressure, and so on. One

may sometimes meet the statement that matter and energy are the two

realities; both are spoken of as entities. It is much more philosophical

to speak of matter and motion, for in the absence of motion there is no

energy, and the energy varies with the amount of motion; and

furthermore, to understand any manifestation of energy one must inquire

what kind of motion is involved. This we do when we speak of mechanical

energy as the energy involved in a body having a translatory motion;

also, when we speak of heat as a vibratory, and of light as a wave

motion. To speak of energy without stating or implying these

distinctions, is to speak loosely and to keep far within the bounds of

actual knowledge. To speak thus of a body possessing energy, or

expending energy, is to imply that the body possesses some kind of

motion, and produces pressure upon another body because it has motion.

Tait and others have pointed out the fact, that what is called potential

energy must, in its nature, be kinetic. Tait says--"Now it is impossible

to conceive of a truly dormant form of energy, whose magnitude should

depend, in any way, upon the unit of time; and we are forced to conclude

that potential energy, like kinetic energy, depends (even if unexplained

or unimagined) upon motion." All this means that it is now too late to

stop with energy as a final factor in any phenomenon, that the _form of

motion_ which embodies the energy is the factor that determines _what_

happens, as distinguished from how _much_ happens. Here, then, are to be

found the distinctions which have heretofore been called forces; here

is embodied the proof that direct pressure of one body upon another is

what causes the latter to move, and that the direction of movement

depends on the point of application, with reference to the centre

of mass.

It is needful now to look at the other term in the product we call

energy, namely, the substance moving, sometimes called matter or mass.

It has been mentioned that the idea of a medium filling space was

present to Newton, but his gravitation problem did not require that he

should consider other factors than masses and distances. The law of

gravitation as considered by him was--Every particle of matter attracts

every other particle of matter with a stress which is proportional to

the product of their masses, and inversely to the squares of the

distance between them. Here we are concerned only with the statement

that every particle of matter attracts every other particle of matter.

Everything then that possesses gravitative attraction is matter in the

sense in which that term is used in this law. If there be any other

substance in the universe that is not thus subject to gravitation, then

it is improper to call it matter, otherwise the law should read, "Some

particles of matter attract," etc., which will never do.

We are now assured that there is something else in the universe which

has no gravitative property at all, namely, the ether. It was first

imagined in order to account for the phenomena of light, which was

observed to take about eight minutes to come from the sun to the earth.

Then Young applied the wave theory to the explanation of polarization

and other phenomena; and in 1851 Foucault proved experimentally that the

velocity of light was less in water than in air, as it should be if the

wave theory be true, and this has been considered a crucial experiment

which took away the last hope for the corpuscular theory, and

demonstrated the existence of the ether as a space-filling medium

capable of transmitting light-waves known to have a velocity of 186,000

miles per second. It was called the luminiferous ether, to distinguish

it from other ethers which had also been imagined, such as electric

ether for electrical phenomena, magnetic ether for magnetic phenomena,

and so on--as many ethers, in fact, as there were different kinds of

phenomena to be explained.

It was Faraday who put a stop to the invention of ethers, by suggesting

that the so-called luminiferous ether might be the one concerned in all

the different phenomena, and who pointed out that the arrangement of

iron filings about a magnet was indicative of the direction of the

stresses in the ether. This suggestion did not meet the approval of the

mathematical physicists of his day, for it necessitated the abandonment

of the conceptions they had worked with, as well as the terminology

which had been employed, and made it needful to reconstruct all their

work to make it intelligible--a labour which was the more distasteful as

it was forced upon them by one who, although expert enough in

experimentation, was not a mathematician, and who boasted that the most

complicated mathematical work he ever did was to turn the crank of a

calculating machine; who did all his work, formed his conclusions, and

then said--"The work is done; hand it over to the computers."

It has turned out that Faraday's mechanical conceptions were right.

Every one now knows of Maxwell's work, which was to start with Faraday's

conceptions as to magnetic phenomena, and follow them out to their

logical conclusions, applying them to molecules and the reactions of the

latter upon the ether. Thus he was led to conclude that light was an

electro-magnetic phenomenon; that is, that the waves which constitute

light, and the waves produced by changing magnetism were identical in

their nature, were in the same medium, travelled with the same velocity,

were capable of refraction, and so on. Now that all this is a matter of

common knowledge to-day, it is curious to look back no further than ten

years. Maxwell's conclusions were adopted by scarcely a physicist in

the world. Although it was known that inductive action travelled with

finite velocity in space, and that an electro-magnet would affect the

space about it practically inversely as the square of the distance, and

that such phenomena as are involved in telephonic induction between

circuits could have no other meaning than the one assigned by Maxwell,

yet nearly all the physicists failed to form the only conception of it

that was possible, and waited for Hertz to devise apparatus for

producing interference before they grasped it. It was even then so new,

to some, that it was proclaimed to be a demonstration of the existence

of the ether itself, as well as a method of producing waves short enough

to enable one to notice interference phenomena. It is obvious that Hertz

himself must have had the mechanics of wave-motion plainly in mind, or

he would not have planned such experiments. The outcome of it all is,

that we now have experimental demonstration, as well as theoretical

reason for believing, that the ether, once considered as only

luminiferous, is concerned in all electric and magnetic phenomena, and

that waves set up in it by electro-magnetic actions are capable of being

reflected, refracted, polarized, and twisted, in the same way as

ordinary light-waves can be, and that the laws of optics are applicable

to both.

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