It was with this precise object in view that, in 1878, he added to his

_Critique philosophique_ a supplement which he entitled _La Critique

religieuse_, a quarterly intended purely for propaganda purposes.

“Criticism,” he had said, “is in philosophy what Protestantism is in

religion.”[23] As certitude is, according to Renouvier’s doctrines, the

fruit of intelligence, heart and will, it can never be obtained by the

coercion of authority or by obedience such as the Roman Church demands.

He appealed to the testimony of history, as a witness to the conflict

between authority and the individual conscience. Jesus, whom the Church

adores, was himself a superb example of such revolt. History, however,

shows us, says Renouvier, the gradual decay of authority in such

matters. Thought, if it is really to be thought in its sincerity, must

be free. This Renouvier realised, and in this freedom he saw the

characteristic of the future development of religion, and shows

himself, in this connection, in substantial agreement with Renan and

Guyau.

[23] _Ibid_., 1873, pp. 145-146.

Renouvier’s interest in theology and religion, and in the theological

implications of all philosophical thought, was not due merely to a

purely speculative impulse, but to a very practical desire to initiate

a rational restatement of religious conceptions, which he considered to

be an urgent need of his time. He lamented the influence of the Roman

Church over the minds of the youth of his country, and realised the

vital importance of the controversy between Church and State regarding

secular education. Renouvier was a keen supporter of the secular

schools (_écoles laïques_). In 1879, when the educational controversy

was at its height, he issued a little book on ethics for these

institutions (_Petit Traité de Morale pour les Ecoles laïques_), which

was republished in an enlarged form in 1882, when the secular party,

ably led by Jules Ferry, triumphed in the establishment of compulsory,

free, secular education. That great achievement, however, did not solve

all the difficulties presented by the Church in its educational

attitude, and even now the influence of clericalism is dreaded.

Renouvier realised all the dangers, but he was forced also to realise

that his enthusiastic and energetic campaign against the power of the

Church had failed to achieve what he had desired. He complained of

receiving insufficient support from quarters where he might well have

expected it. His failure is a fairly conclusive proof that

Protestantism has no future in France: it is a stubborn survival,

rather than a growing influence. With the decline in the power and

appeal of the Roman Catholic Church will come the decline of religion

of a dogmatic and organised kind. Renouvier probably had an influence

in hastening the day of the official severance of Church and State, an

event which he did not live long enough to see.[24]

[24] It occurred, however, only two years after his death.

Having become somewhat discouraged, Renouvier stopped the publication

of his religious quarterly in 1885 and made the _Critique

philosophique_ a monthly instead of a weekly Journal. It ceased in

1889, but the following year Renouvier’s friend, Pillon, began a new

periodical, which bore the same name as the one which had ceased with

the outbreak of the war in 1870. This was _L’Année philosophique_, to

which Renouvier contributed articles from time to time on religious

topics.

Some writers are of the opinion that Renouvier’s attacks on the Roman

Catholic Church and faith, so far from strengthening the Protestant

party in France, tended rather to increase the hostility to the

Christian religion generally or, indeed, to any religious view of the

universe.

Renouvier’s own statements in his philosophy, in so far as these

concern religion and theology, are in harmony with his rejection of the

Absolute in philosophy and the Absolute in politics. His criticism of

the idea of God, the central point in any philosophy of religion, is in

terms similar to his critique of the worship of the Absolute or the

deification of the State.

In dealing with the question of a “Total Synthesis” Renouvier indicated

his objections to the metaphysical doctrine of an Absolute, which is

diametrically opposed to his general doctrine of relativity. He is

violently in conflict with all religious conceptions which savour of

this Absolute or have a pantheistic emphasis, which would diminish the

value and significance of relativity and of personality. The

“All-in-All” conception of God, which represents the pantheistic

elements in many theologies and religions, both Christian and other, is

not really a consciousness, he shows, for consciousness itself implies

a relation, a union of the self and non-self. In such a conception

actor, play and theatre all blend into one, God alone is real, and he

is unconscious, for there is, according to this hypothesis, nothing

outside himself which he can know. Renouvier realises that he is faced

with the ancient problem of the One and the Many, with the alternative

of unity or plurality. With his usual logical decisiveness Renouvier

posits plurality. He does not attempt to reconcile the two opposites,

and he deals with the problem in the manner in which he faced the

antinomies of Kant. Both cannot be true, and the enemy of pantheism and

absolutism acclaims pluralism, both for logical reasons and in order to

safeguard the significance of personality. In particular he directly

criticises the philosophy of Spinoza in which he sees the supreme

statement of this philosophy of the eternal, the perfect, necessary,

unchanging One, who is the same yesterday, to-day and forever. He

admits that the idea of law or a system of laws leads to the

introduction of something approaching the hypothesis of unity, but he

is careful to show by his doctrine of freedom and personality that this

is only a limited unity and that, considered even from a scientific

standpoint, a Total Synthesis, which is the logical outcome of such an

hypothesis, is ultimately untenable. He overthrows the idols of Spinoza

and Hegel. Such absolutes, infinite and eternal, whether described as

an infinite love which loves itself or a thought thinking thought, are

nothing more to Renouvier than vain words, which it is absurd to offer

as “The Living God.”

Against these metaphysical erections Renouvier opposes his doctrines of

freedom, of personality, relativity and pluralism. He offers in

contrast the conception of God as a Person, not an Absolute, but

relative, not infinite, but finite, limited by man’s freedom and by

contingency in the world of creatures. God, in his view, is not a Being

who is omnipotent, or omniscient. He is a Person of whom man is a type,

certainly a degraded type, but man is made in the image of the divine

personality. Our notion of God, Renouvier reminds us, must be

consistent with the doctrine of freedom, hence we must conceive of him

not merely as a creator of creatures or subjects, but of creative power

itself in those creatures. The relation of God to man is more complex

than that of simple “creation” as this word is usually comprehended,

“It is a creation of creation,” says Renouvier,[25] a remark which is

parallel to the view expressed by Bergson, to the effect that, we must

conceive of God as a “creator of creators.”[26] The existence of this

Creative Person must be conceived, Renouvier insists, as indissolubly

bound up with his work, and it is unintelligible otherwise. That work

is one of creation and not emanation—it involves more than mere power

and transcendence. God is immanent in the universe.

[25] _Psychologie ralionnelle_, vol. 2, p. 104.

[26] In his address to the Edinburgh Philosophical Society, 1914.

Theology has wavered between the two views—that of absolute

transcendence and omnipotence and that of immanence based on freedom

and limitation. In the first, every single thing depends upon the

operation of God, whose Providence rules all. This is pure determinism

of a theological character. In the other view man’s free personality is

recognised; part of the creation is looked upon as partaking of freedom

and contingency, therefore the divinity is conceived as limited and

finite.

Renouvier insists that this view of God as finite is the only tenable

one, for it is the only one which gives a rational and moral

explanation of evil. In the first view God is responsible for all

things, evil included, and man is therefore much superior to him from a

moral standpoint. The idea of God must be ethically acceptable, and it

is unfortunate that this idea, so central to religion, is the least

susceptible to modification in harmony with man’s ethical development.

We already have noticed Guyau’s stress upon this point in our

discussion of ethics. Our conception of God must, Renouvier claims, be

the affirmation of our highest category, Personality, and must express

the best ethical ideals of mankind. Society suffers for its immoral and

primitive view of God, which gives to its religion a barbarous

character which is disgraceful and revolting to finer or more

thoughtful minds.

It is true that the acceptance of the second view, which carries with

it the complete rejection of the ideas of omnipotence and omniscience,

modifies profoundly many of the old and primitive views of God.

Renouvier recognises this, and wishes his readers also to grasp this

point, for only so is religion to be brought forward in a development

harmonious with the growth of man’s mind in other spheres. Man should

not profess the results of elaborate culture in science while he

professes at the same time doctrines of God which are not above those

of a savage or primitive people. This is the chief mischief which the

influence of the Hebrew writings of the Old Testament has had upon the

Christian religion. The moral conscience now demands their rejection,

for to those who value religion they can only appear as being of pure

blasphemy. God is neither omnipotent nor omniscient, consequently many

things must be unknown to him until they happen. Foreknowledge and

predetermination on his part are impossible, according to Renouvier.

God is not to be conceived as a consciousness enveloping the entire

universe, past, present and future, in a total synthesis. Such a belief

is mischievous to humanity because of its fatalism, in spite of the

comfortable consolation it offers to pious souls. Moreover, it presents

the absurd view of God working often against himself.

The idea of God, Renouvier shows, arises out of the discussions of the

nature of the universal laws of the universe and from the progress of

personalities. The plausible conceptions of God based on causality and

on “necessary essence” have not survived the onslaughts of Criticism.

The personality of God seems to us, says Renouvier, indicated as the

conclusion and the almost necessary culmination of the consideration of

the probabilities laid down by the practical reason or moral law. The

primary, though not primitive, evidence for the existence of God is

contained in, and results from, the generalisation of the idea of

“ends” in the universe. We must not go bevond phenomena or seek

evidence in some fictitious sphere outside of our experience. In its

most general and abstract sense the idea of God arises from the

conception of moral order, immortality, or the accord of happiness and

goodness. We cannot deny the existence of a morality in the order and

movements of the world, a physical sanction to the moral laws of virtue

and of progress, an external reality of good, a supremacy of good, a

witness of the Good itself. Renouvier does not think that any man,

having sufficiently developed his thought, would refuse to give the

name God to the object of this supreme conception, which at first may

seem abstract because it is not in any way crude, many of its intrinsic

elements remaining undetermined in face of our ignorance, but which,

nevertheless, or just for that very reason, is essentially practical

and moral, representing the most notable fact of all those included in

our belief. This method of approaching the problem of God is, he

thinks, both simple and grand. It is a noble contrast to the scholastic

edifice built up on the metaphysical perfection of being, called the

Absolute. In this conception all attributes of personality are replaced

by an accumulation of metaphysical properties, contradictory in

themselves and quite incompatible with one another. This Absolute is a

pure chimerical abstraction; its pure being and pure essence are

equivalent to pure nothing or pure nonsense.

The fetish of pure substance, substantial cause, absolute being,

whatever it be called, is vicious at all times, but particularly when

we are dealing with the fundamental problems of science. It would be

advisable here that the only method of investigation be that of

atheism, for scientific investigation should not be tainted by any

prejudices or preconceived ideas upon the nature of the divinity.

What really is Atheism? The answer to this query, says Renouvier, is

clear. The idea of God is essentially a product of the moral law or

conscience. An atheist is, strictly speaking, one who does not admit

the reality of this moral order of ends and of persons as valuable in

themselves. Verily, he himself may personally lead a much more upright

life than the loud champions of theism, but he denies the general moral

order, which is God. With the epithet of atheist as commonly used for

those who merelv have a conception of God which differs from the

orthodox view, we are not here concerned. That may be dismissed as a

misuse of the word due to religious bigotry. The fruits of true atheism

are materialism, pantheism and fatalism. Indeed any doctrine, even a

theological doctrine, which debases and destroys the inherent value of

the human consciousness and personality, is rightly to be regarded,

whatever it may _say_ about God, however it may repeat his name (and

two of these doctrines are very fond of this repetition, but this must

not blind us to the real issue)—that doctrine is atheistic. The most

resolute materialists, the most high-minded worshippers of Providence

and the great philosophers of the Absolute, find themselves united here

in atheism. God is not a mere totality of laws operating in the

universe. Such a theism is but a form of real atheism. We must, insists

Renouvier, abandon views of this type, with all that savours of an

Absolute, a Perfect Infinite, and affirm our belief in the existence of

an order of Goodness which gives value to human personality and assures

ultimate victory to Justice. This is to believe in God. We arrive at

this belief rationally and after consideration of the world and of the

moral law of persons. Through these we come to God. We do not begin

with him and pretend to deduce these from his nature by some

incomprehensible _a priori_ propositions. The methods of the old

dogmatic theology are reversed. Instead of beginning with a Being of

whom we know nothing and can obviously deduce nothing, let us proceed

inductively, and by careful consideration of the revelation we have

before us in the world and in humanity let us build up our idea of God.

Renouvier is anxious that we should examine the data upon which we may

found “rational hypotheses” as to the nature of God. The Critical

Philosophy has upset the demonstrations of the existence of God, which

were based upon causality and upon necessary existence (the

cosmological and ontological proofs). Neo-criticism not only

establishes the existence of God as a rational hypothesis, but “this

point of view of the divine problem is the most favourable to the

notion of the personality of God. The personality of God seems to us to

be indicated as the looked-for conclusion and almost necessary

consummation of the probabilities of practical reason.”[27]

[27] _Psychologie rationnelle_, vol. 2, p. 300.

The admission of ends, of finality, or purpose in the universe is

frequently given as involving a supreme consciousness embracing this

teleology. Also it is argued that Good could not exist in its

generality save in an external consciousness—that is, a divine mind. By

recalling the objections to a total synthesis of phenomena, Renouvier

refutes both these arguments which rest upon erroneous methods in

ontology and in theology. The explanation of the world by God, as in

the cosmological argument, is fanciful, while the ontological argument

leads us to erect an unintelligible and illogical absolute. Renouvier

regards God as existing as a general consciousness corresponding to the

generality of ends which man himself finds before him, finite, limited

in power and in knowledge. But in avowing this God, Renouvier points

him out to us as the first of all beings, a being like them, not an

absolute, but a personality, possessing (and this is important) the

perfection of morality, goodness and justice. He is the supreme

personality in action, and as a perfect person he respects the

personality of others and operates on our world only in the degree

which the freedom and individuality of persons who are not himself can

permit him, and within the limits of the general laws under which he

represents to himself his own enveloped existence. This is the

hypothesis of unity rendered intelligible, and as such Renouvier claims

that it bridges in a marvellous manner the gap always deemed to exist

between monotheism and polytheism—the two great currents of religious

thought in humanity. The monotheists have appeared intolerant and

fanatical in their religion and in their deity (not in so far as it was

manifest in the thoughts of the simple, who professed a faith of the

heart, but as shown in the ambitious theology of books and of schools),

bearing on their banner the signs of a jealous deity, wishing no other

gods but himself, declaring to his awed worshippers: “I am that I am;

have no other gods but me!” On the other hand, the polytheistic peoples

have been worshippers of beauty and goodness in all things, and where

they saw these things they created a deity. They were more concerned

with the immortality of good souls than the eternal existence of one

supreme being; they were free-thinkers, creators of beauty and seekers

after truth, and believers in freedom. The humanism of Greece stands in

contrast to the idolatrous theocracy of the Hebrews.

The unity of God previously mentioned does not exclude the possibility

of a plurality of divine persons. God the one would be the first and

foremost, _rex hominum deorumque_. Some there may be that rise through

saintliness to divinity, Sons of God, persons surpassing man in

intelligence, power and morality. To take sides in this matter is

equivalent to professing a particular religion. We must avoid the

absolutist spirit in religion no less than in philosophy. By this

Renouvier means that brutal fanaticism which prohibits the Gods of

other people by passion and hatred, which aims at establishing and

imposing its own God (which is, after all, but its own idea of God) as

the imperialist plants his flag, his kind and his customs in new

territory, in the spirit of war and conquest. Such a “holy war” is an

outrage, based not upon real religion, but on intolerant fanaticism in

which freedom and the inherent rights of personality to construct its

own particular faith are denied.

Renouvier finds a parallelism between the worship of the State in

politics and of the One God in religion. The systems in which unity or

plurality of divine personality appears differ from one another in the

same way in which monarchal and republican ideas differ. Monarchy in

religion offers the same obstacles to progress as it has done in

politics. It involves a parallel enslavement of one’s entire self and

goods, a conscription which is hateful to freedom and detrimental to

personality. To this supreme and regal Providence all is due; it alone

in any real sense exists. Persons are shadows, of no reality, serfs

less than the dust, to whom a miserable dole is given called grace, for

which prayer and sacrifice are to be unceasingly made or chastisements

from the Almighty will follow. This notion is the product of monarchy

in politics, and with monarchy it will perish. The two are bound up,

for “by the grace of God” we are told monarchs hold their thrones, by

his favour their sceptre sways and their battalions move on to victory.

This monarchal God, this King of kings and Lord of hosts, ruler of

heaven and earth, is the last refuge of monarchs on the earth.

Confidence in both has been shaken, and both, Renouvier asserts, will

disappear and give place to a real democracy, not only to republics on

earth, but to the conception of the whole universe as a republic. Men

raise up saints and intercessors to bridge the gulf between the divine

Monarch and his slaves. They conceive angels as doing his work in

heaven; they tolerate priests to bring down grace to them here and now.

The doctrine of unity thus gives rise to fanatical religious devotion

or philosophical belief in the absolute, which stifles religion and

perishes in its own turn. The doctrine of immortality, based on the

belief in the value of human personality, leads us away from monarchy

to a republic of free spirits. A democratic religion in this sense will

display human nature raised to its highest dignity by virtue of an

energetic affirmation of personal liberty, tolerance, mutual respect

and liberty of faith—a free religion without priests or clericalism,

not in conflict with science and philosophy, but encouraging these

pursuits and in turn encouraged by them.[28]

[28] The fullest treatment of this is the large section in the

conclusion to the _Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire_ (tome iv.).

_Cf_. also the discussion of the influence of religious beliefs on

societies in the last chapter of _La Nouvelle Monadologie_.

III

Ravaisson, in founding the new spiritual philosophy, professed certain

doctrines which were a blending of Hellenism and Christianity. In the

midst of thought which was dominated by positivism, naturalism or

materialism, or by a shallow eclecticism, wherein religious ideas were

rather held in contempt, he issued a challenge on behalf of spiritual

values and ideals. Beauty, love and goodness, he declared, were divine.

God himself is these things, said Ravaisson, and the divinity is “not

far from any of us.” In so far as we manifest these qualities we

approach the perfect personality of God himself. In the infinite, in

God, will is identical with love, which itself is not distinguished

from the absolutely good and the absolutely beautiful. This love can

govern our wills; the love of the beautiful and the good can operate in

our lives. In so far as this is so, we participate in the love and the

life of God.

Boutroux agrees substantially with Ravaisson, but he lays more stress

upon the free creative power of the deity as immanent. “God,” he

remarks in his thesis, “is not only the creator of the world, he is

also its Providence, and watches over the details as well as over the

whole.”[29] God is thus an immanent and creative power in his world as

well as the perfect being of supreme goodness and beauty. Boutroux here

finds this problem of divine immanence and transcendence as important

as does Blondel, and his attitude is like that of Blondel, midway

between that of Ravaisson and Bergson.

[29] _La Contingence des Lois de la Nature_, p. 150.

Religion, Boutroux urges, must show man that the supreme ideal for him

is to realise in his own nature this idea of God. There is an

obligation upon man to pursue after these things-goodness, truth,

beauty and love—for they are his good, they are the Good; they are,

indeed, God. In them is a harmony which satisfies his whole nature, and

which does not neglect or crush any aspect of character, as narrow

conceptions of religion inevitably do. Boutroux insists upon the

necessity for intellectual satisfaction, and opposes the “philosophy of

action” in ils doctrine of “faith for faith’s sake.” At the same time

he conceives Reason as a harmony, not merely a coldly logical thing.

Feeling and will must be satisfied also.[30]

[30] Boutroux has in his volume, _Science et Religion dans la

Philosophie contemporaine_, contributed a luminous and penetrating

discussion of various religious doctrines from Comte to William James.

This was published in 1908.

We have observed already how Fouillée claimed that the ethics of his

_idées-forces_ contained the gist of what was valuable in the world

religions. He claims that philosophy includes under the form of

rational belief or thought what the religions include as instinctive

belief. In religion he sees a spontaneous type of metaphysic, while

metaphysic or philosophy is a rationalised religion.

Nothing in this connection is more important than a rational and

harmonious view of God. This he insists upon in his thesis and in his

_Sketch of the Future of a Metaphysic founded on Experience_. The old

idea of God was that of a monarch governing the world as a despot

governs his subjects. The government of the universe may still be held

to be a monarchy, but modern science is careful to assure us that it

must be regarded as an absolutely constitutional monarchy. The monarch,

if there be one, acts in accordance with the laws and respects the

established constitution. Reason obliges us to conceive of the

sovereign: experience enlightens us as to the constitution.

There can be little doubt that one of the world’s greatest books upon

religion is the work of Guyau, which appeared in 1886, bearing the

arresting title, _L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_. Its sub-title describes it

as an Etude sociologique, and it is this treatment of the subject from

the standpoint of sociology which is such a distinctive feature of the

book. The notion of a _social bond_ between man and the powers superior

to him, but resembling him, is, claims Guyau, a point of unity in which

all religions are at one. The foundation of the religious sentiment

lies in sociality, and the religious man is just the man who is

disposed to be sociable, not only with all living beings whom he meets,

but with those whom he imaginatively creates as gods. Guyau’s thesis,

briefly put, is that religion is a manifestation of life (again he

insists on “Life,” as in his Ethics, as a central conception), becoming

self-conscious and seeking the explanation of things by analogies drawn

from human society. Religion is “sociomorphic” rather than merely

anthropomorphic; it is, indeed, a universal sociological hypothesis,

mythical in form.

The religious sentiment expresses a consciousness of dependence, and in

addition, adds Guyau, it expresses the need of affection, tenderness

and love—that is to say, the “social” side of man’s nature. In the

conception of the Great Companion or Loving Father, humanity finds

consolation and hope. Children and women readily turn to such an ideal,

and primitive peoples, who are just like children, conceive of the

deity as severe and all- powerful. To this conception moral attributes

were subsequently added, as man’s own moral conscience developed, and

it now issues in a doctrine of God as Love. All this development is,

together with that of esthetics and ethics, a manifestation of life in

its individual and more especially social manifestations.

It is the purpose of Guyau’s book not only to present a study of the

evolution of religion in this manner, from a sociological point of

view, but to indicate a further development of which the beginnings are

already manifest—namely, a decomposition of all systems of dogmatic

religion. It is primarily the decay of dogma and ecclesiasticism which

he intends to indicate by the French term _irréligion_. The English

translation of his work bears the title _The Non-religion of the

Future_. Had Guyau been writing and living in another country it is

undoubtedly true that his work would probably have been entitled _The

Religion of the Future_. Owing to the Roman Catholic environment and

the conception of religion in his own land, he was, however, obliged to

abandon the use of the word religion altogether. In order to avoid

misunderstanding, we must examine the sense he gives to this word, and

shall see then that his title is not meant to convey the impression of

being anti-religious in the widest sense, nor is it irreligious in the

English meaning of that word.

Guyau considers every positive and historical religion to present three

distinct and essential elements:

An attempt at a mythical and non-scientific explanation of (_a_)

natural phenomena—_e.g._, intervention, miracles, efficacious prayer;

(_b_) historical facts—_e.g._, incarnation of Buddha or Jesus.

A system of dogmas—that is to say, symbolic ideas or imaginative

beliefs—forcibly imposed upon one’s faith as absolute verities, even

though they are susceptible to no scientific demonstration or

philosophical justification.

A cult and a system of rites or of worship, made up of more or less

immutable practices which are looked upon as possessing a marvellous

efficacy upon the course of things, a propitiatory virtue.[31]

[31] _L’Irréligion de l’Avenir_, p. xiii; Eng. trans., p. 10.

By these three different and really organic elements, religion is

clearly marked off from philosophy. Owing to the stability of these

elements religion is apt to be centuries behind science and philosophy,

and consequently reconciliation is only effected by a subtle process

which, while maintaining the traditional dogmas and phrases, evolves a

new interpretation of them sufficiently modern to harmonise a little

more with the advance in thought, but which presents a false appearance

of stability and consistency, disguising the real change of meaning, of

view-point and of doctrine. Of this effort we shall see the most

notable instance is that of the “Modernists” or Neo-Catholics in France

and Italy, and the Liberal Christians in England and America.

Guyau claims that these newer interpretations, subtle and useful as

they are, and frequently the assertions of minds who desire sincerely

to adapt the ancient traditions to modern needs, are in themselves

hypocritical, and the Church in a sense does right to oppose them.

Guyau cannot see any satisfactoriness in these compromises and

adaptations which lack the clearness of the old teaching, which they in

a sense betray, while they do not sufficiently satisfy the demands of

modern thought.

With the decay of the dogmatic religion of Christendom which is

supremely stated in the faith of the Roman Catholic Church, there must

follow the non-religion of the future, which may well preserve, he

points out, all that is pure in the religious sentiment and carry with

it an admiration for the cosmos and for the infinite powers which are

there displayed. It will be a search for, and a belief in, an ideal not

only individual, but social and even cosmic, which shall pass the

limits of actual reality. Hence it appears that “non-religion” or

“a-religion,” which is for Guyau simply “the negation of all dogma, of

all traditional and supernatural authority, of all revelation, of all

miracle, of all myth, of all rite erected into a duty,” is most

certainly not a synonym for irreligion or impiety, nor does it involve

any contempt for the moral and metaphysical doctrines expressed by the

ancient religions of the world. The non-religious man in Guyau’s sense

of the term is simply the man without a religion, as he has defined it

above, and he may quite well admire and sympathise with the great

founders of religion, not only in that they were thinkers,

metaphysicians, moralists and philanthropists, but in that they were

reformers of established belief, more or less avowed enemies of

religious authority and of every affirmation laid down by an

ecclesiastical body in order to bind the intellectual freedom of

individuals. Guyau’s remarks in this connection agree with the tone in

which Renan spoke of his leaving the Church because of a feeling of

respect and loyalty to its Founder. Guyau points out that there exists

in the bosom of every great religion a dissolving force—namely, the

very force which in the beginning served to constitute it and to

establish its triumphant revolt over its predecessor. That force is the

absolute right of private judgment, the free factor of the personal

conscience, which no external authority can succeed, ultimately, in

coercing or silencing. The Roman Church, and almost every other

organised branch of the Christian religion, forgets, when faced with a

spirit which will not conform, that it is precisely to this spirit that

it owes its own foundation and also the best years of its existence.

Guyau has little difficulty in pressing the conclusions which follow

from the recognition of this vital point.

Briefly, it follows that the hope of a world-religion is an illusion,

whether it be the dream of a perfect and world-wide Judaism, Buddhism,

Christianity, or Mohammedanism. The sole authority in religious

matters, that of the individual conscience, prevents any such

consummation, which, even if it could be achieved, would be

mischievous. The future will display a variety of beliefs and

religions, as it does now. This need not discourage us, for therein is

a sign of vitality or spiritual life, of which the world-religions are

examples, marred, however, by their profession of universality, an

ideal which they do not and never will realise.

The notion of a Catholic Church or a great world- religion is really

contrary to the duty of personal thought and reflection, which must

inevitably (unless they give way to mere lazy repetition of other

people’s thoughts) lead to differences. The tendency is for humanity to

move away from dogmatic religion, with its pretensions to universality,

catholicity, and monarchy (of which, says Guyau, the most curious type

has just recently been achieved in our own day, by the Pope’s

proclamation of the dogma of papal infallibility), towards religious

individualism and to a plurality of religions. There may, of course, be

religious associations or federations, but these will be free, and will

not demand the adherence to any dogma as such.

With the decay of dogmatic religion the best elements of religious life

will have freer scope to develop themselves, and will grow both in

intensity and in extent. “He alone is religious, in the philosophical

sense of the word, who researches for, who thinks about, who loves,

truth.” Such inquiry or search involves freedom, it involves conflict,

but the conflict of ideas, which is perfectly compatible with

toleration in a political sense, and is the essence of the spirit of

the great world teachers. This is what Jesus foresaw when he remarked:

“I did not come to bring peace, but a sword.” More fully, he might have

put it, Guyau suggests: “I came not to bring peace into human thought,

but an incessant battle of ideas; not repose, but movement and progress

of spirit; not universal dogma, but liberty of belief, which is the

first condition of growth.” Well might Renan remark that it was loyalty

to such a spirit which caused him to break with the Church.

While attacking religious orthodoxy in this manner, Guyau is careful to

point out that if religious fanaticism ls bad, anti-religious

fanaticism is equally mischievous, wicked and foolish.[32] While the

eighteenth century could only scoff at religion, the nineteenth

realised the absurdity of such raillery. We have come to see that even

although a belief may be irrational and even erroneous, it may still

survive, and it may console multitudes whose minds would be lost on the

stormy sea of life without such an anchor. While dogmatic or positive

religions do exist they will do so, Guyau reminds us, for quite

definite and adequate reasons, chiefly because there are people who

believe them, to whom they mean something and often a great deal. These

reasons certainly do diminish daily, and the number of adherents, too,

but we must refrain from all that savours of anti- religious

fanaticism.[33] He himself speaks with great respect of a Christian

missionary. Are we not, he asks, both brothers and humble collaborators

in the work and advance of humanity? He sees no real inconsistency

between his own dislike of orthodoxy and dogma and the missionary’s

work of raising the ignorant to a better life by those very dogmas. It

is a case of relative advance and mental progress.

[32] He cites a curious case of anti-religious fanaticism at

Marseilles in 1885, when all texts and scripture pictures were removed

fromthe schools.

[33] Guyau’s book abounds in illustrations. He mentions here Huss’s

approval of the sincerity of one man who brought straw from his own

house to burn him. Huss admired this act of a man in whom he saw a

brother in sincerity.

It is with great wealth of discussion that Guyau recounts the genesis

of religions in primitive societies to indicate the sociological basis

of religion. More important are his chapters on the dissolution of

religions in existing societies, in which he shows the

unsatisfactoriness of the dogmas of orthodox Protestantism equally with

those of the Catholic Church. As mischievous as the notion of an

infallible Church is that of an infallible book, literally—that is to

say, foolishly-interpreted. He recognises that for a literal

explanation of the Bible must be substituted, and is, indeed, being

substituted, a literary explanation. Like Renan, he criticises the

vulgar conception of prayer and of religious morality which promotes

goodness by promise of paradise or fear of hell. He urges in this

connection the futility of the effort made by Michelet, Quinet and,

more especially, by Renouvier and Pillon to “Protestantise” France.

While admitting a certain intellectual, moral and political superiority

to it, Guyau claims that for the promotion of morality there is little

use in substituting Protestantism for Catholicism. He forecasts the

limitation of the power of priests and other religious teachers over

the minds of young children. Protestant clergymen in England and

America he considers to be no more tolerant in regard to the

educational problem than the priests. Guyau urges the importance of an

elementary education being free from religious propaganda. He was

writing in 1886, some years after the secular education law had been

carried. There is, however, more to be done, and he points out “how

strange it is that a society should not do its best to form those whose

function it is to form it.”[34] In higher education some attention

should be given to the comparative study of religions. “Even from the

point of view of philosophy, Buddha and Jesus are more important than

Anaximander or Thales.”[35] It is a pity, he thinks, that there is not

a little more done to acquaint the young with the ideas for which the

great world-teachers, Confucius, Zoroaster, Buddha, Socrates, Mohammed,

stood, instead of cramming a few additional obscure names from early

national history. It would give children at least a notion that history

had a wider range than their own country, a realisation of the fact

that humanity was already old when Christ appeared, and that there are

great religions other than Christianity, religions whose followers are

not poor ignorant savages or heathen, but intelligent beings, from whom

even Christians may learn much. It is thoroughly mischievous, he aptly

adds, to bring up children in such a narrow mental atmosphere that the

rest of their life is one long disillusionment.

[34] _L’Irréligion de l’Avenir_, p. 232; Eng. trans., p. 278.

[35] _Ibid_., p. 236; Eng. trans., p. 283.

With particular reference to his own country, Guyau criticises the

religious education of women, the question of “mixed marriages,” the

celibacy of the Roman Catholic clergy, and the influence of religious

beliefs upon the limitation or increase of the family.

After having summed up the tendency of dogmatic religion to decay, he

asks if any unification of the great religions is to-day possible, or

whether any new religion may be expected? The answer he gives to both

these questions is negative, and he produces a wealth of very valid

reasons in support of his finding. He is, of course, here using the

term religion as he has himself defined it. The claim to universality

by all world-religions, the insistence by each that it alone is the

really best or true religion, precludes any question of unity. As well

might we imagine unity between Protestantism and the Roman Catholic

Church.

In the “non-religious” state, dogma will be replaced by individual

constructions. Religion will be a free, personal affair, in which the

great philosophical hypotheses (_e.g._, Theism and Pantheism) will be

to a large extent utilised. They will, however, be regarded as such by

all, as rational hypotheses, which some individuals will accept, others

will reject. Certain doctrines will appeal to some, not to others. The

evidence for a certain type of theism will seem adequate to some, not

to others. There will be no endeavour to impose corporately or singly

the acceptance of any creed upon others.

With Guyau’s conception of the future of religion or non-religion,

whichever we care to call it, we may well close this survey of the

religious ideas in modern France. In the Roman Church on the one hand,

and, on the other, in the thought of Renan, Renouvier and Guyau,

together with the multitude of thinking men and women they represent,

may be seen the two tendencies—one conservative, strengthening its

internal organisation and authority, in defiance of all the influences

of modern thought, the other a free and personal effort, issuing in a

genuine humanising of religion and freeing it from ecclesiasticism and

dogma.

A word may be said here, however, with reference to the “Modernists.”

The Modernist movement is a French product, the result of the

interaction of modern philosophical and scientific ideas upon the

teaching of the Roman Church. It has produced a philosophical religion

which owes much to Ollé-Laprune and Blondel, and is in reality modern

science with a veneer of religious idealism or platonism. It is a

theological compromise, and has no affinities with the efforts of

Lamennais. As a compromise it was really opposed to the traditions of

the French, to whose love of sharp and clear thinking such general and

rather vague syntheses are unacceptable. It must be admitted, however,

that there is a concreteness, a nearness to reality and life, which

separates it profoundly from the highly abstract theology of Germany,

as seen in Ritschl and Harnack.

The Abbé Marat of the Theological School at the Sorbonne and Father

Gratry of the Ecole Normale were the initiators of this movement, as

far back as the Second Empire. “Modernism” was never a school of

thought, philosophical or religious, and it showed itself in a freedom

and life, a spirit rather than in any formula;. As Sorel’s syndicalism

is an application of the Bergsonian and kindred doctrines to the left

wings, and issues in a social theory of “action,” so Modernism is an

attempt to apply them to the right and issues in a religion founded on

action rather than theology. The writings of the Modernists are

extensive, but we mention the names of the chief thinkers. There is the

noted exegetist Loisy, who was dismissed in 1894 from the Catholic

Institute of Paris and now holds the chair of the History of Religions

at the College de France. His friend, the Abbé Bourier, maintained the

doctrine, “ Where Christ is there is the Church,” with a view to

insisting upon the importance of being a Christian rather than a

Catholic or a Protestant.

The importance of the Catholic thinker, Blondel, both for religion and

for philosophy, has already been indicated at an earlier stage in this

book. His work inspires most.Modernist thought. Blondel preaches, with

great wealth of philosophical and psychological argument, the great

Catholic doctrine of the collaboration of God with man and of man with

God. Man at one with himself realises his highest aspirations. Divine

transcendence and divine immanence in man are reconciled. God and man,

in this teaching, are brought together, and the stern realism of

every-day life and the idealism of religion unite in a sacramental

union. The supreme principle in this union Laberthonnière shows to be

Love. He is at pains to make clear, however, that belief in Love as the

ultimate reality is no mere sentimentality, no mere assertion of the

will-to-believe. For him the intellect must play its part in the

religious life and in the expression of faith. No profounder

intellectual judgment exists than just the one which asserts “God is

Love,” when this statement is properly apprehended and its momentous

significance clearly realised. We cannot but lament, with

Laberthonnière, the abuse of this proposition and its subsequent loss

of both appeal and meaning through a shallow familiarity. The

reiteration of great conceptions, which is the method by which the

great dogmas have been handed down from generations, tends to blurr

their real significance. They become stereotyped and empty of life. It

is for this reason that Le Roy in _Dogme et Critique_ (1907) insisted

upon the advisability of regarding all dogmas as expressions of

practical value in and for action, rather than as intellectual

propositions of a purely “religious” or ecclesiastical type, belonging

solely to the creeds.

To Blondel, Laberthonnière, and Le Roy can be added the names of

Fonsegrive, Sertillanges, Loyson and Houtin, the last two of whom

ultimately left the Church, for the Church made up its mind to crush

Modernism. The Pope had intimated in 1879 that the thirteenth-century

philosophy of Aquinas was to be recognised as the only official

philosophy.[36] Finally, Modernism was condemned in a Vatican

encyclical (_Pascendi Dominici Gregis_) in 1907, as was also the social

and educational effort, _Le Sillon_.

[36] This led to revival of the study of the _Summa Theologiæ_ and to

the commencement of the review of Catholic philosophy, _Revue

Thomiste_.

Such has been Rome’s last word, and it is not surprising, therefore,

that France is the most ardent home of free thought upon religious

matters, that the French people display a spirit which is unable to

stop at Protestantism, but which heralds the religion or the

_non-religion_ of the future to which Guyau has so powerfully indicated

the tendencies and has by so doing helped, in conjunction with Renan

and Renouvier, to hasten its realisation.

A parallel to the “modernist” theology of the Catholic thinkers was

indicated on the Protestant side by the theology of Auguste Sabatier,

whose _Esquisse d’une Philosophie de la Religion d’après la Psychologie

et l’Histoire_ appeared in 1897[37] and of Menegoz,[38] whose

_Publications diverges sur le Fidéisme et son Application a

l’Enseignement chrétien traditionnel_ were issued in 1900. Sabatier

assigns the beginning of religion to man’s trouble and distress of

heart caused by his aspirations, his belief in ideals and higher

values, being at variance with his actual condition. Religion arises

from this conflict of real and ideal in the soul of man. This is the

essence of religion which finds its expression in the life of faith

rather than in the formation of beliefs which are themselves accidental

and transitory, arising from environment and education, changing in

form from aee to age both in the individual and the race. While LeRoy

on the Catholic side, maintained that dogmas were valuable for their

practical significance, Sabatier and Ménégoz claimed that all religious

knowledge is symbolical. Dogmas are but symbols, which inadequately

attempt to reveal their object. That object can only be grasped by

“faith” as distinct from “belief”—that is to say, by an attitude in

which passion, instinct and intuition blend and not by an attitude

which is purely one of intellectual conviction. This doctrine of

“salvation by faith independently of beliefs” has a marked relationship

not only to pragmatism and the philosophy of action, but to the

philosophy of intuition. A similar anti-intellectualism colours the

“symbolo-fidéist” currents within Catholicism, which manifest a more

extreme character. A plea voiced against all such tendencies is to be

found in Bois’ book, _De la Connaissance religieuse_ (1894), where an

endeavour is made to retain a more intellectual attitude, and it again

found expression in the volume by Boutroux, written as late as 1908,

which deals with the religious problem in our period.

[37] It was followed after his death in 1901 by the volume _Les

Religions d’Authorité et la Religion de l’Esprit_, 1904.

[38] This is the late Eugene Ménégoz, Professor of Theology in Paris,

not Ferdinand Ménégoz, his nephew, who is also a Professor of Theology

now at Strasbourg.

Quoting Boehme in the interesting conclusion to this book on _Science

and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy_ (1908) Boutroux sums up in the

words of the old German mystic his attitude to the diversity of

religious opinions. “Consider the birds in our forests, they praise God

each in his own way, in diverse tones and fashions. Think you God is

vexed by this diversity and desires to silence discordant voices? All

the forms of being are dear to the infinite Being himself!”[39]

[39] It is interesting to compare with the above the sentiments

expressed in Matthew Arnold’s poem, entitled Progress:

“Children of men! the unseen Power, whose eye

For ever doth accompany mankind,

Hath look’d on no religion scornfully

That men did ever find.

This survey of the general attitude adopted towards religion and the

problems which it presents only serves to emphasise more clearly those

tendencies which we have already denoted in previous chapters. As the

discussion of progress was radically altered by the admission of the

principle of freedom, and the discussion of ethics passes bevond rigid

formulae to a freer conception of morality, so here in religion the

insistence upon freedom and that recognition of personality which

accompanies it, colours the whole religious outlook. Renan, Renouvier

and Guyau, the three thinkers who have most fully discussed religion in

our period, join in proclaiming the importance of the personal factor

in religious belief, and in valiant opposition to that Church which is

the declared enemy of freedom, they urge that in freedom of thought

lies the course of all religious development in the future, for only

thus can be expressed the noblest and highest aspirations of man’s

spirit.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing pages have been devoted to a history of ideas rather than

to the maintenance of any special thesis or particular argument.

Consequently it does not remain for us to draw any definitely logical

conclusions from the preceding chapters. The opportunity may be justly

taken, however, of summing up the general features of the development.

Few periods in the history of human thought can rival in interest that

of the second half of the nineteenth century in France. The discussion

covers the principal problems with which man’s mind is occupied in

modern times and presents these in a manner which is distinctly human

and not merely national. This alone would give value to the study of

such a period. There is, however, to be added the more striking fact

that there is a complete “turning of the tide” manifested during these

fifty years in the attitude to most of the problems. Beginning with an

overweening confidence in science and a belief in determinism and in a

destined progress, the century closed with a complete reversal of these

conceptions.

Materialism and naturalism are both recognised as inadequate, a

reaction sets in against positivism and culminates in the triumph of

spiritualism or idealism. This idealism is free from the cruder aspects

of the Kantian or Hegelian philosophy. The Thing-in-itself and the

Absolute are abandoned; relativity is proclaimed in knowledge, and

freedom in the world of action. Thoughts or ideas show themselves as

forces operating in the evolution of history. This is maintained in

opposition to the Marxian doctrine of the purely economic or

materialistic determination of history. A marked tendency, however, is

manifested to regard all problems from a social stand point. The

dogmatic confidence in science gives way to a more philosophical

attitude, while the conflict of science and religion resolves itself

into a decay of dogma and the conception of a free religion.

We have indicated the problem presented by “_science et conscience_,”

and in so far as we have laid down any thesis or argument in these

pages, as distinct from an historical account of the development, that

thesis has been, that the central problem in the period was that of

freedom. It was to this point which the consideration of science, or

rather of the sciences, led us. We have observed the importance of the

sciences for philosophy, and it is clear that, so far from presenting

any real hostility to philosophy, it can acclaim their autonomy and

freedom, without attempting by abstract methods to absorb them into

itself. They are equally a concrete part of human thought, and in a

deep and real sense a manifestation of the same spirit which animates

philosophy.

By recognising the sciences philosophy can avoid the fallacy of

ideology on the one hand and naturalism on the other. Unlike the old

eclecticism, the new thought is able to take account of science and to

criticise its assertions. We have seen how this has been accomplished,

and the rigidly mechanical view of the world abandoned for one into

which human freedom enters as a real factor. This transforms the view

of history and shows us human beings creating that history and not

merely being its blind puppets. History offers no cheerful outlook for

the easy-going optimist; it is not any more to be regarded as mere data

for pessimistic reflections, but rather a record which prompts a

feeling of responsibility. The world is not ready-made, and if there is

to be progress it must be willed by us and achieved by our struggle and

labour.

The doctrine of immanence upon which the modern tendency is to insist,

in place of the older idea of transcendence, makes us feel, not only

that we are free, but that our freedom is not in opposition to, or in

spite of, the divine spirit, but is precisely an expression of divine

immanence. Instead of the gloomy conception of a whole which determines

itself apart from us, we feel ourselves part, and a very responsible

part, of a reality which determines itself collectively and creatively

by its own action, by its own ideals, which it has itself created. This

freedom must extend not only to our conceptions of history but also to

those of ethics and of religion.

“English philosophy ends in considering nature as an assemblage of

facts; German philosophy looks upon it chiefly as a system of laws. If

there is a place midway between the two nations it belongs to us

Frenchmen. We applied the English ideas in the eighteenth century; we

can in the nineteenth give precision to the German ideas. What we have

to do is to temper, amend and complete the two spirits, one by the

other, to fuse them into one, to express them in a style that shall be

intelligible to everybody and thus to make of them the universal

spirit.”

Such was Taine’s attitude, and it indicates clearly the precise

position of French thought. We are apt to consider Taine purely as an

empiricist, but we must remember that he disagreed with the radical

empiricism of John Stuart Mill. His own attitude was largely that of a

reaction against the vague spiritualism of the Eclectic School,

especially Cousin’s eclecticism, a foreign growth on French soil, due

to German influence. The purely _a priori_ constructions of the older

spiritualism could find no room, and allowed none, for the sciences.

This was sufficient to doom it, and to lead naturally to a reaction of

a positive kind, revolting from all _a priori_ constructions.

It was to combat the excessive positive reaction against metaphysics

that Renouvier devoted his energies, but while professing to modernise

Kant and to follow out the general principles of his Critical

Philosophy, Renouvier was further removed from the German thinker than

he at times seems to have observed. Renouvier must undoubtedly share

with Comte the honours of the century in French Philosophy. Many

influences, however, prevented the general or speedy acceptance of

Renouvier’s doctrines. The University was closed against him, as

against Comte. He worked in isolation and his style of presentation,

which is heavy and laborious, does not appeal to the _esprit_ of the

French mind. Probably, too, his countrymen’s ignorance of Kant at the

time Renouvier wrote his _Essais de Critique générale_ prevented an

understanding and appreciation of the neo-critical advance on

Criticism.

Renouvier commands respect, but he does not appear to be in the line of

development which manifests so essentially the character of French

thought. This is to be found rather in that spiritualism, which, unlike

the old, does not exclude science, but welcomes it, finds a place for

it, although not by any means an exclusive place. The new spiritualists

did not draw their inspiration, as did Cousin, from any German source,

their initial impulse is derived from a purely French thinker, Maine de

Biran, who, long neglected, came to recognition in the work of

Ravaisson and those subsequent thinkers of this group, right up to

Bergson.

This current of thought is marked by a vitality and a concreteness

which are a striking contrast to the older eclectic spiritualism.

Having submitted itself to the discipline of the sciences, it is

acquainted with their methods and data in a manner which enables it to

oppose the dogmatism of science, and to acclaim the reality of values

other than those which are purely scientific. Ignoring _a priori_

construction, or eclectic applications of doctrines, it investigates

the outer world of nature and the inner life of the spirit.

We have said that these ideas are presented, not merely from a national

standpoint, but from one which is deeply human and universal. “_La

Science_,” re-marked Pasteur, “_n’a pas de patrie_.” We may add that

philosophy, too, owns no special fatherland. There is not in

philosophy, any more than in religion, “a chosen people,” even although

the Jews of old thought themselves such, and among moderns the Germans

have had this conceit about their _Kultur_. In so far as philosophy

aims at the elucidation of a true view of the universe, it thereby

tends inevitably to universality. But just as a conception of

internationalism, which should fail to take into account the factors of

nationality, would be futile and disastrous, so a conception of the

evolution of thought must likewise estimate the characteristics which

nationality produces even in the philosophical field.

Such characteristics, it will be found, are not definite doctrines, for

these may be transferred, as are scientific discoveries, from one

nation to another, and absorbed in such a manner that they become part

of the general consciousness of mankind. They are rather differences of

tone and colour, form or expression, which express the vital genius of

the nation. There are features which serve to distinguish French

philosophy from the development which has occurred in Germany, Italy,

England and America.

Modern French thought does not deliberately profess to maintain

allegiance to any past traditions, for it realises that such a

procedure would be inconsistent with that freedom of thought which is

bound up with the spirit of philosophy. It does, however, betray

certain national features, which are characteristic of the great French

thinkers from Descartes, Pascal and Malebranche onwards.

One of the most remarkable points about these thinkers was their

intimacy with the sciences. Descartes, while founding modern

philosophy, also gave the world analytic geometry; Pascal made certain

physical discoveries and was an eminent mathematician. Malebranche,

too, was keenly interested in science. In the following century the

Encyclopaedists displayed their wealth of scientific knowledge, and in

the nineteenth century we have seen the work of Comte based on science,

the ability of Cournot and Renouvier in mathematics, while men like

Boutroux, Hergson and Le Roy possess a thorough acquaintance with

modern science.

These facts have marked results, and distinguish French philosophy from

that of Germany, where the majority of philosophers appear to haye been

theological students in their youth and to have suffered from the

effects of their subject for the remainder of their lives. Theological

study does not produce clearness; it does not tend to cultivate a

spirit of precision, but rather one of vagueness, of which much German

philosophy is the product. On the other hand, mathematics is a study

which demands clearness and which in turn increases the spirit of

clarity and precision.

There is to be seen in our period a strong tendency to adhere to this

feature of clearness. Modern French philosophy is remarkably lucid.

Indeed, it is claimed that there is no notion, however profound it may

be, or however based on technical research it may be, which cannot be

conveyed in the language of every day. French philosophy does not

invent a highly technical vocabulary in order to give itself airs in

the eyes of the multitude, on the plea that obscurity is a sign of

erudition and learning. On the contrary, it remembers Descartes’

intimate association of clearness with truth, remembers, too, his clear

and simple French which he preferred to the scholastic Latin. It knows

that to convince others of truth one must be at least clear to them

and, what is equally important, one must be clear in one’s own mind

first. Clarity does not mean shallowness but rather the reverse,

because it is due to keen perceptive power, to a seeing further into

the heart of things, involving an intimate contact with reality.

French thought has always remained true to a certain “common sense.”

This is a dangerous and ambiguous term. In its true meaning it

signifies the general and sane mind of man free from all that prejudice

or dogma or tradition, upon which, of course, “common sense” in the

popular meaning is usually based. A genuine “common sense” is merely

“_liberté_” for the operation of that general reason which makes man

what he is. It must be admitted that, owing to the fact that philosophy

is taught in the _lycées_, the French are the best educated of any

nation in philosophical ideas and have a finer general sense of that

spirit of criticism and appreciation which is the essence of

philosophy, than has any other modern nation. Philosophy in France is

not written in order to appeal to any school or class. Not limited to

an academic circle only, it makes its pronouncements to humanity and

thus embodies in a real form the principles of _egalité_ and

_fraternité_. It makes a democratic appeal both by its _clarté_ and its

belief that _la raison commune_ is in some degree present in every

human being.

Not only was clearness a strong point in the philosophy of Descartes,

but there was also an insistence upon method. Since the time of his

famous _Discours de la Méthode_ there has always been a unique value

placed upon method in French thought, and this again serves to

distinguish it profoundly from German philosophy, which is, in general,

concerned with the conception and production of entire systems. The

idea of an individual and systematic construction is an ambitious

conceit which is not in harmony with the principles of _liberté_,

_egalité_, _fraternité_. Such a view of philosophical work is not a

sociable one, from a human standpoint, and tends to give rise to a

spirit of authority and tradition. Apart from this aspect of it, there

is a more important consideration. All those systems take one idea as

their starting-point and build up an immense construction _a priori_.

But another idea may be taken and opposed to that. There is thus an

immense wastage of labour, and the individual effort is never

transcended. Yet an idea is only a portion of our intelligence, and

that intelligence itself is, in turn, only a portion of reality. A

wider conception of philosophy must be aimed at, one in which the _vue

d’ensemble_ is not the effort of one mind, but of many, each

contributing its share to a harmonious conception, systematic in a

sense, but not in the German sense. Modern French thought has a dislike

of system of the individualistic type; it realises that reality is too

rich and complex for such a rapid construction to grasp it. It is

opposed to systems, for the French mind looks upon philosophy as a

manifestation of life itself—life blossoming to self-consciousness,

striving ever to unfold itself more explicitly and more clearly,

endeavouring to become more harmonious, more beautiful, and more noble.

The real victories of philosophical thought are not indicated by the

production of systems but by the discovery or creation of ideas. Often

these ideas have been single and simple, but they have become veritable

forces, in the life of mankind.

French thinkers prefer to work collectively at particular problems

rather than at systems. Hence the aim and tone of their work is more

universal and human, and being more general is apt to be more generous.

This again is the expression of _liberte_, _égalité_ and _fraternité_

in a true sense. The French prefer, as it were, in their philosophical

campaign for the intellectual conquest of reality diverse batteries of

_soixante-quinze_ acting with precision and alertness to the clumsy

production of a “Big Bertha.” The production of ambitious systems, each

professing to be the final word in the presentation of reality, has not

attracted the French spirit. It looks at reality differently and

prefers to deal with problems in a clear way, thereby indicating a

method which may be applied to the solution of others as they present

themselves. This is infinitely preferable to an ambitious unification,

which can only be obtained at the sacrifice of clearness or meaning,

and it arises from that keen contact with life, which keeps the mind

from dwelling too much in the slough of abstraction, from which some of

the German philosophers never succeed in escaping. Their pilgrimage to

the Celestial City ends there, and consequently the account of their

itinerary cannot be of much use to other pilgrims.

Another feature of modern French thought is the intimacy of the

connection between psychology and metaphysics, and the intensive

interest in psychology, which is but the imestigation of the inner life

of man. While in the early beginnings of ancient Greek philosophy some

time was spent in examining the outer world before man gave his

attention to the world within, we find Descartes, at the beginning of

modern philosophy, making his own consciousness of his own existence

his starting-point. Introspection has always played a prominent part in

French philosophy. Pascal was equally interested in the outer and the

inner world. Through Maine de Biran this feature has come down to the

new spiritualists and culminates in Bergson’s thought, in which

psychological considerations hold first rank.

The social feature of modern French thought should not be omitted. In

Germany subsequent thought has been coloured by the Reformation and the

particular aspects of that movement. In France one may well say that

subsequent thought has been marked by the Revolution. There is a

theological flavour about most German philosophy, while France, a

seething centre of political and social thought, has given to her

philosophy a more sociological trend.

The French spirit in philosophy stands for clearness, concreteness and

vitality. Consequently it presents a far greater brilliance, richness

and variety than German philosophy displays.[1] This vitality and even

exuberance, which are those of the spirit of youth manifesting a _joie

de vivre_ or an _élan vital_, have been very strongly marked since the

year 1880, and have placed French philosophy in the van of human

thought.

[1] It is, therefore to be lamented that French thought has not

received the attention which it deseives. In England far more

attention has been given to the nineteenth-century German philosophy,

while the history of thought in France, especially in the period

between Comte and Bergson, has remained in sad neglect. This can and

should be speedily remedied.

It would be vain to ask whither its advance will lead. Even its own

principles prevent any such forecast; its creative richness may blossom

forth to-morrow in forms entirely new, for such is the characteristic

of life itself, especially the life of the spirit, upon which so much

stress is laid in modern French philosophy. The New Idealism lays great

stress upon dynamism, voluntarism or action. Freedom and creative

activity are its keynotes, and life, ever fuller and richer, is its

aspiration. _La Vie_, of which France (and its centre, Paris) is such

an expression, finds formulation in the philosophy of contemporary

thinkers.[2]

[2] The student of comparative thought will find it both interesting

and profitable to compare the work done recently in Italy by Croce and

Gentile. The intellectual kinship of Croce and Bergson has frequently

been pointed out, but Gentile’s work comes very close to the

philosophy of action and to the whole positive-idealistic tendency of

contemporary French thought. This is particularly to be seen in

_L’atto del pensare come atto puro_ (1912), and in _Teoria generalo

dello spirito come atto puro_ (1916). Professor Carr, the well-known

exponent of Bergson’s philosophy, remarks in his introduction to the

English edition of Gentile’s book, “We may individualise the mind as a

natural thing-object person. . . . Yet our power to think the mind in

this way would be impossible were not the mind with and by which we

think it, itself not a thing, not a _fact_, but _act_; . . . never

_factum_, but always _fieri_.” This quotation is from p. xv of the

_Theory of Mind as Pure Act_. With one other quotation direct from

Gentile we must close this reference to Italian neo-idealism. “In so

far as the subject is constituted a subject by its own act it

constitutes the object. . . . Mind is the transcendental activity

productive of the objective world of experience” (pp. 18, 43). Compare

with this our quotation from Ravaisson, given on p. 75 of this work,

and the statement by Lachelier on p. 122, both essential principles of

the French New Idealism.

One word of warning must be uttered against those who declare that the

tendency of French thought is in the direction of anti-intellectualism.

Such a declaration rests on a misunderstanding, which we have

endeavoured in our pages to disclose It is based essentially upon a

doctrine of Reason which belongs to the eighteenth century. The severe

rationalism of that period was mischievous in that it rested upon a

one-sided view of human nature, on a narrow interpretation of “Reason”

which gave it only a logical and almost mathematical significance. To

the Greeks, whom the French represent in the modern world, the term

“NOUS” meant more than this—it meant an intelligible harmony. We would

do wrong to look upon the most recent developments in France as being

anti-rational, they are but a revolt against the narrow view of Reason,

and they constitute an attempt to present to the modern world a

conception akin to that of the Greeks. Human reason is much more than a

purely logical faculty, and it is this endeavour to relate all problems

to life itself with its pulsing throb, which represents the real

attitude of the French mind. There is a realisation expressed

throughout that thought, that life is more than logic. The clearness of

geometry showed Descartes that geometry is not all-embracing. Pascal

found that to the logic of geometry must be added a spirit of

appreciation which is not logical in its nature, but expresses another

side of man’s mind. To-day France sees that, although a philosophy must

endeavour to satisfy the human intelligence, a merely intellectual

satisfaction is not enough. The will and the feelings play their part,

and it was the gteat fault of the eighteenth century to misunderstand

this The search to-day is for a system of values and of truth in action

as well as a doctrine about things in their purely theoretical aspects.

This is a serious demand, and it is one which philosophy must endeavour

to appreciate Salvation will not be found in a mere dilettantism which

can only express ieal indifference, nor in a dogmatism which results in

bigotry and pride. Criticism is required, but not a purely destructive

criticism, rather one which will offer some acceptable view of the

universe. Such a view must combine true positivism or realism with a

true idealism, by uniting fact and spirit, things and ideas. Its

achievement can only be possible to minds possessing some creative and

constructive power, yet minds who have been schooled in the college of

reality. This is the task of philosophy in France and in other lands.

That task consists not only in finding values and in defining them but

in expressing them actively, and in endeavouring to realise them in the

common life.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Works of the Period classified under Authors. (The more important

monographs are cited.) Names of philosophical journals.

II. Books on the Period.

III. Comparative Table showing contemporary German and Anglo-American

Works from 1851 to 1921.

I

WORKS OF THE PERIOD CLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORS.

BERGSON: _Les Données immédiates de la Conscience_. 1889. English

Translation—_Time and Free-Will._ 1910.

_Matière et Mémoire_. 1896. (E.T.[1] 1911.)

_Le Rire_. 1901. (E.T. 1911.)

_Introduction a la Métaphysique_. 1903. _Revue de Métaphysique et de

Morale_. (E.T. 1913.)

_L’Evolution créatrice_. 1907. (E.T. 1911.)

_L’Energie spirituelle_. 1919. (E.T. 1920.)

Some monographs on Bergson: Le Roy (1912), Maritain (1914) in France,

Meckauer (1917) in Germany, and for the English reader Lindsay (1911),

Stewart (1911), Carr (1912), Cunningham (1916), and Gunn (1920).

BERNARD: _Introduction a l’Etude de la Médecine expérimental_. 1865.

BERTHELOT: _Science et Philosophie_. 1886. BINET: _Magnétisme animal_.

1886.

_Les Altérations de la Personnalité_. 1892.

_L’Introduction à la Psychologie expérimental_. 1894.

(Founded the _Année psychologique_ in 1895.) BLONDEL: _L’Action, Essai

d’une Critique de la Vie et d’une Science de la Pratique_. 1893.

_Histoire et Dogme_. 1904. BOIRAC: _L’Idée du Phénomène_. 1894. BOIS:

_De la Connaissance religieuse_. 1894. BOURGEOIS: _Solidarité_. 1896.

BOUTROUX (EMILE): _De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature_ 1874. (E.T.

1916.)

_De l’Idée de Loi naturelle dans la Science et la Philosophie

contemporaines_. 1895. (E.T. 1914.)

_Questions de Morale et d’Education_. 1895. (E.T. 1913.)

_De l’Influence de la Philosophie écossaise sur la Philosophie

française_. 1897.

_La Science et la Religion dans la Philosophie contemporaine_. 1908.

(E.T. 1909.)

_Rapport sur la Philosophie en France depuis_ 1867. Paper read to Third

Congress of Philosophy at Heidelberg in 1908. _Revue de Métaphysique et

de Morale_. Nov., 1908.

_Etudes d’Histoire de la Philosophie_. (E.T. 1912.)

_The Beyond that is Within_. E.T. 1912. (Addresses.) BROCHARD: _De la

Responsabilité morale_. 1874.

_De l’Universalité des Notions morales_. 1876.

_De L’Erreur_. 1879. BRUNSCHWICG: _La Modalité du jugement_. 1897.

_La Vie de l’Esprit_. 1900.

_Les Etapes de la Philosophie mathématique_. 1912. BUREAU: _La Crise

morale des Temps nouveau_. 1907. CARO: _Le Matérialisme et la Science_.

1868.

_Problèmes de Morale sociale_. 1876. COMTE: _Cours de Philosophie

positive_. 6 vols. 1830-42.

_Discours sur l’Esprit positive_. 1844.

_Système de Politique positive_. 4 vols. 1851-4.

_Catéchisme positiviste._ _Synthèse subjective_ (vol. i.). 1856.

_Note_.—The Free and Condensed Translation of Comte’s Positive

Philosophy in English by Miss Martineau, appeared in two volumes in

1853. Monograph by Lévy-Bruhl. COURNOT: _Essai sur les Fondements de

nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la Critique philosophique_

(2 vols.). 1851.

_Traité de l’Enchaînement des Idées fondamentales dans les Sciences et

dans l’Histoire_ (2 vols.). 1861.

_Considérations sur la Marche des Idées et des Evénements dans les

Temps modernes_ (2 vols.). 1872.

_Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisine: Etude sur l’Emploi des Données

de la Science en Philosophie_. 1875.

_Note_.—A number of the _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_ was

devoted to Cournot in 1905. See also the Monograph by Bottinelli and

his _Souvenirs de Cournot_. 1913. COUTURAT: _De l’Infini mathématique_.

_Les Principes des Mathématiques_. CRESSON: _Le Malaise de la pensée

philosophique contemporaine_. 1905. DAURIAC: _Croyance et Realité_.

1889.

_Motions de Matière et de Force_. 1878. DELBOS: _L’Esprit philosophique

de l’Allemagne et la Pensée française_. 1915. DUHEM: _La Théorie

physique_. 1906. DUNAN: _Les deux Idéalismes_. 1911. DURKHEIM: _De la

Division du Travail social_. 1893.

_Les Regles de la Méthode sociologique_. 1894.

_Le Suicide_. 1897.

_Les Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse_. 1912. (E. T.) ESPINAS:

_Societés animales_. 1876. EVELLlN: _La Raison pure et les Antinomies_.

1907. FONSEGRIVE: _Morale et Société_. 1907. FOUILLÉE: _La Philosophie

de Platon 2 vols_. 1869. Prize for competition in 1867, on the. Theory

of Ideas, offered by the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.

“Crowned” after publication by the Académie française. 1871. Second

Edition, revised, and enlarged to four volumes. 1888-9.

_La Liberté et le Determinisme_. 1872. (Doctorate Thesis)

_La Philosophie de Socrate_. 2 vols 1874. Prize in 1868, Académie des

Sciences morales et politiques.

_Histoire générale de la Philosophie_. 1875. New Edition revised and

augmented, 1910.

_Extraits des grands Philosophes_. 1877.

_L’Idée moderne du Droit en Allemagne, en Ingleterre et en France_.

1878.

_La Science sociale contemporaine_. 1880.

_Critique des Systèmes contemporains_. 1883.

_La Propriété sociale et la Démocratie_. 1884.

_L’Avenir de la Métaphysique fondée sur l’Expérience_. 1889.

_L’Evolutionisme des Idées-forces_. 1890.

_L’Enseignement au Point de Vue national_. 1891 (E. T. 1892.)

_La Psychologie des Idées-forces_. 2 vols. 1893.

_Tempérament et Caractère selon les Individus, les Sexes et les Races_.

1895.

_Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction contre la Science positive_.

1895.

_Le Mouvement positiviste et la Conception sociologique du Monde_.

1896.

_Psychologie du Peuple français_. 1898.

_Les Etudes classiques et la Démocratie_. 1898.

_La France au Point de Vue moral_. 1900.

_La Reforme de l’Enseignement par la Philosophie_. 1901.

_La Conception morale et civique de L’Enseignement_.

_Nietzsche et l’Immoralisme_. 1904.

_Esquisse psychologique des Peuples européens_. 1903.

_Le Moralisme de Kant et l’Amoralisme contemporain_. 1905.

_Les Elements sociologiques de la Morale_. 1905.

_La Morale des Idées-forces_. 1907.

_Le Socialisme et la Sociologie réformiste_. 1909.

_La Démocratie politique et sociale en France_. 1911.

_La Pensée et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intéllectualistes_. 1912.

Posthumous: _Esquisse d’une Interprétation du Monde_.

_Humanitaires et Libertaires_. 1914.

_Equivalents philosophiques des Religions_.

On Fouillée, monograph by Augustin Guyau, son of J. M. Guyau. GOBLOT:

_Traité de Logique_. 1918. GOURD: _Le Phénomène_. 1888.

_La Philosophie de la Religion_. 1911. GUYAU: _La Morale d’Epicure et

ses Rapports avec les Doctrines contemporaines_. 1878. “Crowned” four

years before by the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.

_La Morale anglaise contemporaine_. 1879. An extension of the Prize

Essay (Second Part).

_Vers d’un Philosophe_. 1881.

_Problèmes de l’Esthétique contemporaine_. 1884.

_Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_. 1885. (E.T. 1898.)

_L’Irréligion de l’Avenir_. 1887. (E.T. 1897.)

Posthumous: _Education et Hérédité_. (E.T. 1891.)

_L’Art au Point de Vue sociologique_.

_La Genèse de l’Idée de Temps_. 1890.

There is a monograph on Guyau by Fouillée. HAMELIN: _Essai sur les

Eléments principaux de la Représentation_. 1907. HANNEQUIN: _Essai

critique sur l’Hypothèse des Atomes_. 1896. IZOULET: _La Cité moderne_.

1894. JANET (PAUL): _La Famille_. 1855.

_Histoire de la Philosophie morale et politique dans L’Antiquité et

dans les Temps modernes._ 2 vols. 1858. Republished as _Histoire de la

Science politique dans ses Rapports avec la Morale_. 1872.

_La Philosophie du Bonheur_. 1862.

_La Crise philosophique_. 1865.

_Le Cerveau et la Pensée_. 1867.

_Eléments de Morale_. 1869.

_Les Problèmes du XIXe Siècle_. 1872.

_La Morale_. 1874 (E T. 1884.)

_Philosophie de la Révolution française_. 1875.

_Les Causes finales_. 1876. (E.T. 1878.)

JANET (PIERRE): _L’Automatisme psychologique_. 1889

_L’Etat mental des Hystériques_. 1894.

_Névroses et Idées-fixes_. 1898.

(Janet founded the _Journal de Psychologie_. 1904). JAVARY: _L’Idée du

Progrès_. 1850. LABERTHONNIÈRE. _Le Dogmatisme morale_. 1898.

_Essais de Philosophie religieuse_. 1901.

_Le Réalisme chrétien et l’Idéalisme grec_. LACHELIER: _Du Fondement de

l’Induction_. 1871.

_Psychologie et Métaphysique_. 1885. Article in _Revue de Métaphysique

et de Morale_, now published with the above.

_Etude sur le Syllogisme_. 1907.

Monograph by Séailles, article by Noël. LACOMBE: _De l’Histoire

considérée comme Science_. 1894. LALANDE: _La Dissolution opposée à

l’Evolution, dans les Sciences physiques et morales_. 1899.

_Précis raisonné de Morale pratique par Questions et Réponses_. 1907.

LAPIE: _Logique de la Volonté_. 1902. LE BON: _Lois psychologiques de

l’Evolution des Peuples_.

_Les Opinions et les Croyances._ 1911.

_Psychologie du Socialisme_. 1899.

_Psychologie des Foules._ (E.T.)

_La Vie des Vérités_. 1914. LEQUIER: _La Recherche d’une Première

Vérité (Fragments posthumes)_. 1865. LE ROY: _Dogme et Critique_. 1907.

LIARD: _Des Définitions géometriques et des Définitions empiriques_.

1873.

_La Science positive et la Métaphysique_. 1879.

_Morale et Enseignement civique_. 1883.

_L’Enseignement supérieure en France_, 1789 à 1889. 1889. LOISY:

_L’Evangile et l’Eglise_. (E.T.) MARION: _La Solidarité morale_. 1880.

MÉNÉGOZ: _Publications diverses sur le Fidéisme et son Application à

l’Enseignement chrétien traditionnel_. 1900. Two additional volumes

later. MEYERSON: _Identité et Réalité_. 1907 MICHELET: _L’Amour_. 1858

_Le Prêtre la Femme et la Famille_. 1859.

_La Bible de l’Humanité._ 1864

MILHAUD: _Essai sur les Conditions et les Limites de la Certitude

logique._ 1894

_Le Rationnel_. 1898. OLLÉ-LAPRUNE: _La Certitude morale_. 1880.

_Le Prix de la Vie_. 1885

_La Philosophie et le Temps présent_. 1895.

_La Raison et le Rationalisme_. 1906. PARODI: _Le Problème morale et la

Pensée contemporaine_. 1910. PASTEUR: _Le Budget de la Science_. 1868

PAULHAN: _Phénomènes affectifs_.

_L’Activité mentale_. 1889 PAYOT: _La Croyance_. 1896. PELLETAN:

_Profession da Foi du XIXe Siècle_. 1852. POINCAIRÉ: _La Science et

l’Hypothèse_. 1902. (E.T. 1905.)

_La Valeur de la Science_. 1905.

_Science et Méthode_. 1909

_Dernières pensées_. PROUDHON: _Qu’est-ce que la Propriété?_ 1840

_Système des Contradictions économiques_. 1846

_La Philosophie du Progrès_. 1851.

_De la Justice_. 1858. RAUH: _Psychologie appliquée à la Morale et à

l’Education_.

_De la Méthode dans la Psychologie des Sentiments_.

_Essai sur le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale_. 1890.

_L’Expérience morale_. 1903. RAVAISSON-MOLLIEN (1813-1900): _Habitude_.

1838. (Thesis.) Reprinted 1894 in _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_.

_Aristote_. 1837. Vol. I. Vol. II. in 1846. Development of work crowned

by Académie des Sciences morales et politiques in 1833, when the author

was twenty.

_Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle_. 1867.

_La Philosophie de Pascal (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1887)

_L’Education (Revue bleue_. 1887).

_Métaphysique et Morale (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1893).

_Le Testament philosophique (Revue des Deux Mondes_. 1901).

_Cf_. Boutroux on Ravaisson (_Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_.

1900).

Bergson : _Discours à l’Académie des Sciences morales et politiques_.

1904. RENAN: _Averroès et l’Averroisme_. 1852.

_Etudes d’Histoire religieuse_. 1857.

_Essais de Morale et de Critique_. 1851).

_Les Origines du Christianisme_. 1863-83. 8 vols., of which: _Vie de

Jésus_. 1863. (E.T.)

_Questions contemporaines_. 1868.

_La Réforme intellectual et morale_. 1871.

_Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_. 1870. (E.T. 1883.)

_Drames philosophiques_.

_Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_. 1883. (E.T. 1883.)

_Nouvelles Etudes d’Histoire religieuse_. 1884. (E.T. 1886.)

_Histoire du Peuple d’Israël_. 5 vols. 1887-04. (E.T. 1888-91. 3 vols.)

_L’Avenir de la Science_. 1890. Written 1848-9. (E.T.)

_Feuilles détachées_. 1802.

For monographs on Renan: Allier: _La Philosophie de Renan_. 1895.

Monod: _Renan, Taine, Michelet_. 1894.

Séailles: _Renan_. 1894*. RENOUVIER: _Manuel de Philosophie moderne_.

1842.

_Manuel de Philosophie ancienne_. 1844.

_Manuel républicaine de l’Homme et du Citoyen_. 1848.

_Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale et centrale de la

République_. 1851.

_Essais de Critique générale_. 4 vols. 1854, 1859, 1864, 1864. (On

revision these four became thirteen vols.)

_La Science de la Morale_. 2 vols. 1869.

_1er Essai_, revised: _Traité de Logique général et de Logique

formelle_. 3 vols. 1875.

_2e Essai_, revised: _Traité de Psychologie rationnelle_. 3 vols. 1875.

_Uchronie (L’Utopie dans l’Histoire), Esquisse historique du

Développement de la Civilisation européenne, tel qu’il n’a pas été, tel

qu’il aurait pu être_. 1876.

_Petit Traité de Morale pour les Ecoles laïques_. 1879.

_Esquisse d’une Classification systématique des Doctrines

philosophiques_. 2 vols. 1886.

_3e Essai_, revised: _Les Principes de la Nature_. 1892.

_Victor Hugo, le Poète_. 1893.

_4e Essai_, revised: _L’lntroduction à la Philosophie analytique de

l’Histoire_. 1896.

_5e Essai_, new: _La Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire_. 4 vols. I.

and II. 1806. III. and IV. 1897. (This brought the Essais up to

thirteen volumes.)

_La Nouvelle Monadologie_. 1891). (With L. Prat.) (“Crowned” by the

Académie des Sciences morales et politiques.)

_Victor Hugo, le Philosophe_. 1900.

_Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique pure_. 1901.

_Histoire et Solution des Problèmes métaphysiques_. 1901.

_Le Personnalisme, suivi d’une Etude sur la Perception externe et sur

la Force_ 1903.

Posthumous:

_Derniers entretiens_. 1905.

_Doctrine de Kant_. 1906.

For his two journals, see under “Periodicals.”

In the latest edition the complete _Essais de Critique générale_ are

only ten volumes, as follows: _Logic_, 2; _Psychology_, 2; _Principles

of Nature_, 1; _Introduction to Philosophy of History_, 1; _and the

Philosophy of History_, 4.

The best monograph is that of Séailles, 1905.

Renouvier’s Correspondence with the Swiss Philosopher, Sécretan, has

been published; _cf_. also _The Letters of William James_. REYNAUD:

_Philosophie religieuse_. 1858. (Third Edition.) RIBOT: _La Psychologie

anglaise contemporaine_. 1870. (E.T. 1873.)

_Hérédité, Etude psychologique_. 1873. (E.T. 1875.)

_La Psychologie allemande contemporaine_. 1879. (E.T. 1886.)

_Les Maladies de la Mémoire, Essai dans la Psychologie positive_. 1881.

(E.T. 1882.)

_Les Maladies de la Volonté_. 1883. (E.T. 1884.)

_Les Maladies de la Personnalité_. 1885. (E.T. 1895.)

_La Psychologie de l’Attention_. 1889. (E.T. 1890.)

_La Psychologie des Sentiments._ 1896. (E.T. 1897.)

_L’Evolution des Idées générales._ 1897. (E.T. 1899.)

_Essai sur l’Imagination créatrice_. 1900.

_La Logique des Sentiments_. 1904.

_Essai sur les Passions_. 1906.

_La Vie inconsciente et les Mouvements_. SABATIER (AUGUSTE): _Esquisse

d’une Philosophie de Religion d’après la Psychologie et l’Histoire_.

1897.

_Les Religions d’Autorité et la Religion de l’Esprit_. 1904. (E.T.)

SABATIER (PAUL): _A propos de la Séparation des Eglises de l’Etat_.

1905. E.T., Robert Dell, 1906 (with Text of the Law). SÉAILLES:

_Affirmations de la Conscience moderne_. 1903. SIMON: _La Liberté de

Conscience_. 1859.

_Dieu, Patrie, Liberté_. 1883. SOREL: _Reflexions sur la Violence_.

1907. (E.T 1916.)

_Illusions du Progrès_. 1911. TAINE: _Les Philosophes français au XIXe

Siecle_. 1857.

_Essais de Critique et d’Histoire_. 1858.

_Philosophie de l’Art_. 2 vols. 1865. (E.T. 1865.)

_Nouveaux Essais de Critique et d’Histoire_. 1865.

_De l’Intélligence_. 2 vols. 1870. (E T. 1871.)

The work _Origines de la France contemporaine_ in 5 vols, 1876-93.

_Histoire de la Littérature anglaise_. 5 vols. 1863. (E.T. by Van Laun.

1887.)

Monographs: De Margerie: _Taine_. 1894.

Monod: _Renan, Taine, et Michelet_. 1894.

Barzellotti: _La Philosophie de Taine._

Boutmy: _H. Taine_. 1897.

Giraud: _Essai sur Taine_. 1901. TARDE: _Criminalité comparée_. 1898.

_Les Lois de l’Imitation_. 1900. VACHEROT: _Histoire de l’Ecole

d’Alexandrie_. 1846-51.

_La Métaphysique et la Science_. 3 vols. 1858.

_La Démocratie_. 1860.

_Essais de Philosophie critique_. 1864.

_La Religion_. 1868.

_La Science et la Conscience_. 1870.

_Le Nouveau Spiritualisme_. 1884.

_Cf_. Parodi on Vacherot, _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. 1899.

WEBER: _Le Rythme du Progrès_.

_Vers le Positivisme absolu par l’Idéalisme_. 1903. WlLBOIS: _Devoir et

Durée: Essai de Morale sociale_. 1912. XÉNOPOL: _Principes fondamentaux

de l’Histoire_. 1899. Revised and reissued in larger form in 1905 as

_La Théorie de l’Histoire_.

[1] This abbreviation is used throughout for “English Translation.”

PERIODICALS

“LA CRITIQUE PHILOSOPHIQUE,” of Renouvier and Pillon, 1872. to 1884,

weekly; monthly from 1885 to 1889.

“LA CRITIQUE RELIGIEUSE,” 1878-1884 (quarterly). Renouvier.

“REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA FRANCE ET DE L’ÉTRANGER,” founded by Ribot

in 1876.

“L’ANNÉE PHILOSOPHIQUE.” 1867-1869. Renouvier and Pillon, refounded in

1890 by Pillon.

“REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE,” founded by Xavier Leon in 1893.

“Crowned” by Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, 1921.

“ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE,” founded by Beaunet and Binet, 1895.

“REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE,” founded by Peillaube, 1900.

“REVUE THOMISTE.”

“ANNALES DE PHILOSOPHIE CHRÉTIENNE.” Laberthonnière.

“ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE.” 1896-1912. Durkheim.

“JOURNAL DE PSYCHOLOGIE NORMALE ET PATHOLOGIQUE.” Founded 1904 by Janet

and Dumas.

“BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ FRANÇAISE DE PHILOSOPHIE.” From 1901.

II

GENERAL BOOKS ON THE PERIOD.

ALIOTTA: _The Idealistic Reaction against Science_. (E.T. from Italian.

1914.) BARTH: _Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie_. 1897.

BERGSON: _La Philosophie française_. 1915. BOUTROUX: _Philosophie en

France depuis_ 1867. Report to Congress of Philosophy given in the

_Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_. 1908.

_La Philosophie_: an Essay in the volume of collected Essays entitled:

_Un Demi-Siècle de la Civilisation française_. 1870- 1915. Pp. 25-48.

(Paris: Hachette. 1916.) DWELSHAUVERS: _La Psychologie française

contemporaine_. 1920. FAGUET: _Dix-Neuvième Siècle_. 1887.

_Politiques et Moralistes du XIXe Siècle_. 1881. FERRAZ: _Etudes sur la

Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle_. 3 vols. 1882-9.

It is interesting to notice the triple division adopted by Ferraz:

Socialism (under which heading he also groups Naturalism and

Positivism). Traditionalism (Ultramontanism). Spiritualism (together

with Liberalism).

FISCHER: _Geschichte der neuern Philosophie_. 9 vols. FOUILLÉE:

_Histoire de la Philosophie_, Latest Edition, last Chapter.

_Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction contre la Science positive._

1896.

_La Pensée et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes_. 1912.

HÖFFDING: _Modern Philosophers._ (E.T. from Danish. 1915.) LÉVY-BRUHL:

_Modern Philosophy in France_. Chicago, 1899. MERZ: _History of

European Thought in the Nineteenth Century_. 4 vols.

A great work. Very comprehensive, particularly for German and British

thought. PARODI: _La Philosophie contemporaine en France_. 1919.

An excellent treatment of the development from 1890 onwards by a French

thinker. (“Crowned” by Académie.) RAVAISSON: _Rapport sur la

Philosophie en France au XIXe Siècle_. 1867. (Second Edition, 1889.)

This has become an acknowledged classic. RENOUVIER: _Philosophie

analytique de l’Histoire_. (Vol. IV. latest sections.) 1897.

RUGGIERO: _Modern Philosophy_. 1912. (E.T. from Italian. 1921.)

Gives a stimulating account of German, French, Anglo- American and

Italian thought. STEBBING: _Pragmatism and French Voluntarism_. 1914.

TAINE: _Les Philosophes français du XIXe Siècle_. 1857. TURQUET-MILNES,

G.: _Some Modern French Writers: A Study in Bergsonism_. 1921.

Deals mainly with literary figures-e.g., Barres, Péguy, France,

Bourget, Claudel. VILLA: _Contemporary Psychology_. (E.T. from Italian.

1903.)

_L’Idealismo moderno_. 1905. WEBER: _Histoire de la Philosophie

européenne_. (Eighth Edition, 1914.)

* * * * *

The article contributed by Ribot to _Mind_ in 1877 is worthy of notice,

while much light is thrown on the historical development by articles in

the current periodicals cited on p. 338, especially in the _Revue

philosophique_ and the _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_.

IIII

COMPARATIVE TABLE

THE CHIEF PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, ENGLAND AND AMERICA

FROM 1851 TO 1921.

_FRANCE._ _GERMANY._ _ENGLAND AND AMERICA._ l851 COURNOT: “Essai

sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances.” 1851 FECHNER: “Zend

Avesta.” 1851 MANSEL: “Prolegomena to Logic.” RENOUVIER:

“Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale.”

PROUDHON: “La Philosophie du Progrès.”

1852 MOLESCHOTT: “Der Kreislauf des Lebens.” LOTZE: “Medizinische

Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele.” 1854 RENOUVIER: “Essai de

Critique générale”(Ier Essai).

1854 FERRIER: “Institutes of Metaphysic.” COMTE completes “Systeme

de Politique positive.”

1855 BÜCHNER: “Kraft und Stoff.” 1855 BAIN: “The Senses and

the Intellect.” FECHNER: “Uber die physikalische und die philosophische

Atomlehre.” SPENCER: “Principles of Psychology.” CZOLBE: “Neue

Darstellung des Sensualismus.”

1856 COMTE: “Synthèse subjective,” vol. i. 1856 LOTZE:

“Mikrokosmos” (1856-1864).

CZOLBE: “Die Enstehung des Selbstbewusstseins.” 1857 TAINE:

“Philosophes rançais du XIXe Siecle.”

1857 BUCKLE: “History of Civilization in England” (vol. i.). RENAN:

“Etudes d’Histoire religieuse.” MANSEL: “The Limits of Religious

Thought.” 1858 VACHEROT: “La Métaphysique et la Science.” 1858

HAMILTON: “Lectures” (1858-1860). 1859 RENOUVIER: “Deuxième

Essai de Critique generale.” I859 DARWIN: “Origin of Species.”

1860 FECHNER: “Elemente der Psychophysik.”

1861 COURNOT: “Traité de l’Enchaînement des Idees.” 1861

FECHNER: “Uber die Seelenfrage.”

1862 HÄCKEL: “Generalle Morphologie” (1862-1866). 1862

SPENCER: “First Principles.” 1863 RENAN: “Vie de Jésus.” 1863

VOGT: “Vorlesungen iiber den Menschen.” 1863 MILL (J. S.):

“Utilitarianism.”

FECHNER: “Die Drei Motive des Glaubens.”

1864 RENOUVIER: “Troisième Essai de Critique générale”; “Quatrième

Essai de Critique générale.”

1865 BERNARD: “Introduction à l’Etude de la Médecine

expérimentale.” 1865 DÜHRING: “Der Wert des Lebens.” 1865

HODGSON: “Time and Space.”

CZOLBE: “Die Grenzen und der Ursprung der Menschlichen Erkenntnis.”

MILL (J. S): “Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.”

HAMILTON: “Lectures on Metaphysics.” STIRLING: “Secret of Hegel.” 1866

LANGE: “Geschichte des Materialismus.”

1867 RAVAISSON: “Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au XIXe

Siecle.” 1867 MARX: “Das Kapital.” 1867 BUCKLE:

“History of Civilization in England” ( vol. ii.). 1868 RENAN:

“Questions contemporaines.” 1868 LOTZE: “Geschichte der

Asthetik in Deutschland.”

HÄCKEL: “Natürliche Schöpftungsgeschichte 1869 RENOUVIER: “Science

deU Morale.” 1869 HARTMANN: “Philosophic des Unbewussten.” 1870

TAINE: “De l’Intelligence.” 1870 RITSCHL: “Lehre von der

Rechfertigung”(1870-1874). 1871 LACHELIER: “Du Fondement de

l’Induction.”

1872 FOUILLÉE: “La LibertcS et la Determinisme,” 1872

STRAUSS: “Der Alte und der neue Glaube.” 1872 MAURICE: “Moral

and Metaphysical Philosophy.” JANET: “Problemes du XIXe Siecle.”

NIETZSCHE: “Die Geburt der Tragödie” WALLACE: “Logic of Hegel.”

COURNOT: “Considerations sur la Marche des Idees.”

1873 RIBOT: “IWredite.” 1873 1973 SIGWART: “Logik”

(1873-1878). 1873 1973 STEPHEN (J. F.): “Liberty,

Equality,Fraternity.” 1874 BOUTROUX: “La Contingence des Lois de la

Nature.” 1874 LOTZE: “Drei Bucher der Logik.” 1874

SIDGWICK: “Method of Ethics.”

WUNDT: “Physiologische Psychologie.”

BRENTANO: “Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt.” 1875 COURNOT:

“Materialisme, Vitalisme,Rationalisme.”

RENOUVIER: Revises first and second “Essais.” 1876 RENAN:

“Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques.” 1876 FECHNER:

“Vorschule der Asthetik.” 1876 BRADLEY: “Ethical Studies.”

JANET: “Les Causes finales.”

GROTE: “Moral Ideals.”

1877 FLINT: “Theism.” 1878 FOUILLEE: “L’Idee du Droit.”

1878 NIETZSCHE: “Menschliches Allzumenschhches “(1878-1880).

1878 HODGSON: “Philosophy of Reflection.” 1879 BROCHARD: “De

l’Erreur.” 1879 LOTZE: “Drei Bucher der Metaphysik.” 1879

SPENCER: “Data of Ethics.”

HARTMANN: “Phanomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins.” BALFOUR:

“Defence of Philosophic Doubt.” 1880 AVENARIUS: “Kritik der reinen

Erfahrung”(1880-1890) 1880 CAIRD: “Philosophy ol Religion.”

1881 GUYAU: “Vers d’un Philosophe.” 1881 NIETZSCHE:

“Morgenrote.”

1882 NIETZSCHE: “Die frohliche Wissenschaft.” 1882 STEPHEN

(L.): “Science of Ethics.” 1883 NIETZSCHE: “Also sprach

Zarathustra”(1883-1891) 1883 GREEN: “Prolegomena to Ethics.”

DUHRING: “Der Ersatz der Religion.” BRADLEY: “Principles of Logic.”

WUNDT: “Logik.”

MACH: “Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung.” 1885 GUYAU: “Esquisse

d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction.”

1885 MARTINEAU: “Types o. Ethical Theory.” LACHELIER: “Psychologic

et Métaphysique.” BOSANQUET: “Knowledge and Reality.” 1886

GUYAU: “L’Irreligion de l’Avenir.” 1886 MACH: “Analyse der

Empfindungen.” 1886 WARD: “Psychology” (article).

WUNDT: “Ethik.”

NIETZSCHE: “Jenseits von Gut und Böse.” 1887 NIETZSCHE: “Zur

Genealogie der Moral.” 1887 SETH (Pringle-Pattison):

“Hegelianism and Personality.” 1888 EUCKEN: “Die Einheit des

Geisteslebens.” 1888 BOSANQUKT: “Logic.” 1889 BERGSON: “Les

Donnees immediates de la Conscience.” 1889 WUNDT: “System der

Philosophie.” 1889 MARTINEAU: “Study of Religion.” FOUILLEE:

“L’Avenir de la Metaphysique.” LIPPS: “Grundthatsachen des

Seelenlebens.” ALEXANDER: “Moral Order and Progress.” JANET

(Pierre): “L’Automatisme psychologique.”

PAULHAN: “L’Activité mentale.” 1890 RENAN: “L’Avenir de la

Science.” 1890 JAMES: “Principles of Psychology.” FOUILLÉE:

“L’Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces.”

RAUH: “Le Fondement métaphysique de la Morale”

1891 SIMMEL: “Moralwissenschaft.” AVENARIUS: “Der menschliche

Weltbegriff.” 1892 RENOUVIER Revises third “Essai.”

1892 PEARSON: “Grammar Of Science.” RENAN “Feuilles détachées.”

1893 DURKHEIM: “De la Division du Travail social.” 1893

HUXLEY: “Evolution and Ethics.” BLONDEL: “L’Action.” CAIRD:

“Evolution of Religion” FOUILLÉE: “Psychologie des Idées-forces.”

BRADLEY: “Appearance and Reality.”

1894 MEINONG: “Werththeorie” (Psychologisch-ethische

Untersuchungen). 1894 FRASER: “Philosophy of Theism” HERTZ:

“Prinzipien der Mechanik.”

1895 FOUILLÉE: “Le Mouvement idéaliste.”

1895 BALFOUR: “Foundations of Belief.” 1896 BERGSON: “Matière

et Mémoire” 1896 EUCKEN: “Der Kampf um einen geistigen

Lebensinhalt.” 1896 STOUT: “Analytic Psychology.” RENOUVIER:

Revises fourth “Essai.”

HOBHOUSE: “Theory of Knowledge.” RENOUVIER: Publishes fifth “Essai” (La

Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire), vols. 1 and 2. MERZ:

“History of Thought in the Nineteenth Century” (1896-1914).

MACTAGGART: “Hegelian Dialectic.” 1897 RENOUVIER: Ditto, vols. 3

and 4. 1897 HARTMANN: “Kategorienlehre.” 1897 JAMES:

“The Will to Believe SABATIER: “Esquisse d’une Philosophie de

Religion.” DREWS: “Das Ich als Grundproblem der Metaphysik.”

EHRENFELS: “System der Werttheorie” (1897-1898).

1898 WALLACE: “Natural Theology and Ethics.” 1899 RENOUVIER

(and Prat): “La Nouvelle Monadologie.” 1899 MEINONG: “Uber

gegenstände höheren Ordnung.” 1899 WARD: “Naturalism and

Agnosticism.”

BOSANQUET: “Philosophical Theory of the State.” HODGSON: “Metaphysic of

Experience.” 1900 TARDE: “Les Lois de l’Imitation.” 1900

PETZOLDT: “Die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung.” 1900 ROYCE:

“The World and the Individual.” BRUNSCHWICG: “La Vie de l’Esprit.”

1901 EUCKEN: “Das Wesen der Religion.” EUCKEN: “Das Wahrheitsgehalt

der Religion.” 1902 POINCARÉ 1902 COHEN: “System der

Philosophie: Logik.” 1902 JAMES: “Varieties of Religious

Experience.”

CLIFFORD: “Essays and Lectures.” 1903 WEBER: “Vers le Positivisme

absolu par l’Idéalisme.” 1903 BERGMANN: “System des objectiven

Idealismus.” 1903 RUSSELL: “Principles of Mathematics.” RAUH:

“L’Expérience morale.”

SCHILLER: “Humanism.” RENOUVIER: “Le Personnalisme.”

1904 COHEN: “System der Philosophie: Ethik.” 1904

MACTAGGART: “Hegelian Cosmology.” 1905 POINCARÉ: “Valeur de la

Science.” 1905 MACH: Erkenntnis und Irrtum.”

1906 OLLÉ-LAPRUNE: “La Raison et le Rationalisme.” 1906

MEINONG: “Die Stellung der Gegenstandtheorie ein System der

Wissenschaften.” 1906 BAILLIE: “Idealistic Construction of

Experience.” DUHEM: “La Théorie physique.”

BALDWIN: “Thought and Things.” 1907 HAMELIN: “Les Eléments

principaux de la Répresentation.” 1907 EUCKEN: “Grundlinien

einer neuen Lebensauschauung.” 1907 SCHILLER: “Studies in

Humanism.” BERGSON: “L’Evolution créatrice.” EUCKEN: “Hauptprobleme

der Religionsphilosophie.”

EVELLIN: “La Raison pure et les Antinomies.”

LALANDEL “Précis de Morale.” FOUILLÉE: “Morale des Idées-forces.” 1908

BOUTROUX: “Science et Religion.” 1908 EUCKEN: “Sinn und

Wertdes Lebens.”

EUCKEN: “Philosophie des Geisteslebens.” MÜNSTERBERG: “Philosophie der

Werte.” 1909 POINCARÉ: “Science et Méthode.”

1909 DEWEY: “Logical Theory.”

1910 REMKHE: “Philosophie als Grundwissenschaft”

1911 DUNAN: “Les Deux Idéalismes.” 1911 EUCKEN: “Konnen wir

noch Christen sein?” 1911 WARD: “Realm of Ends.” 1912

FOUILLÉE: “La Pensée.” 1912 COHEN: “System der Philosophie:

Æsthetik.” 1912 BOSANQUET: “Value and Destiny of the

Individual” DURKHEIM: “Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse.”

EUCKEN: “Erkennen und Leben.”

1913 BOSANQUET: “Value and Destiny of the Individual.” 1914

FOUILLÉE: “Humanitaires et Libertaires.”

1915 SORLEY: “Moral Values and the Idea of God.” 1917 LOISY:

“La Religion.”

1918 GOBLOT: “Traité de Logique.” 1919 BERGSON: “L’Energie

spirituelle.”

1920 ALEXANDER: “Space, Time and Deity.” 1921 RUSSELL:

“Analysis of Mind.” MACTAGGART: “Nature of Existence.”