_Navy Seabees managed to get their first bulldozer ashore on D-Day.
With it, and the ones that followed, the Seabees built artillery
revetments, smothered enemy positions, dug mass graves, and rebuilt the
damaged runway--all while under fire._]
With the 2d Marines and 8th Marines off to Hawaii, McLeod’s 3/6 enroute
to Apamama, and Murray’s 2/6 beginning its long trek through the other
islands of the Tarawa Atoll, Major Jones’ 1/6 became the last infantry
unit on Betio. Its work was tedious: burying the dead, flushing out
die-hard snipers, hosting visiting dignitaries.
The first of these was Major General Holland Smith. The V Amphibious
Corps Commander flew to Betio on 24 November and spent an emotional
afternoon viewing the carnage with Julian Smith. “Howling Mad” Smith
was shaken by the experience. In his words: “The sight of our dead
floating in the waters of the lagoon and lying along the blood-soaked
beaches is one I will never forget. Over the pitted, blasted island
hung a miasma of coral dust and death, nauseating and horrifying.”
Major Jones recalled that Holland Smith had tears in his eyes as he
walked through the ruins. Robert Sherrod also accompanied the generals.
They came upon one sight that moved all of them to tears. It was a dead
Marine, leaning forward against the seawall, “one arm still supported
upright by the weight of his body. On top of the seawall, just beyond
his upraised hand, lies a blue and white flag, a beach marker to tell
succeeding waves where to land.” Holland Smith cleared his throat and
said, “How can men like that ever be defeated?”
Company D, 2d Tank Battalion, was designated as the scout company for
the 2d Marine Division for the Tarawa operation. Small elements of
these scouts landed on Eita and Buota Islands while the fighting on
Betio still raged, discovering and shadowing a sizeable Japanese force.
On 23 November, Lieutenant Colonel Manley Curry’s 3d Battalion, 10th
Marines, landed on Eita. The battalion’s pack howitzers were initially
intended to augment fires on Betio; when that island finally fell,
the artillerymen turned their guns to support the 2d Battalion, 6th
Marines, in clearing the rest of the islands in the atoll.
[Illustration: _“Ebb Tide--Tarawa,” a sketch by Kerr Eby, evokes the
tragic view of the beachhead._
U.S. Navy Combat Art Collection
]
Lieutenant Colonel Murray’s LT 2/6 boarded boats from Betio at 0500 on
24 November and landed on Buota. Murray set a fierce pace, the Marines
frequently wading across the sandspits that joined the succeeding
islands. Soon he was out of range of Curry’s guns on Eita. Curry
detached Battery G to follow Murray in trace. The Marines learned from
friendly natives that a Japanese force of about 175 naval infantry was
ahead on the larger island of Buariki, near the northwest point of the
atoll. Murray’s lead elements caught up with the enemy at dusk on 26
November. There was a sharp exchange of fire in very thick vegetation
before both sides broke contact. Murray positioned his forces for an
all-out assault in the morning.
The battle of Buariki on 27 November was the last engagement in the
Gilberts, and it was just as deadly as each preceding encounter with
the _Special Naval Landing Forces_. Murray attacked the Japanese
defensive positions at first light, getting one salvo of supporting
fire from Battery G before the lines became too intermingled in the
extended melee. Here the fighting was similar to Guadalcanal: much
hand-to-hand brawling in tangled underbrush. The Japanese had no
elaborate defenses as on Betio, but the Imperial sea soldiers took
advantage of cover and concealment, made every shot count, and fought
to the last man. All 175 were slain. Murray’s victory was dearly
bought: 32 officers and men killed, 59 others wounded. The following
day, the Marines crossed to the last remaining islet. There were no
more Japanese to be found. On 28 November, Julian Smith announced
“remaining enemy forces on Tarawa wiped out.”
Admirals Nimitz and Spruance came to Betio just before Julian Smith’s
announcement. Nimitz quickly saw that the basic Japanese defenses were
still intact. He directed his staff to diagnose the exact construction
methods used; within a month an identical set of bunkers and pillboxes
was being built on the naval bombardment island of Kahoolawe in the
Hawaiian Islands.
Admiral Nimitz paused to present the first of many combat awards to
Marines of the 2d Marine Division. In time, other recognition followed.
The entire division was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. Colonel
David Monroe Shoup received the Medal of Honor. Major “Jim” Crowe and
his executive officer, Major Bill Chamberlin, received the Navy Cross.
So did Lieutenant Colonel Herb Amey (posthumously), Major Mike Ryan,
and Corporal John Spillane, the LVT crewchief and prospective baseball
star who caught the Japanese hand grenades in mid-air on D-Day before
his luck ran out.
[Illustration: _MajGen Julian C. Smith, wearing helmet liner at center,
describes the nature of the recently completed conquest of Betio to Adm
Chester Nimitz, facing camera, and Army LtGen Robert Richardson during
their visit to the island on 27 November 1943. An exhausted Col Edson
looks on at right. While they talked, the smell of death pervaded over
the island._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 65437
]
Some of the senior officers in the division were jealous of Shoup’s
Medal of Honor, but Julian Smith knew full well whose strong shoulders
had borne the critical first 36 hours of the assault. Shoup was
philosophical. As he recorded in his combat notebook, “With God and
the U.S. Navy in direct support of the 2d MarDiv there was never any
doubt that we would get Betio. For several hours, however, there was
considerable haggling over the exact price we were to pay for it.”
[Sidebar (page 46): Incident on D+3
A small incident on the last day of the fighting on Betio cost First
Sergeant Lewis J. Michelony, Jr. his sense of smell. Michelony, a
member of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, was a former boxing champion
of the Atlantic Fleet and a combat veteran of Guadalcanal. Later in the
Pacific War he would receive two Silver Star Medals for conspicuous
bravery. On D+3 at Tarawa, however, he very nearly lost his life.
First Sergeant Michelony accompanied two other Marines on a routine
reconnaissance of an area east of Green Beach, looking for likely
positions to assign the battalion mortar platoon. The area had been
“cleared” by the infantry companies of the battalion the previous
morning. Other Marines had passed through the complex of seemingly
empty Japanese bunkers without incident. The clearing was littered with
Japanese bodies and abandoned enemy equipment. The three Marines threw
grenades into the first bunker they encountered without response. All
was quiet.
“Suddenly, out of nowhere, all hell broke loose,” recalled Michelony.
“The front bunker opened fire with a machine gun, grenades hailed in
from nowhere.” One Marine died instantly; the second escaped, leaving
Michelony face down in the sand. In desperation, the first sergeant
dove into the nearest bunker, tumbling through a rear entrance to land
in what he thought was a pool of water. In the bunker’s dim light,
he discovered it was a combination of water, urine, blood, and other
material, “some of it from the bodies of the dead Japanese and some
from the live ones.” As he spat out the foul liquid from his mouth,
Michelony realized there were live Japanese in among the dead, decaying
ones. The smell, taste, and fear he experienced inside the bunker
were almost overpowering. “Somehow I managed to get out. To this day,
I don’t know how. I crawled out of this cesspool dripping wet.” The
scorching sun dried his utilities as though they had been heavily
starched; they still stank. “For months after, I could taste and smell,
as well as visualize, this scene.” Fifty years after the incident,
retired Sergeant Major Michelony still has no sense of smell.
]
_The Significance of Tarawa_
The costs of the forcible seizure of Tarawa were two-fold: the loss
of Marines in the assault itself, followed by the shock and despair
of the nation upon hearing the reports of the battle. The gains at
first seemed small in return, the “stinking little island” of Betio,
8,000 miles from Tokyo. In time, the practical lessons learned in the
complex art of amphibious assault began to outweigh the initial adverse
publicity.
The final casualty figures for the 2d Marine Division in Operation
Galvanic were 997 Marines and 30 sailors (organic medical personnel)
dead; 88 Marines missing and presumed dead; and 2,233 Marines and 59
sailors wounded. Total casualties: 3,407. The Guadalcanal campaign had
cost a comparable amount of Marine casualties over six months; Tarawa’s
losses occurred in a period of 76 hours. Moreover, the ratio of killed
to wounded at Tarawa was significantly high, reflecting the savagery of
the fighting. The overall proportion of casualties among those Marines
engaged in the assault was about 19 percent, a steep but “acceptable”
price. But some battalions suffered much higher losses. The 2d
Amphibian Tractor Battalion lost over half the command. The battalion
also lost all but 35 of the 125 LVT’s employed at Betio.
Lurid headlines--“The Bloody Beaches of Tarawa”--alarmed American
newspaper readers. Part of this was the Marines’ own doing. Many of the
combat correspondents invited along for Operation Galvanic had shared
the very worst of the hell of Betio the first 36 hours, and they simply
reported what they observed. Such was the case of Marine Corps Master
Technical Sergeant James C. Lucas, whose accounts of the fighting
received front-page coverage in both _The Washington Post_ and _The New
York Times_ on 4 December 1943. Colonel Shoup was furious with Lucas
for years thereafter, but it was the headline writers for both papers
who did the most damage (_The Times_: “Grim Tarawa Defense a Surprise,
Eyewitness of Battle Reveals; Marines Went in Chuckling, To Find Swift
Death Instead of Easy Conquest.”).
Nor did extemporaneous remarks to the media by some of the senior
Marines involved in Operation Galvanic help soothe public concerns.
Holland Smith likened the D-Day assault to Pickett’s Charge at
Gettysburg. “Red Mike” Edson said the assault force “paid the stiffest
price in human life per square yard” at Tarawa than any other
engagement in Marine Corps history. Evans Carlson talked graphically of
seeing 100 of Hays men gunned down in the water in five minutes on D+1,
a considerable exaggeration. It did not help matters when Headquarters
Marine Corps waited until 10 days after the battle to release casualty
lists.
[Illustration: _A Marine combat correspondent assigned to the Tarawa
operation interviews a Marine from the 18th Engineers, 2d Marine
Division, during the course of the fighting._
LtGen Julian C. Smith Collection
]
The atmosphere in both Washington and Pearl Harbor was particularly
tense during this period. General MacArthur, still bitter that the 2d
Marine Division had been taken from his Southwest Pacific Command,
wrote the Secretary of War complaining that “these frontal attacks
by the Navy, as at Tarawa, are a tragic and unnecessary massacre
of American lives.” A woman wrote Admiral Nimitz accusing him of
“murdering my son.” Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox called a press
conference in which he blamed “a sudden shift in the wind” for exposing
the reef and preventing reinforcements from landing. Congress proposed
a special investigation. The Marines were fortunate to have General
Alexander A. Vandegrift in Washington as the newly appointed 18th
Commandant. Vandegrift, the widely respected and highly decorated
veteran of Guadalcanal, quietly reassured Congress, pointing out that
“Tarawa was an assault from beginning to end.” The casualty reports
proved to be less dramatic than expected. A thoughtful editorial in the
27 December 1943 issue of _The New York Times_ complimented the Marines
for overcoming Tarawa’s sophisticated defenses and fanatical garrison,
warning that future assaults in the Marshalls might result in heavier
losses. “We must steel ourselves now to pay that price.”
The controversy was stirred again after the war when General Holland
Smith claimed publicly that “Tarawa was a mistake!” Significantly,
Nimitz, Spruance, Turner, Hill, Julian Smith, and Shoup disagreed with
that assessment.
Admiral Nimitz did not waver. “The capture of Tarawa,” he stated,
“knocked down the front door to the Japanese defenses in the Central
Pacific.” Nimitz launched the Marshalls campaign only 10 weeks after
the seizure of Tarawa. Photo-reconnaissance and attack aircraft from
the captured airfields at Betio and Apamama provided invaluable
support. Of greater significance to success in the Marshalls were the
lessons learned and the confidence gleaned from the Tarawa experience.
Henry I. Shaw, Jr., for many years the Chief Historian of the Marine
Corps, observed that Tarawa was the primer, the textbook on amphibious
assault that guided and influenced all subsequent landings in the
Central Pacific. Shaw believed that the prompt and selfless analyses
which immediately followed Tarawa were of great value: “From analytical
reports of the commanders and from their critical evaluations of what
went wrong, of what needed improvement, and of what techniques and
equipment proved out in combat, came a tremendous outpouring of lessons
learned.”
All participants agreed that the conversion of logistical LVTs to
assault craft made the difference between victory and defeat at Betio.
There was further consensus that the LVT-1s and LVT-2s employed in the
operation were marginal against heavy defensive fires. The Alligators
needed more armor, heavier armament, more powerful engines, auxiliary
bilge pumps, self-sealing gas tanks--and wooden plugs the size of 13mm
bullets to keep from being sunk by the Japanese M93 heavy machine
guns. Most of all, there needed to be many more LVTs, at least 300 per
division. Shoup wanted to keep the use of LVTs as reef-crossing assault
vehicles a secret, but there had been too many reporters on the scene.
Hanson W. Baldwin broke the story in _The New York Times_ as early as 3
December.
Naval gunfire support got mixed reviews. While the Marines were
enthusiastic about the response from destroyers in the lagoon,
they were critical of the extent and accuracy of the preliminary
bombardment, especially when it was terminated so prematurely on D-Day.
In Major Ryan’s evaluation, the significant shortcoming in Operation
Galvanic “lay in overestimating the damage that could be inflicted on a
heavily defended position by an intense but limited naval bombardment,
and by not sending in the assault forces soon enough after the
shelling.” Major Schoettel, recalling the pounding his battalion had
received from emplacements within the seawall, recommended direct fire
against the face of the beach by 40mm guns from close-in destroyers.
The hasty, saturation fires, deemed sufficient by planners in view of
the requirement for strategic surprise, proved essentially useless.
Amphibious assaults against fortified atolls would most of all need
sustained, deliberate, aimed fire.
While no one questioned the bravery of the aviators who supported the
Betio assault, many questioned whether they were armed and trained
adequately for such a difficult target. The need for closer integration
of all supporting arms was evident.
Communications throughout the Betio assault were awful. Only the
ingenuity of a few radio operators and the bravery of individual
runners kept the assault reasonably coherent. The Marines needed
waterproof radios. The Navy needed a dedicated amphibious command ship,
not a major combatant whose big guns would knock out the radio nets
with each salvo. Such command ships, the AGCs, began to appear during
the Marshalls campaign.
Other revisions to amphibious doctrine were immediately indicated. The
nature and priority of unloading supplies should henceforth become the
call of the tactical commander ashore, not the amphibious task force
commander.
Betio showed the critical need for underwater swimmers who could
stealthily assess and report reef, beach, and surf conditions to
the task force before the landing. This concept, first envisioned
by amphibious warfare prophet Major Earl “Pete” Ellis in the 1920s,
came quickly to fruition. Admiral Turner had a fledgling Underwater
Demolition Team on hand for the Marshalls.
The Marines believed that, with proper combined arms training, the
new medium tanks would be valuable assets. Future tank training
would emphasize integrated tank, infantry, engineer, and artillery
operations. Tank-infantry communications needed immediate improvement.
Most casualties among tank commanders at Betio resulted from the
individuals having to dismount from their vehicles to talk with the
infantry in the open.
The backpack flamethrower won universal acclaim from the Marines on
Betio. Each battalion commander recommended increases in quantity,
range, and mobility for these assault weapons. Some suggested that
larger versions be mounted on tanks and LVTs, presaging the appearance
of “Zippo Tanks” in later campaigns in the Pacific.
Julian Smith rather humbly summed up the lessons learned at Tarawa by
commenting, “We made fewer mistakes than the Japs did.”
Military historians Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl used different
words of assessment: “The capture of Tarawa, in spite of defects in
execution, conclusively demonstrated that American amphibious doctrine
was valid, that even the strongest island fortress could be seized.”
The subsequent landings in the Marshalls employed this doctrine, as
modified by the Tarawa experience, to achieve objectives against
similar targets with fewer casualties and in less time. The benefits of
Operation Galvanic quickly began to outweigh the steep initial costs.
In time, Tarawa became a symbol of raw courage and sacrifice on the
part of attackers and defenders alike. Ten years after the battle,
General Julian Smith paid homage to both sides in an essay in _Naval
Institute Proceedings_. He saluted the heroism of the Japanese who
chose to die almost to the last man. Then he turned to his beloved 2d
Marine Division and their shipmates in Task Force 53 at Betio:
For the officers and men, Marines and sailors, who crossed that
reef, either as assault troops, or carrying supplies, or evacuating
wounded I can only say that I shall forever think of them with a
feeling of reverence and the greatest respect.
[Illustration: _Themes underlying the enduring legacy of Tarawa are:
the tide that failed; tactical assault vehicles that succeeded; a high
cost in men and material; which in the end spelled out victory in the
Central Pacific and a road that led to Tokyo._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 63843
]
[Sidebar (page 51): Tarawa Today
Tarawa is one of the few Pacific battlefields that remained essentially
unchanged for the half century that followed World War II. Visitors
to Betio Island can readily see wrecked American tanks and LVTs along
the beaches, as well as the ruins of Japanese gun emplacements and
pill boxes. Admiral Shibasaki’s imposing concrete bunker still stands,
seemingly as impervious to time as it was to the battleship guns
of Task Force 53. The “Singapore Guns” still rest in their turrets
overlooking the approaches to the island. A few years ago, natives
unearthed a buried LVT containing the skeletons of its Marine Corps
crew, one still wearing dog tags.
General David M. Shoup was recalled from retirement to active duty for
nine days in 1968 to represent the United States at the dedication of
a large monument on Betio, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the
battle. As Shoup later told _The National Observer_, “My first reaction
was that Betio had shrunk a great deal. It seems smaller in peace than
in war.” As he toured the ruined fortifications, Shoup recalled the
savage, desperate fighting and wondered “why two nations would spend so
much for so little.” Nearly 6,000 Japanese and Americans died on the
tiny island in 76 hours of fighting.
Twenty years after Shoup’s dedication ceremony, the American memorial
had fallen into disrepair; indeed, it was in danger of being torn
down to make room for a cold-storage plant for Japanese fishermen.
A lengthy campaign by the 2d Marine Division Association and Long
Beach-journalist Tom Hennessy raised enough funds to obtain a new, more
durable monument, a nine-ton block of Georgia granite inscribed “To our
fellow Marines who gave their all.” The memorial was dedicated on 20
November 1988.
Betio is now part of the new Republic of Kiribati. Tourist facilities
are being developed to accommodate the large number of veterans who
wish to return. For now, the small island probably resembles the way it
appeared on D-Day, 50 years ago. American author James Ramsey Ullman
visited Tarawa earlier and wrote a fitting eulogy: “It is a familiar
irony that old battlefields are often the quietest and gentlest of
places. It is true of Gettysburg. It is true of Cannae, Chalons,
Austerlitz, Verdun. And it is true of Tarawa.”
]
_Sources_
Much of this history is based on first-hand accounts as recorded
by the surviving participants. One rich source is contained in the
USMC archives maintained by the Washington National Records Group in
Suitland, Maryland. Of special value are the 2d Marine Division’s
Operations Order 14 (25Oct43) and Special Action Report (6Jan44).
Other useful documents in the archives include the combat reports of
2d Tank Battalion and 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion; the Division D-3
Journal for 20-24Nov43; the D-2 POW Interrogation Reports; “comments
on equipment and procedures” by the battalion commanders; and the
exhaustive intelligence report, “Study of Japanese Defenses on Betio
Island” (20Dec43). The Marine Corps Historical Center’s Personal Papers
Collection contains Colonel Shoup’s combat notebook, as well as his
after-action report, comments during the Pearl Harbor conference on
LVTs, comments on draft histories in 1947 and 1963, and his remarks for
the record at various anniversaries of the battle. A lengthy account
of the Betio assault is found in the transcript of Colonel Merritt
Edson’s briefing to the staff officers of the Marine Corps Schools
after the battle (6Jan44). The Personal Papers Collection also includes
worthwhile Tarawa accounts by General Julian C. Smith, 2dLt George D.
Lillibridge, 1stLt Frank Plant, and LtCol Russell Lloyd, used herein.
Other useful Tarawa information can be gleaned from the MCHC’s Oral
History Collection, which contains recollections by such participants
as General Smith; Eugene Boardman; Major Henry P. Crowe; Staff Sergeant
Norman Hatch; Brigadier General Leo Hermle; Admiral Harry Hill, USN;
Captain Carl Hoffman; Major Wood Kyle; Major William K. Jones; and
Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray. Other contemporary accounts
include newspaper essays written by war correspondents on the scene,
such as Robert Sherrod, Richard Johnston, Keith Wheeler, and Earl
Wilson.
The author also benefitted from direct correspondence with four
retired Marines who served with valor at Tarawa: Lieutenant General
William K. Jones; Major General Michael P. Ryan; Sergeant Major Lewis
J. Michelony, Jr.; and Master Sergeant Edward J. Moore. Further, the
author gratefully acknowledges the donation of two rare photographs of
the Japanese garrison on Betio by the 2d Marine Division Association.
_Errata_
Please make the following changes in the World War II 50th anniversary
commemorative monograph noted:
_Opening Moves: Marines Gear Up For War_
Page 16, the correct armament for the Grumann F4F Wildcat is two
.50-caliber machine guns mounted in each wing instead of four.
_First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal_
Page 43, the correct hull number for the cruiser _Atlanta_ should be
CL(AA) 51 instead of CL 104.
_Outpost in the Atlantic: Marines in the Defense of Iceland_
Photographs accredited to the Col Chester M. Craig Collection should be
accredited instead to the Col Clifton M. Craig Collection.
Page 5, sidebar on “Uniforms and Equipment”--the enlisted Marine wore
an almost black cow-skin belt called a “fair leather belt” instead of
“... a wide cordovan leather ‘Peter Bain’” belt.
Page 8 and _passim_, the British division based on Iceland was the 49th
Division, not the 79th Division.
_About the Author_
[Illustration]
Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), served 29 years on active duty
as an assault amphibian officer, including two tours in Vietnam. He
earned an undergraduate degree in history from the University of North
Carolina and masters’ degrees in history and government from Georgetown
and Jacksonville. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War
College, a member of the Society for Military History, and a life
member of the Marine Corps Historical Foundation.
Colonel Alexander, an independent historian, is the author of
military essays published in _Marine Corps Gazette_, _Naval Institute
Proceedings_, _Naval History_, _Leatherneck_, _Amphibious Warfare
Review_, and _Florida Historical Quarterly_. He is co-author (with
Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett) of “Sea Soldiers in the Cold
War” (Naval Institute Press, accepted).
[Illustration]
THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in
the World War II era, is published for the education and training of
Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps, Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense
observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.
Printing costs for this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by the
Defense Department World War II Commemoration Committee. Editorial
costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by a
bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late
husband, Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient
of a Purple Heart.