_South side of RAdm Shibasaki’s headquarters on Betio is guarded by a
now-destroyed Japanese light tank. The imposing blockhouse withstood
direct hits by Navy 16-inch shells and 500-pound bombs. Fifty years
later; the building stands._]
Smith, Edson, and Shoup were near exhaustion themselves. Relatively
speaking, the third day on Betio had been one of spectacular gains, but
progress overall was maddeningly slow, nor was the end yet in sight. At
1600, General Smith sent this pessimistic report to General Hermle, who
had taken his place on the flagship:
Situation not favorable for rapid clean-up of Betio. Heavy
casualties among officers make leadership problems difficult. Still
strong resistance.... Many emplacements intact on eastern end of
the island.... In addition, many Japanese strongpoints to westward
of our front lines within our position that have not been reduced.
Progress slow and extremely costly. Complete occupation will take
at least 5 days more. Naval and air bombardment a great help but
does not take out emplacements.
General Smith assumed command of operations ashore at 1930. By that
time he had about 7,000 Marines ashore, struggling against perhaps
1,000 Japanese defenders. Updated aerial photographs revealed many
defensive positions still intact throughout much of Betio’s eastern
tail. Smith and Edson believed they would need the entire 6th Marines
to complete the job. When Colonel Holmes landed with the 6th Marines
headquarters group, Smith told him to take command of his three landing
teams by 2100. Smith then called a meeting of his commanders to assign
orders for D+3.
Smith directed Holmes to have McLeod’s 3/6 pass through the lines
of Jones’ 1/6 in order to have a fresh battalion lead the assault
eastward. Murray’s 2/6 would land on Green Beach and proceed east in
support of McLeod. All available tanks would be assigned to McLeod
(when Major Jones protested that he had promised to return the two
Shermans loaned by Major Ryan, Shoup told him “with crisp expletives”
what he could do with his promise). Shoup’s 2d Marines, with 1/8 still
attached, would continue to reduce the re-entrant strongpoints. The
balance of the 8th Marines would be shuttled to Bairiki. And the 4th
Battalion, 10th Marines would land its “heavy” 105mm guns on Green
Beach to augment the fires of the two pack howitzer battalions already
in action. Many of these plans were overcome by events of the evening.
The major catalyst that altered Smith’s plans was a series of vicious
Japanese counterattacks during the night of D+2/D+3. As Edson put it,
the Japanese obligingly “gave us very able assistance by trying to
counterattack.” The end result was a dramatic change in the combat
ratio between attackers and survivors the next day.
Major Jones sensed his exposed forces would be the likely target for
any _Banzai_ attack and took precautions. Gathering his artillery
forward observers and naval fire control spotters, Jones arranged for
field artillery support starting 75 yards from his front lines to a
point 500 yards out, where naval gunfire would take over. He placed
Company A on the left, next to the airstrip, and Company B on the
right, next to the south shore. He worried about the 150-yard gap
across the runway to Company C, but that could not be helped. Jones
used a tank to bring a stockpile of grenades, small arms ammunition,
and water to be positioned 50 yards behind the lines.
[Illustration:
BETIO
TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS
ATTACH OF THE 2d BN., 8th MARINES
NOV. 22, 1943
TAKEN FROM 2d BN 8th MARINES
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT.
]
The first counterattack came at 1930. A force of 50 Japanese
infiltrated past Jones’ outposts in the thick vegetation and
penetrated the border between the two companies south of the
airstrip. Jones’ reserve force, comprised of “my mortar platoon and
my headquarters cooks and bakers and admin people,” contained the
penetration and killed the enemy in two hours of close-in fighting
under the leadership of First Lieutenant Lyle “Spook” Specht. An
intense fire from the pack howitzers of 1/10 and 2/10 prevented the
Japanese from reinforcing the penetration. By 2130 the lines were
stabilized. Jones asked Major Kyle for a company to be positioned 100
yards to the rear of his lines. The best Kyle could provide was a
composite force of 40 troops from the 2d Marines.
[Illustration: