_Light tanks debark at the reef from LCMs launched by_ Harris _(APA 2)
and_ Virgo _(AKA 20) to begin the 1,000-yard trek towards Green Beach
the evening of D+1._]
Major Jones remarked that he did not feel like “The Admiral of the
Condom Fleet” as he helped paddle his raft shoreward. “Control was
nebulous at best ... the battalion was spread out over the ocean from
horizon to horizon. We must have had 150 boats.” Jones was alarmed at
the frequent appearance of antiboat mines moored to coralheads beneath
the surface. The rubber rafts passed over the mines without incident,
but Jones also had two LVTs accompanying his ship-to-shore movement,
each preloaded with ammo, rations, water, medical supplies, and spare
radio equipment. Guided by the rafts, one of the LVTs made it ashore,
but the second drifted into a mine which blew the heavy vehicle 10 feet
into the air, killing most of the crew and destroying the supplies.
It was a serious loss, but not critical. Well covered by Ryan’s men,
the landing force suffered no other casualties coming ashore. Jones’
battalion became the first to land on Betio essentially intact.
It was after dark by the time Jones’ troops assumed defensive positions
behind Ryan’s lines. The light tanks of Company B continued their
attempt to come ashore on Green Beach, but the high surf and great
distance between the reef and the beach greatly hindered landing
efforts. Eventually, a platoon of six tanks managed to reach the beach;
the remainder of the company moved its boats toward the pier and worked
all night to get ashore on Red Beach Two. McLeod’s LT 3/6 remained
afloat in LCVPs beyond the reef, facing an uncomfortable night.
That evening Shoup turned to Robert Sherrod and stated, “Well, I think
we’re winning, but the bastards have got a lot of bullets left. I think
we’ll clean up tomorrow.”
After dark, General Smith sent his chief of staff, “Red Mike” Edson,
ashore to take command of all forces on Betio and Bairiki. Shoup had
done a magnificent job, but it was time for the senior colonel to take
charge. There were now eight reinforced infantry battalions and two
artillery battalions deployed on the two islands. With LT 3/6 scheduled
to land early on D+2, virtually all the combat and combat support
elements of the 2d Marine Division would be deployed.
Edson reached Shoup’s CP by 2030 and found the barrel-chested warrior
still on his feet, grimy and haggard, but full of fight. Edson assumed
command, allowing Shoup to concentrate on his own reinforced combat
team, and began making plans for the morning.
Years later, General Julian Smith looked back on the pivotal day of 21
November 1943 at Betio and admitted, “we were losing until we won!”
Many things had gone wrong, and the Japanese had inflicted severe
casualties on the attackers, but, from this point on, the issue was no
longer in doubt at Tarawa.
[Sidebar (page 33): Colonel David M. Shoup, USMC
An excerpt from the field notebook David Shoup carried during the
battle of Tarawa reveals a few aspects of the personality of its
enigmatic author: “If you are qualified, fate has a way of getting you
to the right place at the right time--tho’ sometimes it appears to be
a long, long wait.” For Shoup, the former farm boy from Battle Ground,
Indiana, the combination of time and place worked to his benefit on
two momentous occasions, at Tarawa in 1943, and as President Dwight
D. Eisenhower’s deep selection to become 22d Commandant of the Marine
Corps in 1959.
[Illustration: