_Navy hospital corpsmen attend a critically wounded Marine on Betio.
The 2d Marine Division’s organic medical personnel paid a high price
while administering aid to fallen Marines: 30 Navy doctors and corpsmen
were killed; another 59 wounded._]
Communications were still terrible. For example, Ryan twice reported
the southern end of Green Beach to be heavily mined, a message that
never reached any higher headquarters. But General Smith on board
_Maryland_ did receive direct word of Ryan’s success and was overjoyed.
For the first time Smith had the opportunity to land reinforcements on
a covered beach with their unit integrity intact.
General Smith and “Red Mike” Edson had been conferring that morning
with Colonel Maurice G. Holmes, commanding the 6th Marines, as to the
best means of getting the fresh combat team ashore. In view of the
heavy casualties sustained by Hays’ battalion on Red Beach Two, Smith
was reconsidering a landing on the unknown eastern end of the island.
The good news from Ryan quickly solved the problem. Smith ordered
Holmes to land one battalion by rubber rafts on Green Beach, with a
second landing team boated in LCVPs prepared to wade ashore in support.
At this time Smith received reports that Japanese troops were escaping
from the eastern end of Betio by wading across to Bairiki, the next
island. The Marines did not want to fight the same tenacious enemy
twice. Smith then ordered Holmes to land one battalion on Bairiki to
“seal the back door.” Holmes assigned Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L.
Murray to land 2/6 on Bairiki, Major “Willie K.” Jones to land 1/6 by
rubber boat on Green Beach, and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth F. McLeod
to be prepared to land 3/6 at any assigned spot, probably Green Beach.
Smith also ordered the light tanks of Company B, 2d Tank Battalion, to
land on Green Beach in support of the 6th Marines.
These tactical plans took much longer to execute than envisioned. Jones
was ready to debark from _Feland_ (APA 11) when the ship was suddenly
ordered underway to avoid a perceived submarine threat. Hours passed
before the ship could return close enough to Betio to launch the
rubber boats and their LCVP tow craft. The light tanks were among the
few critical items not truly combat loaded in their transports, being
carried in the very bottom of the cargo holds. Indiscriminate unloading
during the first 30 hours of the landing had further scrambled supplies
and equipment in intervening decks. It took hours to get the tanks
clear and loaded on board lighters.
Shoup was bewildered by the long delays. At 1345 he sent Jones a
message: “Bring in flamethrowers if possible.... Doing our best.” At
1525 he queried division about the estimated landing time of LT 1/6. He
wanted Jones ashore and on the attack before dark.
Meanwhile, Shoup and his small staff were beset by logistic support
problems. Already there were teams organized to strip the dead of their
ammunition, canteens, and first aid pouches. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson
helped organize a “false beachhead” at the end of the pier. Most
progress came from the combined efforts of Lieutenant Colonel Chester
J. Salazar, commanding the shore party; Captain John B. McGovern, USN,
acting as primary control officer on board the minesweeper _Pursuit_
(AM 108); Major Ben K. Weatherwax, assistant division D-4; and Major
George L. H. Cooper, operations officer of 2d Battalion, 18th Marines.
Among them, these officers gradually brought some order out of chaos.
They assumed strict control of supplies unloaded and used the surviving
LVTs judiciously to keep the shuttle of casualties moving seaward
and critical items from the pierhead to the beach. All of this was
performed by sleepless men under constant fire.
[Illustration: