_“The Hard Road to Triumph,” a sketch by Kerr Eby. The action shows
Maj Crowe’s LT 2/8 trying to expand its beachhead near the contested
Burns-Philp pier._]
Altogether, some 5,000 Marines had stormed the beaches of Betio on
D-Day. Fifteen hundred of these were dead, wounded, or missing by
nightfall. The survivors held less than a quarter of a square mile of
sand and coral. Shoup later described the location of his beachhead
lines the night of D-Day as “a stock market graph.” His Marines went
to ground in the best fighting positions they could secure, whether
in shellholes inland or along the splintered seawall. Despite the
crazy-quilt defensive positions and scrambled units, the Marines’
fire discipline was superb. The troops seemed to share a certain grim
confidence; they had faced the worst in getting ashore. They were
quietly ready for any sudden _banzai_ charges in the dark.
Offshore, the level of confidence diminished. General Julian Smith on
_Maryland_ was gravely concerned. “This was the crisis of the battle,”
he recalled. “Three-fourths of the Island was in the enemy’s hands,
and even allowing for his losses he should have had as many troops
left as we had ashore.” A concerted Japanese counterattack, Smith
believed, would have driven most of his forces into the sea. Smith and
Hill reported up the chain of command to Turner, Spruance, and Nimitz:
“Issue remains in doubt.” Spruance’s staff began drafting plans for
emergency evacuation of the landing force.
The expected Japanese counterattack did not materialize. The principal
dividend of all the bombardment turned out to be the destruction of
Admiral Shibasaki’s wire communications. The Japanese commander could
not muster his men to take the offensive. A few individuals infiltrated
through the Marine lines to swim out to disabled tanks and LVTs in the
lagoon, where they waited for the morning. Otherwise, all was quiet.
[Illustration: _Marines of Landing Teams 2/8 and 3/8 advance forward
beyond the beach._
LtGen Julian C. Smith Collection
]
The main struggle throughout the night of D-Day was the attempt by
Shoup and Hermle to advise Julian Smith of the best place to land the
reserves on D+1. Smith was amazed to learn at 0200 that Hall and Hays
were in fact not ashore but still afloat at the line of departure,
awaiting orders. Again, he ordered Combat Team Eight (-) to land
on the eastern tip of the island, this time at 0900 on D+1. Hermle
finally caught a boat to one of the destroyers in the lagoon to relay
Shoup’s request to the commanding general to land reinforcements on
Red Beach Two. Smith altered Hall’s orders accordingly, but he ordered
Hermle back to the flagship, miffed at his assistant for not getting
ashore and taking command. But Hermle had done Smith a good service in
relaying the advice from Shoup. As much as the 8th Marines were going
to bleed in the morning’s assault, a landing on the eastern end of the
island would have been an unmitigated catastrophe. Reconnaissance after
the battle discovered those beaches to be the most intensely mined on
the island.
[Illustration:
INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAND
TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS
SITUATION 1800 D-DAY
NOTE: LINES ARE GENERAL INDICATION ONLY.
GAPS WERE COVERED BY SMALL GROUPS
AND BY FIRE. SECONDARY LINES WERE
ESTABLISHED WHERE POSSIBLE BEHIND
FRONT LINES.
TAKEN FROM 2D MAR DIV
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
]
[Sidebar (page 10): LVT-2 and LVT(A)2 Amphibian Tractors
The LVT-2, popularly known as the Water Buffalo, was built to improve
upon shortcomings in the design of the Marine Corps’ initial amphibian
vehicle, the LVT-1. The new vehicle featured a redesigned suspension
system with rubber-tired road wheels and torsion springs for improved
stability and a smoother ride. The power train was standardized with
that of the M3A1 Stuart light tank. This gave the LVT-2 greater power
and reliability than its predecessor and, combined with new “W”-shaped
treads, gave it greater propulsion on land and in the water. The new
vehicle also could carry 1,500 pounds more cargo than the original
LVT-1.
[Illustration: