_The Japanese garrison on Betio conducts pre-battle training._]
The Japanese garrison on Betio on D-Day consisted of the _3d Special
Base Force_ (formerly the _6th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force_),
the _7th Sasebo Special Naval Landing Force_ (which included 200 NCOs
and officers of the _Tateyama Naval Gunnery School_), the _111th
Pioneers_, and the _4th Construction Unit_, an estimated grand total of
4,856 men.
All crew-served weapons on Betio, from 7.7mm light machine guns
to eight-inch naval rifles, were integrated into the fortified
defensive system that included 500 pillboxes, blockhouses, and other
emplacements. The basic beach defense weapon faced by the Marines
during their landings on the northern coast was the M93 13mm, dual
purpose (antiair, antiboat) heavy machine gun. In many seawall
emplacements, these lethal weapons were sited to provide flanking
fire along wire entanglements and other boat obstacles. Flanking fire
discipline was insured by sealing off the front embrasures.
Admiral Shibasaki organized his troops on Betio for “an overall
decisive defense at the beach.” His men fought with great valor. After
76 hours of bitter fighting, 4,690 lay dead. Most of the 146 prisoners
taken were conscripted Korean laborers.
Only 17 wounded Japanese surrendered.
]
_D-Day at Betio,_
_20 November 1943_
The crowded transports of Task Force 53 arrived off Tarawa Atoll
shortly after midnight on D-Day. Debarkation began at 0320. The captain
of the _Zeilin_ (APA 3) played the Marines Hymn over the public address
system, and the sailors cheered as the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines,
crawled over the side and down the cargo nets.
At this point, things started to go wrong. Admiral Hill discovered that
the transports were in the wrong anchorage, masking some of the fire
support ships, and directed them to shift immediately to the correct
site. The landing craft bobbed along in the wake of the ships; some
Marines had been halfway down the cargo nets when the ships abruptly
weighed anchor. Matching the exact LVTs with their assigned assault
teams in the darkness became haphazard. Choppy seas made cross-deck
transfers between the small craft dangerous.
Few tactical plans survive the opening rounds of execution,
particularly in amphibious operations. “The Plan” for D-Day at Betio
established H-Hour for the assault waves at 0830. Strike aircraft from
the fast carriers would initiate the action with a half-hour bombing
raid at 0545. Then the fire support ships would bombard the island from
close range for the ensuing 130 minutes. The planes would return for a
final strafing run at H-minus-five, then shift to inland targets as the
Marines stormed ashore. None of this went according to plan.
The Japanese initiated the battle. Alerted by the pre-dawn activities
offshore, the garrison opened fire on the task force with their
big naval guns at 0507. The main batteries of the battleships
_Colorado_ (BB 45) and _Maryland_ commenced counterbattery fire almost
immediately. Several 16-inch shells found their mark; a huge fireball
signalled destruction of an ammunition bunker for one of the Japanese
gun positions. Other fire support ships joined in. At 0542 Hill ordered
“cease fire,” expecting the air attack to commence momentarily. There
was a long silence.
The carrier air group had changed its plans, postponing the strike
by 30 minutes. Inexplicably, that unilateral modification was never
transmitted to Admiral Hill, the amphibious task force commander.
Hill’s problems were further compounded by the sudden loss of
communications on his flagship _Maryland_ with the first crashing salvo
of the ship’s main battery. The Japanese coastal defense guns were
damaged but still dangerous. The American mix-up provided the defenders
a grace period of 25 minutes to recover and adjust. Frustrated at every
turn, Hill ordered his ships to resume firing at 0605. Suddenly, at
0610, the aircraft appeared, bombing and strafing the island for the
next few minutes. Amid all this, the sun rose, red and ominous through
the thick smoke.
[Illustration: