_An LVT-1 is lowered from a troop transport during landing rehearsals.
Some of the Marines shown here are wearing camouflage utilities while
the others are in the usual herringbone twill. Note that the sea
appears unusually calm._]
The Japanese during August replaced Saichiro with Rear Admiral Meichi
Shibasaki, an officer reputed to be more of a fighter than an engineer.
American intelligence sources estimated the total strength of the Betio
garrison to be 4,800 men, of whom some 2,600 were considered first-rate
naval troops. “Imperial Japanese Marines,” Edson told the war
correspondents, “the best Tojo’s got.” Edson’s 1st Raider Battalion had
sustained 88 casualties in wresting Tulagi from the _3d Kure Special
Naval Landing Force_ the previous August.
Admiral Shibasaki boasted to his troops, “a million Americans couldn’t
take Tarawa in 100 years.” His optimism was forgivable. The island was
the most heavily defended atoll that ever would be invaded by Allied
forces in the Pacific.
Task Force 53 sorely needed detailed tidal information for Tarawa.
Colonel Shoup was confident that the LVTs could negotiate the reef at
any tide, but he worried about the remainder of the assault troops,
tanks, artillery, and reserve forces that would have to come ashore
in Higgins boats (LCVPs). The critical water depth over the reef was
four feet, enough to float a laden LCVP. Anything less and the troops
would have to wade ashore several hundred yards against that panoply of
Japanese weapons.
Major Frank Holland, a New Zealand reserve officer with 15 years’
experience sailing the waters of Tarawa, flatly predicted, “there won’t
be three feet of water on the reef!” Shoup took Holland’s warnings
seriously and made sure the troops knew in advance that “there was a
50-50 chance of having to wade ashore.”
In the face of the daunting Japanese defenses and the physical
constraints of the island, Shoup proposed a landing plan which included
a sustained preliminary bombardment, advance seizure of neighboring
Bairiki Island as an artillery fire base, and a decoy landing. General
Smith took this proposal to the planning conference in Pearl Harbor
with the principal officers involved in Operation Galvanic: Admirals
Nimitz, Spruance, Turner, and Hill, and Major General Holland Smith.
The Marines were stunned to hear the restrictions imposed on their
assault by CinCPac. Nimitz declared that the requirement for strategic
surprise limited preliminary bombardment of Betio to about three hours
on the morning of D-Day. The imperative to concentrate naval forces to
defend against a Japanese fleet sortie also ruled out advance seizure
of Bairiki and any decoy landings. Then Holland Smith announced his own
bombshell: the 6th Marines would be withheld as corps reserve.
All of Julian Smith’s tactical options had been stripped away. The 2d
Marine Division was compelled to make a frontal assault into the teeth
of Betio’s defenses with an abbreviated preparatory bombardment. Worse,
loss of the 6th Marines meant he would be attacking the island fortress
with only a 2-to-1 superiority in troops, well below the doctrinal
minimum. Shaken, he insisted that Holland Smith absolve him of any
responsibility for the consequences. This was done.
David Shoup returned to New Zealand to prepare a modified operations
order and select the landing beaches. Betio, located on the
southwestern tip of Tarawa near the entrance to the lagoon, took the
shape of a small bird, lying on its back, with its breast facing north,
into the lagoon. The Japanese had concentrated their defenses on the
southern and western coasts, roughly the bird’s head and back (where
they themselves had landed). By contrast, the northern beaches (the
bird’s breast) had calmer waters in the lagoon and, with one deadly
exception (the “re-entrant”), were convex. Defenses in this sector were
being improved daily but were not yet complete. A 1,000-yard pier which
jutted due north over the fringing reef into deeper lagoon waters (in
effect, the bird’s legs) was an attractive logistics target. It was an
easy decision to select the northern coast for landing beaches, but
there was no real safe avenue of approach.
Looking at the north shore of Betio from the line of departure
within the lagoon, Shoup designated three landing beaches, each 600
yards in length. From right to left these were: Red Beach One, from
Betio’s northwestern tip (the bird’s beak) to a point just east of
the re-entrant; Red Beach Two, from that juncture to the pier; Red
Beach Three, from the pier eastward. Other beaches were designated as
contingencies, notably Green Beach along the western shore (the bird’s
head).
Julian Smith had intended to land with two regiments abreast and one
in reserve. Loss of the 6th Marines forced a major change. Shoup’s
modified plan assigned the 2d Marines, reinforced by Landing Team (LT)
2/8 (2d Battalion, 8th Marines), as the assault force. The rest of the
8th Marines would constitute the division reserve. The attack would be
preceded by advance seizure of the pier by the regimental scout sniper
platoon (Lieutenant William D. Hawkins). Landing abreast at H-Hour
would be LT 3/2 (3d Battalion, 2d Marines) (Major John F. Schoettel) on
Red One; LT 2/2 (2d Battalion, 2d Marines) (Lieutenant Colonel Herbert
R. Amey, Jr.) on Red Two; and LT 2/8 (Major Henry P. Jim Crowe) on Red
Three. Major Wood B. Kyle’s LT 1/2 (1st Battalion, 2d Marines) would be
on call as the regimental reserve.
[Illustration:
INTELLIGENCE MAP BITITU (BETIO) ISLAND
TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS
TAKEN FROM 2D MAR DIV
SPECIAL ACTION REPORT
]
General Smith scheduled a large-scale amphibious exercise in Hawkes
Bay for the first of November and made arrangements for New Zealand
trucks to haul the men back to Wellington at the conclusion in time for
a large dance. Complacently, the entire 2d Marine Division embarked
aboard 16 amphibious ships for the routine exercise. It was all an
artful ruse. The ships weighed anchor and headed north for Operation
Galvanic. For once, “Tokyo Rose” had no clue of the impending campaign.
Most of Task Force 53 assembled in Efate, New Hebrides, on 7 November.
Admiral Hill arrived on board _Maryland_. The Marines, now keenly aware
that an operation was underway, were more interested in the arrival
from Noumea of 14 new Sherman M4-A2 tanks on board the dock landing
ship _Ashland_ (LSD 1). The division had never operated with medium
tanks before.
The landing rehearsals at Efate did little to prepare the Marines
for Betio. The fleet carriers and their embarked air wings were off
assaulting targets in the Solomons. The Sherman tanks had no place
to offload. The new LVT-2s were presumably somewhere to the north,
underway directly for Tarawa. Naval gun ships bombarded Erradaka
Island, well away from the troops landing at Mele Bay.
One overlooked aspect of the rehearsal paid subsequent dividends
for the Marines in the coming assault. Major William K. “Willie K.”
Jones, commanding LT 1/6, took the opportunity to practice embarking
his troops in rubber rafts. In the pre-war Fleet Marine Force, the
first battalion in each regiment had been designated “the rubber boat
battalion.” The uncommon sight of this mini-flotilla inspired numerous
catcalls from the other Marines. Jones himself was dubbed “The Admiral
of the Condom Fleet.”
The contentious issue during the post-rehearsal critique was the
suitability of the naval gunfire plan. The target island was scheduled
to receive the greatest concentration of naval gunfire of the war to
date. Many senior naval officers were optimistic of the outcome. “We
do not intend to neutralize [the island], we do not intend to destroy
it,” boasted one admiral, “Gentlemen, we will obliterate it.” But
General Smith had heard enough of these boasts. In a voice taut with
anger he stood to address the meeting: “Even though you naval officers
do come in to about 1,000 yards, I remind you that you have a little
armor. I want you to know the Marines are crossing the beach with
bayonets, and the only armor they’ll have is a khaki shirt!”
While at Efate, Colonel William Marshall, commanding Combat Team Two
and scheduled for the major assault role at Betio, became too ill to
continue. In a memorable decision, General Smith promoted David Shoup
to colonel and ordered him to relieve Colonel Marshall. Shoup knew the
2d Marines, and he certainly knew the plan. The architect was about to
become the executor.
Once underway from Efate, Admiral Hill ordered the various commanders
of Task Force 53 to brief the troops on their destination and mission.
Tarawa came as a surprise to most of the men. Many had wagered they
were heading for Wake Island. On the day before D-Day, General Julian
Smith sent a message “to the officers and men of the 2d Division.” In
it, the commanding general sought to reassure his men that, unlike
the Guadalcanal campaign, the Navy would stay and provide support
throughout. The troops listened attentively to these words coming over
the loudspeakers:
A great offensive to destroy the enemy in the Central Pacific has
begun. Our Navy screens our operation and will support our attack
tomorrow with the greatest concentration of aerial bombardment
and naval gunfire in the history of warfare. It will remain with
us until our objective is secured.... Garrison troops are already
enroute to relieve us as soon as we have completed our job.... Good
luck and God bless you all.
As the sun began to set on Task Force 53 on the evening of D-minus-one,
it appeared that strategic surprise had indeed been attained. More good
news came with the report that the small convoy of LSTs bearing LVT-2s
had arrived safely from Samoa and was joining the formation. All the
pieces seemed to be coming together.
[Illustration: