The actual condition of Greece is a disgrace to the political
civilisation of Europe. There is hope for the Othoman Empire, for the
Turks are sensible that they have much to learn; but for the kingdom of
Greece there is no hope, unless the modern Hellenes lay aside the
self-conceit which induces them to boast of their superior orthodoxy
when the question relates to their practical ignorance. Englishmen and
Russians, despots and demagogues, princes and people, Europeans and
Americans, all agree in pronouncing King Otho’s kingdom a satire on
monarchical institutions, constitutional legislation, and central
administration. The valour and patriotism displayed by the Albanians of
Suli and Hydra, and by the Greeks of Messolonghi and Psara, were the
theme of well-merited praise, and were rewarded by liberal gifts of
money and other supplies from the friends of Greece in Germany,
Switzerland, France, England, and the United States of America. Greece
has great obligations to the people of Western Europe, whom she now
stigmatises as hostile Latins. It was the voice of the people that moved
the Cabinet of London to take the initiative in the negotiations which
caused the battle of Navarino, and conferred on Greece the rank of an
independent kingdom by the treaty of 1832.
No political experiment during the present century—fruitful as the
period has been in producing new States—excited higher expectations or
warmer wishes for its success. Twenty-two years have now elapsed since
Greece became a kingdom under the sceptre of Prince Otho of Bavaria. He
was then a minor, and he was selected to fill the new throne more for
his father’s merits than from any promise of superior talent in his own
person. King Louis of Bavaria loved art, and his want of political
capacity and military power removed any feelings of jealousy on the part
of the greater powers in Europe to the addition thus made to the dignity
of the house of Wittelsbach. King Otho was known to be a youth of very
moderate attainments; but his natural deficiencies being fortunately
united to an amiable disposition, it was expected that he would prove a
docile monarch, and listen to good counsellors. It has proved otherwise.
His limited capacity has not been more remarkable than his obstinacy and
perverseness in following a line of policy which has inflicted serious
injury on Greece. Notwithstanding a natural love of justice, and a good
moral character, his misgovernment has degenerated into corruption,
though it has not assumed a character of systematic tyranny. On the
whole, his incapacity to perform the duties of his station, and his
silly eagerness to assume the appearance of being a despotic sovereign,
while he was unable to make any use of the greater part of the
prerogatives willingly conceded to him by his subjects, have made him a
very apt regal type of the anarchical and rapacious nation he rules. The
result is, that the hopes of ardent Philhellenes, the expectations of
enthusiastic scholars, and the wishes of cautious statesmen, have all
been utterly disappointed by the government of King Otho. More than
this, while the King of Greece has shown himself a bad monarch, the
Greeks have displayed extreme ignorance in all their attempts to supply
his deficiencies. Instead of suggesting better principles for his
guidance, they have become the steady supporters of his system whenever
he condescended to purchase their support by places and pensions. It
seems as if the Bavarian monarchy had infused a morbid lethargy into
Romaic society, so rapidly has the central administration of Athens
quenched the fervour of patriotism throughout liberated Greece. The
Albanian population has lost its valour and perseverance; the Greek has
sunk back into that normal condition of rapacious imbecility which has
characterised the Hellenic race ever since the time of Mummius.
The revolution which freed Greece from the Turkish yoke broke out early
in the year 1821, so that the inhabitants of the kingdom have now
enjoyed the advantages of political independence for thirty-three years.
A generation has grown up to manhood in possession of a greater degree
of freedom than is possessed by most of the continental nations of
Europe. Municipal institutions existed, to some extent, under the Turks,
and they acquired considerable importance during the revolutionary war.
The fullest exercise of the liberty of the press has prevailed ever
since the first year of the revolution. Nor has this liberty been
greatly abused, though it has often been misused—a circumstance not to
be wondered at in a country so torn by faction as Greece has been ever
since she commenced her struggle for independence. This fact must be
weighed against the many vices and corruptions of the Greeks which it
will be our task to notice, for it affords decisive evidence that there
still exists among the mass of the population a sound basis of public
opinion.
The establishment of free and orthodox Greece as an independent State,
under the protection of Great Britain, France, and Russia, was a
conception of George Canning’s genius, and it received the sanction of
the Duke of Wellington. After Canning’s death, his enemies made it a
subject of reproach. It is said that, when his statue was erected in
Palace Yard, a royal duke, walking beside it with the late Lord Eldon,
began to pour out a diatribe of harmless accusations against the
honoured dead, which he summed up, saying, “He caused the battle of
Navarin, Eldon, and he was not nearly so big as that statue;” to which
the great Lord Chancellor, whose patience had been long tried, expanded
his bushy eyebrows, and exclaimed, “No, truly—nor so green:” the statue
being then, as some of our readers may remember, more remarkable for the
verdant colour of its patent verdigris than for its size. Whether the
battle of Navarin was absolutely necessary to save Greece from Ibrahim
Pasha and his Arabs, may still admit of dispute; but unquestionably it
was the battle of Navarin which did save Greece. When, however, the
business of selecting a king, and of organising the institutions of a
central administration on monarchical principles came to be performed,
the genius of Canning was represented by the torpor of Aberdeen, and the
sagacity of Wellington by the belligerent amenity of Palmerston.
The Russian sympathies of Capodistrias succeeded in delaying the final
settlement of the Greek question, with the hope of placing Greece in a
state of vassalage to the Czar. Lord Aberdeen combated the policy of the
Corfiote feebly and unsuccessfully. He barely succeeded in preventing
the execution of the Russian schemes, when the dagger of Mavromichalis
opened the way for making Greece an independent kingdom by the
assassination of Capodistrias.
The only candidate worthy of the throne of Greece was Leopold of
Saxe-Cobourg, the present King of Belgium. He was compelled to resign
his pretensions on account of the mutilated form of the territory
offered to him by Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington. Lord
Palmerston improved the territorial position of Greece by giving it a
better frontier than Lord Aberdeen, but it remained still a very bad
one, as Colonel Leake pointed out at the time. In 1832, moreover, Lord
Palmerston administered his antidote to an improved frontier, in the
shape of a Bavarian prince, whom, for some years, he supported with his
usual vigour and contempt of consequences. King Otho being a minor, a
regency accompanied him from Bavaria to Greece in 1833, to govern in his
name. This regency consisted of three statesmen of purblind views—men of
the limited political intelligence which distinguishes the artistic city
of Munich. Yet Lord Palmerston, in concert with the other protecting
powers, consented to strangle the Greek Chambers, in order to vest
unlimited power in the hands of these Bavarian regents. Count Armansperg
was chosen to do the honours, M. Maurer was intrusted with the duty of
organising the civil administration, and General Heideck was allowed to
sketch uniforms for the Greek army, and instructed to paint pictures for
the cabinet of King Louis. These three statesmen soon quarrelled among
themselves, and, with Teutonic _bonhomie_, called in the Greeks as
spectators of their contests. The foreign policy of the regency was
quite as ill-judged as their domestic behaviour. M. Maurer, who got the
upper hand for a year, was ultra-Gallican; Count Armansperg, who at last
succeeded in getting him shipped off to Bavaria, was ultra-Anglican. The
follies of the regency, however, did not prevent the three protecting
powers from heaping benefits on the Greek nation. A large loan,
amounting to two million four hundred thousand pounds, was placed at the
disposal of the Royal government. The object which the protectors of
Greece had in view, was to remove any difficulties which the finances of
Greece might have offered to a reform in the general system of taxation,
and at the same time to afford facilities for immediately commencing the
construction of roads, and other necessary improvements. The Greek
treasury was rendered completely independent of the receipts of the
annual revenues for the period necessary to effect a thorough
reorganisation of every branch of the public service, civil, military,
naval, and judicial. Greece had everything done for her which her
friends could desire. But the Greeks, instead of employing their
energies, and making use of the liberty of the press to restrain the
Bavarians from wasting the loan, aided them to dissipate it in every way
by which they could profit. The whole force of public opinion, it is
true, was employed in driving the Bavarians from profitable employments;
but when success attended the clamours of the Greeks, instead of
abolishing the offices which they had previously declared to be useless,
they installed themselves in the vacant places, and employed the
influence thus acquired to diminish even the scanty sum devoted to
national improvements by the Bavarians. Accordingly, we find that the
Bavarians did as much for improving Greece during their short period of
power, as the Greeks during their long subsequent administration. Yet
every traveller hears the Greeks constantly declaring that all the evils
in the country are caused by foreign interference. The only truth in
their observation is, that they were and are utterly unfit to be trusted
with the administration of any money beyond what they levy on themselves
in the way of taxation. Nothing, indeed, shows the moral obliquity of
the Greeks more than the ingratitude with which they receive every
public and private gift.
We consider _that_ ingratitude a sufficient excuse for recapitulating
some of the favours which the British Government has conferred on them
since Otho the beloved ascended the Hellenic throne. Nothing but the
blindest self-conceit, or the blackest ingratitude, can prevent their
acknowledging that the English Cabinet has done infinitely more for
advancing the commercial prosperity and extending the agricultural
industry of Greece, than King Otho’s ministers or the Greek Chambers.
The personal interest which several members of our Government took in
the success of the kingdom they had contributed to found, induced them
to conclude a reciprocity treaty with the King’s government at an early
period. To the same feeling we may ascribe the early repeal of the duty
on currants imported into the British dominions from the Greek kingdom.
This change of duty, by placing the currants, a most important product
of the Morea, on the same footing as those of Zante, was a direct boon
to the currant-growers of Achaia, a bounty on the cultivation of fruit
in the Greek kingdom, a premium to commerce at Patras, and a
considerable gift to King Otho’s treasury. Lord Palmerston was Foreign
Secretary during these changes, and we therefore request the public
writers at Athens, when they think fit to reproach him for quarrelling
with their beloved monarch, whom they believe is ever ready to sacrifice
his throne for their orthodoxy, to bear in mind that these measures have
done more for the agricultural and commercial prosperity of Greece, than
any which King Otho or the Greek Chambers have adopted since they freed
themselves from foreign domination.
For nearly five years—that is, from the beginning of 1833 to the end of
1837—the Bavarians continued to waste the loan granted by the three
powers, partly in large salaries to themselves, and partly in creating
places and jobs for the Greeks, to induce the most influential and
clamorous to consent to their mode of dissipating the public money.
Notwithstanding this, there can be no doubt that Greece received some
permanent benefit from the regency. The Greeks were not in a condition
to establish an equitable system of laws. M. Maurer endowed the country
with this invaluable boon. To him Greece owes its excellent judicial
organisation, and its code of civil procedure. Whatever were the defects
of M. Maurer as a statesman, he was an able legislator, practically
conversant with every detail of legal administration. The judicial
system he planted in Greece was so complete in all its parts, that it
has become an element in the political civilisation of the kingdom; and
it affords the strongest grounds of hope to those who look forward to
the Greek nation as the instrument for extending political civilisation
in the East. Count Armansperg governed Greece much longer than M.
Maurer, but his improvements were not so beneficial. He made court balls
and political bribery national institutions.
During the whole of the Bavarian domination, a well-filled treasury, a
number of foreign officers and native councillors of state, political
sycophants, dressed in handsome uniforms and speaking good French, a
hired press, and a liberal distribution of King Otho’s Order of the
Redeemer of Greece, with its ribbon and star, to foreign diplomatists
and English peers, concealed from Western Europe the discontent, civil
wars, and brigandage that fermented in the little kingdom. The bands of
robbers that infested Greece during this period became so numerous as to
give their system of plunder the character of a civil war. In the year
1835, during the administration of Count Armansperg, a body of about 500
brigands remained for more than a month levying contributions under the
walls of Lepanto, in which it kept the garrison blockaded until relieved
by a general from Athens with a strong detachment of Bavarian and Greek
regular troops. These armed bands repeatedly resisted the central
government, which drew all the money of the country to the capital
without making any improvements in the provinces. Several foreign
officers were charged with the task of re-establishing order. Generals
Schmaltz, Gordon, and Church, each made a campaign against the brigands,
who rendered Messenia, Etolia, Acarnania, Doris, and Phthiotis in turns
the scene of their skirmishes with King Otho’s troops. Besides this
extensive system of brigandage, a regular civil war was caused in Maina
by the same central rapacity and want of judgment on the part of the
Regency. In Maina, the Bavarian troops were defeated, and a considerable
number were compelled to lay down their arms.
During the whole of the Bavarian domination, the Greeks enjoyed the
liberty of the press. M. Maurer placed the newspapers under some
reasonable restraints, and Count Armansperg made one or two feeble
demonstrations against them, for he was timid in everything but emptying
the Greek treasury. His attacks were easily repulsed, and the Greeks
have the honour of retaining the liberty of the press by their own
exertions, though they have hitherto not rendered the privilege of much
use to the nation. At length, in the month of December 1837, the
Chevalier Rudhart, the last Bavarian prime-minister, resigned his
office, and from that time King Otho has governed his kingdom with Greek
or Albanian prime-ministers. This office has been more than once held by
men who could hardly read or write; but the individuals have invariably
been persons of some mark in the factions that divide the place-hunters
of Athens. The ignorance and want of education of his ministers, which
is often made a reproach to King Otho, ought to be considered as a
national disgrace, for the court would never have selected men so
destitute of administrative knowledge, had they not possessed
considerable influence and a numerous following.
Ever since the commencement of the year 1838, the Greeks have possessed
a predominant influence in King Otho’s cabinet. They are entirely
responsible for the faults of his government from that time; for if the
Greek ministers had used their power with a very little honesty, and one
single grain of patriotism, they might have retained the direction of
the internal administration in their own hands, and effected every
improvement the nation could desire. Indeed, if they had ever shown a
wish to improve the material condition of the population, it is probable
King Otho would have given them his support in their endeavours. But
when the King saw them intent only on profiting by office to enrich
themselves and create places for their partisans, in order to perpetuate
their tenure of office, he very naturally looked about for means to form
a royal party, and thus render the court independent of the ministers.
We shall soon explain to our readers how effectually his Hellenic
Majesty accomplished this object. The Greek ministers never made any
serious effort to diminish the weight of taxation, either by economy or
by improving the barbarous manner in which the agricultural taxes are
collected; they thought only of appropriating the national lands, and
creating new places to reward their supporters. Instead of establishing
systematic regulations for securing a respect to seniority and merit in
civil, judicial, and military appointments, they destroyed the system
the Bavarians had established, and disposed of the highest offices in
the most arbitrary and unprincipled manner. Judges have been appointed
in violation of the law, and men have been made generals who had never
served in a military capacity. Worthless politicians and intriguing
secretaries were decorated with military titles in order to enrich them
with high pay. These men may be seen at the balls in King Otho’s palace,
flaunting in vulgar embroidery, and imitating with Greek pertness the
sumptuous Albanian dress and Mussulman gravity of the chiefs who filled
the halls of Ali Pasha of Joannina. The Greeks alone have enjoyed the
profits of the corruption which has reigned in the administration since
the year 1838; they are consequently not entitled to throw the blame on
foreigners.
In consequence of the misconduct of the Greek ministers and the
servility of a council of state filled with official sycophants, the
Greek government became such a scene of corruption that the patience of
all ranks was exhausted, and an attempt was made to reform the vicious
system by a revolution in the year 1843. A representative chamber and an
imitation of Louis Philippe’s senate of officials, called in France a
House of Peers, were constituted. The deputies were chosen by universal
suffrage, but the election of the municipal authorities was left subject
to the oligarchical restrictions imposed by the Regency. Ten years have
now elapsed since the constitutional system was established, so that for
ten years the Greeks have made their own laws and voted their own
budgets. At the same time, the enjoyment of the fullest liberty of the
press, and the existence of sixteen newspapers at Athens, have enabled
every party and class to criticise the acts of the government with
unrestrained license. If corruption and venality have been the leading
features of political society in Greece during this period, it is
evident that the nation has been a party to the abuses, from its refusal
to punish the offenders. The mass of those whose superior knowledge and
rank have obtained for them the direction of public opinion in political
matters, have sacrificed the interests of the nation to advance their
own personal schemes of profit. The Greeks ought not to feel surprised
at the low estimation in which they are now held. It is entirely their
own fault. They have hawked about their nationality at Munich, Paris,
and St Petersburg, for illicit gains in a falling market at a very
unpatriotic price.
Yet we collect from the newspapers published at Athens, that a
considerable number of well-educated men of all parties, while they
acknowledge the degraded state of their country, assert that the whole
blame ought to be ascribed to the three protecting powers. Many of these
patriots, it seems, are nevertheless in the receipt of large salaries
from the public treasury; yet, though they feel that they are themselves
destitute of the patriotism necessary to lighten the burdens of their
country, they take the liberty of supposing that Lord Palmerston had the
power of making all Greeks honest men by the magic of a protocol. We are
not going to waste the time of our readers, as the Greek Senate and
House of Representatives have wasted the resources of the country, by
exposing the childishness of modern Greek political logic. If the
descendants of Lucian’s contemporaries can find relief in their present
degradation, by swallowing any dose of vanity they can mix for
themselves, we have no wish to deprive them of the solace. But we cannot
refrain from advising them to try some other remedy to remove the evils
that are undermining the national strength and character. Instead of
seeking for apologies to excuse their vices, they had better commence
reforming their vicious habits.
Nothing has so much retarded the progress of the Greek race as the
inconceivable vanity and unbounded presumption of the class who make
letters a profession. Those who believe in the unmixed purity of the
Hellenic blood might cite this besotted pride, after two thousand years
of national degradation, as a proof that the Greeks of the present day
are lineal descendants of those who sold their country to the
Macedonians and the Romans, as they have lately attempted to sell it to
the Russians. An admixture of foreign blood would probably have infused
into the people a wish to look forward to a glorious future, instead of
leaving them to gaze at a reflection of the past, distorted by their own
senile visual orbits, at moments when action, not contemplation, is
their business.
The strange manner in which the modern Greeks misrepresent history for
the gratification of their national vanity, is well displayed in their
ecclesiastical history. We will select one anecdote from the _History of
the Patriarchs of Constantinople_, written by Malaxos, one of the Greek
_logiotatọi_ of the sixteenth century. His work was first published by
Martin Crusius in his _Turco-Græcia_, and has lately been reprinted in
the new edition of the Byzantine historians, in the course of
publication at Bonn.
The Greeks are in the habit of boasting that their Church preserved
their nationality under the Turks. Considering the subserviency of the
great body of the Greek clergy during that period, and the readiness
with which they acted as spies and policemen for the Othoman government,
we own that we entertain a very different opinion. We think it would be
nearer the truth to assert that the people, having perpetuated their
existence by the toleration of their conquerors, preserved their
nationality by their municipal organisation, and that this preservation
of their nationality was the cause of their ecclesiastical establishment
surviving. Mohammed II. reconstituted the patriarchate of
Constantinople, after he had conquered the city, merely as a branch of
the Othoman administration. Mr Masson and other enthusiasts fancy they
can discern Presbyterian doctrines in the Greek Church. It may be the
case. We have heard that chemists find gold in strawberries; but the
gold rarely sits heavy on the stomachs of those who eat strawberries,
and we opine that the Presbyterian doctrines of the Greek Church never
prevent its votaries from worshipping images. So, in the anecdote we are
going to extract from the Patriarchal History, we find that the Greeks
regard violations of truth and honour as venial offences, if not
absolutely meritorious acts, whenever they are supposed to have turned
to the profit of their ecclesiastical establishment.
“During the reign of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, when Toulphi
Pasha was grand vizier,[133] the attention of the Sublime Porte was
called to the circumstance that the duty of the caliph of the Mohammedan
faith required the destruction of all places of worship belonging to
Infidels in every city which the true believers had taken with the
sword. Now, as Mohammed II. had taken Constantinople by storm, it was
the sultan’s duty to destroy all the Christian churches within the
walls; and all the plagues and fires which had desolated the city, and
which, it was observed, generally consumed more Turkish than Greek
property, evidently arose from the Divine anger at the neglect of this
important command of the Prophet. Sultan Suleiman was said to have
consulted the mufti on the necessity of only tolerating places of
worship for the Christians without the walls; and it was believed that
the mufti had delivered a fetva, authorising the destruction of all the
Greek churches in Constantinople. Sultan Suleiman then issued an order
to his grand vizier, commanding him to carry the fetva into execution.
At this time Jeremiah was patriarch of Constantinople.
“The patriarch heard the report, and, terrified at the news, mounted his
mule, and hastened to the palace of the grand vizier, who received him
with kindness. The two dignitaries discussed the matter of the sultan’s
order, and concerted together a mode of evading its execution. A meeting
of the divan was held, at which the grand vizier made a public
communication of the imperial decree to the patriarch Jeremiah. But the
head of the Greek Church gravely observed, that the circumstances of the
mufti’s fetva were not applicable to the city of Constantinople. He
declared that before Mohammed II. entered Constantinople, the Emperor
Constantine, finding the place no longer tenable, had gone out of the
city and presented the keys to the Sultan, who had admitted him to do
homage as a subject for himself and the Greek people, before the gates
were thrown open to admit the conqueror. On this ground he pleaded that
all the concessions made by Mohammed II. to the patriarchs and to the
Greek Church were lawful. Well might all the members of the divan wonder
at this strange tale concerning the conquest of Constantinople. But many
had received large presents from the patriarch, and many waited to hear
the opinion of the grand vizier before pretending to doubt its accuracy.
The grand vizier declared that the question was so important that it
would be proper to adjourn the business to a grand divan on the
following day.
“The report having spread among the whole population of Constantinople,
that the Government intended to destroy all the Christian churches,
every class of society was in movement. Long before the meeting of the
divan, crowds of Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews assembled at the
Porte to hear the result of the deliberation. The whole space from the
gate of the serai to the court of St Sophia’s was filled with the
multitude. The Patriarch Jeremiah was waiting to be admitted to the
divan, and soon after the members had taken their places he was summoned
to enter. When he reached the centre of the hall, he made his
prostrations to the assembled viziers, and then, standing erect,
declared himself ready to answer for his church. All admired the dignity
of his presence. His white beard descended on his breast, and the sweat
fell in large drops from his forehead. The Greeks declared that he
emulated the passion of Christ, of whose orthodox church he was the
representative on earth. The archonts of the Greek nation stood
trembling beside him.
“At length the grand vizier spoke. ‘Patriarch of the Greeks, a fetva of
our law has been delivered, and an order of the padishah has been
issued, prohibiting the existence of any church in the cities which the
true believers have conquered sword in hand. This city was taken by
storm by the great Sultan Mohammed the conqueror. Therefore, let your
priests remove all their property from the churches in their possession,
and, after shutting them up, deliver the keys to our master’s officers,
that the churches may be destroyed.’ To this summons the patriarch
replied in a distinct voice, ‘I cannot answer, O grand vizier! for what
happened in other cities; but with regard to this city of Constantinople
I can solemnly affirm that the Emperor Constantine Palaiologos, with the
nobles, the clergy, and the people, surrendered it voluntarily to the
Sultan Mohammed.’ The grand vizier cautioned the patriarch not to assert
anything which he could not prove by the testimony of Mohammedan
witnesses, who were able to certify the truth of what he said. The
patriarch immediately engaged to produce witnesses, and the affair was
adjourned for twenty days.
“The Greeks were in great alarm. Everybody knew that the patriarch had
engaged to prove a lie; so that the only hope of safety appeared to be
in the perpetual adjournment of the question. To effect this, the
wealthiest Greeks—Phanariotes and merchants—offered to supply the
patriarch with the sums of money necessary to bribe the grand vizier and
the members of the divan.
“But the Patriarch Jeremiah and the grand vizier Toulphi did not wish to
admit any strangers into the secret of their proceedings. So the
patriarch sent men of experience to Adrianople, who met agents of the
grand vizier, and at last two aged Mussulmans were found who were
willing for a large bribe to testify that the patriarch had spoken the
truth. These witnesses were conducted to Constantinople, and presented
to the Patriarch Jeremiah, who embraced them, and took care that they
should be well fed, lodged, clothed, and carefully watched, until they
appeared before the divan. When they had rested from the fatigues of
their journey, they were conducted to the grand vizier, who spoke kindly
to them, told them the patriarch was his friend, and exhorted them to
give their evidence without fear.
“On the day appointed to hear the evidence, the Patriarch Jeremiah
presented himself before the divan. The grand vizier asked if he was
prepared to produce the evidence he had promised, and the Patriarch
replied that the witnesses were waiting without to be examined.
“Two aged Turks were now conducted into the hall. Their beards were
white as the purest snow, red circles surrounded their eyes, from which
the tears fell incessantly, while their hands and feet moved with a
continual tremor. The viziers gazed at them with astonishment, for two
men so far advanced in years had never been seen before on earth
standing side by side. They looked like two brothers whom death had
forgotten. The grand vizier asked their names, and encouraged them by
making some other inquiries. They replied that they were both about
eighteen years of age when Constantinople was taken by the Sultan
Mohammed the victorious. Since that time they knew that eighty-four
years had elapsed, and therefore they were aware that they had reached
the age of a hundred and two. They then gave the following account of
the conquest of Constantinople:—
“The siege was formed by land and sea, and long and bloody engagements
took place, but at last several breaches were made in the walls, and it
was evident that the place would soon be taken. Preparations were making
for a final assault, when the Emperor of the Greeks sent a deputation of
his nobles to the sultan to demand a capitulation. The sultan, wishing
to save the city from destruction, and to spare the blood of the true
believers, granted the infidels the following terms of capitulation,
which the witnesses pretended to remember with accuracy, because a copy
had been publicly signed by the sultan and read aloud to the troops: ‘I,
the Sultan Mohammed, pardon the Emperor Constantine and the Greeks, and
grant their petition to become my subjects, and live in peace under my
protection. I allow the nobles to retain their slaves and property, and
I declare that the people shall live free from all illegal exactions,
and that their children shall not be taken to be enrolled in the corps
of janissaries.[134] This charter shall be binding on me and my
successors for ever.’ With this charter the Greek deputation returned to
the emperor, who came out immediately, and falling on his knees before
Mohammed the Second, presented to him the keys of the city. The sultan
then raised Constantine, kissed him, and made him sit down on his right
hand. For three days the two princes rejoiced together, and then the
emperor led the sultan into the city.
“As soon as the members of the divan heard this account of the taking of
Constantinople from the two old men who had witnessed the events, they
drew up a report and transmitted it to Sultan Suleiman. The sultan,
convinced that everything must have happened as the old Mussulmans
deposed, immediately ordered that the Christians should be allowed to
retain possession of their churches, and that no man should molest the
patriarch of the Greeks under any pretext.”
Now, the whole of this tale is an absurd forgery. Moreover, the
ignorance of the Greeks who framed it is even more extraordinary than
their utter disregard for truth. The accomplished sultan, Suleiman the
Magnificent, and the learned grand vizier, Loufti Pasha, are represented
as stupid Turks, destitute of all knowledge of the history of the
Othoman Empire. Greek vanity is flattered by an exhibition of the way in
which Romaic genius nullifies the power of the padishah, by availing
itself of the corruption in the Turkish administration. But the
strangest feature in the fable is the moral obtuseness of the Hellenic
mind, which solicits admiration for the frauds and falsehoods of their
patriarch. The inventor of the tale had in all probability heard that
Loufti Pasha was an Albanian by birth, but was ignorant of the fact that
he was a man of learning. He could not have known that, when in exile at
Demotika, Loufti wrote a history of the Othoman Empire, which is still
preserved. Indeed, a comparison of the flourishing state of Turkish
literature with the degraded condition of Greek literature in the
sixteenth century contrasts in a singular manner with the contempt
displayed by the Greeks in their illiterate records for the accomplished
and warlike Othomans. But the Greeks have always viewed the history of
other nations through a mist of prejudices which has bewildered
themselves far more than their enemies.
This anecdote presents a faithful picture of the Hellenic mind, and of
Greek political and historical knowledge, three hundred years ago. We
shall now endeavour to place before our readers an equally correct
picture of their mode of thinking and acting at present.
The constitutional system of government has proved as complete a failure
in Greece as the absolute monarchy which terminated at the revolution of
1843. Our description of the actual condition of the country will
explain the particular causes which have corrupted the representative
system and the central administration. The court of King Otho is really
quite as much the predominant feature in the political condition of
Greece as his palace is in the landscape at Athens. Both are great
deformities in scenes of great interest. There is a grotesque mimicry of
royal state at the monster palace of the little capital of liberated
Greece. A marshal of the palace and a master of the ceremonies, a
grandmaîtresse, military and naval aides-de-camp, ordinance officers,
ladies of honour, and young ladies-in-waiting, courtiers who cannot
write, and courtiers who cannot ride; court carriages in a kingdom
without mail-coaches; royal steam-yachts, but no packets even with oars;
crosses, ribbons, and stars; salaries, places, and pensions;—everything
which ruins a government, and nothing which enriches a people.
The power of the crown is great. It is supported by a civil list of one
million of drachmas annually, in a state which has a net revenue of
twelve. The enormous amount of this civil list may be estimated from the
facts, that the salaries of the Greek ministers are only twelve thousand
drachmas a year, and of the Greek senators only six thousand. Besides
the influence which this exorbitant wealth confers on the monarch, he
possesses still greater social influence, for the whole of the upper
classes at Athens consist of paid officials, every one of whom is liable
to lose his place at a word from King Otho, who, with very little
exertion on the part of that royal memory on which kings pride
themselves, may recollect every man who resides at his capital qualified
to enter his palace. The desire of King Otho to extend his personal
influence, and centralise power in his own hands, is so great, that
every individual who receives a public appointment, however
insignificant, whether at Athens or in the provinces, is compelled to
wait on his majesty to thank him for the favour, which he naturally
pretends to consider as a reward for his attachment to the royal
Bavarian, not as a reward for his services to Greece. King Otho has been
an apt pupil of Louis Philippe in the political corruption that renders
the constitutional system subservient to the royal power in a thoroughly
centralised administration.
In one branch of political corruption King Otho may boast that he has
outdone all European sovereigns. It is true, he found in the Hellenic
mind a rich soil, but he may claim the merit of having worked it like a
first-rate farmer. The local institutions to which the friends of Greece
looked for a firm basis for liberal institutions, have in his hands been
rendered the instrument for converting popular elections into royal
nominations. When the Bavarian regency destroyed the communal system of
Greece, they replaced it by municipalities of greater extent, and
rendered the local authorities dependent on the Minister of the
Interior. King Otho availed himself of the central control created by
the municipal law, to make the mayor and local magistrates everywhere
dependent on his personal favour. The mayors are now agents and spies of
the court. This is effected in the following manner: By one of those
preposterous regulations, framed by statesmen to delude the people with
a show of conferring on them free institutions, the nomination of the
mayor is vested in the central government. An oligarchical college of
electors selects three members of the municipality, and from these his
majesty selects the most subservient to occupy the place. By availing
himself skilfully of this absurd law, King Otho has filled the towns of
Greece with magistrates entirely dependent on his will—men whom their
fellow-citizens, if universal suffrage prevailed in the municipal
elections of the mayors as it does in the more important elections of
deputies to the legislature, would not allow to remain an hour in
office. These nominees of the court are placed in possession of
considerable salaries by the will of the central government, and as they
are dependent on the court for their office, they act as its devoted
agents. The consequence is, that King Otho is enabled to employ the
funds of the Greek municipalities in maintaining a species of court
policemen over the whole country. The influence thus gained may be
estimated from the circumstance that upwards of two millions of drachmas
are thus withdrawn from their legitimate use, in making roads and
facilitating communications by land and water, and are devoted to pay a
band of royal _sbirri_. Many persons in England have felt astonished
that a man of such moderate talents as King Otho could render such
effectual service to Russia, as to agitate the whole of Greece by making
an invasion of Turkey appear a national movement. But the fact is, that
the power possessed by the central government through the municipalities
is so great, that we have to thank the extreme incapacity of King Otho
and the general corruption of the instruments he employed for rendering
the attack on Turkey as inefficient as it proved. The King gave the
signal for a general recruiting to aid the Russian cause, but his
instruments in the provinces employed the opportunity in attending to
their own interests, before giving themselves much trouble about making
a diversion for the profit of the Czar or the Bavarian. King Otho on
this occasion paid the usual penalty of those who work by corruption.
We must not blame King Otho too severely for making use of corrupt
persuasion as an instrument of parliamentary government. The proceedings
of our Ministers rise up before us as an apology for the Greek monarchy.
A Coalition of all the administrative talent of Britain cannot conduct
the non-centralised government of the empire without a little local
jobbery. Even Lord Aberdeen’s own department publicly owns the necessity
of throwing a few corrupt sops to a hungry and restive body of Liberal
representatives. In the Treasury report, recommending some reforms in
our post-office, the following words will be found,—it seems a very
plain statement of adherence to the principles on which King Otho
influences the Greek municipalities: “My Lords (of the Treasury—_i. e._,
Messrs Aberdeen & Co.) are of opinion that it is for the _public
interest_ that the appointments should be made as at present by my
Lords, after consulting, through the recommendation of the members for
the county or town, the convenience and wishes of the population.”
Population in this sentence, we presume, means the class who usually job
such matters, for we have never before heard it asserted that the mob
was the best judge of administrative capacity.
The fact that a man so notoriously deficient in political wisdom as King
Otho has succeeded in establishing a system, giving him a predominant
influence over the Greeks, is a sad evidence of the extreme venality of
Greek society; for there can hardly be a doubt that the Greeks suggested
to their King the employment of the national resources in purchasing the
service of individuals instead of devoting them to the improvement of
the nation.
We have but few observations to make on the late treacherous attack of
King Otho and his subjects on their neighbour and ally, the Sultan Abdul
Medjid. There could not be an act of greater folly; and even amidst the
incapable and cowardly exhibitions of modern times, it is the national
movement which has been conducted in the most incapable and cowardly
manner. Of the complicity of King Otho there never was a doubt, in spite
of the denials of the Greek and German press. The courts of London and
Paris have refrained from giving publicity to all the documents which
fell into the hands of the Turks proving this complicity, as it was not
their wish to increase the embarrassments of the hour by declaring the
throne of Greece vacant. Regarding the attack on Turkey, however, in the
light of a diversion for the advantage of Russia, it might have rendered
important assistance to the Czar. Had it been conducted with energy and
ability, it might have inflicted a serious blow on the Othoman Empire.
When King Otho violated the treaties to which he owed his throne, and
appealed to force as the arbiter of his future relations with Turkey, he
expected, not without some chance of success, to become master of the
line of fortresses that defend the frontiers of Turkey towards Greece.
Volo, Domoko, Arta, and Prevesa, were almost without garrisons; and it
was only by the extreme incapacity of the Greek leaders, and the
misconduct of those who invaded Turkey, that these fortresses escaped
capture. The court of Athens acted on the conviction that the Russian
army would force the Balkan in a few weeks, and appear before the walls
of Constantinople without encountering any serious resistance. It
consequently believed that it would not be in the Sultan’s power to
detach a force sufficient to protect Thessaly and Epirus. Once in
possession of the fortresses which command these provinces, the King
believed that England and France would be compelled to treat with him,
and leave him in possession of the spoil. Fortunately for the Othoman
Empire, both the Emperor Nicholas and King Otho are very bad generals.
Both appear to have calculated that the armed rabble of Greeks in
fustanello could perform the duties of an army. And King Otho now finds
that he has sacrificed the most valuable portion of his subjects’
commerce to Russian interests, without any advantage to his cherished
scheme of making himself an absolute monarch.
The political morality of King Otho, in his foreign as in his internal
affairs, deserves the severest condemnation. His behaviour to Turkey has
met with the most galling punishment. He retains his crown by the
sufferance of those whom he has betrayed. His folly has ruined the
commerce of his subjects, and transferred the neutral trade, which might
have enriched the Greeks, to the ships of the Austrians, Genoese, and
Neapolitans.
Let us now contrast the conduct of the Greek monarch with the behaviour
of the President of the United States in a similar case. Cuba is quite
as desirable a possession to the Americans as Thessaly and Epirus are to
the Greeks. In both countries a large part of the population eagerly
desires the conquest. There is, however, this difference: The Greeks
could not make any impression on their enemy, even though they took him
by surprise; but the Americans would probably soon gain possession of
Cuba, if their government only winked at the enterprises of private
citizens. Had the President of the United States been as impolitic and
selfish as King Otho, he might have encouraged piratical attacks on
Cuba. The position of General Pierce bore a strong resemblance to that
of the King of Greece, but his conduct was diametrically opposite. Even
though General Pierce is now engaged in demanding from Spain reparation
for acts of violence committed on the property of American citizens in
Cuba, and though it is possible that the disputes between the two
countries may soon lead to hostilities, the President of the United
States uses the following terms in his Message to the Senate:—
“The formal demand for immediate reparation (from Spain) has only served
to call forth a justification of the local authorities of Cuba, which
transfers the responsibility to the Spanish government.... Meanwhile
information was received that preparation was making within the limits
of the United States, by private individuals, under military
organisation, for a descent upon the island of Cuba, with a view to
wrest it from the dominion of Spain. International comity, the
obligations of treaties, and the express provisions of the law, alike
required, in my judgment, that all the constitutional power of the
executive should be exerted to prevent the consummation of such a
violation of positive law, and of that good faith on which mainly the
amicable relations of neighbouring nations must depend.
“In conformity with these convictions of public duty, a proclamation was
issued to warn all persons not to participate in the contemplated
enterprise, and to invoke the interposition in this behalf of the proper
officers of government. _No provocation whatever can justify private
expeditions of hostility against a country at peace with the United
States._”
Contrast these words with King Otho’s declaration to the ministers of
Great Britain and France, that his royal conscience would not allow him
to restrain the marauding forays and piratical expeditions of his
subjects against Turkey, and that rather than attempt it he would
himself march at their head. _International comity_ and _the obligations
of treaties_ now compel the two protecting powers to employ against King
Otho and the Greeks that force to which they appealed as arbiter of
their relations with Turkey, and they must be forcibly obliged to
observe _that good faith on which mainly the amicable relations of
neighbouring States must depend_. Unless, therefore, the Greek King and
the Greek nation can give ample security that no provocation will again
induce them to commence private acts of hostility against Epirus and
Thessaly while the Greek kingdom is at peace with the Othoman Empire,
the tranquillity of Europe requires that the independence of Greece
should be suspended, and the country remain in the power of a foreign
force, until a government be firmly established which will respect the
principles of the law of nations as laid down by the President of the
United States in his Message to the Senate.
The Greeks in general apologise for their treacherous attempt to
surprise the Turks, by declaring that the liberated territory is too
small to constitute an independent State. They seem to overlook the
corollary which the European cabinets may be inclined to deduce from
their violation of “international comity and the obligations of
treaties,” and extinguish their independence rather than increase their
territory. But the falsehood of the assertion is too apparent to deserve
refutation. The kingdom of Greece is more thinly peopled than any other
State in Europe; but this want of population is caused by its
communications, both by land and sea, being in a worse state than they
are in any other country. Idle clerks in public offices, and armed men
who frequent coffee-houses, form a numerous section of the town
population, and these men consume all the revenues of the State, which
ought to be devoted to public improvements. Indeed, the financial and
political condition of King Otho’s dominions is so bad, that it would be
an act of inhumanity to transfer any portion of the population of the
Sultan’s territory to the Greek government. If Chios or Samos were
annexed to Greece tomorrow, the inhabitants would find their financial
burdens greatly increased, and their trade very much diminished, without
any corresponding improvement in their political condition for the
present. The benefits they would acquire might nevertheless awaken hopes
of a better future. They would be placed in possession of the liberty of
the press, and of a good judicial system, so that when the corrupting
influence of the court of Athens, of the Phanariot place-hunters, and of
the palikari, ceases to exist, amendment may be expected by the
enthusiastic. Judging from actual appearances, King Otho’s dominions
seem to be much too large, both for the amount of the population, and
for the administrative capacity of the government. Even Athens, Syra,
Patras, Nauplia, and Chalcis, are little better than undrained dirty
towns, destitute of proper municipal organisation and local police,
while the other towns in the country are merely overgrown villages. With
the exception of a few drives for the court carriages round Athens, and
a road for the Austrian traffic across the isthmus of Corinth, there is
not a good cart-road in the kingdom, and very few tolerable bridle-roads
even from one town to another. Twenty islands of the Archipelago, each
containing a town, are not visited by any regular packets, and it
frequently happens that six weeks elapse without their receiving any
news from the capital. It is almost needless to say that a population
living in such a state of isolation must be in a stationary, if not in a
declining, condition. If the numbers are kept up, the buildings of past
times are allowed to fall to decay, and all the accumulated capital is
rapidly deteriorating. Every traveller who has visited the islands of
the Archipelago, and the towns in the interior of the Peloponnesus, must
have noticed many proofs of this decay, quite independent of the
dilapidation caused by the revolutionary war, or the civil broils which
followed it.
Other proofs of the incapacity of the existing government of Greece to
conduct the centralised system, as established in the limited territory
it now rules, may be found in the civil wars already noticed, in the
general anarchy and contempt for the rights of property that prevails,
and in the enormous numbers of criminals in all the prisons of the
kingdom. We have now before us Athenian newspapers of the month of July,
filled with complaints of acts of brigandage almost within sight of King
Otho’s palace. Some years ago a party of pleasure was robbed during a
picnic at Kephisia; and the newspapers have frequently recorded cases of
boiling oil having been poured on women to compel them to show the
robbers where the family hoards were concealed. We have seen an
occurrence of this kind recorded in Attica while the Chambers were in
session. The inference from these facts seems to be, that King Otho, the
Greek Chambers, and the existing central administration, are incompetent
to establish order and security for life and property in the territory
they now pretend to govern. We ask whether it is possible for Great
Britain and France to entertain the question of an augmentation of such
a kingdom?
We may now turn from examining the position of King Otho and the Greek
government in relation to their foreign policy, and take a glance at the
social and political condition of the nation. We must commence by
enumerating what the people have neglected to do. This will serve to
show how great the difficulties now are in the way of improving the
country. During the ten years of representative government which have
now elapsed, the Greek deputies have made no systematic efforts to
improve the condition of the agricultural population, though
three-quarters of the inhabitants of Greece are chiefly dependent on
agriculture for their subsistence. No attempt has been made to reform
the barbarous method of collecting the land-tax in kind, which retains
the population in the stationary condition into which it fell on the
decline of the Byzantine Empire. The municipalities have been allowed to
become the vehicles of court corruption, and no measures have been taken
to enforce regular publication of their receipts and expenditure. No
criminal statistics are published. Instead of appropriating annually a
sum of money for the construction of roads, bridges, quays, and
ferry-boats, which are so necessary in a mountainous and insular State,
the national interests are sacrificed to the gains of individual
senators and deputies. New places are annually created, and the trade of
Greece is transferred to Austrian and French steam-companies. The
greatest commercial advantages ever placed at the disposal of any people
have been neglected by the Greek nation, and perhaps completely thrown
away by their late devotion to Russia. Yet the Greeks, who see the
number of foreign steamers daily increasing in their ports, boast with
their usual childish vanity of their superiority over every other people
in naval skill. They even throw out hints in their political writings
that the real cause of Lord Palmerston’s dissatisfaction with King Otho
was founded on a reasonable jealousy of the Greek navy, and a patriotic
fear lest the subjects of that monarch should deprive England of her
commercial supremacy! Yet while boasting in this Hellenic strain, like
true descendants of the contemporaries of Juvenal and Lucian, they have
allowed the most profitable part of their own coasting trade to pass
into the hands of the Austrian Lloyd Steam Company.
A tendency to social and political disintegration is quite as much a
characteristic of the population of liberated Greece as it was of
ancient Hellas. National differences, municipal distinctions, local
interests, class prejudices, and individual pretensions, divide the
people.
The first great social division is one of race. Only about
three-quarters of the population of the Greek kingdom consists of
Greeks—the other quarter is composed of Albanians. These races rarely
intermarry, and few Greeks ever learn the Albanian language; yet the
Albanian race is rapidly acquiring political importance in the present
condition of the Othoman Empire. It enjoys two immense advantages over
the Greek race. Its geographical location concentrates the population,
and offers a strong barrier against any foreign conquerors; while its
military habits enables it to raise far larger and more efficient
armies. It is also physically as much superior to the Greek as it is
intellectually inferior. The bravest men and the most beautiful women in
the Greek kingdom are of the purest Albanian blood, unadulterated with
any admixture with the Hellenic race. Marko Botzaris, Miaoulis, and
Konduriottis were Albanians. If the Albanians should, like their
fellow-citizens the Greeks, become more eager to identify their
existence with an ideal past than with a promising future, there is no
reason for their being behind-hand in boasting. As descendants of the
Macedonians, they may proudly vaunt that they have repeatedly conquered
the Hellenes; and, as a section of the great Thracian people, they trace
their origin to a mightier source than the Greeks. Consequently, if race
is to become a determining cause in the formation of independent States,
or even national representations, within the limits of the Othoman
Empire, the warlike Albanians, in their inexpugnable mountains, are
likely to assume a more important position than the commercial Greeks,
dispersed in exposed seaports and defenceless islands. The application
of ethnology to politics, which the Greeks have strongly-advocated, is
extremely likely to operate forcibly in preventing any considerable
extension of their kingdom. A Greek empire would be an impossibility if
a natural ethnological development were adopted as a basis for
partitioning Turkey in Europe. The Vallachians, Sclavonians, and
Albanians are as able and willing to arrest the progress of the Greeks
to-day, as the Thracians, Macedonians, and Epirots were in ancient
times.
The next strongly-marked line of separation in the population of the
Greek kingdom is that between the agricultural population and the
inhabitants of the towns, whether the citizens live by orchard and
garden culture, or by trade and foreign commerce. About three-quarters
of the inhabitants of Greece live by agriculture; yet agricultural
industry remains in the rudest state. The Bavarian Regency, the Greek
King, and the representative Chambers, have hitherto done nothing to
improve the condition of the agricultural class, nor to increase the
produce of the country. The land which maintained one family four
hundred years ago, will only maintain one family at the present day; the
district which supported a thousand families under the Turks, can do no
more under King Otho. The absurd fiscal arrangements concerning the
collection of the land-tax in kind, prevent the peasantry from planting
trees; so that in the richest plains devoted to the cultivation of
cereals, the agricultural class is in the most miserable condition—as in
the fertile districts of Thebes and Messenia. There is also no
inducement to extend cultivation, as no roads exist; and a mule would,
in a large part of Greece, eat its load of barley before it reached the
nearest market. The agricultural class in Greece is poor, barbarous, and
industrious; the population of the towns, on the other hand, is in easy
circumstances, advanced in civilisation, and extremely idle. In no other
country are coffee-houses so numerous or so well filled. The great
number of persons living on places and pensions conferred by the central
government, or receiving pay from the municipalities with no duty to
perform, fills the streets of every town in Greece with an amount of
idle individuals which travellers view with wonder.
The third prominent feature in the social condition of the Greek
population is the existence of a military caste called Palikars. These
palikars are nothing more than the armed followers of certain military
chiefs who have secured to themselves an acknowledged position and
regular pay in the Greek kingdom. The palikars wear the Albanian dress,
and pretend to be professional soldiers, though neither they nor their
leaders know anything of military tactics or discipline. A small number
only are composed of the survivors of the irregular troops of the
revolutionary war. The greater part consists of idle young men who are
incapable of learning a trade, and disinclined to submit to discipline.
The utter uselessness of the palikars in military operations was
displayed in the ease with which they were defeated and dispersed by
Fuad Effendi. These armed bands, however, though they are useless
against an enemy, are extremely dangerous to the native peasantry. They
march about the Greek kingdom from one end to the other, living at free
quarters on the villagers, and consuming annually as large a portion of
the produce of the soil as is paid to the central government in the
shape of land-tax. In some disturbances which took place in the island
of Eubœa they were said to have consumed, in forced contributions from
the agricultural population, nearly one-third of the whole annual
produce of the island.
We do not intend to deny the services which the palikars rendered during
the war against the Turks. In a defensive warfare against an
undisciplined enemy like the Turks of 1821, or an ill-organised force
like the Bavarians of 1833, they were very efficient. But against the
French at Argos they were utterly useless, even though they had
intrenched themselves in a manner which they fancied would give them a
decided advantage over regular troops. The French carried all their
positions with the bayonet, and the palikars soon fled in dismay. The
revival of the system of palikarism is one of the many evils which Lord
Palmerston’s knavish protégé, Count Armansperg, bequeathed to Greece. M.
Maurer had broken up the hordes of these children of anarchy in a very
effectual manner, though perhaps with unnecessary violence and severity.
The object of Count Armansperg in restoring palikarism was to form for
himself a military party. By the formation of troops enrolled under
chiefs attached to his own person, he expected to be able to keep down
public opinion in the provinces; while, by a lavish distribution of
money and places, he knew he could silence it at Athens. The favoured
captains were allowed to collect bands of armed followers, almost
without any control on the part of the minister-of-war, and without the
men or the officers being subjected to any discipline. In the provinces,
these captains were intrusted with extraordinary powers, which they used
for party purposes; and the palikars became an organ of the government
for intimidating its opponents. The consequences of Count Armansperg’s
conduct were most injurious. Those captains who were unable to gain his
good-will collected bands of armed men, or joined the brigands, and
endeavoured to increase the number of their followers by levying
black-mail on the peaceful agriculturists, in the hope that the
government would eventually be compelled to purchase their services.
Their calculation proved correct; and Count Armansperg ended by taking
into his pay the very men against whom he had employed his generals.
King Otho adopted with delight the corrupt system of his regent, and
even extended its application. He filled his palace with palikars, and
neglected the regular troops. Men ignorant of all military service were
intrusted with military command in the provinces, where their services
were chiefly required to intimidate opposition, and secure the election
of court candidates as deputies and mayors. Koletti, the favourite
leader of the palikar class, became King Otho’s favourite minister; and
the influence of that worthless Vallachian Aspropotamite enabled the
count to nullify the constitution of 1844. By the influence of the
palikars, assisted, it is true, by his own anti-constitutional love of
administrative despotism, Mavrocordatos was driven from the ministry,
and King Otho re-established in absolute power, by the assistance of
palikarism and municipal corruption.
The late invasion of Turkey could hardly have taken place, if it had not
been in King Otho’s power to launch these irregular bands against his
neighbour’s frontier; for, with all his folly and imprudence, he would
not have ventured to march regular troops openly against the Sultan
without a declaration of war. On the other hand, it was fortunate for
Europe that the utter worthlessness of these undisciplined bands for all
military operations, except the defence of mountain passes, prevented
their capturing the frontier fortresses of Epirus and Thessaly, and
enabled Fuad Effendi to defeat their army with so much ease at Peta.
Never, certainly, did any troops make a more despicable military display
than the palikars of Greece in their late attack on Turkey. While these
invaders made their patriotism a pretext for plundering their
unfortunate countrymen who were subjects of the Othoman Empire, and
devoted their chief attention to carrying off cattle and sheep belonging
to Greeks and Christians, instead of attempting to storm the
ill-fortified holds of the Turks, the Othoman troops displayed one of
the highest characteristics in which the Greek race has always been
deficient—a sense of duty. They bravely defended the posts committed to
their care, and success crowned their good conduct.
We have now given an impartial account of the faults of King Otho, and
of the political vices of the Greek nation; we will proceed to enumerate
the virtues of the people with equal impartiality. The greatest enemies
of the Greeks cannot deny that they possess a high degree of patriotism.
Whatever its origin may be, and however much it may be disfigured by
vanity, it is a great virtue, and produces abundant good fruit. The sums
of money which have been employed by private individuals in the
construction of churches and school-houses over all Greece, the liberal
donations they annually remit to Athens for advancing the cause of
education, the munificent presents of books, medals, and philosophical
instruments to the University and to the Observatory, and the immense
contributions collected to aid the late impolitic attack on Turkey, all
prove that, under a better government, and with good guidance, the
patriotism of the Greeks might be rendered of great use in advancing the
moral improvement and material prosperity of their country. But their
patriotic feelings must be directed to the improvement of morality and
religion before much good can be effected. The importance of private
virtue is not sufficiently appreciated by the Greeks as a guarantee for
political honesty. Individual character has more influence as an element
of national strength and greatness, than the statesmen at Athens are
inclined to believe. Without citing historical examples, we may remind
them that a dispersed nation, mingled as the Greeks are with foreign
races, is much more amenable to the public opinion of other nations,
than a race pressed together in close geographical contiguity, and with
which foreigners rarely communicate.
The industry of the Greeks is attested by their commercial activity, and
by their laborious agricultural operations. The mass of the population,
it is true, derives so little benefit from their toils, that we might
pardon them if they were much idler than they are. Those who are most
successful in commerce are compelled to expatriate themselves, which is
always a great hardship to a Greek. Those who labour at the fields and
dig the vineyards are unable to live in tolerable ease; for the want of
roads prevents their finding a sale for their produce, and deprives them
of the power of purchasing the luxuries they most eagerly desire.
Another honourable feature in Greek society is the good feeling
displayed by the classes which live beyond the sphere of court and
political influence. If a Greek is neither a courtier, a government
official, nor a palikar, he is generally a tolerably honest man, and by
no means a bad fellow, unless he be an Ionian or a Phanariot. We may
mention an anecdote, which proves strongly the existence of virtue in
the great mass of the labouring classes, even on that most delicate of
all subjects, honesty in paying taxes. When the Bavarians arrived in
Greece, they had not time to take any strong measures for enforcing a
very strict collection of the national revenues. The probable amount was
estimated at four millions, but the revenues of the preceding year had
not reached that sum. As it was necessary to leave much to the
conscience of the people, Mr Gladstone might have been satisfied with
three millions and a half, with a few five-pound notes falling in from
time to time from the remorse of defaulters. But the Greeks paid down
seven millions within the year; and the experience of subsequent revenue
returns proves that they must have paid the full amount to which
government had any claim.
The state of the legal profession at Athens impresses strangers with a
favourable opinion of the educated classes, when uncorrupted by the
service of a corrupted central administration. The advocates form a body
of well-educated men, whose professional gains render them independent
of court influence, and whose talents and character give them great
power over public opinion on judicial matters. Hence they exercise a
salutary control over the minister of justice and the judges. This is
doubly necessary, from the circumstance that the judges hold their
offices only during the pleasure of King Otho, who has frequently
removed those who have displeased him from office, or sent them into a
dreary exile in some distant province in an inferior charge. The power
of public opinion, as exercised by the bar, is consequently of great
importance to insure some degree of equity in the courts, and control
the general administration of justice in civil affairs; and it has been
used in a manner highly honourable both to the Greek bar and to the
national character.
There is another quality which the Greeks possess in a high degree, and
which, if properly directed by a good government, would aid greatly in
raising them from their present state of political degradation. This is
their aptitude for public discussion. Concentrated as at present on
state affairs, concerning which they are naturally quite ignorant, it
becomes a mere waste of words. But if employed on their local and
municipal affairs, concerning every detail of which they are fully
informed, it would soon become the means of checking the corruptions of
the court and of the central administration. This aptitude for public
business enabled them to retain a large share in the local
administration of their provinces under the Turks, and to organise the
communal system to which we are inclined to attribute their success in
the revolutionary war. The various central governments which followed
one another in succession during the war with Turkey, never displayed
much talent, nor enjoyed much influence over the people. The naval
force, though admirably conducted by Miaoulis, was, in spite of the
gallant deeds of Kanaris, inadequate to secure a decisive victory. The
military force was without organisation, powerless for attack, and
extremely ill-directed. No general in Greece, native or foreigner,
displayed any great military talent. In the navy, on the contrary, the
name of Hastings, who first employed hot shot and shells from ship
artillery, ranks justly with the glorious names of Miaoulis and Kanaris.
The war on land was entirely supported by the indomitable perseverance
of the people. Their political and military leaders weakened their
powers of resistance by their intrigues, avarice, and incapacity, but
the energy of the people never failed. Glorious examples are
innumerable, though Mr Tricoupi, the Greek historian of the war, has not
the judgment to select them. Lord Byron describes their behaviour, in
speaking of the Spaniards—
“Back to the struggle; baffled in the strife,
War! war! was still their cry—war, even to the knife!”
Messolonghi attests its truth.
The friends of Greece,—and she has still some sincere friends, in spite
of all her faults—may look forward to her communal system and local
attachments as a basis on which political order and national prosperity
can be firmly established. But unless the restless activity of the
people be usefully occupied in the management of their local affairs,
they will employ it, as at present, injuriously, in profiting by the
corruption of the central government. The want of a proper sphere of
energy for a large class of the population is evidently preparing Greece
for a series of revolutions. A representative government and a free
press, linked to a centralised administration, without the control of a
municipal organisation, tends naturally to revolution. To remove a
parish grievance, it becomes necessary to overthrow a minister; and a
very little experience in such countries reveals the secret, that it is
easier to make a revolution than obtain a reform.
Such was the state of Greece when the French and English troops landed
at the Piræus in the month of June, to prevent King Otho from throwing
the country into a state of complete anarchy by his insane policy of
assisting Russia. The Greeks, who had invaded Turkey, were already
defeated, strong garrisons were already placed in all the Turkish
fortresses on the Greek frontier, and a fleet of Turkish steamers
commanded the Archipelago. The war had degenerated into a series of
forays by land and piratical expeditions by sea, in which the Greeks
carried off the cattle, and plundered the warehouses and barns of the
subjects of the Porte. On the other hand, the Othoman government, unable
to guard against these attacks, threatened to invade Greece, and occupy
the richest islands of the Archipelago as a material guarantee for
indemnity. The interference of the Allies was quite as necessary to
defend the Greek people as the Turkish provinces. A change was of course
immediately effected in the government. M. Alexander Mavrocordatos, then
Greek minister at Paris, was appointed Prime Minister. The name of
Mavrocordatos is well known to all who are acquainted with the history
of the Greek revolution. His merits and defects are correctly stated in
General Gordon’s excellent work. General Kalergy, another distinguished
name in Greek history, was intrusted with the war department. M. George
Psyllas, who for the last ten years has stood forward as the only
consistent supporter of liberal measures and communal interests in the
Senate, was named Minister of Religion and Public Instruction. He is an
Athenian, and represented Athens at the first National Assembly, held at
the commencement of the revolution, when the constitution of Epidaurus
was framed. These three men are undoubtedly the best men in Greece for
the offices committed to them. But their colleagues are not so well
selected. Kanaris is Minister of the Marine—no braver nor more patriotic
man breathes, but he is no better suited to be a minister than an
archbishop. The other ministers are positively very ill chosen. M.
Anastasios Londos, whose tergiversation and folly caused the quarrel
with Great Britain in 1850, and the blockade of the Piræus, is Minister
of Justice. He is as deficient in knowledge of law and judicial
administration, as he has shown himself ignorant of the principles of
political honesty, and destitute of sound judgment. The other
individuals may be left nameless.
The only question of interest in Great Britain is, whether these
ministers can do anything to improve the condition of the people, to
establish a greater degree of security for life and property than now
prevails, open new fields for commercial and agricultural industry, and
make Greece an improving and prosperous country; for these changes alone
can guarantee the tranquillity of the East.
The first step to be taken must be, to abolish the existing manner of
collecting the tenth of the gross produce of the land, as a land-tax.
There is no other means of getting quit of the numerous fiscal
regulations which deprive the agricultural classes of the power of
disposing of their labour in the way most conducive to their profit. The
next thing is, to restore life and energy to the municipal system, and
extend the independent sphere of action of the municipal authorities.
The present Minister of the Interior is perhaps as well fitted to do
this as he is to swallow a camel. The Greeks generally have shown that
they are deficient in the temper and capacity requisite to conduct a
central government. They still want the experience necessary to give
ordinary men a sense of the value of political honesty, and there is no
possibility of their gaining it in any school but that of their own
municipal practice. If they are incurably addicted to peculation, they
had better commit their acts of dishonesty at home, where the exact
amount of their frauds can easily be ascertained, and is sure to be made
public. Palikarism must be utterly rooted out. General Kalergy has
promptly commenced the work which no man is so well able to complete.
The army and navy must be reformed. A corps of pioneers must be formed
to build bridges; steam-packets, and galleys with oars, must facilitate
communications.
Now, is Alexander Mavrocordatos the man to do these things? We cannot
say. He has always shown himself too much the slave of bureaucratic
prejudices for us to feel any very firm confidence in his political
views. Nevertheless, at this moment, he is the only Greek who possesses
the political honesty and diplomatic experience necessary for preserving
friendly relations with the allies of Turkey, and at the same time
saving the national independence of his country: he has, therefore, our
best wishes for his success.
The time is one of great difficulty. A mighty revolution has commenced
in the East, which the Greek race has neither the energy nor the power
to direct. If well and wisely governed, it may profit by the course of
events; but if its national vanity force it into collision with any of
the great actors in the scene, it may be brushed rudely aside, and sink
back into the insignificant position it has held ever since the Franks
conquered Constantinople and founded principalities in Greece in 1204.
Hellenism and orthodoxy must yield to philanthropy and Christian
civilisation. To us the future is dark; but of one thing we are assured,
that the occupation of Greece by the allied troops was absolutely
necessary to enable any ministry to commence the task of improvement in
the kingdom of Greece.