PREFACE.

“To be, or not to be--that is the question.”

That is indeed the question we are about to consider,--BEING or DEATH; a

short sentence, but of unequalled importance. Yet how little does the

demise of a fellow-man dwell on the human mind, unless the ties of

kindred, or any peculiarity of circumstance by which the event may

happen to be encircled, impart to it adventitious interest.

A newspaper paragraph entitled “Awful and sudden death” may for a moment

arrest our attention; but it is the “awful and sudden,” not the actual

transit, which attracts the fancy. Perchance, also, it may be printed in

rather a larger type than the adjoining paragraph, or we may expect to

find some exciting detail of the facts of the case; but the awful

Reality, the earthly ending of the being, immortal though it is to be,

elicits little sympathy, and the wearied eye turns to some other news.

The dying _speech_ of the malefactor arrests our attention; the dead

_speaker_ of it is unregarded as a lump of clay. Who that amidst the

excitement of a crowded court of justice has turned his thoughts within

himself, and divesting the scene of all the panoply of pomp which

surrounds him, has reflected on the moral effect to be the result of

the sentence of death _if executed_, but has felt his sympathy rather

awakened in favour of the culprit, and confessed to himself how

inefficient the gibbet is when viewed (according to its intended

purpose) as the roadside guidepost, by which other earthly travellers,

who might be disposed to stray, should be warned of a pathway to be

avoided.

Alas! the body on the gibbet is but like the scarecrow in the field of

grain,--little heeded by its brethren in plumage, scarcely noticed by

aught save the vacant gape of curiosity; it dangles for a time, and is

remembered no more!

But let us take a more serious view of the question,--one which commands

our deepest respect and our gravest veneration. Let us consider the

question of the assumed right to take human life on the warranty, or, as

is sometimes said, on the express command of Scripture.

It has been often urged that it is expressly commanded in the Old

Testament that “he who sheddeth man’s blood, by man _shall_ his blood be

shed;” and, consequently, that the punishment of death for murder is

sanctioned by the high and holy God who inhabiteth eternity.

How cautious should we be, to ascertain that no fallacy exists in this

our opinion! I grant that, according to our translation, the above

isolated text, if taken alone, may be so construed; but what are the

acts of the Creator recorded as following upon this text? What was his

first judgment on the first of murderers, Cain? Not only did he not

inflict death, but by a special providence protected him from its

infliction by his fellow-man. Behold again the case of David, guilty of

at least imagining the death of Uriah. Was David struck dead for the

crime?

Whatever an isolated chapter (much less, then, a single verse) may

amount to of itself, if we take the context of the same part of Genesis

and behold the first murderer even especially guarded, by God’s mark,

from the effect of “every man’s hand being against him;” and again if we

search the New Testament, where we find no passage, under the new

dispensation, that can be construed to call for the infliction of death

for murder,--from these results I submit that the question must be left

solely to mundane argument, to stand or fall by its own efficacy as a

preventive of murder, and that the isolated phrase of Scripture should

not be construed into a command as to what ought to be done, but rather

as the probable result of human revenge, a feeling at variance with

God’s holy ordinance; for we read, “Vengeance is mine, saith the

Lord,”--expressly and clearly withholding the power over human life from

mere mortal judgment.

Let me here give a short extract from the “Morning Herald,”--a paper

which has always so consistently and ably advocated the sacredness of

human life:--

“On the motion of Mr. Ewart, some important returns connected with

the subject of CAPITAL PUNISHMENTS have been made to the House of

Commons, and ordered to be printed.

“_First Class._--A return of the number of persons _sentenced to

death_ for MURDER in the year 1834, whose punishment was

_commuted_,--specifying the counties in which their crimes

occurred, and stating the number of _commitments_ for murder in

the same counties during the _same_ year and in the _following_

year, together with the _increase_ or _diminution of commitments_

for murder in the same counties in the year following the

commutation of the sentences; similar returns for 1835, 1836, 1837,

and 1838.

“_Second Class._--A return of the number of EXECUTIONS which took

place in England and Wales during the three years ending the 31st

day of December, 1836, and also during the three years ending the

31st day of December, 1839, together with the number of

_commitments_ in each of those periods respectively for offences

_capital_, on the 2d day of January, 1834. Also, the total number

of _convictions_ for the same offences, together with the

_centesimal proportions of convictions to commitments_ in each of

those periods respectively.

“The facts set forth upon the face of these returns furnish very

strong evidence, indeed, to prove the utter _inutility of_ CAPITAL

PUNISHMENTS as a means of preventing or repressing crime.

“What are the facts?

“We find that in one county (Stafford) in the year 1834 the

sentence of one convict for _murder_ was _commuted_. In that year

the commitments for murder were six, and in the following year the

commitments for that crime were also six. Thus the commutation of

the sentence in that instance was followed by neither a

_diminution_ nor an _increase_ of commitments for murder.

“It is sufficient for the argument of the advocates of abolition of

capital punishment to show that the suppression of the barbarous

exhibitions of the scaffold would _not_ necessarily cause an

_increase_ of heinous offences; for if the amount of crime were to

remain the _same_ under laws _non-capital_ as under those which are

_capital_, to prefer the latter to the former would evince a

passion for the wanton and unavailing destruction of human life,

unspeakably disgraceful to the Government or Legislature of any

civilized country.

“In Derbyshire, in the year 1835, we find a similar result

following a commutation of sentence for murder to that which

followed a similar commutation in the county of Stafford in the

preceding year; namely, the same number of _commitments for murder_

in the year following the commutation as in that in which it

occurred,--being two in each; thus, also, in this instance, there

was neither increase nor diminution of the crime of murder in the

year following that of the commutation, judging from the number of

commitments.

“In Warwickshire, in the year 1835, the sentence of a convict for

murder was commuted, the number of commitments for the crime in

that year being five, whereas in the year following there was but

one commitment. In this instance, then, we have not only _no

increase_ of the crime of murder, but an actual _diminution_

amounting to four.

“In Westmoreland, in the year 1835, there was one commutation; and

the commitments in the year following showed neither an _increase_

nor _diminution_, being two in each.

“In Cheshire, in the year 1836, the sentences of _two_ convicts for

_murder_ were _commuted_, the commitments for the crime in that

year being two; the commitments for the year following were also

two, showing _neither an increase nor diminution_.

“Here we have an instance where the sentences of _all_ convicted

were commuted, and no _increase_ of the crime followed.

“In Devonshire, in the year 1836, there was one commutation of

sentence for _murder_, the commitments being four. In the year

following there were _no_ commitments, making a _decrease_ of four.

“In Lancashire, in the year 1836, the sentences of _four_ convicts

for _murder_ were commuted, the number of commitments in the same

year being seven. In the year following the number of commitments

was one, making a _decrease_ of six.

“In the county of Norfolk, in the year 1836, the sentences of

_five_ convicts for _murder_ were commuted, the number of

commitments for the same year being eight. In the following year

the number of commitments for murder were but five, giving a

_decrease_ of three.

“In the counties of Norfolk, Nottingham, and Stafford, in the year

1837, there was one commutation of the sentence of murder for each

respectively. The result was a fall in the committals of the

following year from five to two in the first county,--giving a

decrease of three; in the second county a fall from one to _none_;

in the third county _neither_ an increase nor diminution,--the

number of committals having been three in each year.

“In the counties of Lincoln, Stafford, and Denbigh, in the year

1838, there was respectively _one_ commutation of the sentence for

_murder_. The result was that in the following year the commitments

fell from two to one in the first county, from three to one in the

second, and from one to _none_ in the third, thus giving

respectively a decrease of one-half, two-thirds, and of the whole.

The last is more correctly called an extinction than a decrease.

“In Cheshire, Middlesex, Somersetshire, and Surrey, in the year

1838, there were, respectively, _two_ commutations of the sentence

for murder. The result was that in the first county the

commitments, as between that year and the year following, fell from

two to one; in the second county they fell from seven to three; in

the third, from three to one; and in the fourth, from three to two;

thus giving a diminution, respectively, of one-half, four-sevenths,

two-thirds, and one-third.

“In Kent, in the year 1838, the sentences of _nine_ convicts for

murder were commuted, the commitments for that crime in the same

year being seventeen. In the following year the commitments for

murder were only two, showing a decrease of fifteen. In this last

case, however, we cannot in fairness press the argument in favour

of the _salutary_ effect of discontinuing capital punishments to

the extent that the arithmetical table would show. That year, if

we recollect right, was the year of the extraordinary outbreak

headed by the madman Courtenay or Thom. That event swelled the

commitments for murder to an unprecedented height. The fall in the

commitments from seventeen, in that year, to two in the year

following, is not a fall under _equal_ circumstances, and it would

be illogical to make it an argument for more than this: that

society received _no detriment_ because the deluded followers of

the frantic Courtenay _were sent to a penal settlement, instead of

being strangled on the scaffold_.

“Looking to the table of EXECUTIONS, we find that in the _three_

years ending the 31st of December, 1836, the number _executed_ was

85, while during the _three_ years ending the 31st of December,

1839, the number was only twenty-five. The _commitments_ in the

former period were 3,104, in the latter 2,989, showing a

_decrease_, though a small one, in the number of _commitments_,

while there is exhibited an _increase_ in the number of

_convictions_; namely, from 1,536 to 1,788, showing the

_centesimal_ proportion of convictions to commitments in the two

periods, to be represented by the figures 49·48 and 59·48

respectively.

“These returns, as far as they go, are highly satisfactory as the

testimony of experience to the _safe_ policy of ABOLISHING CAPITAL

PUNISHMENTS ALTOGETHER, and thus getting rid of the barbarous and

brutalizing exhibitions of cold-blooded cruelty and deliberate

slaughter which they present to the people.”

_Morning Herald_, 1840.

From this statement of facts, and indeed from all that has taken place

regarding crimes where capital punishment has been remitted, there can

be little doubt that it is inexpedient; there can be none that it is

unnecessary. But if any still persist that the Divine sanction is given

by “He who sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed,” then

the tyrant who engages in a war of aggression, the general who sanctions

one effective shot being fired, should alike bear the penalty with the

midnight assassin. Nay, does not the man who accidentally “sheds the

blood” of him who is “made in the likeness of God,” literally come

within the pale of the command, if _command_ it be?

The Chinese but seek to carry out this principle: they merely say, and

with juster pretension to consistency, “we cannot remit it; there must

be blood for blood.”

Yet we would dispute their right to have _always_ blood for blood; why

then may we not question the right _ever_ to have blood shed, under

Bible sanction at least? God makes no mention of motives or comparative

reasonings as to guilt; in this His supposed command there is no

discretionary option to soften its asserted force. By whatever means or

under whatever circumstances one man kills another, _blood is shed_; and

if blood for blood should hold good, then under this reasoning the

slayer must die. If it be argued, that _wilful_ shedding of blood is

meant, I point to the words of the text; they refer to “life for life,”

they give no exceptions: “Who then, oh man! made thee a judge to tell

the signs of the times?”

Once grant an exception to execution, once admit the doctrine of

reprieve, and the authority, as a command, in the Bible ceases

altogether.

Those who argue in favour of executions say, “But as an earthly

punishment, we _may_ hang;” _may_, indeed! There are fifty things we

_may_ do that are better avoided. Why need we hang, when other

punishments will suffice, and have been proved to have succeeded in

other cases? A very few years back, and the advances we have recently

made in the civilization of our laws would have been scouted as equally

Utopian, as is now considered the attempt to abolish the punishment of

death altogether. Let us reflect too that in a case of murder, the

prisoner (from a feeling which imperceptibly affects the minds of all)

is looked on with a degree of suspicious anxiety to convict that almost

watches to make out a case against him sufficient to condemn. The very

fact of his being put on his trial for murder prejudges him in our eyes;

and a slight variation in reporting a conversation has marvellously

increased many a poor man’s danger of the gallows.

There is no recalling the erroneously condemned from the grave; a wrong

judgment cannot there be reversed! Let us bear in mind, also, that the

wisest judges may sometimes decide wrongfully. They were considered by

myself and others to have erred in respect to the privileges of the

House of Commons; why might they not commit a similar error in the case

of a prisoner?

But enough; let errors in judgment speak for themselves. They contain

matter for deep reflection and self-examination for us all.

If the average number of executions be reduced, even by one, I shall

have the satisfaction of feeling at least that I have been an humble

labourer in the great cause of mercy, which could not have a more

zealous advocate, though it may have many more powerful and successful

supporters.

Happy are we if, in all we do during the course of our career, we have

not to answer for one death; for the bitter word, the cruel neglect, the

light injurious observation, may be the cause of death, as well as the

bludgeon or the steel.

I would here desire to make a few observations as to the medium through

which I have introduced to the public my opinions in favour of the

abolition of Capital Punishment, and the advantages to the cause

obtained from its appearing in the form of a translation, the

reflections being those of a foreigner who looked not to England when he

penned his work. In all this there is a beneficial distraction of ideas

created, for we look, as it were, at a foreign scene when we read the

interesting paper of the narrative,--the sentiments conveyed, the idioms

transcribed, are foreign, and the reader appropriates alone the portion

he feels is applicable to the circumstances of his own country; in fact,

he examines the context, not as he would an original treatise, but as

one who would apply the problems found advantageous in one region to

another. He cavils not at words or similes; his criticism is reserved

for the object at which the translator aims,--no matter even if the

phraseology be too flowery, the expressions too strong. There may be

strange similes, strained amplifications; he studies but a translation,

and cares comparatively little for them. True, he may have some

curiosity awakened as to what the original author was in feeling and

ideas; but these thoughts are light and evanescent compared with the

anxiety, or more properly the curiosity, he has to ascertain what could

be the translator’s ideas in thus “wasting the midnight oil” by

reducing into the phraseology of his vernacular (English) tongue, the

varied thoughts, the acute observations, the (to English ears) novel

ideas of that clever, eccentric, single-minded writer, Victor Hugo.

“What was the aim of the copyist?” methinks I hear repeated by many; and

as my object is one of serious importance to the realities of life, and

to arrest the attention of the reader beyond the mere passing hour, I

reply: The object for which I plead is the priceless value of human

life. Well and truly may the reading public,--and happy for this my dear

native land is it that its public is a reading one,--well may this

public exclaim, “Who is he, or what his view, who has thus dared to

scatter these additional leaves on the pathway of a nation’s thoughts?

Why has he done so, what motives urged him, what end did he seek?”

Such are the surmises that may flit across the reader’s brain, and the

translator humbly hopes that the lightning scowl, or the thunder of

maledictive criticism, will be directed alone against the oaken plank of

a hundred years’ growth, and that this his nautilus bark will feel no

breeze beyond the _aura populi_. Probably to the English public many of

the observations in this translation will be original. Haply to the gay

and frivolous the thoughts may appear exaggerated; but, alas! with too

many they will come home to the heart. Numbers there are, who, steeped

in misery before they were steeped in crime, had as little inclination

to sin as their more fortunate fellow-men, but whose first

transgressions were the offsprings of their misery, the necessitous

urgings of their poverty. Yes, gentle reader,--for among the fair and

young I hope to have many readers; readers whose hearts yet know how to

feel,--ye would I address, and exclaim, for the startling fact is but

too true, that though,--

“we who in lavish lap have rolled

And every year with new delight have told;

We who recumbent on the lacquered barge

Have dropped down life’s gay stream of pleasant marge;

We may extol life’s calm untroubled sea,”

well may the miserable, the guilty answer,--

“The storms of misery never burst on thee.”

“YOU NEVER FELT POVERTY. You never were comparatively tempted to crime.”

“A noble,” say they, and truly, “a noble is tried, is judged by his

peers, as being those who alone are considered to know, to be able to

appreciate his case. Let poverty have her peers also.” “My poverty and

not my will consented” is a phrase to which too little consideration is

given when we discuss the question of crime and punishment; for though

poverty cannot be pleaded by the criminal in justification of his

offence (nor should such justification be permitted in the legal view),

Society, whose interests are represented by the tribunal which adjudges,

should be careful that any circumstances or defects in its conformation

which may have had a tendency even to induce the criminality of the

culprit, should go in mitigation of his punishment. It would be a

startling observation in the present day, and one for which Society is

not yet prepared, to hear the assertion made that _punishment_ for

crime is more often unjust than just; but after much reflection on the

origin of crime, humanly speaking, I am constrained to come to this

conclusion: that the criminality of individuals is more frequently

traceable to the evils incidental to an imperfect social system than to

the greater propensity towards crime, as affecting others, that exists

in the heart of one person if compared with another. Had the judge or

the prosecutor entered life under the same circumstances as the

prisoner, been early initiated into the same habits, been taught to view

society through the same distorted glass, and had their feelings blunted

by the same cold blasts of adversity, who shall say what their

respective positions might have been?

In the phrase “My poverty but not my will consented,” let me not be

understood to speak of poverty merely in the light of want of money;

that is a very narrow view, and very confined as to what forms the real

pains of poverty. Poverty is the want of means, intellectual and moral

as well as pecuniary, to feed the being who is placed on the area of the

world; with mind active as well as body, sustenance is necessary to its

existence. If the poor man cannot obtain bread, he takes to gin to

assuage cravings of the stomach. No less, if the mind cannot obtain

light to guide it in the onward path, the visual organs become

habituated to the dark and murky gloom of almost darkness; and through

these confused gleamings, no wonder if the being fall into the pits and

whirlpools which beset with danger the pathway of man, even when blessed

with the clear light of day; how much more, therefore, when he has not

light to discern good from evil, nor an intellectual poor-law to supply

him with food, when a beggar by the way-side of knowledge! How strange

it is that we can incarcerate the _bodies_ of the poor because they are

poor, objecting to let them be dependent on casual charity for bodily

sustenance, and yet cannot be equally strict in legislating for the

mind.

Surely if, as members of one common society, we contend it is necessary

for the well-being of the community at large that each person should be

provided with work to enable him to procure food, and that if persons be

unable to obtain work, or purchase food, then that the State shall

provide for them,--should we not equally be provident for the mental as

well as we are for the corporeal wants of those who hold a less

fortunate position in the scale of society; more particularly when we

reflect on the effect mind has on matter, and that did we sufficiently

provide for the former, each individual would probably find little

difficulty in procuring a supply for his bodily wants.

The poverty of the mind, if relieved, will probably be a permanent good;

whereas bodily relief is at best but temporary. How vast, too, is the

effect of knowledge, on the creation of food. Knowledge teaches

industry; knowledge and industry multiply an hundred fold the product of

labour. Comfort and security are thus increased; idleness, and

consequently crime, is diminished,--for a man of information is seldom

idle, and one surrounded with comforts is rarely inclined to commit

crimes against society.

Would not, therefore, the effects resulting from education be the best

preventative of crime?--and, if so, heavy indeed is the responsibility

of every man who puts an impediment in the way of a nation’s

enlightenment. Circumstanced as Great Britain now is, internally

speaking, with her countless millions congregated or _hived_ in large

towns, ready to follow any leader of more daring or greater knowledge

than themselves, comparatively indifferent as to the means for

compassing any much desired end,--though actuated by no wish to work ill

to others, even when excited beyond the unmanageableness of irrational

physical force,--there is much to be feared from the effects of any

combustion which might suddenly inflame a people thus charged to the

full with every ingredient requisite for scenes of violence, whilst at

the same time, through a strong line of prescribed demarcation,

separated from the privileged classes; and it cannot but be mainly by

the controlling power of knowledge that we can expect to see the masses

endeavouring to be satisfied with their lot in life. Thus it is, as I

have before asserted, that the poverty of opportunity for information,

and consequently acquirement of knowledge, originates much of the

present state of crime. Oh, that I could distinctly see my way through

the halo which as yet obscures that glorious day, when ignorance shall

be deplored as much as shame! With what satisfaction would the statesman

then die and bequeath his country to the care of, not the fate of

accident, as now, but the masses of its own population. Methinks the

gleam which harbingers this bright morning, already, though faintly,

begins to tinge the horizon, under the happy auspices of our beloved

Queen; and to the credit of the liberal advisers of Her Majesty, a more

liberal arrangement of schools has been established,--though it

probably remains for ages yet unborn to develope fully the blessings of

such a system. Well worthy, aye, brighter than a diadem of a thousand

stars, is the advancement of a nation’s happiness. May such thoughts

have our beloved Queen’s deep and considerate attention; and as her

noble mind traces, on an ideal map, the future destinies of her people,

and turns to times when another generation, with its train of guilt or

happiness, shall arise, may she anticipate in time the benefits which

will flow from a system of general education!

But if these things be now lightly accounted, the time may arrive when

population shall be yet more dense, and the strong arm of numbers become

yet more strong; for if no countervailing power intervene, force and

numbers must prevail at last, and there must come a time when it will

alone depend upon the respective powers of intellect or animal force

being dominant, whether confidence in our stability shall be shaken,

capital cease to be here expended, and commerce leave our

shores,--whether, in fact, brute force or reason become the recognized

sovereign of the people; whether the influence of intellect has been

fostered, and nobler thoughts and more refined pleasures become the

pastime of this great nation. Then, but not till then, will crime hide

her head, and the race no longer be to the swift or the battle to the

strong: a calm and steady breeze will temper the course of the swift to

wrath, or the powerfully scientific lever of knowledge uproot violence

out of the councils of the nation; for they will then appreciate law,

knowing it is peculiarly the palladium of the defenceless, and

confident in the strength of their cause, they will cast off the

trammels of tradition, form unions of information, not restriction; and

when the various classes of society shall have learned to know that each

has his proper duties, each his proper limits, each is equally necessary

to each, whose strength is a combination of the whole,--like the arch,

sure to drop to pieces if the key-stone were removed.

Oh, how the heart bleeds to reflect on the pains which are taken to

render efficient the laws for punishing crime, and the little care to

fortify the minds of the people to resist the first impress of crime.

Train up the child in the way he should go, and he will not depart

therefrom. If, therefore, we train it not up, it never has wherefrom to

depart, but is cast forth, like a helmless, pilotless bark, on the

waters of life; strange if it founder not, or at least if it become not

damaged by striking on some of the shoals by which it is beset on every

side. We talk of “penal laws” or a “penal settlement” as though the aim

and intention of laws were to be _penal_, instead of being as they most

decidedly are, or ought to be, _sanitary_. Wherefore do we, as we term

it, _punish_, but to cure an evil which hurts and pains society? Just so

we cauterize a wound, in order to heal the body, not for the sake of

giving pain to the affected limb.

The very fact of the common acceptation of the word _penal_, as applied

to our criminal system, is of itself a strong proof of the

misunderstanding on which that system is founded, and on which we

legislate. If we arrogate to ourselves a right to judge men for their

criminality, instead of urging our only legitimate excuse for

punishing, namely, “the giving over the offending member to that course

of discipline we deem most likely to restrain a similar disposition to

delinquency in another member of the frame-work of society,” let us at

least carry out this principle to the full extent; and then the man who

cheats his neighbour of money by availing himself of his ignorance, and

leads him to make an improvident bargain, will be deemed as guilty in

the eye of the law as he who, throwing him off his guard,

surreptitiously conveys his hand into the other’s pocket.

But it is really absurd to talk of laws being framed to punish sin. It

is to restrain others, as well as the culprit himself, from similar

offences that pains and penalties are inflicted. If they fail of this

end they become themselves improper; if the same end can be attained by

a mild as by a severe sentence, the milder course should be adopted.

Perhaps there may be some who are only timid regarding the total

abolition of capital punishment because they are fearful of a license

being given which would render human life of less value in the sight of

man. Can then the destruction of a second life increase the reverence

for its sacredness? Surely, not! If we were, in imagination, to place

ourselves in the chamber of the condemned, or by the fire-side of the

mere spectator of an execution, we shall find the heart of the first

generally in a morbid state, whilst the spectator commiserates the fate

of the condemned more than he learns to reprobate the crime for which

the guilty one suffered.

Punishment, when strained beyond what is necessary becomes revenge;

punishment, also, should never exceed, but rather be milder than, public

opinion. In the awful decision of death, more especially, we should be

careful not to inflict a penalty which we cannot repay back to the

sufferer if the condemnation should afterwards prove to have been

erroneous. There can be no recall from the grave: in the beautiful words

of our author, “THE DOOR OF THE TOMB OPENS NOT INWARDS!”

* * * * *

There are several points in “The Last Days of a Condemned” to which I

would particularly invite the attention of the reader. In the first

place, the story being left unfinished, and there being a doubt as to

whether the condemned was executed or pardoned, takes from the feeling

of horror without affecting our interest in his fate. It is as a veil

cast over the last moments,--a film, an indistinctness that blends into

harmony the last distorted features of the vision we are contemplating.

Next, I would mention the papers relating to chaplains. How touchingly

does the author paint the pure and pastorly being who has dwelt in the

homely cure, and amid the peaceful scenes of nature studied nature’s

God! At page 277, the poor captive, crushed in worldly feeling, yearns

for those “good and consoling words” that shall “heal the bruised reed,

and quench the smoking flax.” How beautiful to see the soul seeking for

that hope which dieth not; and whether we look at pages 279 and 280, or

289, we cannot but feel a happy and holy wish that Heavenly Peace may

rest on the poor condemned.

Pass we now to a beautiful scene of nature, page 290,--the final

interview between the prisoner and his infant daughter, which few could

read unmoved by its pathos. How happy for the parent who can enfold his

child in his arms,--a happiness of which parents seldom know the value

until the grave has closed over them, or they have left the homestead

and parental hearth for the pathway of independent manhood. Agonizing

must it be to a parent when absence has transferred much of the warmth

of filial affection to strangers, to behold the child you have pictured,

possibly for years, as anxious to welcome home from distant noxious

climes the parent from whom it parted in the happy days of innocence,

perhaps ere yet the mind was conscious of the father’s parting blessing.

How the pulse throbs and the heart beats when the vessel touches land,

and the waving handkerchief is indistinctly discerned amidst hundreds of

spectators; and if when disengaged from the crowd, and with the beloved

object seated beside you as the carriage speeds you to your home, how

scrutinizingly does the heart search each gaze, fearfully anxious lest

it should be able to fathom the depth of a love it would hold

fathomless! But oh! how bitter beyond expression must be a meeting such

as is described by the author of “The Condemned:” not only want of

recognition from the innocent little prattler, not only indifference

towards him,--but _terror_! How infinitely more must this have

reconciled him, and made him court death than all that myriads of

arguments could have effected!

A widely contrasted scene is painted from page 245 to 251, wherein is

described the departure of the convicts for the Galleys. What an

interesting and painful study for the philanthropist or the moralist! In

a few words we read the history of years, the downward path, the

emulation in vice. The pride of the hardened sinner to show his

superiority in crime, and the effort of the newer delinquent to hide his

inexperience under a more hardened exterior, prove forcibly how equally

emulative is man, whether the object be a sceptre or a public execution,

that his fellows may admire him when he is gone, that his compeers shall

not surpass him while he remains!

The deterioration of mind on all connected with a crowded gaol,--that

university for crime--is shown, in a paper a few pages further on (page

255), where even the song of a young girl, the outpouring of an

unburthened heart, is tainted by the details of crime. The words are

left in their original tongue; retained for the sake of showing the

ability of the author, but not translated, as being little suited to

give pleasure or effect any good. Alas! that the gaol should have power

thus to efface even the charms of melody, and render discordant music’s

silvery tones. But even that sweetest of sounds, a female voice, becomes

tainted by prison association: the rust of a gaol corrodes the heart,

and eats into every thing; time cannot efface its mark, nor the

brightest sun call forth one gleam from where its dimness has once

affixed itself.

As it mars lovely woman’s charms, so it renders disgustful the

venerableness of age. From the song of the young girl we trace its

earlier mildew; from the powerful paper narrating the history of the old

convict (which is by far the most stirring and full of adventure of the

whole, see pages 268 to 272) we learn its baleful effects on old age.

May a beneficent, rationally-grounded clemency be, in future, the means

of redeeming “all such as have erred;” and may a widely-spread system of

enlightened education happily train the children of adverse

circumstances “in the way they should go.”

Hans of Iceland, Vol. 2 of 2; The Last Day of a Condemned · 第 66 / 153 题