Two men considered themselves most likely to attract to themselves the

passionate adoration with which the soldiers of Cæsar had regarded

their general; they were his trusted lieutenants, Marcus Lepidus and

Marcus Antonius, the former a Proconsul in command of an army, the

latter Cæsar’s colleague in the Consulship at the time of his death,

and his intimate friend; Cæsar’s widow placed all her husband’s papers

in his hands. Antonius had the advantage of being constitutional head

of the Government, and as soon as it was clear that the popular feeling

at Rome was strongly adverse to the Liberators, he procured a decree

from the frightened Senate sanctioning all Cæsar’s arrangements. Any

other course would in fact have produced intolerable confusion. The

most important consequence of this measure was that the Liberators

were put into positions of great power and influence by the voice of

the man they had killed, and were protected from the consequences of

their own imprudence. Cicero threw aside his literary work and rushed

to Rome, to assist in the restoration of the Republic, and to revive

the party of Pompeius. Antonius, however, had no intention of letting

the reins of Government slip from his grasp; being possessed of the

dead Cæsar’s papers, he was able to produce at his pleasure decrees

which the constitutional party had already sanctioned by anticipation,

and the partisans of the dead man were bound to support. Moderation

was no part of the character of Antonius; he prepared himself to enjoy

thoroughly the wealth which was poured into his hands; with Cæsar’s

soldiers at his back, he felt that he could do what he pleased. An

unexpected event shook his self-confidence, and revived the prospects

of the constitutional party by dividing the Cæsarians.

The young Octavian crossed from Apollonia and landed at Brundisium.

Cæsar had left no direct descendants except an illegitimate son by

Cleopatra, but he had distinguished his great-nephew Octavius by

such indications of his confidence and affection as a Roman would

bestow upon his destined heir. The year before his death he had taken

the young man with him to Spain, on the expedition against the sons

of Pompeius, which ended in their defeat at Munda; he had attached

him closely to his person, shared his tent with him, conducted

all his business in his presence, had in fact begun his political

apprenticeship. Apparently Cæsar came to the conclusion that his

nephew’s education was inadequate, and on the return from Spain he sent

him to Apollonia on the Illyrian coast, a Greek town of considerable

commercial importance, which was the seat of a University largely

frequented by Roman students. So far Cæsar had not taken the final step

of adopting Octavius, but he did so by his will.

Octavius was at this time little over eighteen years of age; his mother

and stepfather were alive, both of them devoted to his interests, but

nobody seems as yet to have thought of him as a possible factor in the

politics of the future.

By removing him to Apollonia his uncle had to some extent withdrawn him

from political life, and the Liberators had forgotten his existence. He

was of weakly health, and had shown no particular aptitude for military

pursuits. Antonius thought him of such small importance, that he

disregarded those portions of Cæsar’s will which referred to him, and

actually seized the private treasure which had been bequeathed to him.

Friends and relatives were alike urgent that Octavian should either

remain where he was, or delay his journey to Italy till he was assured

of the support of an Army. The young man wisely relied on his own

judgment; he was Cæsar’s heir and adopted son, but Cæsar could only

bequeath to him his private inheritance; it was not in his power to

transfer the reins of Government; the nature of the conspiracy against

Cæsar and its extent was still unknown; Antonius and other leading

Cæsarians had been spared, it was clear that no proscription of the

adherents of Cæsar had been contemplated, or, if contemplated, it had

been abandoned. If Octavian were marked out for slaughter, he was

already doomed; nothing could save him but the affection of Cæsar’s

veterans; they were all in Italy, and there was as yet no evidence

that they were prepared to transfer their allegiance to so distant

a relative of their late commander. To appear with an army would be

to invite attack, and Octavian knew his own limitations better than

anybody else; he knew that he was no general, and he had not as yet

a general in whom he could trust. By appearing in Italy simply as a

private person engaged in an ordinary matter of private business, the

formal succession to an inheritance, he disarmed prejudice. If Antonius

wished to put him out of the way, he could do so in any case. On the

other hand, by appearing simply as a defrauded heir, he might attract

popular sympathy; Cæsar’s will had already proved to be a political

force; and the Constitutional party might be glad of a counterpoise to

Antonius.

Such considerations may well have influenced Octavian in the adoption

of the important step which he took contrary to advice. It is even

possible that he contemplated nothing more than the assertion of his

undeniable right; and that the consequences of his daring step took him

by surprise. It is certain that he had no sooner landed at Brundisium

than he found himself a power; the soldiers flocked to meet him, and

his march to Rome was a triumphal progress.

The events of the next three years are difficult to disentangle; to

the actors they must have been perplexing in the extreme. The factor

which had been omitted from the calculations of all the leaders was the

character of the army, which Cæsar had created. As fast as Cæsar made

way in Gaul he enlisted the Gauls in his service; his legions were in

the end less Italian than Gallic; to the Gauls the abstraction called

the Roman Senate had no more significance than the House of Commons to

Sikhs and Gurkhas; they had not got beyond, or not fallen behind, the

conceptions of personal fidelity to a chieftain which are developed

by the clan system. Not only was it natural to them to transfer their

fidelity from the person of a father to that of his son and successor,

but such personal ties were their strongest political passion. They

would obey Antonius and even Lepidus as Cæsar’s friends and trusted

subordinates, but their affection for Cæsar’s heir was of a different

character; to avenge their dead commander, to put his son in his

rights, were to them matters of the first importance; as for the Roman

Constitution and theoretical Republics, they neither cared about them

nor understood them. At first Octavian did not grasp the situation;

his temperament was legal and formal; his first preoccupation was to

assert his legal rights against Antonius, and in order to do this

effectively, he had no objection to using such help as might be given

him by Cicero and the Constitutional party, who for their part proposed

to use against him Antonius and then put him out of the way. The

first serious operation in the field showed Octavian his mistake; the

Senate sent him with the Consuls to relieve Decimus Brutus, brother of

Marcus Brutus, who was being besieged by the Cæsarians under Antonius

at Mutina; both Consuls, old Cæsarians, were killed, and the soldiers

insisted on bringing Octavian back to Rome and making him Consul; it

was not long before they also insisted on a reconciliation between

the Cæsarian leaders, compelling Antonius, Lepidus, and Octavian to

work together and unite in the task of punishing the enemies of Cæsar.

The proscription was partly the work of the army; so far as it was a

punishment of the enemies of Cæsar, Octavian was an accomplice, though

an unwilling accomplice; Antonius and Lepidus both took advantage of

it to satisfy old grudges and make large confiscations. Meanwhile the

general disorganization invited any man who found himself in command of

troops, or was otherwise favourably circumstanced, to fish in troubled

waters; Cicero’s son-in-law Dolabella, the dissolute little gentleman

who was “tied to a sword,” was not the only man who saw an opportunity

of doing something to his own advantage. Adventures of this kind

disturbed the world for a few months, but after Brutus and Cassius had

been beaten near Philippi a fairly definite division declared itself;

the world was again divided between Cæsarians and Pompeians, and the

chief Pompeian leader was Sextus Pompeius. Antonius had gone off to the

East to meet Cleopatra and his fate on the Cydnus. Lepidus, though in

command of an army and Governor of Africa, was a negligible quantity,

destined to suffer a very remarkable disillusionment as soon as he

ventured to assert himself in an independent position.

Few men have ever been so fortunate as Octavian in the mistakes of

their adversaries, and few have ever turned them to such good advantage.

East and West alike were taught to adore the memory of the great

Cæsar by the incompetence of the men who proposed to succeed to his

power; under his sway the commercial cities of Asia Minor had thriven;

Cassius plundered them in the name of the Senate, Dolabella on his

own responsibility, Antonius as the successor of Cæsar; Italy had no

sooner begun to look forward to relief from civil war on the departure

of Antonius than the Constitutional party allied itself with Lucius

Antonius and Fulvia, the brother and wife of Marcus Antonius, to impede

the settlement. Tiberius Nero was among those who joined the new

movement. Relieved of the presence of Antonius, who in spite of all

his faults was a general of ability, the Pompeians hoped to be able

to crush Octavian, who was no general; the proscription had left very

bitter feelings; Octavian had so far had no opportunity of indicating

his pacific inclinations; he had had to do what his soldiers required

of him; Antonius was obviously a self-indulgent adventurer, with

whose fortunes no self-respecting man could ally himself; Fulvia

was a virago, and Lucius Antonius no less greedy than his brother,

though less amiable; still it seemed that these latter with their

adherents embodied the Republican principle; and the remnants of the

Constitutional party joined them. Incompetent generalship allowed their

forces to be locked up in Perusia, and after a siege of three months

the soldiers of Octavian glutted their vengeance upon the enemies of

Cæsar; the terror that was inspired served its purpose in two ways:

there were no more conspiracies in Italy, and Octavian made up his mind

never again to be the slave of his own army.

Tiberius Nero either escaped from Perusia before the town was

completely invested, or had started on a special mission to Campania

with the object of creating a diversion in Southern Italy. He still

held the office of Prætor though his legal term had expired, and thus

invested his enterprise with a legal and constitutional aspect. The

territory of Capua had been confiscated by Rome after the second Punic

War, the penalty of the destructive friendship which that city had

conferred on Hannibal; the Senate of those days had appropriated the

land to its own purposes; the redivision of this land had been part

of the programme of the popular party from the days of the Gracchi,

and their heirs the Cæsarians now proposed to assign it to Octavian’s

veterans. Tiberius Nero took up the cause of the proprietors, who

were threatened with expropriation, thus adopting the old Senatorial

standpoint; he doubtless expected to find that the Campanians, to whom

the existing conditions, sanctioned as they were by the precedents of a

century and a half, caused no grievance, would flock to his standards;

but he met with languid support from the beginning, and the fall of

Perusia with the subsequent atrocities destroyed every prospect of

success; the Campanians preferred a peaceful spoliation to the chances

of war. Tiberius Nero was obliged to fly for his life; accompanied

by his wife, his eldest son barely two years of age, and only one

attendant, he made his way to Naples. Here a romantic incident took

place. C. Velleius Paterculus, the grandfather of the historian, had

been associated with Tiberius Nero in all his enterprises; he had been

his friend all his life; he had served under him as Chief Engineer at

Alexandria, and in his subsequent campaigns; it is not clear whether

he had been the sole companion of the flight from Campania, but in any

case he rejoined his friend at Naples; but Naples was no safe refuge;

Octavian was pressing southwards; it was necessary to cross to Sicily;

when it proved to be difficult to provide for the escape of the whole

party, the old man committed suicide rather than be an impediment to

his friend.

Tiberius Nero had suffered two disappointments: he had been

disappointed in Cæsar; he had been disappointed in the attempt to form

a constitutional party in opposition to Cæsar’s heir; a third and

severer disappointment awaited him in Sicily.

Of the two sons of Pompeius, the elder had been killed in Spain

at or after the battle of Munda; the younger, Sextus, had escaped,

and adopted the life of a corsair in the Mediterranean; during the

confusion which reigned in Italy after the death of Cæsar he had

escaped notice, and had been able to get together a formidable fleet of

pirates; he had seized Sicily, and now hoped to be able to secure the

restitution of his father’s property by imposing terms on Rome, for he

controlled the food supply of the capital. The proscription had sent

him many valuable allies, and the anti-Cæsarian party began to look to

him to take his father’s place as their leader. Sextus, however, was no

politician; he was a mere marauder; the corsairs whom his father had

dispersed reassembled from the bays and islands of the Mediterranean,

and joined in an organized system of brigandage; the subordinates

of Sextus were adventurers of the type which has been the perennial

curse of the inland sea, repeatedly stamped out, and ever ready to

reassert itself till the advent of steam power made such operations

too dangerous. It was not the policy of Sextus, but circumstances

beyond his control, which elevated him from being a leader of bandits

to the position of an umpire between parties in the threatened break

up of the Empire. Outlaws and broken men of all kinds gathered to his

headquarters, and the grave Senators of Rome found themselves strangely

out of place in this assemblage of cut-throats and their mistresses.

Tiberius Nero was among the last to arrive; he attempted to assume

the position of a Roman official, and to exact the respect due to

one before whom the prætorian fasces were carried. Sextus, however,

was by no means inclined to put himself under the orders of men of

respectability; still less so the Greek corsairs, who looked forward to

unlimited plunder under his flag.

When Octavian arrived in due course he temporized; his advisers saw

that for the time being nothing could be done; the Cæsarians had no

fleet; on the other hand, Sextus was glad to disembarrass himself

of the Roman notables; and the result was that the victims of the

proscription were pardoned and received into the Cæsarian ranks. This

was the first occasion on which Octavian was able to manifest his

moderation, and to begin his career of conquest by diplomacy. Sextus

was recognized, admitted to a share in the dismembered Empire; there

was no alternative; Rome was relieved from the danger of starvation,

and Octavian was left free to deal with the veterans and the

consolidation of Italy.

Tiberius Nero was not among those who accepted the amnesty; he again

fled, this time to Corinth, which was associated with his family by

ancient ties of patronage. He became a wanderer, a hunted man; romantic

adventures are assigned to the months of danger and hardship which

followed; he even sought the protection of Antonius; at length he

too made terms with Octavian and returned to Rome, where a further

disappointment awaited him; his young wife attracted the notice of

Octavian; she accepted his attentions, and shortly afterwards an

amicable divorce and re-marriage were arranged. Six months later Livia

bore a second son, who was sent to her first husband by Octavian,

and acknowledged by him as his own. The families lived on terms of

intimacy, and when Tiberius Nero died five years later, both his sons

passed under the care of their mother and Octavian, whose family now

consisted of his own daughter Julia by a previous wife, Scribonia, and

his two stepsons. Julia was a little over a year younger than Tiberius

the future Emperor.

So far there had been nothing discreditable in the life of Tiberius

Nero, and it was never attacked even by the bitterest enemies of his

son. He followed the fortunes of Cæsar, so did many men who saw in

Cæsar the only hope of a reformed constitution; he was frightened by

Cæsar’s root and branch reforms, so were many moderate men; he saw in

Cæsar the tyrant, and applauded the men who cut him down, so did Cicero

and many honourable men; in the confusion that ensued he steadily clung

to any power that seemed to make for the restoration of the Republic;

in this he may have been mistaken, but was not dishonourable; he

eventually made terms with the one party which promised a restoration

of order--no other policy was open to a wise and prudent man; he

surrendered his wife to the conqueror; at this point we withdraw our

approval; we think of Cæsar, who refused to put away his wife at the

bidding of Sulla, and our inclination is to see in the action of

Tiberius Nero contemptible weakness.

Apart, however, from the fact that marriages of convenience and

divorces of convenience were of frequent occurrence among the members

of the princely houses of Rome at this period, the personal conditions

in this case may have been such as to render the divorce in question

as little disgraceful to the injured husband as such an event can be.

There is nothing contrary to probability in assuming that Tiberius Nero

at the time of his marriage to Livia was an elderly, if not an old man;

his intimate friend Velleius Paterculus was certainly an old man when

he killed himself at Naples. The father of Livia had been a political

and possibly personal friend of Tiberius Nero; he fought on the

losing side at the battle of Philippi, and was among those who killed

themselves after their cause seemed to be irreparably lost; immediately

afterwards Tiberius Nero married Livia, who, if she was eighty-six

at the time of her death in A.D. 29, can have been little more than

fourteen at the time of her first marriage. According to Paterculus

the historian, the Emperor Tiberius was less than two years old when

his parents fled to Naples after the fall of Perusia in B.C. 40; this

places the marriage somewhere in 43 B.C., or at the latest very early

in 42 B.C. We have no mention of brothers or other relatives of Livia

in her later life; it would seem that her father’s death left her alone

and friendless; it is a possible conjecture that Tiberius Nero married

the daughter of an old friend, partly in order to save her life and

fortune. The disparity of age must have been great in any case, and

Livia must have accepted the marriage as the only way out of a position

of great peril. It is in accordance with all that we know of Livia

that she should have conducted herself with the strictest propriety

as a Roman matron, though the youthful wife of an elderly or aged

husband; and it is more than probable that he became strongly attached

to her, even though her feeling towards him was dutiful rather than

affectionate. When she met Octavian, she met a man but little older

than herself, who fell passionately in love with her; of their mutual

attachment there can be no doubt; it lasted through the whole of their

life together, and on his deathbed Augustus bade her never to forget

their union. Under these circumstances what was the best thing that

Tiberius Nero could do to secure the happiness of the child whom he

had taken to his home, and who now wished to leave him? By the custom

of his time and race no disgrace attached to a divorce in itself; the

Romans had no conception of a holy estate of matrimony indissoluble

except under scandalous circumstances; it was better that Livia should

be transferred peaceably to the man of her choice than that her

good name should suffer. Tiberius Nero accepted the inevitable, not

necessarily because Octavian could have compelled, but because Livia

had given to her young lover the affections which she had never been

able to give to her elderly protector.

Tiberius Nero died in B.C. 33; his eldest son was then only nine

years old, but had already been sufficiently well trained to be able

to recite the customary oration as chief mourner at his father’s

funeral; both he and his brother are said to have been exceptionally

well educated. We may imagine the solitary father with his strong

love of learning, the victim of so many disappointments, finding some

alleviation to his sorrows in bringing up his boys in the strictest

traditions of an old Roman house.

III

Octavian

To the student of even the clearest narrative of the events which

followed the assassination of Cæsar, the impression conveyed is one of

absolute chaos; officials are appointed and removed, decrees passed

and rescinded, provinces assigned and redistributed, leaders combine

and separate only to combine again; it is difficult to distinguish

any guiding principle, any organized force, by which order might be

restored. War and spoliation seem to be universal and continuous, and

the direction of the march of events to be subject to the caprices

of a licentious soldiery, led by rapacious adventurers, who can keep

hold of their troops only by extravagant largess and promises of

plunder. Licensed brigandage rules the world. And yet this turmoil was

immediately succeeded, and in part accompanied by such prosperity as

the civilized world had not yet known; trade flourished in spite of

piracy, great public improvements were designed and completed, young

men went to universities, travellers passed from one end of the Empire

to the other.

The exact date of the journey which Horace took from Rome to Brundisium

in attendance upon Mæcenas is still a subject of dispute among

scholars, but it certainly cannot be placed later than the battle of

Actium, and is generally assigned to a time before Sextus Pompeius had

been driven from Sicily; neither Italy nor the world were at peace,

and Italy had recently been the scene of civil war. There is, however,

nothing in the description of this journey to suggest a ruined or

disordered country; before Horace caught up the suite of his patron he

travelled by the ordinary conveyances along the road or the canal to

the South; the misadventures of his journey are only such as happen to

travellers in a well ordered country in times of the profoundest peace.

The ordinary routine of life can have been but little disturbed by the

marchings and counter-marchings of armies; and the habits of order must

have been too firmly established to be much shaken by the apparent

anarchy at the capital.

Tiberius the Tyrant · 第 6 / 28 段