CHAPTER II

THE AXIOMS OF MODERN STATECRAFT

Are the foregoing axioms unchallengeable?--Some typical statements

of them--German dreams of conquest--Mr. Frederic Harrison on

results of defeat of British arms and invasion of England--Forty

millions starving.

Are the axioms set out in the last chapter unchallengeable?

Is it true that the wealth, prosperity and well-being of a nation depend

upon its military power, or have necessarily anything whatever to do

therewith?

Can one civilized nation gain moral or material advantage by the

military conquest of another?

Does conquered territory add to the wealth of the conquering nation?

Is it possible for a nation to "own" the territory of another in the way

that a person or corporation would "own" an estate?

Could Germany "take" English trade and Colonies by military force?

Could she turn English Colonies into German ones, and win an overseas

empire by the sword, as England won hers in the past?

Does a modern nation need to expand its political boundaries in order

to provide for increasing population?

If England could conquer Germany to-morrow, completely conquer her,

reduce her nationality to so much dust, would the ordinary British

subject be the better for it?

If Germany could conquer England, would any ordinary German subject be

the better for it?

The fact that all these questions have to be answered in the negative,

and that a negative answer seems to outrage common sense, shows how much

our political axioms are in need of revision.

The literature on the subject leaves no doubt whatever that I have

correctly stated the premises of the matter in the foregoing chapter.

Those whose special vocation is the philosophy of statecraft in the

international field, from Aristotle and Plato, passing by Machiavelli

and Clausewitz down to Mr. Roosevelt and the German Emperor, have left

us in no doubt whatever on the point. The whole view has been admirably

summarized by two notable writers--Admiral Mahan, on the Anglo-Saxon

side, and Baron Karl von Stengel (second German delegate to the First

Hague Conference) on the German. Admiral Mahan says:

The old predatory instinct that he should take who has the

power survives ... and moral force is not sufficient to

determine issues unless supported by physical. Governments are

corporations, and corporations have no souls; governments,

moreover, are trustees, and as such must put first the lawful

interests of their wards--their own people.... More and more

Germany needs the assured importation of raw materials, and,

where possible, control of regions productive of such

materials. More and more she requires assured markets and

security as to the importation of food, since less and less

comparatively is produced within her own borders by her rapidly

increasing population. This all means security at sea.... Yet

the supremacy of Great Britain in European seas means a

perpetually latent control of German commerce.... The world has

long been accustomed to the idea of a predominant naval power,

coupling it with the name of Great Britain, and it has been

noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly often

associated with commercial and industrial predominance, the

struggle for which is now in progress between Great Britain and

Germany. Such predominance forces a nation to seek markets,

and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by

preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is

possession.... From this flow two results: the attempt to

possess and the organization of force by which to maintain

possession already achieved.... This statement is simply a

specific formulation of the general necessity stated; it is an

inevitable link in the chain of logical sequences--industrial

markets, control, navy bases....[3]

But in order to show that this is no special view, and that this

philosophy does indeed represent the general public opinion of Europe,

the opinion of the great mass which prompts the actions of Governments

and explains their respective policies, I take the following from the

current newspapers and reviews ready to my hand:

It is the prowess of our navy ... our dominant position

at sea ... which has built up the British Empire and its

commerce.--London _Times_ leading article.

Because her commerce is infinitely vulnerable, and because her

people are dependent upon that commerce for food and the wages

with which to buy it.... Britain wants a powerful fleet, a

perfect organization behind the fleet, and an army of defence.

Until they are provided this country will exist under perpetual

menace from the growing fleet of German _Dreadnoughts_, which

have made the North Sea their parade-ground. All security will

disappear, and British commerce and industry, when no man knows

what the morrow will bring forth, must rapidly decline, thus

accentuating British national degeneracy and decadence.--H.W.

Wilson in the _National Review_, May, 1909.

Sea-power is the last fact which stands between Germany and the

supreme position in international commerce. At present Germany

sends only some fifty million pounds worth, or about a seventh,

of her total domestic produce to the markets of the world

outside Europe and the United States.... Does any man who

understands the subject think there is any power in Germany,

or, indeed, any power in the world, which can prevent Germany,

she having thus accomplished the first stage of her work, from

now closing with Great Britain for her ultimate share of this

240 millions of overseas trade? Here it is that we unmask the

shadow which looms like a real presence behind all the moves of

present-day diplomacy, and behind all the colossal armaments

that indicate the present preparations for a new struggle for

sea-power.--Mr. Benjamin Kidd in the _Fortnightly Review_,

April 1, 1910.

It is idle to talk of "limitation of armaments" unless the

nations of the earth will unanimously consent to lay aside all

selfish ambitions.... Nations, like individuals, concern

themselves chiefly with their own interests, and when these

clash with those of others, quarrels are apt to follow. If the

aggrieved party is the weaker he usually goes to the wall,

though "right" be never so much on his side; and the stronger,

whether he be the aggressor or not, usually has his own way. In

international politics charity begins at home, and quite

properly; the duty of a statesman is to think first of the

interests of his own country.--_United Service Magazine_, May,

1909.

Why should Germany attack Britain? Because Germany and Britain

are commercial and political rivals; because Germany covets

the trade, the colonies, and the Empire which Britain now

possesses.--Robert Blatchford, "Germany and England," p. 4.

Great Britain, with her present population, exists by virtue of

her foreign trade and her control of the carrying trade of the

world; defeat in war would mean the transference of both to

other hands and consequent starvation for a large percentage of

the wage-earners.--T.G. Martin in the London _World_.

We offer an enormously rich prize if we are not able to defend

out shores; we may be perfectly certain that the prize which we

offer will go into the mouth of somebody powerful enough to

overcome our resistance and to swallow a considerable portion

of us up.--The Speaker of the House of Commons in a speech at

Greystoke, reported by the London _Times_.

What is good for the beehive is good for the bee. Whatever

brings rich lands, new ports, or wealthy industrial areas to a

State enriches its treasury, and therefore the nation at large,

and therefore the individual.--Mr. Douglas Owen in a letter to

the _Economist_, May 28, 1910.

Do not forget that in war there is no such thing as

international law, and that undefended wealth will be seized

wherever it is exposed, whether through the broken pane of a

jeweller's window or owing to the obsession of a humanitarian

Celt.--London _Referee_, November 14, 1909.

We appear to have forgotten the fundamental truth--confirmed by

all history--that the warlike races inherit the earth, and that

Nature decrees the survival of the fittest in the never-ending

struggle for existence.... Our yearning for disarmament, our

respect for the tender plant of Non-conformist conscience, and

the parrot-like repetition of the misleading formula that the

"greatest of all British interests is peace" ... must

inevitably give to any people who covet our wealth and our

possessions ... the ambition to strike a swift and deadly blow

at the heart of the Empire--undefended London.--_Blackwood's

Magazine_, May, 1909.

These are taken from English sources, but there is not a straw to choose

between them and other European opinion on the subject.

Admiral Mahan and the other Anglo-Saxons of his school have their

counterpart in every European country, but more especially in Germany.

Even so "Liberal" a statesman as Baron Karl von Stengel, the German

delegate to the First Hague Peace Conference, lays it down in his book

that--

Every great Power must employ its efforts towards exercising

the largest influence possible, not only in European but in

world politics, and this mainly because economic power depends

in the last resort on political power, and because the largest

participation possible in the trade of the world is a vital

question for every nation.

The writings of such classic authorities as Clausewitz give full

confirmation of this view, while it is the resounding note of most

popular German political literature that deals with "Weltpolitik." Grand

Admiral von Koster, President of the Navy League, writes:

The steady increase of our population compels us to devote

special attention to the growth of our overseas interests.

Nothing but the strong fulfilment of our naval programme can

create for us that importance upon the free-world-sea which it

is incumbent upon us to demand. The steady increase of our

population compels us to set ourselves new goals and to grow

from a Continental into a world power. Our mighty industry must

aspire to new overseas conquests. Our world trade--which has

more than doubled in twenty years, which has increased from

2500 million dollars to 4000 million dollars during the ten

years in which our naval programme was fixed, and 3000 million

dollars of which is sea-borne commerce--only can flourish if we

continue honorably to bear the burdens of our armaments on

land and sea alike. Unless our children are to accuse us of

short-sightedness, it is now our duty to secure our world power

and position among other nations. We can do that only under the

protection of a strong German fleet, a fleet which shall

guarantee us peace with honor for the distant future.

One popular German writer sees the possibility of "overthrowing the

British Empire" and "wiping it from the map of the world in less than

twenty-four hours." (I quote his actual words, and I have heard a

parallel utterance from the mouth of a serious English public man.) The

author in question, in order to show how the thing could come about,

deals with the matter prophetically. Writing from the standpoint of

1911,[4] he admits that--

At the beginning of the twentieth century Great Britain was a

free, a rich, and a happy country, in which every citizen, from

the Prime Minister to the dock-laborer, was proud to be a

member of the world-ruling nation. At the head of the State

were men possessing a general mandate to carry out their

programme of government, whose actions were subject to the

criticism of public opinion, represented by an independent

Press. Educated for centuries in self-government, a race had

grown up which seemed born to rule. The highest triumphs

attended England's skill in the art of government, in her

handling of subject peoples.... And this immense Empire, which

stretched from the Cape to Cairo, over the southern half of

Asia, over half of North America and the fifth continent, could

be wiped from the map of the world in less than twenty-four

hours! This apparently inexplicable fact will be intelligible

if we keep in sight the circumstances which rendered possible

the building up of England's colonial power. The true basis of

her world supremacy was not her own strength, but the maritime

weakness of all the other European nations. Their almost

complete lack of naval preparations had given the English a

position of monopoly which was used by them for the annexation

of all those dominions which seemed of value. Had it been in

England's power to keep the rest of the world as it was in the

nineteenth century, the British Empire might have continued for

an unlimited time. The awakening of the Continental States to

their national possibilities and to political independence

introduced quite new factors into Weltpolitik, and it was only

a question of time as to how long England could maintain her

position in the face of the changed circumstances.

And the writer tells how the trick was done, thanks to a fog, efficient

espionage, the bursting of the English war balloon, and the success of

the German one in dropping shells at the correct tactical moment on to

the British ships in the North Sea:

This war, which was decided by a naval battle lasting a single

hour, was of only three weeks' duration--hunger forced England

into peace. In her conditions Germany showed a wise moderation.

In addition to a war indemnity in accordance with the wealth of

the two conquered States, she contented herself with the

acquisition of the African Colonies, with the exception of the

southern States, which had proclaimed their independence, and

these possessions were divided with the other two powers of the

Triple Alliance. Nevertheless, this war was the end of England.

A lost battle had sufficed to manifest to the world at large

the feet of clay on which the dreaded Colossus had stood. In a

night the British Empire had crumbled altogether; the pillars

which English diplomacy had erected after years of labour had

failed at the first test.

A glance at any average Pan-Germanist organ will reveal immediately how

very nearly the foregoing corresponds to a somewhat prevalent type of

political aspiration in Germany. One Pan-Germanist writer says:

"The future of Germany demands the absorption of

Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey, with the North

Sea ports. Her realms will stretch towards the east from Berlin

to Bagdad, and to Antwerp on the west."

For the moment we are assured there is no immediate intention of seizing

the countries in question, nor is Germany's hand actually ready yet to

catch Belgium and Holland within the net of the Federated Empire.

"But," he says, "all these changes will happen within our epoch," and he

fixes the time when the map of Europe will thus be rearranged as from

twenty to thirty years hence.

Germany, according to the writer, means to fight while she has a penny

left and a man to carry arms, for she is, he says, "face to face with a

crisis which is more serious than even that of Jena."

And, recognizing the position, she is only waiting for the moment she

judges the right one to break in pieces those of her neighbors who work

against her.

France will be her first victim, and she will not wait to be attacked.

She is, indeed, preparing for the moment when the allied Powers attempt

to dictate to her.

Germany, it would seem, has already decided to annex the Grand Duchy of

Luxemburg, and Belgium, incidentally with, of course, Antwerp, and will

add all the northern provinces of France to her possessions, so as to

secure Boulogne and Calais.

All this is to come like a thunderbolt, and Russia, Spain, and the rest

of the Powers friendly to England will not dare to move a finger to aid

her. The possession of the coasts of France and Belgium will dispose of

England's supremacy for ever.

In a book on South Africa entitled "Reisen Erlebnisse und

Beobachtungen," by Dr. F. Bachmar, occurs the passage:

"My second object in writing this book is that it may happen to

our children's children to possess that beautiful and unhappy

land of whose final absorption (_gewinnung_) by our Anglo-Saxon

cousins I have not the least belief. It may be our lot to unite

this land with the German Fatherland, to be equally a blessing

to Germany and South Africa."

The necessity for armament is put in other than fictional form by so

serious a writer as Dr. Gaevernitz, Pro-Rector of the University of

Freiburg. Dr. Schulze-Gaevernitz is not unknown in England, nor is he

imbued with inimical feelings towards her. But he takes the view that

the commercial prosperity of Germany depends upon her political

domination.[5]

After having described in an impressive way the astonishing growth of

Germany's trade and commerce, and shown how dangerous a competitor

Germany has become for England, he returns to the old question, and asks

what might happen if England, unable to keep down the inconvenient

upstart by economic means, should, at the eleventh hour, try to knock

him down. Quotations from the _National Review_, the _Observer_, the

_Outlook_, the _Saturday Review_, etc., facilitate the professor's

thesis that this presumption is more than a mere abstract speculation.

Granted that they voice only the sentiments of a small minority, they

are, according to our author, dangerous for Germany in this--that they

point to a feasible and consequently enticing solution. The old peaceful

Free Trade, he says, shows signs of senility. A new and rising

Imperialism is everywhere inclined to throw the weapons of political

warfare into the arena of economic rivalry.

How deeply the danger is felt even by those who sincerely desire peace

and can in no sense be considered Jingoes may be judged by the following

from the pen of Mr. Frederic Harrison. I make no apology for giving the

quotations at some length. In a letter to the London _Times_ he says:

Whenever our Empire and maritime ascendancy are challenged it

will be by such an invasion in force as was once designed by

Philip and Parma, and again by Napoleon. It is this certainty

which compels me to modify the anti-militarist policy which I

have consistently maintained for forty years past.... To me now

it is no question of loss of prestige--no question of the

shrinkage of the Empire; it is our existence as a foremost

European Power, and even as a thriving nation.... If ever our

naval defence were broken through, our Navy overwhelmed or even

dispersed for a season, and a military occupation of our

arsenals, docks, and capital were effected, the ruin would be

such as modern history cannot parallel. It would not be the

Empire, but Britain, that would be destroyed.... The occupation

by a foreign invader of our arsenals, docks, cities, and

capital would be to the Empire what the bursting of the boilers

would be to a _Dreadnought_. Capital would disappear with the

destruction of credit.... A catastrophe so appalling cannot be

left to chance, even if the probabilities against its occurring

were 50 to 1. But the odds are not 50 to 1. No high authority

ventures to assert that a successful invasion of our country is

absolutely impossible if it were assisted by extraordinary

conditions. And a successful invasion would mean to us the

total collapse of our Empire, our trade, and, with trade, the

means of feeding forty millions in these islands. If it is

asked, "Why does invasion threaten more terrible consequences

to us than it does to our neighbors?" the answer is that the

British Empire is an anomalous structure, without any real

parallel in modern history, except in the history of Portugal,

Venice, and Holland, and in ancient history Athens and

Carthage. Our Empire presents special conditions both for

attack and for destruction. And its destruction by an enemy

seated on the Thames would have consequences so awful to

contemplate that it cannot be left to be safeguarded by one

sole line of defence, however good, and for the present hour

however adequate.... For more than forty years I have raised my

voice against every form of aggression, of Imperial expansion,

and Continental militarism. Few men have more earnestly

protested against postponing social reforms and the well-being

of the people to Imperial conquests and Asiatic and African

adventures. I do not go back on a word that I have uttered

thereon. But how hollow is all talk about industrial

reorganization until we have secured our country against a

catastrophe that would involve untold destitution and misery on

the people in the mass--which would paralyze industry and raise

food to famine prices, whilst closing our factories and our

yards!

The Great Illusion A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage · 第 2 / 11 章