There is no link between barbaric society and the feudalism of the

Middle Ages; there is no trace of such a link. There is, on the

contrary, a very definite and clearly marked historical sequence

between Roman civilization and the feudal system, attested by

innumerable documents which, once read and compared in their order,

leave no sort of doubt that feudalism and the mediæval civilization

repose on purely Roman origins.

In a word, the gradual cessation of central Imperial rule in Western

Europe, the failure of the power and habit of one united organization

seated in Rome to color, define and administrate the lives of men, was

an internal revolution; it did not come from without. It was a change

from within; it was nothing remotely resembling an external, still less

a barbaric, conquest from without.

All that happened was that Roman civilization having grown very old,

failed to maintain that vigorous and universal method of local

government subordinated to the capital, which it had for four or five

hundred years supported. The machinery of taxation gradually weakened;

the whole of central bureaucratic action weakened; the greater men in

each locality began to acquire a sort of independence, and sundry

soldiers benefited by the slow (and enormous) change, occupied the

local “palaces” as they were called, of Roman administration, secured

such revenues as the remains of Roman taxation could give them, and,

conversely, had thrust upon them so much of the duty of government as

the decline of civilization could still maintain. That is what

happened, and that is all that happened.

As an historical phenomenon it is what I have called it—enormous. It

most vividly struck the imagination of men. The tremors and the

occasional local cataclysms which were the symptoms of this change of

base from the old high civilization to the Dark Ages, singularly

impressed the numerous and prolific writers of the time. Their terrors,

their astonishment, their speculations as to the result, have come down

to us highly emphasized. We feel after all those centuries the shock

which was produced on the literary world of the day by Alaric’s sack of

Rome, or by the march of the Roman auxiliary troops called “Visigoths”

through Gaul into Spain, or by the appearance of the mixed horde

called—after their leaders—“Vandals” in front of Hippo in Africa. But

what we do _not_ feel, what we do _not_ obtain from the contemporary

documents, what was a mere figment of the academic brain in the

generation now just passing away, is that anti-Catholic and

anti-civilized bias which would represent the ancient civilization as

conquered by men of another and of a better stock who have since

developed the supreme type of modern civilization, and whose contrast

with the Catholic world and Catholic tradition is at once applauded as

the principle of life in Europe and emphasized as the fundamental fact

in European history.

The reader will not be content with a mere affirmation, though the

affirmation is based upon all that is worth counting in modern

scholarship. He will ask what, then, did really happen? After all,

Alaric did sack Rome. The Kings of the Franks were Belgian chieftains,

probably speaking (at first) Flemish as well as Latin. Those of the

Burgundians were probably men who spoke that hotchpotch of original

barbaric, Celtic and Roman words later called “Teutonic dialects,” as

well as Latin. The military officers called (from the original

recruitment of their commands) “Goths,” both eastern and western, were

in the same case. Even that mixed mass of Slav, Berber, escaped slaves

and the rest which, from original leaders was called in North Africa

“Vandal,” probably had some considerable German nucleus.

The false history has got superficial ground to work upon. Many

families whose origins came from what is now German-speaking Central

Europe ruled in local government during the transition, and distinct

though small tribes, mainly German in speech, survived for a short time

in the Empire. Like all falsehood, the falsehood of the “Teutonic

theory” could not live without an element of truth to distort, and it

is the business of anyone who is writing true history, even in so short

an essay as this, to show what that ground was and how it has been

misrepresented.

In order to understand what happened we must first of all clearly

represent to ourselves the fact that the structure upon which our

united civilization had in its first five centuries reposed, was the

_Roman Army_. By which I do not mean that the number of soldiers was

very large compared with the civilian population, but that the organ

which was vital in the State, the thing that really counted, the

institution upon which men’s minds turned, and which they thought of as

the foundation of all, was the military institution.

The original city-state of the Mediterranean broke down a little before

the beginning of our era.

When (as always ultimately happens in a complex civilization of many

millions) self-government had broken down, and when it was necessary,

after the desperate faction fights which that breakdown had produced,

to establish a strong centre of authority, the obvious and, as it were,

necessary person to exercise that authority (in a State constituted as

was the Roman State) was the Commander-in-Chief of the army; all that

the word “Emperor”—the Latin word _Imperator_—means, is a

commander-in-chief.

It was the Army which made and unmade Emperors; it was the Army which

designed and ordered and even helped to construct the great roads of

the Empire. It was in connection with the needs of the Army that those

roads were traced. It was the Army which secured (very easily, for

peace was popular) the civil order of the vast organism. It was the

Army especially which guarded its frontiers against the uncivilized

world without; upon the edge of the Sahara and of the Arabian desert;

upon the edge of the Scotch mountains; upon the edge of the poor, wild

lands between the Rhine and Elbe. On those frontiers the garrisons made

a sort of wall within which wealth and right living could accumulate,

outside which small and impoverished bodies of men destitute of the

arts (notably of writing) save in so far as they rudely copied the

Romans or were permeated by adventurous Roman commerce, lived under

conditions which, in the Celtic hills, we can partially appreciate from

the analogy of ancient Gaul and from tenacious legends, but of which in

the German and Slavonic sand-plains, marshes and woods we know hardly

anything at all.

Now this main instrument, the Roman Army—the instrument, remember,

which not only preserved civil functions, but actually created the

master of all civic functions, the Government—went through three very

clear stages of change in the first four centuries of the Christian

era—up to the year A.D. 400 or so. And it is the transformation of the

Roman Army during the first four centuries which explains the otherwise

inexplicable change in society just afterwards, in the fifth and sixth

centuries—that is, from 400 to 600 A.D. The turn from the full

civilization of Rome to the beginning of the Dark Ages.

In its first stage, during the early Empire, just as the Catholic

Church was founded and was beginning to grow, the Roman Army was still

theoretically an army of true Roman citizens. [Footnote: A soldier was

still technically a citizen up to the very end. The conception of a

soldier as a citizen, the impossibility, for instance, of his being a

slave, was in the very bones of Roman thought. Even when the soldiers

were almost entirely recruited from barbarians, that is, from slave

stock, the soldiers themselves were free citizens always.]

As a matter of fact the Army was already principally professional, and

it was being recruited even in this first stage very largely from the

territories Rome had conquered.

Thus we have Cæsar raising a Gallic legion almost contemporaneous with

his conquest of Gaul. But for a long time after, well into the

Christian era, the Army was conceived of in men’s minds as a sort of

universal institution rooted in the citizenship which men were still

proud to claim throughout the Empire, and which belonged only to a

minority of its inhabitants; for the majority were slaves.

In the second phase (which corresponded with the beginning of a decline

in letters and in the arts, which carries us through the welter of

civil wars in the third century and which introduces the remodeled

Empire at their close) the Army was becoming purely professional and at

the same time drawn from whatever was least fortunate in Roman society.

The recruitment of it was treated much after the fashion of a tax; the

great landed proprietors (who, by a parallel development in the

decline, were becoming the chief economic feature in the Roman State)

were summoned to send a certain number of recruits from their estates.

Slaves would often be glad to go, for, hard as were the conditions of

military service, it gave them civic freedom, certain honors, a certain

pay, and a future for their children. The poorer freed men would also

go at the command of their lord (though only of course a certain

proportion—for the conscription was very light compared with modern

systems, and was made lighter by reënlistment, long service, absence of

reserves, and the use of veterans).

During this second stage, while the Army was becoming less and less

civic, and more and more a profession for the destitute and the

unfortunate, the unpopularity and the ignorance of military service

among the rest of the population, was increasing. The average citizen

grew more and more divorced from the Army and knew less and less of its

conditions. He came to regard it partly as a necessary police force or

defence of his frontiers, partly as a nuisance to him at home. He also

came to regard it as something with which he had nothing to do. It

lived a life separate from himself. It governed (through the power of

the Emperor, its chief); it depended on, and also supported or re-made,

the Imperial Court. But it was external, at the close of the Empire, to

general society.

Recruiting was meanwhile becoming difficult, and _the habit grew up of

offering the hungry tribes outside the pale of the Empire the advantage

of residence within it on condition that they should serve as Roman

soldiers_.

The conception of territories within the Empire which were affiliated

and allied to it rather than absorbed by it, was a very ancient one.

That conception had lost reality so far as the old territories it had

once affected were concerned; but it paved the way for the parallel

idea of troops affiliated and allied to the Roman Army, part of that

army in discipline and organization, yet possessed of considerable

freedom within their own divisions.

Here we have not only a constant and increasing use of barbaric troops

drafted into the regular corps, but also _whole bodies which were more

and more frequently accepted “en bloc” and, under their local leaders,

as auxiliaries to the Roman forces_.

Some such bodies appear to have been settled upon land on the

frontiers, to others were given similar grants at very great distances

from the frontiers. Thus we have a small body of German barbarians

settled at Rennes in Brittany. And, again, within the legions (who were

all technically of Roman citizenship and in theory recruited from the

full civilization of Rome), the barbarian who happened to find himself

within that civilization tended more than did his non-barbarian fellow

citizen (or fellow slave) to accept military service. He would nearly

always be poorer; he would, unless his experience of civilization was a

long one, feel the hardship of military service less; and in this

second phase, while the army was becoming more sedentary (more

attached, that is, to particular garrisons), more permanent, more of an

hereditary thing handed on from father to son, and distinguished by the

large element of what we call “married quarters,” it was also becoming

more and more an army of men who, whether as auxiliaries or as true

Roman soldiers, were in _blood, descent, and to some extent in manners

and less in language, barbarians_. There were negroes, there were

probably Celts, there were Slavs, Mongols of the Steppes, more numerous

Germans, and so forth.

In the third stage, which is the stage that saw the great convulsion of

the fifth century, the army though not yet wholly barbaric, had already

become in its most vital part, barbaric. It took its orders, of course,

wholly from the Roman State, but great groups within it were only

partly even Latin-speaking or Greek-speaking, and were certainly

regarded both by themselves and by their Roman masters as non-Roman in

manners and in blood.

It must most clearly be emphasized that not only no such thought as an

attack upon the Empire entered the heads of these soldiers, but that

the very idea of it would have been inconceivable to them. Had you

proposed it they would not even have known what you meant. That a

particular section of the army should fight against a particular

claimant to the Empire (and therefore and necessarily in favor of some

other claimant) they thought natural enough; but to talk of an attack

upon the Empire itself would have seemed to them like talking of an

attack upon bread and meat, air, water and fire. The Empire was the

whole method and meaning of their lives.

At intervals the high and wealthy civilization of the Roman Empire was,

of course, subjected to attempted pillage by small and hungry robber

bands without its boundaries, but that had nothing to do with the

barbaric recruitment of the Roman Army save when such bands were caught

and incorporated. The army was always ready at a moment’s order to cut

such foreign raiders to pieces—and always did so successfully.

The portion of the Army chosen to repel, cut up, and sell into slavery

a marauding band of Slavs or Germans or Celts, always had Celts or

Slavs or Germans present in large numbers among its own soldiery. But

no tie of blood interfered with the business. To consider such a thing

would have been inconceivable to the opponents on either side. The

distinction was not between speech and speech, still less between vague

racial customs. It was a distinction between the Imperial Service on

the one side, against the outer, unrecognized, savage on the other.

As the machinery of Government grew weak through old age, and as the

recruitment of the Army from barbarians and the large proportion of

auxiliary regular forces began to weaken that basis of the whole State,

the tendency of pillaging bands to break in past the frontiers into the

cultivated lands and the wealth of the cities, grew greater and

greater; but it never occurred to them to attack the Empire as such.

All they wanted was permission to enjoy the life which was led within

it, and to abandon the wretched conditions to which they were compelled

outside its boundaries.

Sometimes they were transformed from pillagers to soldiers by an offer

extended by the Roman authorities; more often they snatched a raid when

there was for the moment no good garrison in their neighborhood. Then a

Roman force would march against them, and if they were not quick at

getting away would cut them to pieces. But with the progress of the

central decline the attacks of these small bands on the frontiers

became more frequent. Frontier towns came to regard such attacks as a

permanent peril and to defend themselves against them. Little groups of

raiders would sometimes traverse great districts from end to end, and

whether in the form of pirates from the sea or of war bands on land,

the ceaseless attempts to enjoy or to loot (but principally to enjoy)

the conditions that civilization offered, grew more and more

persistent.

It must not be imagined, of course, that civilization had not

occasionally to suffer then, as it had had to suffer at intervals for a

thousand years past, the attacks of really large and organized barbaric

armies. [Footnote: For instance, a century and a half before the

breakdown of central Government, the Goths, a barbaric group, largely

German, had broken in and ravaged in a worse fashion than their

successors in the fifth century.] Thus in the year 404, driven by the

pressure of an Eastern invasion upon their own forests, a vast barbaric

host under one Radagasius pushed into Italy. The men bearing arms alone

were estimated (in a time well used to soldiery and to such estimates)

at 200,000.

But those 200,000 were wiped out. The barbarians were always wiped out

when they attempted to come as conquerors. Stilicho (a typical figure,

for he was himself of barbarian descent, yet in the regular Roman

service) cut to pieces one portion of them, the rest surrendered and

were sold off and scattered as slaves.

Immediately afterwards you have a violent quarrel between various

soldiers who desire to capture the Imperial power. The story is

fragmentary and somewhat confused: now one usurper is blamed, and now

another, but the fact common to all is that with the direct object of

usurping power a Roman General calls in barbarian bands of pillagers

(all sorts of small groups, Franks, Suevians, Vandals) to cross the

Rhine into Gaul, _not_ as barbarian “conquerors,” but as allies, to

help in a civil war.

The succeeding generation has left us ample evidence of the results. It

presents us with documents that do not give a picture of a ruined

province by any means; only of a province which has been traversed in

certain directions by the march of barbarian robber bands, who

afterwards disappeared, largely in fighting among themselves.

We have, later, the very much more serious business of the Mongol

Attila and his Huns, leading the great outer mass of Germans and Slavs

into the Empire on an enormous raid. In the middle of the fifth

century, fifty years after the destruction of Radagasius, these

Asiatics, leading more numerous other barbaric dependents of theirs

from the Germanies and the eastern Slavonic lands, penetrated for two

brief moments into Northern Italy and Eastern Gaul. The end of that

business—infinitely graver though it was than the raids that came

before it—is just what one might have expected. The regular and

auxiliary disciplined forces of the Empire destroy the barbarian power

near Chalons, and the last and worst of the invasions is wiped out as

thoroughly as had been all the others.

In general, the barbaric eruptions into the Empire failed wholly as

soon as Imperial troops could be brought up to oppose them.

What, then, were the supposed barbaric successes? What was the real

nature of the action of Alaric, for instance, and his sack of Rome; and

how, later, do we find local “kings” in the place of the Roman

Governors?

The real nature of the action of men like Alaric is utterly different

from the imaginary picture with which the _old_ picturesque popular

history recently provided us. That false history gives us the

impression of a barbarian Chieftain gathering his Clan to a victorious

assault on Rome. Consider the truth upon Alaric and contrast it with

this imaginary picture.

Alaric was a young noble of Gothic blood, but from birth a Roman; at

eighteen years of age he was put by the Court in command of a small

Roman auxiliary force _originally_ recruited from the Goths. He was as

much a Roman officer, as incapable of thinking of himself in any other

terms than those of the Roman Army, as any other one of his colleagues

about the throne. He had his commission from the Emperor Theodosius,

and when Theodosius marched into Gaul against the usurper Eugenius, he

counted Alaric’s division as among the most faithful of his Army.

It so happened, moreover, that those few original auxiliaries—mainly

Goths by race—were nearly all destroyed in the campaign. Alaric

survived. The remnant of his division was recruited, we know not how,

but probably from all kinds of sources, to its old strength. It was

still called “Gothic,” though now of the most mixed origin, and it was

still commanded by himself in his character of a Roman General.

Alaric, after this service to the Emperor, was rewarded by further

military dignities in the Roman military hierarchy. He was ambitious of

military titles and of important command, as are all soldiers.

Though still under twenty years of age and only a commander of

auxiliaries, he asks for the title of _Magister Militum_, with the

dignity which accompanied that highest of military posts. The Emperor

refuses it. One of the Ministers thereupon begins to plot with Alaric,

and suggests to him that he might gather other auxiliary troops under

his command, and make things uncomfortable for his superiors. Alaric

rebels, marches through the Balkan Peninsula into Thessaly and Greece,

and down into the Peloponesus; the regulars march against him

(according to some accounts) and beat him back into Albania.

There ends his first adventure. It is exactly like that of a hundred

other Roman generals in the past, and so are his further adventures. He

remains in Albania at the head of his forces, and makes peace with the

Government—still enjoying a regular commission from the Emperor.

He next tries a new adventure to serve his ambition in Italy, but his

army is broken to pieces at Pollentia by the armies in Italy—under a

general, by the way, as barbaric in mere descent as was Alaric, but,

like Alaric, wholly Roman in training and ideas.

The whole thing is a civil war between various branches of the Roman

service, and is motived, like all the Roman civil wars for hundreds of

years before, by the ambitions of generals.

Alaric does not lose his commission even after his second adventure; he

begins to intrigue between the Western and Eastern heads of the Roman

Empire. The great invasion under Radagasius interrupts this civil war.

That invasion was for Alaric, of course, as for any other Roman

officer, an invasion of barbaric enemies. That these enemies should be

called by this or that barbaric name is quite indifferent to him. They

come from outside the Empire and are therefore, in his eyes, cattle. He

helps to destroy them, and destroyed they are—promptly and thoroughly.

When the brief invasion was over, Alaric had the opportunity to renew

the civil wars within the Empire, and asked for certain arrears of pay

that were due to him. Stilicho, the great rival general (himself, by

the way, a Vandal in descent), admitted Alaric’s right to arrears of

pay, but just at that moment there occurred an obscure palace intrigue

which was based, like all the real movements of the time, on

differences of religion, not of race. Stilicho, suspected of attempting

to restore paganism, is killed. In the general confusion certain of the

families of the auxiliaries garrisoned in Italy are massacred by the

non-military population. As Alaric is a general in partial rebellion

against the Imperial authority, these auxiliaries join him.

The total number of Alaric’s men was at this moment very small; they

were perhaps 30,000. There was no trace of nationality about them. They

were simply a body of discontented soldiers; they had not come from

across the frontier; they were not invaders; they were part of the long

established and regular garrisons of the Empire; and, for that matter,

many garrisons and troops of equally barbaric origin, sided with the

regular authorities in the quarrel. Alaric marches on Rome with this

disaffected Roman Army, claiming that he has been defrauded of his due

in salary, and leaning upon the popularity of the dead Stilicho, whose

murder he says he will avenge. His thirty thousand claim the barbarian

slaves within the city, and certain sums of money which had been, the

pretext and motive of his rebellion.

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