THE ECONOMY SERVICES.
What the German submarines taught us--The Salvage Organisation--O.C.
Rags, Bones and Swill--Agriculture's good work and hard luck--The
Forestry Directorate--Soldiers learn economy in a stern school.
There is a sort of grim pleasantry in the fact that the German submarine
war, which was to bring Great Britain to her knees, only brought her to
a school of economy where she learned some lessons which will be very
useful in the future, once the after-the-war phase of reckless
extravagance has passed away. When the cumulative effect of the
unlimited submarine war made itself felt in 1918 it did not stop
operations, though it may claim some of the responsibility for the
extent of the German success in the Spring of that year, which might
have been much more limited if we had had full supplies of wire and
other defence material. What it did do was to set G.H.Q. to devising
valuable economies.
The German was in effect too late with this, as with his other desperate
steps. At the outset of the war, with an inferior sea power, Germany
had yet the chance of using sea forces with great, and perhaps decisive,
effect by raids on the British supply routes with light cruisers and
converted merchantmen. She had prepared for this but neglected the one
necessary act of forethought and daring by not sending out to sea her
commerce destroyers. Such a sea policy would, of course, have been
ruthless; but it could have been made effective without violation of sea
law and without outrages on neutrals. After August, 1914, Germany sought
vainly to repair her initial lack of sound naval sense by the submarine
naval war, in which every canon of sea law and every sentiment of
justice and humanity were violated. The more the submarine war showed
signs of failing the more atrocious and reckless it became, until in its
final shape it set almost all the world against the German Empire. Yet
withal the U-boat atrocities went for nothing. The German people must
see now that their Prussian masters put them very much in the position
of the innkeeper of the old creepy German story. He and his wife
resolved to kill in his sleep and rob a chance traveller who had come to
their inn. They killed him and found that his purse was empty and that
he was their own long-lost son.
On the debit side, as a result of the German submarine war we had in
1918 a lack of certain material--particularly of chocolate, biscuits,
and tinned fruits in the canteens. On the credit side we had those fine
economy organisations, Salvage, Agriculture and Forestry, the effect of
which was not only to make savings at the time but also to teach the
soldier a fuller appreciation of his civil duties.
"Salvage" explained itself very clearly in its official publication:
"The world shortage of almost every kind of raw material used for
war supplies makes Salvage an important Administrative Service.
Without a well-organised and thorough Salvage system, the full
maintenance of our Force in the Field would be made difficult.
"The co-ordination of all Salvage work is in the hands of the
Controller of Salvage at G.H.Q. His duties include the inspection
of executive Salvage work, the arrangements for the disposal of
Salvage material, the investigation of methods for recovering
bye-products, and keeping of statistical records showing the amount
of material salved and disposed of and the resultant gain to the
State.
"The Salvage Organisation is not intended to take the place of, or
in any way discourage, a consistent effort on the part of every
supply department to recover for repair and re-issue its own
articles and its own empties. It is intended to supplement that
effort; to collect and put to use what would otherwise become
derelict; to ensure that nothing utilisable is allowed to go to
waste.
"To this end it is necessary to arrange, in the first place, for
the collection of unserviceable or derelict material, and, in the
second, for its disposal so that it may be brought again into use
with the least delay and to the best advantage."
[Illustration: AN ARMY POSTER.]
"Salvage," in order to secure a practical interest in its work, used to
issue statements to the soldiers showing how salved articles were
utilised. Some examples:
Clothing: Cleaned and repaired
locally. If beyond repair,
sent to the United
Kingdom as rags.
Sacking: Sent to the United
Kingdom.
Entrenching tools: Heads cleaned and
sharpened. If irreparable,
disposed of as scrap.
Steel helmets: Cleaned and relined. If
irreparable, indiarubber
pads in lining removed
and utilised for lining
serviceable helmets. Chin
strap sold as old leather,
and helmet disposed of as
scrap steel.
Rubber (gum boots, Sent to Paris for classification
tyres, etc.): and repair. If
irreparable, sent to the
United Kingdom.
Mess tins, camp Cleaned in caustic soda,
kettles, field reblocked, resoldered if
kitchen boilers: necessary, and retinned.
If irreparable, disposed
of as scrap steel.
Water-bottles: Old felt removed--bottles
cleaned, recovered with
new felt and recorked.
Old felt sent to the United
Kingdom. Water-bottles
not fit for re-issue as such
are used for packing small
quantities of oil or paint
for the Front.
Web equipment, Broken into component
cotton bandoliers, parts--dry-cleaned on
etc.: motor-driven brushes,
darned and repaired. If
irreparable, sent to the
United Kingdom as cotton
rags, after brass or metal
fittings have been removed.
Leather equipment, Broken down into component
harness, saddlery, parts, washed with
etc.: soft soap in lukewarm
water, dried in a drying
cupboard at 100 deg. F.,
treated with fish-oil and
repaired. If irreparable,
sent to United Kingdom
as old leather after brass
or metal fittings have been
removed.
Boots: Classified, repaired and
passed through fish-oil
baths. The uppers of
irreparable boots as far as
possible made into shoe
laces or heel lifts and used
for filling.
"Salvage" had to suffer much from kindly "ragging." It was known as
"Rags and Bones," and as "Swill." It was the favoured sport of the
humourist to devise new salvage dodges, one of which I recall as holding
the record for sheer asininity. It drew attention to the fact that the
little circles of paper, punched out of folios so that they could be put
on files, might be collected and sold as confetti!
But with all this "ragging," G.H.Q. had a very real respect and liking
for Brigadier-General Gibbs and his Salvage Corps, and recognised fully
the solid and practical patriotism which made them devote a passionate
interest to the recovery of solder from old tins, to collecting waste
paper, old boots, nails, horseshoes, rags and buttons. "There is
nothing of the débris of the battlefield which we cannot put to some
use," General Gibbs announced; and by his personal enthusiasm he made
Salvage collection quite a popular sport in the Army.
Some of the items of salvage value from a return will show the wide
range of the department: swill for piggeries, value 16,000 francs;
solder from old tins, value 91,000 francs; cotton waste, 14,000 francs;
tin-plate (won by unrolling old biscuit tins, etc.), 61,000 francs; old
lead, 10,000 francs; various bye-products 7,000,000 francs. The old rags
collected did a great deal to help the cloth shortage at Home, as they
made the best kind of shoddy. The old bones collected helped to find the
glycerine for explosives.
But perhaps the moral effect of the Salvage department was even more
valuable than its excellent material results. War is a wretchedly
wasteful business and must inculcate in soldiers a spirit of waste. But
in the final phase of this campaign every soldier had brought home to
him most urgently the wisdom of saving and the real value of what seemed
to be waste bye-products. Many of them must have learned the lesson and
carried it home with them to the advantage of the general community.
Agriculture was another economy organisation that we owed to the German
submarine war. It had begun in a small way towards the end of 1917;
indeed its germ was alive before then, for from the first our units had
helped the French with labour and horses during harvest time, and some
units enjoying a certain security of tenure had established flower and
vegetable gardens. But in December, 1917, the world's food position
suggested an earnest effort to utilise spare labour and spare land
within army areas in France to grow food. Major-General Ellison and Dr.
Keeble came over to G.H.Q. from the War Office, and a scheme was drawn
up to cultivate 50,000 acres of land. In January, 1918, an Agriculture
Directorate was formed under Brigadier-General the Earl of Radnor, and
search was made for a suitable area for a big farm. The quest was not a
simple one. We could not poach on land that the French might want. We
wished to avoid selecting an area which might be needed for a manoeuvre
ground for our troops in the carrying out of the next Big Push. In
seeking to avoid these two rocks we landed on a worse one. The area
selected around Roye-Nesle was the area which the Germans were going to
over-run in their Spring offensive. All unconscious of that, we began
ploughing in February, 1918. The Home authorities had supplied an
abundance of excellent machinery, and labour was quickly collected and
trained. By March 21st we had got up to a record of ploughing 300
acres per day and a total of 4,742 acres had been turned over. Then
the German came.
[Illustration: BRIG-GENERAL THE EARL OF RADNOR (Director of Agricultural
Production)]
By a fine feat of organisation and courage the Agriculture Directorate
saved most of its machinery. Some of the agricultural tractors came in
useful as aids to the heavy artillery in the retreat. Others, charging
for home at their best speed, were mistaken for German Tanks and in one
or two cases fired on by our troops.
Despite that unlucky experience with the big farm, Agriculture put to
its credit some useful work. It had promoted vegetable gardens in Base
Camps, and the total area of those gardens was 7,496 acres and their
products did much to help out the rations. Soon, too, "Agriculture"
found that though it had not sown on its big farm it might still reap in
other quarters. The German onrush had brought a great area of French
cultivated land within army areas, some of it actually within the zone
of fire. Since every ear of wheat was precious, Agriculture organised to
save this part of the French harvest, and actually reaped the product of
18,133 acres. It was gallant work, done mostly by fighting men in the
intervals between their turns in the trenches. Sometimes the area to be
reaped was under the fire and the observation of the enemy, and the crop
was cut at night. The enemy used gas shells to prevent this work, and
the reapers had to work in gas masks. One area of six acres of corn was
so close to the enemy trenches that the idea of saving it seemed a
desperate one. But volunteers were found, and one night seventeen men
with scythes cleared the whole six acres, in the three hours of darkness
that were available. I own that such acts of heroism impress me more
than deeds done in the heat and ardour of battle.
In the Autumn of 1918 the enemy were in full run for the Rhine, and the
Agriculture Directorate resolved to make another attempt at cultivating
a big farm. An area of 20,000 acres was chosen, this time near Corbie.
The site had been desolated by the Somme battles, and the work of
preliminary clearing (which was done by Prisoners of War) was the
hardest part of its preparation for agriculture. But when ploughing
began with tractors other unexpected difficulties cropped up. The big
armour-piercing shell with delay-action fuse, when it missed the
emplacement for which it was designed and struck the ground, penetrated
to a great depth, exploded there, and often formed a big subterranean
cavern without showing any crater on the surface. A heavy tractor going
over one of these caverns would break through and disappear. Digging it
out would then be a laborious task.
When the Armistice came the Corbie farm was, in accordance with the
wishes of the French Government, passed over to it. So the Agriculture
Directorate never got in a big crop of its own sowing. But it had done
excellent work on its farm gardens and in saving the French crop within
the battle area.
Forestry was another department which we owed to the German submarine
war. In 1916 shipping losses were already so great as gravely to
prejudice the prospects of bringing in timber from Scandinavia. It was
Scandinavia which felt the earliest effects from the submarine campaign;
Norway, especially, which with fine courage had refused to allow its
mercantile shipping to take refuge in harbour.
The Norwegian paper _Tidens Tegn_ published an optimistic statistical
review of the position as regards Germany's submarine war on October
9th, 1917. This, covering a wide period and dealing with a mercantile
service which the German pursued with particular venom, attracted great
attention at the time. Pointing out that for the week ending October 9th
not one Norwegian vessel was sunk by German submarines, the _Tidens
Tegn_ commented that this was the first time for a year that such a
thing could be said. It gave then in detail the record of U-boats'
ravages on Norwegian shipping from May, 1917, until October, 1917, the
record showing a steady decrease of losses. But the sad truth was that
the Norwegian shipping had suffered such terrible losses that there was
not much left of it to destroy.
As early as November, 1916, owing to the difficulties in getting
Scandinavian timber, we had decided to draw our timber supplies chiefly
from the French forests and from Switzerland, Spain, and Great Britain.
Our Forestry Department started with a Canadian lumber-men's unit.
Brig.-Gen. Lord Lovat was Director. In October, 1917, a fresh agreement
was made with the French Government for the exploitation of French
forests for the benefit of the Allied Armies. The magnitude of the
operations can be gauged from the fact that the Forestry Directorate
grew to 425 officers and 11,000 of other ranks, and employed in addition
about 6,000 prisoners of war. But perhaps the public, with Whitehall
departments in its mind's eye, may object that employment figures are no
sound indication of work accomplished. But the production figures admit
of no cavil. From November, 1917, to November, 1918, the Forestry
Department produced from French forests 2,065,074 tons of timber. This
was four-fifths of the total needs of the Army. Reference will be found
in a subsequent chapter to our shortage of barbed wire in the Winter and
Spring of 1918. Forestry did a great deal to fill the gap, producing
90,000 tons of defensive pickets between February and May, 1918.
[Illustration: AT FORESTRY H. Q., THE KING AND A MASCOT]
In addition to its productive work Forestry was a valuable Directorate
in the teaching of economy in forest exploitation. If the lessons it
inculcated are not wasted, British forestry should benefit greatly in
the future.
* * * * *
Salvage, Agriculture, and Forestry were the three chief "Economy
Directorates" of G.H.Q.; and if their spirit can be carried back into
civil life by the demobilised soldier it will prove of real value in
making up for the economic wastage of the war, vast as that has been. I
wonder if those people who are celebrating peace with a long-drawn-out
carnival of slackness and extravagance recognise as clearly as we were
made to do at G.H.Q. in 1918 the extent to which the world is short of
everything! Of course it is difficult for those who are not accustomed
to give close attention to the problems of production to appreciate how
deeply a world war of four years' duration affects every industry; and
especially so when on one side the war was waged on the principle of
destroying everything that could be got at, whether it was military or
civil property, whether it was an enemy or a neutral possession.
Germany, making a ruthless and unlimited war on "sink without trace"
lines, forced practically the whole world to band against her in
self-defence; and over practically the whole world labour and capital
were largely withdrawn from production for purposes of defence.
In the days when the builders of Jerusalem worked with the trowel in one
hand and the sword in the other, it may be concluded that progress was
slow. For years a great deal of the world had the rifle in one hand and
the gas mask in the other, figuratively or literally. It could do little
in the way of normal production, because its chief energies were taken
up with defence.
In regard to any industry, trace step by step the effect of a war such
as this war. The first and most palpable loss is that of the labour
directly withdrawn for armies and navies. That would be serious enough
if it were the sole loss. But it was only one of many losses. A modern
industry depends as much almost on capital as on labour. Capital was
withdrawn from production and devoted to destruction at an appalling
rate. That meant that industry was starved of machinery, of
communications, of nutriment generally. Like a human body deprived of
proper nourishment, it began to suffer from debility. Every neglect to
replace machinery, to repair roads or to open up necessary new roads,
every draft, too, made on the administrative staff, is just as much a
weakening of an industry as the direct loss of hand workers. A healthy
industry should be able to withstand for some time these losses, just as
a healthy human body should be able to withstand some period of
privation and even of actual starvation. But there is a limit to the
power of endurance in both cases. It is quite clear that in many world
industries (and most particularly in those industries which are
connected with the great staples of human comfort, the food industries,
the clothing industries, the transport industries) that limit was
reached long before the war was over, and the world began to suffer from
a constitutional enfeeblement of its powers of production; something
more serious than the temporary interruption of production, something
which makes now a restoration of prosperity difficult and tedious.
All this is so true as to be truism. But it does not seem to be so
clearly recognised by the people who stayed at home as by the people who
went to war. Perhaps as the returned soldier makes his influence felt
more strongly he will have his value in bringing the nation to a sense
of the duty of economy. It was not possible to have two views about the
need of economy when you had to forage the battlefield for old bits of
metal and rags.