G.H.Q. AT WORK.
The Functions of G.H.Q.--The varying conditions to be met--The working
hours--The organisation of a branch--The Chief's system.
To the very end of the war, no doubt, an occasional young regimental
officer could be found who knew exactly what G.H.Q. did: "They swanked
about in Red Tabs and cars: had a gorgeous 'mike,' and, to keep up a
show of work, issued all kinds of fool orders which nobody in the
trenches had any time to read."
This theory of the functions of G.H.Q. had quite a vogue in "regimental
circles" at one time. It was not, of course, founded on any mental
process or it would be deeply interesting to investigate how these
gentlemen came to think that ammunition and supplies could arrive
fortuitously, that a concentration of troops or of Tanks could "just
happen."
[Illustration: LIEUT-GENERAL THE HON. SIR H. A. LAWRENCE (Chief of
the General Staff)]
But, apart from that sort of thoughtless talk, there was, even among
senior officers, some lack of knowledge as to what exactly the hermits
of Montreuil did. They knew of them as issuing General Routine Orders in
the name of the Commander-in-Chief (some 5,000 of these G.R.O.s were
issued in the course of the war); as circulating, more privately, secret
orders and instructions, and perhaps of making occasional appearances on
the battle-field, though probably the majority of regimental officers
never saw a G.H.Q. officer. In brief summary, the more important
functions of G.H.Q. were:
1. G.H.Q. was the link between the B.E.F. and the British
Government. The War Cabinet sitting in London was the supreme
authority. The Secretary of State for War was its spokesman and,
with the War Office Staff, its adviser. The Commander-in-Chief was
the Army's spokesman and, with his G.H.Q., the negotiator with the
Secretary of State for War. In the final result the B.E.F. had to
do what it was ordered to do by the Secretary of State, but the
Commander-in-Chief was usually consulted beforehand, and had always
the right of discussion and of remonstrance. The relations between
the Home Government and the Army were recognised as the most
important matter dealt with by G.H.Q., and War Office letters had a
special priority. No one except the Commander-in-Chief communicated
directly with the War Office.
2. G.H.Q. was the link between the British Army in the Field and
the Allied armies--the French, American, Belgian and
Portuguese. Relations between these were maintained through
Military Missions, we keeping a Mission with the G.H.Q. of the
Allied Army, they keeping Missions with our G.H.Q. There was, quite
apart from big questions of operations, discussion of which was
confined to the Chief of the General Staff and the heads of the
foreign Missions, an immense amount of technical transport, supply
and finance work between the Allies. There was hardly an officer of
G.H.Q. who did not in some detail come into relations with the
foreign Missions.
3. G.H.Q. had to decide the strategy of the campaign in its
relation to the British sector. After the unity of Command there
was a somewhat lessened responsibility in this matter, but the work
was practically the same. The Commander-in-Chief, in consultation
with his Chief of Staff, his Quartermaster-General and his
Adjutant-General, decided when and with what forces we should
attack, when adopt a defensive policy. To come to those decisions a
close and constant study was necessary by the various branches of
G.H.Q. of the state of the enemy's forces, our own numbers and
_morale_, our possibilities of transport and supply.
4. G.H.Q. had to arrange the supply, from Home and from its own
workshops and local civilian workshops, of all the wonderful
equipment of the forces, from a Tank and a 15-inch howitzer to a
tin of dubbin; all the ammunition and all the food supplies to man
and beast. There came to the ports of France every month for the
B.E.F. about 800,000 tons of stuff. The men to be fed totalled over
2,000,000 and the animals to be fed about 500,000. A month's supply
of ammunition weighed about 260,000 tons.
5. G.H.Q. managed a transport system which used constantly about
half a million horses and mules and about 20,000 motor lorries,
running over 9,000,000 motor miles per month; which carried on its
light railways about 544,000 tons a month and ran every day 250
trains on broad gauge lines.
6. G.H.Q. was constantly building new railways and new roads, and
developing new harbour facilities. It ran big canal and sea
services, forestry and agricultural services, repair shops,
laundries, etc., on a gigantic scale.
7. G.H.Q managed the vast medical services for wounded and sick,
the veterinary services, the laboratories for the defence of our
men and animals against poison gas and for the gas
counter-offensive. It was responsible for the organisation of the
Chaplains' services, for educational work and the amusement of the
men.
Such was the work of G.H.Q. It was carried on under these varying
conditions:
1. Maintaining a stabilised position. This was comparatively easy.
Wastage of men, horses and material could be calculated with some
certainty and replaced by a routine process.
2. Preparing for a big attack. This made the greatest strain on
Transport and Supply, and the necessary conditions of secrecy added
complications and difficulties. In preparing an offensive the
Traffic more than doubled per Division. The necessary making of new
railways and new roads and the accumulation of defence material to
fortify a new line were responsible for most of this. But the
accumulation of a big head of ammunition was also a factor. On a
quiet sector two Divisions could get along with about three trains
daily. For the purposes of a big attack ten Divisions might be
concentrated on that sector and those ten Divisions in the
preparatory stage of the attack would need about 33 supply trains a
day, and during the offensive about 27 trains a day. Put the
problem into terms of civil railway administration. Tell the
manager of the London to Brighton line that next week he must carry
15 times the normal traffic for a number of days and that it is
extremely important that people observing his termini and his lines
should not notice anything unusual.
3. Resisting a big attack. The most difficult element of this was
its unexpectedness. The total provision needed for it was less than
for an offensive. The amount of supplies necessary to go up by
train per Division from Base would be 25 per cent. less than in the
case of the preparation of a big attack. We always carried a good
reserve stock of ammunition, food, and engineering stores close
behind the line, and a further reserve of ammunition already loaded
on trains at appropriate railway centres. In case of emergency,
ammunition could start moving up in just the time necessary to
hitch a locomotive on to a standing train. Experience of the German
offensive in 1918 showed that we carried near the front line too
great reserves, and we lost a good deal of food, stores and
ammunition in consequence. That big attack indeed disclosed several
chinks in our armour. It showed that in some cases during Trench
War units had allowed themselves to become immobile. (To give one
example, many Casualty Clearing Stations had burdened themselves
with surgical stores and equipment which should be reserved for
stationary hospitals. Thus burdened, they were tempted to evacuate
too soon). There were weaknesses, too, in Ammunition Columns, and
the railway system was not nearly elastic enough. But we pulled
through, largely because the British officer and soldier has always
a bit in reserve and never thinks so quickly or acts so bravely as
when in a tight corner.
4. Carrying on a general offensive. This was the supreme test of
the British Staff from August, 1918, to November, 1918. It called
for an effort that put in the category of easy things all that had
gone before. The effort was gloriously successful. The British Army
succeeded where the German Army in 1914, under far more favourable
circumstances, had failed.
I have given only the most important of the functions of G.H.Q. and a
very inadequate idea of the conditions under which it had to carry on
its tasks, yet for all this there were only 300 officers at Montreuil
and 240 officers at the outlying directorates.
It did not leave much chance for idleness! At G.H.Q., in my time, in my
branch, no officer who wished to stay was later than 9 a.m. at his desk;
most of the eager men were at work before then. We left at 10.30 p.m. if
possible, more often later. On Saturday and Sunday exactly the same
hours were kept. "An hour for exercise" in the afternoon was supposed
to be reserved, in addition to meal-hours; but it was not by any means
always possible. During the worst of the German offensive in the spring
of 1918 Staff officers toiled from 8.30 a.m. to midnight, with half-hour
intervals for meals. I have seen a Staff officer faint at table from
sheer pressure of work, and dozens of men, come fresh from regimental
work, wilt away under the fierce pressure of work at G.H.Q.
The extreme character of the strain at G.H.Q. used to be recognised by a
special allowance of leave. A short leave every three months was, for a
long time, the rule. With pressure of work, that rule fell in abeyance,
and a G.H.Q. Staff Officer was lucky to get a leave within six months.
In the case of the big men at the head of the departments leave was
something to be talked of, dreamt of, but never realised. Compared with
conditions at G.H.Q. regimental work was care-free and pleasant.
G.H.Q. was organised in this fashion. At the head was the
Commander-in-Chief and his personal staff consisting of an Assistant
Military Secretary, a Private Secretary, a Medical Officer, an Officer
in charge of escorts and five A.D.C.s. Attached to this personal staff
were an American and a French Staff Officer. There was one officer of
the Dominions on the Chief's personal staff, Captain Botha, a son of
the late General Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa. With his
personal staff the Commander-in-Chief was quartered at a château near
Montreuil.
One rarely saw "the Chief." He seldom had occasion to come to the
offices in the Ecole Militaire, and it was only the highest officers who
had to go to confer with him. But his presence was always felt. There
was no more loyal band of brothers than the Grand Staff of the British
Army in 1918, and the humblest member at G.H.Q. expressed the spirit of
the Commander-in-Chief, and, within his sphere, was trying to do exactly
as the Commander-in-Chief would do. When "the Chief" did appear at
Montreuil all felt they had the right to desert work for five minutes to
go to a window to catch a glimpse of him as he passed from one side of
the Ecole Militaire to the other, or stopped in the great courtyard to
chat for a moment with one of his officers.
Under the Chief the staff was divided into branches. There was the
"Military Secretary's Branch," a small branch under Major-General H. G.
Ruggles-Brise, whose duties were to look after honours, promotions, etc.
There was the General Staff Branch, under Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir H.
A. Lawrence, divided into the Operations Section, under Major-General J.
H. Davidson (having charge of the actual strategy and tactics in the
campaign); the Staff Duties Section, under Major-General G. P. Dawnay;
and the Intelligence Section, under Brigadier-General G. S. Clive
(having charge of the collection of information as to the enemy's
movements, dispositions, intentions, etc.). There was the
Adjutant-General's Branch, under Lieutenant-General Sir G. H. Fowke
(having charge of discipline). There was the Quartermaster-General's
Branch, under Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke (having charge of
supply and transport). Finally there were certain officers with special
duties attached to G.H.Q. but not directly under any of these branches,
such as the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, the Inspector of Machine
Gun Units, the Engineer-in-Chief, the officers in charge of Mines and
Searchlights, the Inspector of Training, the Chief Chaplains, the
Provost Marshal, and the Deputy Judge Advocate-General.
[Illustration: LIEUT-GENERAL SIR G. H. FOWKE (Adjutant-General, B.E.F.)]
Of the branches of the Staff, the Quartermaster-General's was far the
greatest, for under it came all the transport and supply services. This
was the formidable list:
Director of Agricultural Production (Brig.-Gen. the Earl of
Radnor).
Director of Army Postal Services (Brig.-Gen. Price).
Deputy Controller of E.F. Canteens (Col. E. Benson).
Director of Engineering Stores (Brig.-Gen. Sewell).
Director of Forestry (Brig.-Gen. Lord Lovat).
Director of Hirings and Requisitions, and President of Claims
Commission (Major-Gen. Rt. Hon. L. B. Friend).
Controller of Labour (Brig.-Gen. Wace).
Director of Ordnance Services (Major-Gen. Sir C. M. Mathew).
Paymaster-in-Chief (Major-Gen. Sir C. A. Bray).
Director of Remounts (Brig.-Gen. Sir F. S. Garrett).
Controller of Salvage (Brig.-Gen. Gibb).
Director of Supplies (Major-Gen. Carter).
Director of Motor Transport (Major-Gen. Boyce).
Director-General of Transportation (Major-Gen. Crookshank).
Director of Veterinary Services (Major-Gen. Moore).
Vice-Chairman Imperial War Graves Commission (Major-Gen. Ware).
Director of Works (Major-Gen. Sir A. M. Stuart).
Nor does that finish the list, for subsidiary directorates under the
Director-General of Transportation were:
Director of Construction (Brig.-Gen. Stewart).
Director of Docks (Brig.-Gen. Wedgewood).
Director of Inland Water Transport (Brig.-Gen. Luck).
Director of Light Railways (Brig.-Gen. Harrison).
Director of Railway Traffic (Brig.-Gen. Murray).
Director of Roads (Brig.-Gen. Maybury).
The Transportation Directorate was, so to speak, a sub-branch of the
Staff. It had a great standard-gauge railway system which kept 900
locomotives running, which in one day could send 196 trains from the
Bases to railheads (this irrespective of trains on lateral lines) and in
one week once moved 439,801 troops and in one month 1,539,410 troops.
Its railway system was constantly being pushed forward, being
duplicated, and being furnished with "avoiding lines." Further,
Transportation had a light railway system which carried 174,923 tons a
week. Those were only two of its activities. On inland waterways,
Transportation carried 293,593 tons a month, and it worked, in addition,
a coastal barge traffic, a cross-Channel barge service, and a
cross-Channel Ferry. Of roads, it maintained about 4,106 miles and was
always making new ones; and it took 4,400 tons of material--much of it
imported by sea--to make a mile of new road.
These figures are impressive enough in themselves and yet give little
real sense of the full task of the Transportation Services. That can
only be realised when it is kept in mind that practically all the work
had to be carried out under conditions of shock and violent movement. It
was not a matter of peacefully carrying on a routine business. At every
point there was a constant liability to interruption and destruction by
enemy action. At every hour there was some new development requiring
some change of method, of destination. The vast machine had to be as
elastic as it was powerful.
Yet that was only one sub-branch of the Staff.
It will be of interest to note how all the directorates of the Q Branch
of the Staff were co-ordinated so that the man at the top could keep
control and yet not be smothered under a mass of detail. Under the head
(Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke) of this Branch of the Staff were
two deputies (Major-General Ford and Major-General May). Under these
deputies were five Brigadier-Generals, and under them nine
Lieutenant-Colonels, and these Lieutenant-Colonels divided between them
82 subjects. A table showing the distribution of these subjects was
circulated throughout the Staff, and most matters got to the right
officer from the beginning, and if they were of a routine nature were
dealt with at once without further reference. Very important matters, or
new questions arising, went up to one of the Deputies and were referred,
or not, to the Q.M.G. as the circumstances dictated. Attached to the
Branch and directly under its head was an officer who had charge of all
orders and all publications. Nothing could be sent out as an order from
the Q.M.G. Branch, or nothing printed as an instruction from the Branch,
until it had gone through his hands; and it was his duty to see that one
section of the Branch did not tread on the toes of another, that orders
and publications did not overlap, and that an order in which several
directorates were interested was drafted in accordance with the views of
all of them.
Other Branches of the Staff did not call for such elaborate
organisation, for their duties were not so various. But all worked on
very much the same plan--of delegating authority so that once a line of
action on any particular point was decided upon, a comparatively junior
staff officer could "carry on" without worrying his superiors by
frequent references.
A G.H.Q. officer was distinguished not only by his red staff badges but
by a red and blue arm-band. An "attached officer," _i.e._, an officer
who was working with the staff as a learner or a helper and was perhaps
graded for pay, etc., as a staff officer, did not wear these
distinctions until he was actually appointed to the Staff.
[Illustration: THE GRANDE PLACE]
The red and blue arm-band was a chromatic outrage--its glaring colours
of course had a purpose--and quite spoiled the appearance of a tunic.
But it was dearly prized and as a rule was worn on leave, though it had
then no usefulness. In the field the distinguishing arm-band was of
great use, to indicate to officers and men the officials to whom they
could appeal in case of need. There were all sorts of arm-bands with
various colour symbols and initials in addition to the G.H.Q. one. A
list of them will indicate the complexity of the task of a modern army
in the field. Special arm-bands of different designs were authorised to
distinguish:
General Headquarters.
Army Headquarters.
Army Corps Headquarters.
Corps Machine Gun Officers.
R.A.F. Headquarters.
Cavalry Divisional Headquarters.
Divisional Headquarters.
Tank Corps Staff.
Tank Headquarters.
Tank Brigade.
Cavalry Brigade.
Infantry Brigade.
Cavalry Divisional Artillery Headquarters.
Divisional Artillery Headquarters.
G.H.Q. Troops Headquarters.
Lines of Communication.
Provost Marshal and his assistants.
Signal Service.
Military Police.
Railway Transport Officers.
Embarkation Staff.
Staff, Directorate of Light Railways.
" " Roads.
" " Docks.
" " Transportation.
" " Inland Water Transport.
" " Broad Gauge Railways.
Light Railways District Superintendent.
" Inspector.
" Yardmaster.
" Controlman.
" Guard.
Officers, Staff Inspector War Trophies.
Servants to Military Attaches.
Stretcher bearers.
All medical personnel.
Press correspondents and servants.
Train Conducting Officers.
Checkers.
Town Majors.
Traffic Control.
Agents de Police Special.
Instructors of Machine Gun School, Lewis Gun School,
and Machine Gun Corps Base Depôt.
H.Q. Corps Heavy Artillery.
Special Brigade.
Area Commandants.
Billet and Camp Wardens.
Corps Chemical Advisers.
Divisional Gas Officers.
Instructors of Divisional Gas Schools.
Camouflage Officers attached to Corps.
Salvage Corps.
Civilian Platelayers.
Intelligence Police.
Sanitary Sections.
Belgian Civ. Rly. Staff.
M.L.O. Staff at Ports.
N.C.O.s and men of Intelligence Corps.
N.C.O.s and men of Dock Directorate.
Sentries on Examining Posts.
Interpreters, Indian Labour Corps.
Interpreters, Chinese Labour Corps.
The Military Police were supposed to be able to keep all these in memory
and an officer in the field had to know the chief ones; and he took care
to know at least that for G.H.Q., for it represented the ultimate source
of honour and blame. Nothing important could happen to him except
through G.H.Q., and that ugly red and blue arm-band always demanded
attention, sometimes, no doubt, mixed with a little resentment, because
of the idea that G.H.Q. had nothing much to do except to bother the
unhappy regimental officer.
We all tried to "live up to" our arm-bands in the crude
stained-glass-window colours. The Commander-in-Chief set a high example
by choosing his men carefully, giving them their particular jobs and
trusting them. He was not one of those fussy souls who want to oversee
every detail. The men who worked under him knew that whilst they did
their work conscientiously and carefully he would back them against any
niggling criticism and against any back-biting. It was a good policy
judged by its results. G.H.Q., B.E.F., France, in the summer of 1918 had
probably reached as high a summit of soldierly scientific skill as the
grand Staff of any Army in the world. The business of improvisation
which had been begun in 1914 was finished, actually finished. From
G.H.Q. was directed day by day a fighting force which met the chief
brunt of the last German attack, held it; then, while it absorbed a
great flood of recruits and helped to equip and train the American Army,
prepared to take the chief part in the final victorious offensive.