TAKING OF JAFFA, AND MASSACRE OF SOLDIERS--DE BOURRIENNE’S
ACCOUNT--NAPOLEON’S OWN VERSION.
It is sad to turn from this rollicking fun to the episode of Jaffa; but
it cannot be dismissed, as it has afforded so much employment to the
detractors of Napoleon, and to the English satirists of the time. First
of all, let us give the version of an eye-witness (De Bourrienne),
friend of, and secretary to, Napoleon. It is rather long, but no word
of it can be omitted, as it gives every argument that can be brought
forward to palliate the sickening massacre.
‘On the 4th of March we commenced the siege of Jaffa. That paltry
place, which, to round a sentence, was pompously styled the ancient
Joppa, held out only to the 6th of March, when it was taken by storm,
and given up to pillage. The massacre was horrible. General Bonaparte
sent his aides de camp, Beauharnais and Croisier, to appease the fury
of the soldiers as much as possible, to observe what was passing, and
to report to him. They learnt that a considerable part of the garrison
had retired into some vast buildings, a sort of caravanserais, which
formed a large enclosed court. Beauharnais and Croisier, who were
distinguished by wearing the aide de camp scarf on the arm, proceeded
to that place.
‘The Arnauts and Albanians, of whom these refugees were almost
entirely composed, cried, from the windows, that they were willing
to surrender, upon an assurance that they would be exempted from the
massacre to which the town was doomed; if not, they threatened to fire
on the aides de camp, and to defend themselves to the last extremity.
The two officers thought that they ought to accede to the proposition,
notwithstanding the decree of death which had been pronounced against
the whole garrison, in consequence of the town being taken by storm.
They brought them to our camp in two divisions, one consisting of about
two thousand five hundred men, the other of about fifteen hundred.
‘I was walking with General Bonaparte, in front of his tent, when he
saw this multitude of men approaching, and, before he even saw his
aides de camp, he said to me in a tone of profound sorrow, “What do
they wish me to do with these men? Have I food for them? ships to
convey them to Egypt or France? Why, in the Devil’s name, have they
served me thus?” After their arrival, and the explanations which the
General in Chief demanded, and listened to with anger, Eugene and
Croisier received the most severe reprimand for their conduct.
‘But the deed was done. Four thousand men were there. It was necessary
to decide upon their fate. The two aides de camp observed, that they
had found themselves alone in the midst of numerous enemies, and that
he had directed them to restrain the carnage. “Yes, doubtless,” replied
the General in Chief, with great warmth, “as to women, children, and
old men--all the peaceable inhabitants; but not with respect to armed
soldiers. It was your duty to die, rather than bring these unfortunate
creatures to me. What do you want me to do with them?” These words were
pronounced in the most angry tone.
‘The prisoners were then ordered to sit down, and were placed, without
any order, in front of the tents, their hands tied behind their backs.
A sombre fury was depicted in their countenances. We gave them a little
biscuit and bread, squeezed out of the already scanty supply for the
army.
‘On the first day of their arrival, a council of war was held in the
tent of the General in Chief, to determine what course should be
pursued with respect to them. The Council deliberated a long time
without coming to any decision.
‘On the evening of the following day, the daily reports of the generals
of division came in. They spoke of nothing but the insufficiency
of the rations, the complaints of the soldiers--of their murmurs
and discontent at seeing their bread given to enemies, who had been
withdrawn from their vengeance, inasmuch as a decree of death, in
conformity with the laws of war, had been passed on Jaffa. All these
reports were alarming, and especially that of General Bon, in which no
reserve was made. He spoke of nothing less than the fear of revolt,
which would be justified by the serious nature of the case.
‘The Council assembled again. All the generals of division were
summoned to attend, and, for several hours together, they discussed,
under separate questions, what measures might be adopted, with the most
sincere desire to discover and execute one which would save the lives
of these unfortunate prisoners.
‘Should they be sent to Egypt? could it be done?
‘To do so, it would be necessary to send with them a numerous escort,
which would too much weaken our little army in the enemy’s country.
How, besides, could they and the escort be supported till they reached
Cairo, having no provisions to give them on setting out, and, their
route being through a hostile territory, which we had exhausted, which
presented no fresh resources, and through which we, perhaps, might have
to return?
‘Should they be embarked?
‘Where were the ships? where could they be found? All our optical
instruments, directed over the sea, could not descry a single friendly
sail. Bonaparte, I affirm, would have regarded such an event as a real
favour of fortune. It was, and I am glad to have to say it, this sole
idea, this sole hope, which made him brave, for three days, the murmurs
of his army. But in vain was help looked for, seawards--It did not come.
‘Should the prisoners be set at liberty?
‘They would then proceed to St. Jean d’Acre to reinforce the Pacha,
or else, throwing themselves into the mountains of Naplouse, would
greatly annoy our rear and right flank, and deal out death to us, as
a recompense for the life we had given them. There could be no doubt
of this. What is a Christian dog to a Turk? It would even have been a
religious and meritorious act in the eyes of the Prophet.
‘Could they be incorporated, disarmed, with our soldiers in the ranks?
‘Here again the question of food presented itself in all its force.
Next came to be considered the danger of having such comrades, while
marching through an enemy’s country. What might happen in the event of
a battle before St. Jean d’Acre? Could we even tell what might occur
during the march? and--finally--what must be done with them when under
the ramparts of that town, if we should be able to take them there? The
same embarrassments with respect to the questions of provisions, and
security, would then recur with increased force.
‘The third day arrived without its being possible, anxiously as it was
desired, to come to any conclusion favourable to the preservation of
these unfortunate men. The murmurs in the camp grew louder--the evil
went on increasing--remedy appeared impossible--danger was real and
imminent.
‘The order for shooting the prisoners was given and executed on the
10th of March. We did not, as has been stated, separate the Egyptians
from the other prisoners. There were no Egyptians.
‘Many of the unfortunate creatures composing the smaller division,
which was fired on close to the sea-coast, at some distance from the
other column, succeeded in swimming to some reefs of rocks out of the
reach of musket shot. The soldiers rested their muskets on the sand,
and, to induce the prisoners to return, employed the Egyptian signs of
reconciliation, in use in that country. They came back; but, as they
advanced, they were killed, and disappeared among the waves.’
Thus far De Bourrienne. Now let us hear what Napoleon himself says of
the matter.[45] ‘He spoke about the measures which he had caused to be
taken at Jaffa. “After the assault,” said he, “it was impossible to
restore any kind of discipline until night. The infuriated soldiers
rushed into the streets in search of women. You know what kind of
people the Turks are. A few of them kept up a fire in the streets. The
soldiers, who desired nothing more, whenever a shot was discharged,
cried out that they were fired upon from certain houses, which they
immediately broke open, and violated all the women they found.”
‘I replied[46] that Miot ... positively asserted that he (Napoleon)
had caused between three and four thousand Turks to be shot, some days
after the capture of Jaffa. Napoleon answered: “It is not true that
there were so many. I ordered about a thousand or twelve hundred to
be shot, which was done. The reason was, that amongst the garrison of
Jaffa, a number of Turkish troops were discovered, whom I had taken a
short time before at El-Arish, and sent to Bagdat upon their parole not
to serve again, or to be found in arms against me for a year. I had
caused them to be escorted twelve leagues on their way to Bagdat, by a
division of my army. But those Turks, instead of proceeding to Bagdat,
threw themselves into Jaffa, defended it to the last, and cost me a
number of brave men to take it, whose lives would have been spared, if
the others had not reinforced the garrison of Jaffa. Moreover, before I
attacked the town, I sent them a flag of truce. Immediately afterwards
we saw the head of the bearer elevated on a pole over the wall. Now,
if I had spared them again, and sent them away upon their parole,
they would directly have gone to St. Jean d’Acre, where they would
have played over again the same scene that they had done at Jaffa. In
justice to the lives of my soldiers, as every general ought to consider
himself as their father, and them as his children, I could not allow
this.
‘“To leave as a guard a portion of my army, already small and reduced
in number, in consequence of the breach of faith of those wretches,
was impossible. Indeed, to have acted otherwise than I did, would
probably have caused the destruction of my whole army. I, therefore,
availing myself of the rights of war, which authorise the putting to
death prisoners taken under such circumstances, independent of the
right given to me by having taken the city by assault, and that of
retaliation on the Turks, ordered that the prisoners taken at El-Arish,
who, in defiance of their capitulation, had been found bearing arms
against me, should be selected out and shot. The rest, amounting to
a considerable number, were spared. I would,” continued he, “do the
same thing again to-morrow, and so would Wellington, or any general
commanding an army under similar circumstances!”’
Between these two partial accounts there are grave discrepancies--both
parties trying, as far as possible, to excuse the deed; but, if De
Bourrienne can be relied on, his account of the cold-blooded massacre
must be the true one, for he says, ‘I confine myself to those details
of this act of dreadful necessity of which I was an eye-witness.’