THE BATTLE OF BUCKLAND MILLS
Buckland Mills was, in some sort, a sequel to Brandy Station. The latter
battle was a brilliant passage at arms, in which neither side obtained a
decisive advantage. Kilpatrick was still pugnacious and both willing and
anxious to meet Stuart again. That his mind was full of the subject was
evinced by a remark he was heard to make one morning at his headquarters
on the Bull Run battle ground. He was quartered in a house, his host a
Virginian too old to be in the army, and who remained at home to look
after the property. It was a clear day, and when the general came out on
the porch, the old gentleman accosted him with a cheery:
"A fine day, general!"
"Yes, a--fine day for a fight;" was the instant reply.
In most men this would have sounded like gasconade. In Kilpatrick's
case, it was not so considered. He was credited with plenty of pluck,
and it was well understood that he was no sooner out of one action, than
he was planning to get into another. He ran into one, a day or two
later, which furnished him all the entertainment of that kind that he
wanted, and more too.
Reconnoissances across Bull Run on the Gainesville road disclosed a
considerable force of mounted confederates. When their pickets were
driven in by the Sixth Michigan on the 15th and again by the First
Michigan on the 16th strong reserves were revealed. As a matter of fact,
Stuart was at Buckland Mills with Hampton's division, and Fitzhugh Lee
was at or near Auburn, but a few miles away. They had their heads
together and devised a trap for Kilpatrick, into which he rode with his
eyes shut.
Sunday evening, October 18, the Third division moved out across Bull
Run, Kilpatrick in command, Custer's brigade leading, Davies[16] with
the First brigade bringing up the rear. Stuart's cavalry was attacked
and driven rapidly until dark by the First Vermont cavalry[17] under
Lieutenant Colonel Addison W. Preston, acting as advance guard. Early on
Monday morning, October 19, the march was resumed, the Sixth Michigan in
advance.
About midway between Bull Run and Broad Run the confederate rear guard,
a regiment of Young's brigade of Hampton's division, was encountered
which fell back before the advance of the Sixth Michigan making but
slight resistance and retreating across Broad Run, where it was found
that Stuart had taken up a strong position, forming the three brigades
of Gordon, Rosser and Young in line on the opposite side, as if to
contest the crossing.
The stream was deep and difficult, spanned at the pike by a stone
bridge. Its banks were wooded. Stuart stationed a piece of artillery on
the high ground so as to command the bridge and its approaches. A
portion of the regiment was dismounted and advanced to engage the
dismounted confederates across the stream. Captain George R. Maxwell of
the First Michigan, whose regiment was at the time in the rear, rode up
and asked permission to take a carbine and go on foot with the men of
the Sixth who were in front. The permission was granted and, giving his
horse into the charge of an orderly, he was in a few moments justifying
his already well established reputation as a man of courage, by fighting
like an enlisted man, on the skirmish line of a regiment not his own,
thus voluntarily exceeding any requirements of duty.
Custer rode up with his staff and escort, and halted in the road, making
a conspicuous group. Stuart's cannoneers planted a shell right in their
midst, which caused a lively scattering, as they had no desire to be
made targets of for that kind of artillery practice. Fortunately no one
was killed.
Custer then brought up his entire command and formed a line of battle,
the Sixth Michigan in the center across the pike, the Fifth Michigan on
the right, the Seventh Michigan on the left, the First Michigan and
First Vermont in reserve, mounted. After a somewhat stubborn
resistance. Stuart apparently reluctantly withdrew, permitting Custer to
cross though he could have held the position easily against ten times
his number whereas, as the sequel proved, he greatly outnumbered
Kilpatrick. The Seventh crossed at a ford about a mile below, the other
regiments at the bridge. Stuart retreated toward Warrenton. It was then
about noon, perhaps a little later than that. Kilpatrick came up and
ordered Custer to draw in his skirmishers and allow Davies to pass him
and take the advance. Custer massed his command on some level ground,
behind a hill, beyond the bridge, and adjacent to the stream. Davies
crossed the bridge, passed the Michigan brigade, and took up the pursuit
of Stuart. Kilpatrick, with his staff, followed along the pike in rear
of Davies's brigade. As he was moving off, Kilpatrick directed Custer to
follow the First brigade and bring up the rear.
This was the very thing that Stuart was waiting for. It had been
arranged between him and Fitzhugh Lee that he, with his three
brigades,[18] was to fall back without resistance before the two
brigades of the Third division, until they were drawn well away from the
bridge, when Lee, who was coming up from Auburn through the woods to the
left, with the brigades of Lomax, Chambliss and Wickham and Breathed's
battery would swing in across the pike, cut Kilpatrick off from the
bridge, and then, at the first sound of Lee's guns, Kilpatrick was to be
attacked simultaneously by Stuart in front and by Lee in rear, and
thoroughly whipped.
It was a very pretty bit of strategy and came very near being
successful. The plan was neatly frustrated by one of those apparent
accidents of war which make or unmake men, according as they are
favorable or unfavorable.
Custer respectfully but firmly demurred to moving until his men could
have their breakfast--rather their dinner, for the forenoon was already
spent. Neither men nor horses had had anything to eat since the night
before, and he urged that the horses should have a feed and the men have
an opportunity to make coffee before they were required to go farther.
Custer was a fighting man, through and through, but wary and wily as
brave. There was in him an indescribable something--call it caution,
call it sagacity, call it the real military instinct--it may have been
genius--by whatever name entitled, it nearly always impelled him to do
intuitively the right thing. In this case it seemed obstinacy, if not
insubordination. It was characteristic of him to care studiously for the
comfort of his men. And he did not believe in wasting their lives. It is
more than probable that there was in his mind a suspicion of the true
state of things. If so, he did not say so, even to the general
commanding the division. He kept his own counsel and had his way. The
delay was finally sanctioned by Kilpatrick, and the brigade remained on
the bank feeding their horses and making coffee, Davies meanwhile
advancing cautiously on the Warrenton road to a point within about two
or three miles of Warrenton. Stuart made slight if any attempt to resist
his progress.
The Gainesville-Warrenton pike, after crossing Broad Run, is bounded on
both sides by cleared farm lands, fringed about one-third of a mile back
by woods. From the place of Custer's halt it was not more than 500 or
600 yards to these woods. The road runs in a westerly direction and the
brigade was on the south side of it.
There is very little of record from which to determine the time consumed
by Custer's halt. It is a peculiar circumstance that not a single report
of this battle made by a regimental commander in Custer's brigade
appears in the official war records. A similar omission has been noted
in the battle of Gettysburg. Custer made a report and so did Kilpatrick
and Davies, but they are all deficient in details. There is no hint in
any of them as to the duration of the delay. The confederate chronicles
are much more complete. From them it would appear that the stop was made
about noon and that the real battle began at 3:30 in the afternoon.
Memory is at fault on this point for the reason that after coffee and
while the horses were feeding I lay down upon the ground and fell
asleep. Before that some of the men had gone into the adjacent fields
in search of long forage. It was understood that the Seventh Michigan
after crossing at the lower ford was scouting through the country toward
Greenwich and there was no hint or suspicion that an enemy could
approach from that direction without being discovered by this scouting
party.
Finally Custer was ready to move. Awakened by a staff officer I was
directed to report to the general.
"Major," said he, "take position with your regiment about 500 yards
toward those woods remain there until the command is in column on the
pike, then follow and bring up the rear."
The order was given with a caution to be careful, as the Seventh
Michigan had been scouting near Greenwich and might be expected to come
in from that direction. Greenwich is almost due south from Buckland
Mills, whereas Auburn, from which place Fitzhugh Lee was approaching,
lay considerably west of south.
The movement of the two commands began simultaneously. The Fifth
Michigan, Pennington's battery, the First Michigan and First Vermont,
with Custer and his staff leading, were in a few moments marching
briskly in column on the Warrenton pike, which was not very far away
from the starting point. The Sixth Michigan meantime proceeded in column
of fours toward the place designated by General Custer, close up to the
woods. Nothing had been seen or heard of Davies for some time.
Everything was quiet. Nothing could be heard except the tramp of the
horses' feet and the rumble of the wheels of Pennington's gun
carriages, growing more and more indistinct as the distance increased.
[Illustration: DON G. LOVELL]
The Sixth had gone about 250 or 300 yards and was approaching a fence
which divided the farm into fields, when Captain Don G. Lovell, who was
riding by the side of the commanding officer of the regiment,[19]
suddenly cried out:
"Major, there is a mounted man in the edge of the woods yonder," at the
same time pointing to a place directly in front and about 200 yards
beyond the fence.
Captain Lovell was one of the most dashing and intrepid officers in the
brigade. He was always cool and never carried away with excitement under
any circumstances. It is perhaps doubtful whether he could have
maintained his customary imperturbability, if he had realized, at the
moment, just what that lone picket portended.
A glance in the direction indicated, revealed the truth of Captain
Lovell's declaration but, recalling what General Custer had said, I
replied:
"The general said we might expect some mounted men of the Seventh from
that direction."
"But that vidette is a rebel," retorted Lovell, "he is dressed in gray."
"It can't be possible," was the insistent reply, and the column kept on
moving.
Just then, the man in the woods began to ride his horse in a circle.
"Look at that," said Lovell; "that is a rebel signal; our men don't do
that."
The truth of the inference was too evident to be disputed. Things were
beginning to look suspicious, and in another instant all doubt, if any
remained, was set at rest. The horseman, after circling about a time or
two, brought his horse to a standstill facing in the direction from
which we were approaching. There was a puff of smoke from the muzzle of
his revolver or carbine, and a bullet whizzed by and buried itself in
the breast of one of the horses in the first set of fours.
"There,--it," exclaimed Lovell. "Now you know it is a rebel, don't you?"
The information was too reliable not to be convincing, and the regiment
was promptly brought front into line, which had hardly been
accomplished, when shots began to come from other points in the woods,
and no further demonstration was needed that they were full of
confederates.
The fence was close at hand, and the command to dismount to fight on
foot was given. The Sixth deployed along the fence and the Spencers
began to bark. The horses were sent back a short distance, under cover
of a reverse slope. The acting adjutant was dispatched to overtake
Custer and report to him that we were confronted by a large force of
confederates and had been attacked. Before he had started, the
confederates displayed a line of dismounted skirmishers that extended
far beyond both flanks of the regiment and a swarm of them in front. A
Michigan regiment, behind a fence, and armed with Spencer carbines, was
a dangerous antagonist to grapple with by a direct front assault, and
Fitzhugh Lee's men were not eager to advance across the open field, but
hugged the woods, waiting for their friends on the right and left to get
around our flanks, which there was imminent danger of their doing,
before relief could come. It did not, however, take Custer long to act.
Putting the Fifth Michigan in on the right of the Sixth, he brought back
Pennington's battery, and stationed the First Vermont mounted to protect
the left flank, holding the First Michigan mounted in reserve to support
the battery and to reinforce any weak point, and proceeded to put up one
of the gamiest fights against odds, seen in the war. Opposed to Custer's
five regiments and one battery, Fitzhugh Lee had twelve regiments of
cavalry, three brigades under Lomax, Owen and Chambliss and as good a
battery--Breathed's--as was in the confederate service.
Before the dispositions described in the foregoing had been completed,
Breathed's battery, which had been masked in the woods to the right and
front of the position occupied by the Sixth Michigan, opened fire with
shell. But Pennington came into position with a rush, and unlimbering
two pieces, in less time than it takes to tell it, silenced the
confederate artillery, firing over the heads of the Sixth Michigan
skirmishers. Fitzhugh Lee pressed forward his dismounted line, following
it closely with mounted cavalry, and made a desperate effort to cut off
Custer's line of retreat by the bridge. This he was unable to do. The
Sixth held on to the fence until the confederates were almost to it, and
until ordered by Custer to retire, when they fell back slowly, and
mounting their horses, crossed the bridge leisurely, without hurry or
flurry, the battery and the other regiments, except the First and Fifth
Michigan, preceding it. The First Michigan brought up the rear.
Fitzhugh Lee was completely foiled in his effort to get in Custer's
rear, or to break up his flanks. Unfortunately, a portion of one
battalion of the Fifth Michigan, about fifty men, under command of Major
John Clark, with Captain Lee and Adjutant George Barse was captured.
Being dismounted in the woods on the right, they were not able to reach
their horses before being intercepted by the enemy's mounted men.
Custer, on the whole, was very fortunate and had reason to congratulate
himself on escaping with so little damage. Davies did not fare so well.
When Kilpatrick found that Custer was attacked, he sent orders to Davies
to retreat. But the sound of firing which gave this notice to Kilpatrick
was also the prearranged signal for Stuart, and that officer immediately
turned on Davies with his entire division, and Davies though he put up
a stout resistance had no alternative finally but to take to the woods
on the north side of the pike and escape, "every man for himself."
Fitzhugh Lee was between him and the bridge, he was hemmed in on three
sides, and in order to escape, his men had to plunge in and swim their
horses across Broad Run. The Fifth Michigan, except Major Clark's
command, escaped in the same way. The wagons, which followed Davies,
including Custer's headquarters wagon containing all his papers, were
captured.
At first blush, it may appear that, if the vidette who fired the first
shot, thus divulging the fact of the enemy's presence, had not done so,
the Sixth Michigan would have gone on and marched right into Fitzhugh
Lee's arms. It is not likely, however, that such would have been the
result. Captain Lovell had already seen and called attention to the
picket, declaring that he was a "rebel." The obvious course, under the
circumstances, before taking down the fence and advancing to the woods,
would have been to deploy a skirmish line and feel of the woods instead
of blundering blindly into them.
Fitzhugh Lee made a mistake in halting to dismount. He should have
charged the Sixth Michigan. Had he charged at once mounted as Rosser did
in the Wilderness, with his overwhelmingly superior force at the moment
of his arrival he must certainly have interposed between Custer and the
bridge. He allowed one regiment to detain his division until Custer
could bring back his brigade, and get his regiments into position to
support each other.
Major H.B. McClellan, Stuart's adjutant general, commenting in his
book[20] on this battle, says that "Custer was a hard fighter, even on a
retreat." He also says:
"Fitzhugh Lee had come up from Auburn expecting to gain, unopposed,
the rear of Kilpatrick's division, but he found Custer's brigade at
Broad Run ready to oppose him. A fierce fight ensued."
Major McClellan also quotes Major P.P. Johnston, who commanded a section
of Breathed's battery in the fight, as saying:
"My battery was hotly engaged. The battle was of the most obstinate
character, Fitz. Lee exerting himself to the utmost to push the
enemy, and Custer seeming to have no thought of retiring."
The battle was opened by Wickham's brigade of Virginians commanded by
Colonel T.H. Owen of the Third Virginia cavalry. It was the First,
Second and Third Virginia that led the advance. Pennington gave
Breathed's battery much the worst of it.
The truth is that Fitz. Lee did not find Custer ready to oppose him,
though it did not take him long to get ready, after he was attacked.
Custer with most of his command was well on his way to follow
Kilpatrick. Only one regiment was left behind, and that one
regiment--the Sixth Michigan cavalry--was taken entirely by surprise
when fired upon by the vidette, and was all that Colonel Owen had in
front of him when he arrived and began the attack. It is possible that
ignorance of what it was facing helped the Sixth Michigan to hold on
till Custer could be notified and brought back. And again, it is
possible that Custer was marching more slowly than the writer wots of;
that he suspected the ruse which was being played by his old West Point
instructor,[21] and sent the regiment out there for the express purpose
of developing the enemy, if enemy there was, making a feint of moving
away so as to deceive, but keeping an ear to windward to catch the first
sound of danger. It has always seemed to the writer that General Custer
must have had a motive which did not appear on the surface, in giving
that order. His order was to go 500 yards. Five hundred yards would have
brought us to the woods. If he suspected that there might be an enemy
there, no surer way to find out whether his suspicions were well founded
or not could have been chosen. One thing is certain. He was back in an
incredibly short space of time. It may be that he heard the sound of
firing and was on his way when the adjutant found him.
Fitzhugh Lee followed Custer half way to Gainesville and then withdrew.
Near that place was found a line of federal infantry sent out to support
the cavalry, but it did not advance far enough to get into the fight.
That night, Kilpatrick invited all the officers of the division to his
headquarters and made a sorry attempt at merry-making over the events of
the day. There were milk-punch and music, both of very good quality, but
the punch, palatable as it undeniably was, did not serve to take away
the bad taste left by the affair, especially among the officers of the
First brigade. Custer's men did not feel so badly. They had saved their
bacon and their battery, and the wariness, prudence and pluck of their
young commander had prevented a much more serious disaster than had
actually happened.
It may be of interest enough to mention that Fitz. Lee told the writer,
in Yorktown, in 1881, that Stuart was at fault in stopping to fight at
Buckland Mills; that, under the arrangement with him (Lee) Stuart should
have fallen back very rapidly, without making any resistance whatever,
until he had lured Kilpatrick with his entire division some distance
beyond the bridge. In that event, General Lee would have found the
opportunity he was seeking. But he did not know about Custer's action in
insisting on stopping there. He was much surprised when informed of the
true state of things, since he had felt that Stuart was blameworthy in
the matter. He had supposed that it was Stuart's resistance to the
federal advance which kept Custer's brigade back until his arrival, and
foiled his well planned attempt.