command of Company B stood in front of it, and supposing he was
going to advance in that position, I (then Second Lieutenant Company
D, but assigned to fight with my old Company B that day), also took
my position in front of the Company expecting to advance in the same
way, but was finally ordered just before advancing, by Stetson,
to go to the right of the front rank in line, where I supposed in
my ignorance of warfare, although a fair tactician, I had got to
remain and did until the line broke in the second advance, Stetson
meantime being a novice in fighting men in battle, going to the rear
of the Company. As it may be convenient for the good of the service
for some to cite this battle, together with others, to Congressmen
as an important reason why men with no experience in battle should
never be placed in high position to command men especially in the
regular army where it can generally be avoided, I feel constrained
to state that the derisive smile and expression on the men's faces,
etc., as I turned to obey Stetson's order plainly showed that they
disapproved of any such arrangement and persistently hung back
in the advance in consequence, which to say the least, was very
embarrassing to a proud spirit, my pride being very much centered
in my old Company, which I knew, if properly handled, would give a
good account of itself. Several times I was greatly tempted to go
in front of the men and lead them, as it was plain to be seen they
sensibly wouldn't be driven at a slow gait into battle like so many
lambs for slaughter without even being given the command to fire
when within a stone's throw of the enemy, which with deadly aim was
shooting them down deliberately, for there was nothing to prevent
its doing so on our part, and why shouldn't it do so? It was war,
that's what we were there for, and being veteran fighters they took
advantage of the situation. Who wouldn't? The only trouble with us
was there wasn't anyone with authority from the highest officer down
on that part of the line, who knew how to fight the command or if
there was they didn't do it. But they were not to blame for it. Who
was? It was the Congress which makes the laws for the Government of
the army; it has never enacted a law as important as it is, making
it impossible to appoint men to high army positions who have never
been in battle enough to know how to take care of their men, or to
tell the officers of their command how to do so.
But realizing that to lead the Company and make a dash for the fence
would be virtually taking the command from my superior officer, and
only at that time having a crude idea of such things even in such
an emergency, I held my peace, although the comparatively simple
act of leading men in battle in the circumstances, as some Company
Commanders did in this fight, would have been much more satisfactory
to my troubled spirit than otherwise. As First Sergeant it was
generally acknowledged I had made Company B the best drilled and
disciplined Company in the regiment, and feeling much genuine pride
in the Company I had never felt more anxious for it than in this
battle, as I wanted it to give a good account of itself as a good
fighting Company as well, which it did in the latter part of the
battle, when it largely went over the fence in an endeavor to help
make the star movement of the day, but which it failed in helping to
do, because of the weakness of some of the left Company Commanders
of the regiment. Although General Wm. H. Morris in his official
report of the fight cites this movement as due to enthusiasm on
the part of the men on the left of the Tenth Vermont, had he been
on that part of the line he would not only have commended it in
stronger terms than he did, but if a good strategist would have
insisted on the movement being executed as if it was worth while
to engage the enemy at all here--which is now greatly doubted as
Meade's army wasn't then ready for a general engagement--it was
certainly worth while to try and turn the enemy's flank at this
point, which could have been done by advancing the three left
companies of the regiment by a two-thirds right turn or wheel across
the before-mentioned angle to the second fence. The enemy understood
the importance of the move, which was one reason doubtless that made
them contest so stubbornly the first line of fence. This we tried
to do and in the second assault the men, led by some of the most
daring wisely broke and made a dash for the first fence and over
it half across the open field of the triangle to the second fence
when we were recalled to the first behind which most had stopped
and opened fire, including Stetson, Captain Hiram R. Steele and
others. I was the only officer over the fence, so far as seen by
me, and had fearlessly endeavored seeing at a glance an opportunity
for an effective flank movement which would greatly relieve the
entire brigade to the right to take the second line of fence on the
opposite side of the triangle, which was just what was needed, and
which could have been done if the movement had been supported with
vim by the entire left wing of the regiment. During the day private
G. D. Storrs was killed, and Sergeant H. M. Pierce, of Montpelier,
and privates John Blanchard and Lafayette G. Ripley, of Barre, Peter
Bover, H. W. Crossett, J. M. Mather and W. M. Thayer, and perhaps
others of Company B, all brave good men, were so badly wounded as to
disable most of them, such as did not die, for the balance of the
war for duty at the front; but two or more of these died of their
wounds.
Feeling nettled, although not in command of Company B, and not
responsible for its behavior, at Colonel Jewett's brusque manner
towards it in the ravine, when it was discovered that the flank
movement before mentioned, would be a failure for want of support,
in order to say I had been the furtherest to the front of anyone
over the fence or in the regiment, I foolishly ran forward under
heavy fire a few steps after ordered back, to a big stump, hit
it with my sword savagely, as I was disgusted at not being fully
supported, when on turning round I found myself alone with bullets
flying about me faster than ever, and the men rapidly scaling the
fence twenty-five yards in rear on the left in full retreat from the
angle. The men of Company B had gone the furtherest ahead of any
over the fence, Stetson and others repeatedly calling, "Come back!
Come back!" As usual, whenever there was an exceedingly hot place
on the line of battle in our front, Alexander Scott, A. H. Crown
and others of the Burlington Company (D), as well as Z. M. Mansur,
the Bruces, W. H. Blake, Judson Spofferd, J. W. Bancroft and others
of Company K, were sure to be there fighting vigorously in the very
front, as most of them were on this occasion. Fully forty or more
men were with me from the three left companies, and it is regretted
more of them can't be remembered by name, but the movement was too
quickly executed, to go minutely into details, and forty years is a
long time for a professional soldier where he has had to do with so
many enlisted men meantime, to remember names.
Says General W. H. Morris in his official report of this battle
which as a whole is not in the best judgment, although he was a
brave, courageous man: "The enemy was holding a fence on the crest
of a hill in our front. I ordered the Tenth Vermont to charge and
take it, and the regiment advanced in gallant style and took the
crest. The left wing in its enthusiasm having advanced too far
beyond the fence, it was necessary to recall it * * * I cannot speak
of the conduct of the officers and men with too much praise." The
regiment's loss was seventy-one killed and wounded, of which eight
were from Company B. This loss was as needless as the fight, as we
suspected at the time, and as history has proved since.
Like most other engagements the most deserving who are generally
on the fighting line where their work is not usually seen by such
as can reward them in orders or otherwise, it was favorite staff
officers and pets who were mentioned for gallantry in general orders
afterwards. Had the men advanced less regularly in line as at drill,
more independently and rapidly, firing meantime when in range of
the enemy, our loss in comparison with what it was would have been
insignificant. All the rest of the brigade had a less trying time
of it than the three left companies of the Tenth Vermont, as they
were advancing through the woods with no open field in front with
two natural lines of breastworks, such as the formidable rail fences
which bordered both long sides of the triangle before mentioned.
This statement is in justice to the three left companies of the
Tenth Vermont. The manner in which they stood the galling fire
without breaking shows what splendid discipline they were under. I
commanded all three companies afterwards in battle separately, and
felt honored in doing so. There were few skulkers in these companies
in any battle they were ever in when under my command.
This battle is another illustration of the folly of appointing
men inexperienced in scientific warfare to high military office
if it can be avoided, and it generally can be in time of peace,
especially in the regular army. Every army, Corps, Division, Brigade
and Regimental Commander, should be a man who has had enough
actual experience in fighting to know how to take care of his men
in battle. If such had been the case in this fight, comparatively
few men would have been killed or wounded. It is criminal to make
any man a general, especially in the regular army, who has not
had enough experience in actual fighting to know how to fight his
command without an unnecessary loss of life; and Congress which
has the authority and is indirectly responsible in such matters,
should make laws such as will render it impossible to do so except
in emergencies, and until it does so every individual member of
Congress will be criminally guilty before God for every man so
sacrificed in battle. It is not known to me whose fault it was that
orders were not given to advance more rapidly, and to fire sooner in
the fight at Locust Grove.
ADDENDA NO. 2.
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, VA., OCT. 19, 1864. AND THE STATUS OF THE
SIXTH CORPS WITH GENERALS GRANT AND SHERIDAN.
I was absent wounded in Vermont at the time of the battle of Cedar
Creek, Va., and only know that my regiment fought desperately and
lost heavily in killed and wounded. Captain Lucian D. Thompson of
Waterbury, Vt., was decapitated by a solid shot from the enemy
and Captain Chester F. Nye, Adjutant Wyllys Lyman and Lieutenants
George E. Davis, B. Brooks Clark, Austin W. Fuller and George P.
Welch were wounded. From June 1st to October 19, 1864, we had seven
officers killed which included all the officers who originally went
out with my old Company B, twelve wounded and two captured, making
twenty-one in all. Surely, the blood shed in the Tenth Vermont for
the preservation of the Union should satisfy the most exacting that
the regiment stood up to the rack all through the Civil War from
the time it entered it.
After the morning surprise at Cedar Creek, Oct. 19, 1864, just a
month after the battle of Winchester, the Sixth Corps, I was told
by officers of my regiment afterwards, was the only unstampeded
infantry organization in the command around which General H. G.
Wright soon rallied the better part of the surprised little army
which Sheridan, after his historic ride of "Twenty Miles Away" from
Winchester, found awaiting him ready to advance and again punish the
enemy which it most effectually did. It was the last fight in the
valley of the Civil War, and it was fitting that the Sixth Corps
should have been allowed so largely to have so brilliantly rung
down the curtain on the great Civil War stage in this section. The
Sixth Corps was the mainstay of Sheridan's brilliant little army
in the Shenandoah Valley campaign, and no one knew it better than
he. When the spring campaign opened in 1865, he wanted it at Five
Forks again, but Grant wanted it, too, at the same time to break
the backbone of the Confederacy by breaking its lines in front of
Petersburg on that memorable morning of April 2nd, 1865, which
was the greatest possible honor of the day, and it did it. When
given his choice by Grant of any corps in the army of the Potomac,
Sheridan again called for it, too, a few days later, April 6, 1865,
at Sailor's Creek, Va., the last real battle fought in the Civil War
by the Army of the Potomac, when the Sixth Corps was rushed forward
by Grant's order at pell-mell speed, where in another of Sheridan's
characteristic, snappy, short, effective, two-hour fights, it
largely helped to capture several--said to be eleven--general
officers, 13,000[37] prisoners and a burning wagon train, almost
an entire column, excepting about 2,000 of General Lee's fleeing
veterans, including himself, three days before his surrender at
Appomattox. It was fitting, too, here, that the Sixth Corps should
largely fight this battle and thus again brilliantly and virtually
finally ring down the stage curtain of the greatest war tragedy of
modern times--The Great Civil War.
[37] So reported then. Generals Ewell and Custis Lee surrendered to
our brigade. The guard was about to force them to wade a swollen
morass about fifty yards wide, waist deep, but Ewell demurred. The
guard said he had to wade it going over for them, and that it was no
more than fair that they should wade it going back. Ewell replied
that it took brave men to do it under fire, but that the necessity
no longer existed for any one to wade it going either way, and so
won the best of the argument, and his wish.
Surely with all the brag and conceit in late years by members
of other corps, that its corps was the best in the Army of the
Potomac--and the Second as well as the Fifth were fine corps, and
probably both these and the Sixth Corps were about equal--neither
Grant nor Sheridan could have regarded the Sixth as an unreliable
one, or second to any as a fighting corps however often members of
other corps may conceitedly dub theirs the best in the army. And
what other than the Sixth Corps can point to any such enviable
_repeated_ preferences on the part of both Grant and Sheridan, or to
such a proud record in the closing scenes of the great rebellion?
Would they not be glad to do so if they could? And still neither of
the able commanders of the Sixth Corps--Sedgwick and Wright--have
been honored by an appropriation for a monument by Congress in the
capital city of the Nation which the Sixth Corps twice saved, once
at the battle of the Monocacy, largely by the Third Division, July
9th, and again three days later largely by the First and Second
Divisions at the battle in front of Ft. Stevens in the suburbs of
Washington, July 12th, 1864, when Early came so near capturing the
city.
I do not believe in being invidious, but having been satiated for
years by the egotistic statements of the superior qualifications
by members of other corps of their particular corps, especially in
Washington, and knowing only too well from long experience that
frequently _true_ merit goes unrewarded in history and otherwise,
because of an over-modest inclination to mention facts by those
interested who _can_, when organizations and persons less worthy get
more than is due by being more aggressive, is one of the reasons
for my partially treating this matter. There was _no_ corps, during
the last few months of the war, to which Grant and Sheridan more
frequently turned in emergencies than to the Sixth Corps, which
is significant, as it shows their estimate of its merits as a
_reliable_ fighting corps, over all others. The Sixth Corps was
ever proud of the Second and Fifth Corps and felt honored in being
associated with such splendid organizations in the same army all
through the Civil War, but the Sixth Corps yields the palm to no
other in the whole Union Army east or west when it comes to fighting
or any other soldierly qualifications pertaining to a model army
corps.
Said General Grant in the closing scenes of the Civil War: "I can
trust the Sixth Corps anywhere." Said General Sheridan: "Give me the
Sixth Corps and I will charge anywhere."
ADDENDA NO. 3.
FINAL BREAKING OF THE ENEMY'S LINES BY THE SIXTH ARMY CORPS, APRIL
2, 1865, AT THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
This memorable siege extending over a period of several months, was
full of exciting, eventful fights, but none more so than the final
assault on the main works, April 2, 1865. For three nights the Sixth
Corps, which had been selected by General Grant to break the main
line of the formidable-looking fortifications in and near its front
to its left, around Petersburg, because of its known reliability for
any work assigned it, had been ordered out between the lines as
noiselessly as possible about midnight, and directed to lie in line
of battle on the ground about two hundred yards from the enemy's
picket line for the purpose of a morning assault. The First Brigade
of the Third Division composed of five regiments, the One Hundred
and Sixth and One Hundred and Fifty-first New York, Fourteenth New
Jersey, Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania and Tenth Vermont Volunteer
Infantry, was formed in three lines, the Tenth Vermont being on the
right and the One Hundred and Sixth New York on the left forming the
front line, the brigade being on the left of the Division and Corps
near Fort Fisher on the side towards Hatcher's Run. As the distance
between the works of the belligerent forces was the least here of
any point along the front of the Sixth Corps probably, as claimed
by Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Damon, in his official report, the
colors of the Tenth Vermont were the first over the enemy's works in
the Third Division though it is difficult to understand how in the
darkness and confusion anyone could _positively_ know this.
The nights were cold and after the first one those who were
fortunate enough to possess a rubber raincoat, as I was, put it
on over the blue overcoat which, when the sword belt was on made
one fairly comfortable even after lying on the ground for a long
time. We were not allowed to talk or move about which made the
blood sluggish, and lying on the cold frosty ground most of the
night, together with the surroundings, etc., was not conducive
to cheerfulness, warmth or comfort. To our right, in front of
Petersburg, the artillery firing was unusually brisk and even
appalling. The damp heavy powder smoke-laden atmosphere was stifling
as the dense smoke from the ominous artillery fire of hundreds of
guns all along the lines from Richmond to Five Forks, about forty
miles, except where General Park's Corps and the Sixth Corps were,
where later in the night in front of the Sixth Corps, the grand
finale of the battle that was to soon bring peace to our stricken
country and rest to two valiant armies, was to take place, settled
to the ground, which added to the gloom of a terrible night of
waiting and suspense, as had been the previous two when so situated.
The enemy's earthworks were very formidable,[38] fully eight feet
high and in places still higher between thickly interspersed forts
and redoubts and especially in front of our brigade, in front of
which works was a ditch or moat about eight feet deep and wide,
partially filled with water, bridged at intervals of about fifty
yards and in some places much less, with a single log hewn flat on
top for the use of the pickets. In front of this moat there were
_three_--_not "one or two"_ as stated in General H. G. Wright's
official report--lines of heavy _abatis_ and _chevaux-de-frise_
heavily wired together. With a strong force well in hand behind this
formidable array of works it would have been impregnable against
any assaulting column of infantry alone. The pioneer corps, Capt.
S. H. Perham commanding had been assigned the unenviable task of
cutting away the _abatis_ and _chevaux-de-frise_ in places as it
advanced with us to enable the men to pass. During the night word
was passed along the line that it was not known from which flank
the movement to advance would begin, but to follow it whichever way
it came from by advancing as it reached each company. This threw
great responsibility on me as my company was in the front line and
on the right of the brigade. I knew nothing of the signal gun for
the general advance to be fired from Fort Fisher at "about 4.45"
o'clock a. m.; indeed if it was fired amid the din I did not know
it or its significance. I had just been promoted Captain of Company
G, overslaughing several other First Lieutenants who had been less
regularly on the fighting line.
[38] The size of these redoubts, Fort, adjacent works, moat, etc.,
in front of our brigade in any description I have ever seen have
always been greatly dwarfed. I fought over them about three hours
and know whereof I write.
To the right of Company G, there was no connecting line that could
be seen, owing to the darkness. Not then knowing the division
formation I was much perplexed over this, and finally after
directing the men on the left of the Company, which joined the next
company to the left, to advance with the line in case the movement
forward commenced with the left flank, I concluded for obvious
reasons to take my position on the right of my company, where
intently watching and listening for any advance in that direction,
supposing I could hear it and that I could rely on the left guide of
my Company to do as directed, I paid no attention to the left flank;
but shortly after the line had advanced and before any firing had
occurred in our front on the advancing column, one of the men, more
conscientious than the guide on the left of the Company, who had
heard my orders to him came to me and said the line to the left had
advanced a little before, but it had done so so silently everything
on the person, canteens, etc., that would make a noise having been
tied fast, in the darkness, smoke and din the advance hadn't been
seen or heard by me to the left of the Company where it commenced.