guns and brasses, and above all the proudly borne but to us hated
banner of the Confederacy with its stars and bars, was a spectacle
rarely surpassed in the bright sunlight of a perfect summer day. I
for one looked on the scene with mingled feelings of bitterness,
dread and awe, for they were so far away there was nothing else to
do. As soon as they first appeared on the hill all firing largely
ceased in my front on the skirmish lines and everything was as
hushed later save the indistinct distant battle cry of the enemy as
on a Sabbath day even the men looking at the spectacle in silent
awe for apparently the enemy which greatly outnumbered us, was
making directly for our part of the line. On, on, they came down the
long slope, through a wide little valley out of sight every moment
seeming an age until finally they appeared about a half mile away
still in excellent order when they slightly changed direction to
their left along the hills near the river which greatly relieved
my anxiety inasmuch as we wouldn't have to bear the brunt of the
attack; but a suspicion of being cut off from the rest of the line
and captured, which I feared a little later, made the situation
still more trying. On they came, swaying first one way and then
another, keeping us in breathless suspense, but determined to hold
our ground as long as possible when the shock of battle should
come. Finally as they got near enough to be shelled our artillery
opened on them to our right and then the infantry supporting it
when the enemy's lines wavered and broke and they were temporarily
repulsed until reinforced.[7] I was then ordered with Company D
about a half mile more or less to my right nearer the left centre
of our line from the railroad to support with others four or more
guns of Alexander's battery, in a sharp artillery duel with the
enemy across the Monocacy in which First Lieutenant C. E. Evans, an
unassuming, quiet officer, but good fighter, took an active part and
did excellent work, together with Second Lieutenant P. Leary--now
Brigadier-General U. S. A., retired--of that battery. It was here,
too, that I was painfully wounded by an exploding shell from the
enemy on the tip of the right hip bone. It was so bad that Major J.
A. Salsbury of my regiment advised me to go to Colonel Henry for
permission to go to the rear as it was well known that soon the
Union forces would have to hastily retreat as the enemy had crossed
the Monocacy river on both flanks and were fast surrounding our
intrepid little force with overwhelming numbers, which, when the
order came to retreat meant a rapid one and Salsbury, an elderly
man, did not think me in condition to keep from being captured.
[7] It was here that General Early mentions in his "Personal
Memoirs" of this battle, an extract from which will be found further
along, that he had to send General Gordon's Division to reinforce
McCausland under the superintendence of General Breckenridge,
etc. This was what kept us waiting so long after McCausland's
repulse, it took so long to get reinforcements across the river.
It was the desperate fighting here, too, where there were three
or more separate assaults, that years afterwards drew forth an
acknowledgment from Gordon that it was one of the hardest fights he
had ever been in or to that effect, and that it caused the waters of
the Monocacy to run red with the mingled blood of the blue and the
gray.
Knowing that every one who possibly could should remain on the
fighting line in such a vital emergency as the possible loss of the
National Capital, and especially an officer, for the effect such an
example would have on the men, and being the only officer with and
in command of my Company, I declined to ask for such permission.
Major Salsbury rather emphatically in effect replied: "If you don't
go and ask Colonel Henry for permission to go to the rear, I shall
go myself!" and he did. Before he returned, the whole limb having
been numbed by the shock produced by the shell, the reaction had
caused excruciating pain, especially at the sensitive point where
the glancing butt end of a shell in full flight had mangled the
flesh and turned it black and blue for several inches around.[8] It
was the sensitive end of the hip bone, however, which afterwards
affected the whole limb producing with age numbness especially
in the toes and heel of the foot and of the whole limb when on
horseback scouting for Indians after the Civil War, which disability
was one of the principal causes of my retirement from active service
in the regular army in 1885, that was most affected. Lying on the
ground with blanched face and clenched teeth to keep from crying out
with pain, which pride prevented, Major Salsbury returned, and to
my amusement, even in such circumstances, jerkily took the position
of a soldier, saluted his junior officer, then a Second Lieutenant,
who was still lying on the ground in great distress, in the most
respectful and dignified way saying, disappointedly, sympathetically
and snappishly, for obvious reasons, with an anxious look: "Colonel
Henry has denied my request!" or to that effect.
[8] As time and history has developed other facts in connection with
this battle and this wound, it is fitting that the facts should be
introduced here, which will be the case from this time on in the
case of battles.
While these events were transpiring, First Lieutenant G. E. Davis,
of Company D, Tenth Vermont, who after Captain Samuel Darrah of that
Company--a most intrepid fighter,--was killed at Cold Harbor, had
commanded Company D, but was now in command of the skirmish line on
the opposite or west side of the Monocacy River where he so ably
directed, fought and finally withdrew it with so much dash,--he and
some of his men sensationally escaping by running along the ties
under fire across the open railroad bridge forty feet above the
water, Private Thomas O'Brien of Company D, Tenth Vermont, falling
through the bridge into the river and escaping,--as to attract the
attention of General Lew Wallace, and thereby won lasting fame
and was also awarded a Medal of Honor later on. For some reason
Major C. G. Chandler had left his command, when it fell to Captain
C. J. Brown, the next in rank, who, being inexperienced, and the
skirmishers in a hot place and hard pressed, sensibly relinquished
his command to Lieutenant Davis who had had more experience, and
thus had enviable fame and valor most dramatically forced upon him,
although he was grandly equal to the emergency.
Within a very short time after I was wounded the valiant little
command was in places virtually cutting its way through the enemy's
lines, which almost completely enveloped it, in full retreat. It was
during this time that one of the color guard, Corporal Alexander
Scott, a brave and efficient soldier of the same Company (D, of
Burlington), who was retreating near me under a hot fusilade of shot
and shell, saved the regimental colors from capture for which he
deservedly afterwards, partly on my recommendation, received a Medal
of Honor. But I did not take to being captured as some who were even
able-bodied did, and hobbled away. Feeling piqued, however, because
not allowed to go sooner to the rear from the battlefield in my
maimed condition--although I would not have gone anyway, but wanted
permission because I thought I deserved it, as up to that time I had
never asked to do so in any battle--still I made no complaint to
anyone afterwards, but stubbornly, grieved and in constant pain,
marched with my command all night and the following day to the Relay
House, near Baltimore, bathing the wound occasionally en route with
cool water from a friendly well or running stream as I passed,
which was a great relief. But my feelings were greatly wounded at
the lack of consideration received, as I thought, from Colonel
Henry. As my pride got the best of my judgment I have suffered in
consequence ever since. Had I ridden instead of marched, it would
have at least saved a game leg and hip of undue strain and possibly
from disappointing results afterwards, for had I been in active
service at the breaking out of the Spanish-American war, as I would
have been but for this wound, it goes without saying that I would
then have been given high rank with others of my rank at that time
and in the end retired from active service with the rank any way of
Major-General.
Owing to a greatly superior force we were obliged to fall back in
disorder having eleven officers and five hundred and forty enlisted
men captured and leaving most of our wounded and dead on the field.
For some unaccountable reason the three regiments of the Second
Brigade mentioned in this diary yesterday as not having arrived
were detained at Monrovia, Md., a station on the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad about eight miles east of Monocacy and were not in the
fight. If they had been, I believe we could have stood the enemy off
even longer than we did, and Early might not think of appearing
before Washington--though this is doubtful--which he may now do. I
cannot understand though, why veteran troops should have been kept
in reserve if such was the case in such a contingency--the capital
of the nation being in jeopardy--instead of hundred days' men or in
fact any force whatever. It seems to me that in case they were not
kept in reserve purposely by competent authority, someone should
be courtmartialed and punished, let it fall where it may, and that
General Lew Wallace should insist upon it in justice to himself and
to the gallant men who so valiantly fought of the Third Division as
to hold an enemy so greatly outnumbering us at bay for almost an
entire day.[9]
[9] Colonel J. W. Keifer of the Second Brigade says in his
official report of this battle that the regiments at Monrovia were
unnecessarily detained by Colonel J. F. Staunton.--See Haynes'
History Tenth Regiment Vermont Infantry.
If General Lee knew the _facts_ in the premises it would not redound
to General Early's military valor, genius or judgment so far as
his conduct of this battle is concerned, any way. He ought to have
driven us from the field at once, and would with his usual dash.
Had he done so, he might capture Washington and may now if other
troops haven't been sent from the Army of the Potomac, but I'm sure
they have. The enemy is estimated at 20,000 strong. At any rate it
is many times our size as I could see it from a hilltop where I was
during a part of the battle. We are falling back over the pike to
the Relay House.
General Early says in his "Memoirs" in regard to this fight:
"McCausland, crossing the river with his brigade, dismounted his men
and advanced rapidly against the enemy's left flank, which he threw
into confusion, but he was then gradually forced back. McCausland's
movement, which was brilliantly executed, solved the problem for
me, and orders were sent to Breckenridge to move up rapidly with
Gordon's Division to McCausland's assistance, and, striking the
enemy's left, drive him from the position commanding the crossings
in Ramseur's front, so that the latter might cross. The Division
crossed under the personal superintendence of General Breckenridge,
and, while Ramseur skirmished with the enemy in front,"--which
didn't deceive us at all--"the attack was made by Gordon in gallant
style, and with the aid of several pieces of King's artillery, which
had been crossed over, and Nelson's artillery from the opposite
side, he threw the enemy into great confusion and forced him from
his position, Ramseur immediately crossed on the railroad bridge and
pursued the enemy's flying forces; and Rhodes crossed on the left
and joined in the pursuit. Between six hundred and seven hundred
unwounded prisoners fell into their hands, and the enemy's loss in
killed and wounded was very heavy. Our loss in killed and wounded
was about seven hundred. The action closed about sunset."
According to General Grant's "Memoirs," Early's command at this time
consisted of four divisions or twenty brigades, composed of the very
sinew or hardened veterans made so from the constant fighting of
sixty-five depleted regiments of infantry, three brigades of cavalry
and three battalions of artillery since the commencement of the war.
It must be taken into consideration, too, that the corps, divisions
and brigades of the Confederate army were just as big again when
its army was reorganized in 1863, as ours. The foregoing does not
include the brigades of infantry composing Breckenridge's division
as its composition is unknown to me, but all of which confronted
us on some part of the field together with the other foregoing
mentioned organizations. At one time we were fighting in our two
fronts to our left center, facing southerly and westerly, forty-five
infantry regiments and more, McCausland's brigade of dismounted
cavalry, and several pieces if not all of Nelson's and King's
artillery either on one side of the river or the other; fourteen of
which infantry regiments were with Ramseur on our west front across
the river and thirty-one with Gordon in our south front near the
Thomas house on the east side of the river behind which a line of
McCausland's dismounted cavalry was formed by Gordon, after it was
defeated in its first assault.
Although General Early admits that it took until about sunset to
fairly dispose of us, it being then mid-summer when the days are
about the longest of the year, what he says as a whole, in some
respects is misleading. He did not at once rout us as soon as
Gordon's assault commenced at about 3 o'clock p. m. as even with
the help of McCausland's brigade and Nelson's and King's artillery
he was repulsed, when he says himself he asked twice that another
brigade be sent him from the west side of the river and even then
after getting it he was held in check some time when, General Rhodes
having forced a crossing on our right at or near the Baltimore pike,
and having to weaken our line at the railroad bridge to reinforce
our line in front of Gordon, we were so weak that a retreat was
ordered, being fast surrounded, but we didn't give up until told
to. The Ninth Regiment of New York Heavy Artillery, one Hundred
and Sixth, One Hundred and Tenth, One Hundred and Twenty-sixth and
One Hundred and Fifty-first Regiments of New York Infantry, and
the Fourteenth New Jersey not being fortunate as was the Tenth
Vermont in finding natural breastworks in their front at first,
their casualties were larger than in the other regiments or at least
than in the Tenth Vermont. General Tyler's command lost one officer
and fourteen enlisted men killed, four officers and seventy-nine
enlisted men wounded, seven officers and one hundred and sixteen
enlisted men were captured or missing, making a total of two hundred
and twenty-one casualties all told in that command. Early levied a
contribution of $200,000 on Frederick, burnt Governor Bradford's
suburban residence, Postmaster-General Blair's home at Silver
Springs, in the suburbs of Washington, D. C., and later Chambersburg
and Williamsport, as well as other small places which did not pay
tribute in money.
General Gordon, when speaking of this fight to a survivor on the
Union side afterwards, stated that it was one of the hardest fights
he saw during the war and he was in many, many of them. A division
of his command and McCausland's brigade confronted six or more
regiments of the Third Division, including the Tenth Vermont, and
still the enemy here had to be reinforced. Let us hope that Time,
our kindliest and truest friend in all things but One, will yet
place the brilliant little Battle of the Monocacy in history before
the world as it belongs.
General Grant in his "Personal Memoirs" makes this interesting
reference to Monocacy: "The force under General Wallace was small
in numbers to move against Early. The situation in Washington was
precarious. Wallace moved with commendable promptitude and met the
enemy at Monocacy. He could hardly have expected to gain a victory,
but hoped to cripple and delay the enemy until Washington could be
put in a state of preparation to meet Early. With Rickett's Division
at Monocacy on time, Wallace succeeded in stopping Early for the day
on which the battle took place.
"The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of the
Nation, arriving before it on the 11th. Learning of the gravity
of the situation, I ordered Meade to send the other two Divisions
of the Sixth Corps to Washington for the relief of the city. The
latter reached there the very day that Early arrived before it. The
Nineteenth Corps, under General Emory, arrived in Washington from
Fort Monroe about the same time.
"Early made his reconnoissance with the view of attacking the city
on the 12th, but the next morning he found intrenchments fully
manned. He commenced to retreat, with the Sixth Corps following.
There is no telling how much this result was contributed to by
General Lew Wallace's leading at Monocacy what might well have been
considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day
sooner, he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the
forces I had sent there.
"Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not,
General Wallace contributed on this occasion a greater benefit to
the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal
force to render by means of a victory."
One would get the impression from the foregoing, that the whole of
Rickett's Division was engaged at Monocacy. It was not. Two and a
half regiments or more, I was credibly informed at the time and have
been since, was in a train of cars eight miles to the rear as before
stated. The reason for this, it was said, was because the engineer
refused to go with the train any nearer the front; but, if so, why
not have marched, or better still, have compelled the engineer at
the point of a bayonet and loaded gun to have taken the train to
the front? Surely the commanding officer of that force could not
have been a model soldier or man of force, and much less an ardent,
devoted patriot, in this instance.
According to Dr. E. M. Haynes' History of the Tenth Vermont, the
Union loss in killed, wounded and missing in this fight was 1,294,
of which 1,072 were of Rickett's Third Division of the Sixth Corps.
There were eleven officers and five hundred and forty-nine enlisted
men taken prisoners, thirty-five officers and five hundred and
seventy-five enlisted men wounded and ten officers and one hundred
and thirteen enlisted men killed. Early mentions the killed and
wounded of his command in his official report as "about" seven
hundred, which was about the same as ours, showing when the strength
of the two commands is taken into consideration, about three to one,
how desperately our force contested every inch of ground at Monocacy
in this fight. The Third Division lost fully one-fourth or more of
its men engaged. General Ricketts, one of the best fighting generals
in the army and much beloved by his men, commanded the Third
Division, Sixth Corps and was second in command to General Wallace
of all the forces there.
The Battle of the Monocacy for obvious reasons, was one of the most
stubbornly contested fights and the most important in its result
of any I was in during the war. It is remarkable when it is taken
into consideration that the Union force of about 5,850 men--of whom
about 2,500 had never fired a gun in real battle--and seven pieces
of artillery, with no trains or reserve ammunition of any kind, not
even a newspaper reporter, so suddenly by reason of Early's invasion
had everything come about, could fight from 8 o'clock a. m. to 5
o'clock p. m., a force of from 15,000 to 20,000 of Lee's veterans,
and about forty pieces of field artillery with plenty of ammunition,
under such a dashing, strategic commander as General Early. But
through the grace of God, it is thought he was over-cautious in this
fight; he had lost his accustomed dash. It will ever be a disputed
point, however, exactly how many men Early had, as twenty-five years
after the battle General Lomax who was in it under Early, informed
me that many of Early's organizations had been so reduced from
constant fighting in the summer's campaign, that even regiments with
but few men left were commanded by non-commissioned officers who
made no morning reports and that the exact strength of Early's force
was unknown. Lomax placed it under 13,000 all told, but I think it
was more.
Great credit is due General Wallace for his excellent judgment in
his selection of a battlefield, as but for that to have fought
against such odds, whatever it was, would have been folly outside
the strong fortifications of Washington; but Baltimore had to be
protected, too, which necessitated the Battle of the Monocacy.
Wallace should have been commended in orders and thanked by Congress
for his splendid judgment and pluck to confront such an overwhelming
force as well as for the indirect benefits which resulted from his
having had the intrepidity to undertake, from a purely military
viewpoint, as Grant says "almost a forlorn hope"; but instead
of this he was ignominiously treated by General Halleck because
Wallace's command had not accomplished an impossibility, it is
presumed, by defeating Early. It should be vigorously resented in
history by every honest, fairminded man who is an advocate of fair
play, and especially by the surviving members of that intrepid
little army, discredited by General Halleck by his treatment of
Wallace, the stubbornness of which army, according to General
Gordon's official report of the fight, caused the waters of the
Monocacy to run red with the mingled blood of the blue and the gray
on that memorable day when it fought not only to save the National
Capital, but to prevent the disastrous moral and other effects its
loss would have produced, and the comfort it would have given to
northern copperheads, allies of the Confederacy, and especially to
the enemy wherever found. If Washington had fallen into the hands of
the enemy, even though only temporarily, at this time, it would of
course have been sacked and its public buildings destroyed; Grant's
plan of campaign, even if it hadn't put an end to his military
career, might have been changed, the Confederacy might possibly have
been recognized by foreign powers--for it is no small matter for an
enemy to occupy a belligerent's capital--and the war might have been
somewhat prolonged, if nothing more.
The ovation given that part of Rickett's Division of the famous
historic fighting Sixth Corps, which bore the brunt of the Monocacy
infantry fighting, as it marched up Pennsylvania Avenue a few
days later, and especially the bullet, shell, weather-beaten and
battle-torn flags of the Tenth Vermont, as they appeared along the
line of march, is a proud and pleasant memory never to be forgotten.
It was the event of the day, no other regiment within hearing,
receiving such a continuous and noisy reception. It will go with
the men of that most excellent regiment throughout eternity; it was
a proud day. The regiment had been one of the most valiant of some
nine or more in the Monocacy fight to save the capital; it was known
in Washington and it was pleasant to feel the city understood and
appreciated it. It has never been thought, though, by the survivors
of the command who fought in the Monocacy battle that the general
public did appreciate, or has since appreciated it, as a defeat
is generally looked upon as a disaster and with discredit; but
indirectly in this case it was a great victory, one of the most
important of the war for obvious reasons aside from having saved
the National Capital, as without the delay of a day or more, caused
by this fight. Early certainly would have found no veteran troops
to defend the city, for even as it was some of them had to double
quick through the city--a fact not before given in history it is
believed--into line of battle just north of it at Fort Stevens from
the transports which had brought them from in front of Petersburg
to fight Early whose appearance before the city they were just in
season to confront with hardly a moment to spare. Says Hon. L. E.
Chittenden, Registrar of the Treasury in his "Recollections of
President Lincoln and his Administration": "The importance of a
battle is determined by its ultimate consequences rather than its
immediate results. If that fought on the Monocacy did delay General
Early so as to save the capital from his assault and probable
capture, it was one of the decisive battles of the world."[10] Thus
we have the matter summed up here in barely two sentences for it did
delay Early just enough to save the capital.