_British Expedition to Calabria, under Sir John Stuart--Character
of the People--Opposed by General Reynier--Battle of Maida, 4th
July, 1806--Defeat of the French--Calabria evacuated by the
British--Erroneous Commercial Views, and Military Plans, of the
British Ministry--Unsuccessful Attack on Buenos Ayres--General
Whitelocke--is cashiered--Expedition against Turkey, and its
Dependencies--Admiral Duckworth's Squadron sent against
Constantinople--Passes and repasses the Dardanelles, without
accomplishing anything--Expedition against Alexandria--Rosetta
attacked--British troops defeated--and withdrawn from Egypt,
September, 1807--Curaçoa and Cape of Good Hope taken by
England--British Expedition against Copenhagen--its Citadel, Forts,
and Fleet, surrendered to the British--Effects of this proceeding
upon France and Russia--Coalition of France, Russia, Austria, and
Prussia, against British Commerce._
The treaty of Tilsit is an important point in the history of Napoleon.
At no time did his power seem more steadfastly rooted, more feebly
assailed. The canker-worm by which it was ultimately to be destroyed,
was, like that of the forest-tree, intrenched and hidden in the bosom of
him whom it was destined to sap and consume. It is a fitting time,
therefore, to take a general survey of the internal character of his
government, when the arrangements seemed to be at his own choice, and
ere misfortune, hitherto a stranger, dictated his course of proceeding,
which had before experienced no control save his own will. We propose,
therefore, in the next chapter, to take a brief review of the character
of Buonaparte's government during this the most flourishing period of
his power.
But, ere doing so, we must shortly notice some circumstances, civil and
military, which, though they had but slight immediate effect upon the
general current of events, yet serve to illustrate the character of the
parties concerned, and to explain future incidents which were followed
by more important consequences. These we have hitherto omitted, in order
to present, in a continuous and uninterrupted form, the history of the
momentous warfare, in the course of which Prussia was for the time
subjugated, and Russia so far tamed by the eventful struggle, as to be
willing to embrace the relation of an ally to the conqueror, whose
course she had proposed to stem and to repel.
Among these comparatively minor incidents, must be reckoned the attempt
made by the British Government to rescue the Calabrian dominions of the
Neapolitan Bourbons from the intrusive government of Joseph Buonaparte.
The character of the inhabitants of that mountainous country is well
known. Bigots in their religion, and detesting a foreign yoke, as is
usual with natives of a wild and almost lawless region; sudden in their
passions, and readily having recourse to the sword, in revenge whether
of public or private injury; enticed also by the prospect of occasional
booty, and retaining a wild species of attachment to Ferdinand, whose
manners and habits were popular with the Italians, and especially with
those of the inferior order, the Calabrians were readily excited to take
arms by the agents sent over to practise among them by the Sicilian
court. Lawless at the time, cruel in their mode of conducting war, and
incapable of being subjected to discipline, the bands which they formed
amongst themselves, acted rather in the manner, and upon the motives of
banditti, than of patriots. They occasionally, and individually, showed
much courage, and even a sort of instinctive skill, which taught them
how to choose their ambushes, defend their passes, and thus maintain a
sort of predatory war, in which the French sustained considerable
losses. Yet if their efforts remained unassisted by some regular force,
it was evident that these insurrectionary troops must be destroyed in
detail by the disciplined and calculated exertions of the French
soldiers. To prevent this, and to gratify, at the same time, the anxious
wishes of the Court of Palermo, Sir John Stuart, who commanded the
British troops which had been sent to defend Sicily, undertook an
expedition to the neighbouring shore of Italy, and disembarked in the
Gulf of St. Euphemia, near the frontier of Lower Calabria, in the
beginning of July, 1806, with something short of five thousand men.
[Sidenote: MAIDA.]
The disembarkation was scarcely made, ere the British commander learned
that General Reynier, who commanded for Joseph Buonaparte in Calabria,
had assembled a force nearly equal to his own, and had advanced to
Maida, a town about ten miles distant from St. Euphemia, with the
purpose of giving him battle. Sir John Stuart lost no time in moving to
meet him, and Reynier, confident in the numbers of his cavalry, the
quality of his troops, and his own skill in tactics, abandoned a strong
position on the further bank of the river Amata, and on the 4th July
came down to meet the British in the open plain. Of all Buonaparte's
generals, an Englishman would have desired, in especial, to be opposed
to this leader, who had published a book on the evacuation of
Egypt,[294] in which he denied every claim on the part of the British to
skill or courage, and imputed the loss of the province exclusively to
the incapacity of Menou, under whom Reynier, the author, had served as
second in command. He was now to try his own fate with the enemy, for
whom he had expressed so much contempt.
At nine in the morning, the two lines were opposite to each other, when
the British light infantry brigade, forming the right of the advanced
line, and the 1^{ere} Légère on the French left, a favourite regiment,
found themselves confronted. As if by mutual consent, when at the
distance of about one hundred yards, the opposed corps threw in two or
three close fires reciprocally, and then rushed on to charge each other
with the bayonet. The British commanding officer, perceiving that his
men were embarrassed by the blankets which they carried at their backs,
halted the line that they might throw them down. The French saw the
pause, and taking it for the hesitation of fear, advanced with a
quickened pace and loud acclamations. An officer, our informer, seeing
their veteran appearance, moustached countenances, and regularity of
order, could not forbear a feeling of anxiety as he glanced his eye
along the British line, which consisted in a great measure of young and
beardless recruits. But disembarrassed of their load, and receiving the
order to advance, they cheered, and in their turn hastened towards the
enemy with a rapid pace and levelled bayonets. The French officers were
now seen encouraging their men, whose courage began to falter when they
found they were to be the assailed party, not the assailants. Their line
halted; they could not be brought to advance by the utmost efforts of
their officers, and when the British were within bayonet's length, they
broke and ran; but too late for safety, for they were subjected to the
most dreadful slaughter. An attempt made by Reynier to redeem the day
with his cavalry, was totally unsuccessful.[295] He was beaten on all
points, and in such a manner as left it indisputable, that the British
soldier, man to man, has a superiority over his enemy, similar to that
which the British seaman possesses upon his peculiar element.[296]
It would be in vain to inquire whether this superiority, which we do not
hesitate to say has been made manifest, with very few exceptions,
wherever the British have met foreign troops upon equal terms, arises
from a stronger conformation of body, or a more determined turn of mind;
but it seems certain that the British soldier, inferior to the Frenchman
in general intelligence, and in individual acquaintance with the trade
of war, has a decided advantage in the bloody shock of actual conflict,
and especially when maintained by the bayonet, body to body. It is
remarkable also, that the charm is not peculiar to any one of the three
united nations, but is common to the natives of all, different as they
are in habits and education. The Guards, supplied by the city of London,
may be contrasted with a regiment of Irish recruited among their rich
meadows, or a body of Scotch from their native wildernesses; and while
it may be difficult to assign the palm to either over the other two, all
are found to exhibit that species of dogged and desperate courage,
which, without staying to measure force or calculate chances, rushes on
the enemy as the bull-dog upon the bear. This great moral encouragement
was the chief advantage derived from the battle of Maida; for such was
the tumultuous, sanguinary, and unmanageable character of the Calabrian
insurgents, that it was judged impossible to continue the war with such
assistants. The _malaria_ was also found to affect the British troops;
and Sir John Stuart, re-embarking his little army, returned to Sicily,
and the efforts of the British were confined to the preservation of that
island. But the battle of Maida was valuable as a corollary to that of
Alexandria. We have not learned whether General Reynier ever thought it
equally worthy of a commentary.[297]
[Sidenote: PLANS OF THE BRITISH MINISTRY.]
The eyes of the best-informed men in Britain were now open to the
disadvantageous and timid policy, of conducting this momentous war by
petty expeditions and experimental armaments, too inadequate to the
service to be productive of any thing but disappointment. The paltry
idea of making war for British objects, as it was called, that is,
withholding from the general cause those efforts which might have saved
our allies, and going in search of some petty object in which Britain
might see an individual interest, was now universally acknowledged;
although it became more difficult than ever to select points of attack
where our limited means might command success. It was also pretty
distinctly seen, that the plan of opening a market for British
manufactures, by conquering distant and unhealthy provinces, was as idle
as immoral. In the latter quality, it somewhat resembled the proceedings
of the surgeon mentioned in Le Sage's satirical novel, who converted
passengers into patients by a stroke of his poniard, and then hastened,
in his medical capacity, to cure the wounds he had inflicted. In point
of profit, we had frequently to regret, that the colonists, whom we
proposed to convert by force of arms into customers for British goods,
were too rude to want, and too poor to pay for them. Nothing deceives
itself so willingly as the love of gain. Our principal merchants and
manufacturers, among other commercial visions, had imagined to
themselves an unlimited market for British commodities, in the immense
plains surrounding Buenos Ayres, which are, in fact, peopled by a sort
of Christian savages called Gauchos, whose principal furniture is the
skulls of dead horses, whose only food is raw beef and water, whose sole
employment is to catch wild cattle, by hampering them with a Gaucho's
noose, and whose chief amusement is to ride wild horses to death.[298]
Unfortunately, they were found to prefer their national independence to
cottons and muslins.
Two several attempts were made on this miserable country, and neither
redounded to the honour or advantage of the British nation. Buenos Ayres
was taken possession of by a handful of British troops on the 27th June,
1806, who were attacked by the inhabitants and by a few Spanish troops;
and, surrounded in the market place of the town, under a general and
galling fire, were compelled to lay down their arms and surrender
prisoners of war. A small remnant of the invading forces retained
possession of a town on the coast, called Maldonado. In October, 1806,
an expedition was sent out to reinforce this small body, and make some
more material impression upon the continent of South America, which the
nation were under the delusion of considering as a measure extremely to
the advantage of British trade. Monte Video was taken, and a large body
of troops, under command of General Whitelocke, a man of factitious
reputation, and who had risen high in the army without having seen much
service, marched against Buenos Ayres. This person proved both fool and
coward. He pushed his columns of attack into the streets of Buenos
Ayres, knowing that the flat roofs and terraces were manned by excellent
though irregular marksmen; and, that the British might have no means of
retaliation, they were not permitted to load their muskets--as if stone
walls could have been carried by the bayonet. One of the columns was
obliged to surrender; and although another had, in spite of desperate
opposition, possessed themselves of a strong position, and that a few
shells might have probably ended the sort of defence which had been
maintained, Whitelocke thought it best to conclude a treaty with the
enemy for recovery of the British prisoners, and so to renounce all
further attempts on the colony. For this misconduct he was cashiered by
the sentence of a court-martial.[299]
An expedition against Turkey and its dependencies, was as little
creditable to the councils of Britain, and eventually to her arms, as
were her attempts on South America. It arose out of a war betwixt
England and the Porte, her late ally against France; for, so singular
had been the turns of chance in this extraordinary conflict, that allies
became enemies, and enemies returned to a state of close alliance,
almost before war or peace could be proclaimed between them. The time
was long past when the Sublime Ottoman Porte could regard the quarrels
and wars of Christian powers with the contemptuous indifference with
which men look on the strife of the meanest and most unclean
animals.[300] She was now in such close contact with them, as to feel a
thrilling interest in their various revolutions.
The invasion of Egypt excited the Porte against France, and disposed
them to a close alliance with Russia and England, until Buonaparte's
assumption of the Imperial dignity; on which occasion the Turks,
overawed by the pitch of power to which he had ascended, sent an embassy
to congratulate his succession, and expressed a desire to cultivate his
friendship.
[Sidenote: CONSTANTINOPLE.]
Napoleon, whose eyes were sometimes almost involuntarily turned to the
East, and who besides desired, at that period, to break off the good
understanding betwixt the Porte and the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh,
despatched Sebastiani as his envoy to Constantinople; a man well known
for his skill in Oriental intrigues, as was displayed in the celebrated
Report which had so much influence in breaking through the peace of
Amiens.
The effect of this ambassador's promises, threats, and intrigues, was
soon apparent. The Turks had come under an engagement that they would
not change the Hospodars, or governors, of Moldavia and Wallachia.
Sebastiani easily alarmed Turkish pride on the subject of this
stipulation, and induced them to break through it. The two Hospodars
were removed, in defiance of the agreement made to the contrary; and
although the Turks became aware of the risk to which they had exposed
themselves, and offered to replace the governors whom they had
dismissed, Russia, with precipitate resentment, declared war, and
invaded the two provinces in question. They overran and occupied them,
but to their own cost; as an army of fifty thousand men thus rashly
engaged against the Turks, might have been of the last consequence in
the fields of Eylau, Heilsberg, or Friedland.
In the meanwhile, Great Britain sent a squadron, under Sir Thomas
Duckworth, to compel the Porte to dismiss the French ambassador, and
return to the line of politics which Sebastiani had induced them to
abandon. Admiral Duckworth passed the Dardanelles in spite of the
immense cannon by which they are guarded, and which hurled from their
enormous muzzles massive fragments of marble instead of ordinary
bullets. But if ever it was intended to act against the Turks by any
other means than intimidation, the opportunity was suffered to escape;
and an intercourse by message and billet was permitted to continue until
the Turks had completed a line of formidable fortifications, while the
state of the weather was too unfavourable to allow even an effort at the
destruction of Constantinople, which had been the alternative submitted
to the Turks by the English admiral. The English repassed the
Dardanelles in no very creditable manner, hated for the threats which
they had uttered, and despised for not having attempted to make their
menaces good.[301]
Neither was a subsequent expedition to Alexandria more favourable in its
results. Five thousand men, under General Fraser, were disembarked, and
occupied the town with much ease. But a division, despatched against
Rosetta, was the cause of renewing in a different part of the world the
calamity of Buenos Ayres. The detachment was, incautiously and
unskilfully on our part, decoyed into the streets of an Oriental town,
where the enemy, who had manned the terraces and the flat roofs of their
houses, slaughtered the assailants with much ease and little danger to
themselves. Some subsequent ill-combined attempts were made for reducing
the same place, and after sustaining a loss of more than a fifth of
their number, by climate and combat, the British troops were withdrawn
from Egypt on the 23d of September, 1807.
It was no great comfort, under these repeated failures, that the British
were able to secure the Dutch island of Curaçoa. But the capture of the
Cape of Good Hope was an object of deep importance; and the more so, as
it was taken at a small expense of lives. Its consequence to our Indian
trade is so great, that we may well hope it will be at no future time
given up to the enemy. Upon the whole, the general policy of England
was, at this period, of an irresolute and ill-combined character. Her
ministers showed a great desire to do something, but as great a doubt
what that something was to be. Thus, they either mistook the importance
of the objects which they aimed at, or, undertaking them without a
sufficient force, failed to carry them into execution. If the wealth and
means, more especially the brave troops, frittered away in the attempts
at Calabria, Buenos Ayres, Alexandria, and elsewhere, had been united
with the forces sent to Stralsund, and thrown into the rear of the
French army before the fatal battle of Friedland, Europe might, in all
probability, have escaped that severe, and, for a time, decisive blow.
The evil of this error, which had pervaded our continental efforts from
the beginning of the original war with France down to the period of
which we are treating, began now to be felt from experience. Britain
gained nothing whatever by her partial efforts, not even settlements or
sugar-islands. The enemy maintained against her revenues and commerce a
constant and never-ceasing war--her resistance was equally stubborn, and
it was evident that the strife on both sides was to be mortal. Ministers
were, therefore, called upon for bolder risks, the nation for greater
sacrifices, than had yet been demanded; and it became evident to every
one, that England's hope of safety lay in her own exertions, not for
petty or selfish objects, but such as might have a decided influence on
the general events of the war. The urgent pressure of the moment was
felt by the new Administration, whose principles being in favour of the
continuance of the war, their efforts to conduct it with energy began
now to be manifest.
[Sidenote: COPENHAGEN.]
The first symptoms of this change of measures were exhibited in the
celebrated expedition to Copenhagen, which manifested an energy and
determination not of late visible in the military operations of Britain
on the continent. It can hardly be made matter of serious doubt, that
one grand object by which Buonaparte meant to enforce the continental
system, and thus reduce the power of England without battle or invasion,
was the re-establishment of the great alliance of the Northern Powers,
for the destruction of Britain's maritime superiority. This had been
threatened towards the conclusion of the American war, and had been
again acted upon in 1801, when the unnatural compact was dissolved by
the cannon of Nelson, and the death of the Emperor Paul. The treaty of
Tilsit, according to the information which the British ambassador had
procured, certainly contained an article to this purpose, and ministers
received from other quarters the most positive information of what was
intended. Indeed, the Emperor Alexander had shown, by many indications,
that in the new friendship which he had formed with the Emperor of the
East, he was to embrace his resentment, and further his plans, against
England. The unfortunate Gustavus of Sweden could scarcely be expected
voluntarily to embrace the proposed northern alliance, and his ruin was
probably resolved upon. But the accession of Denmark was of the utmost
consequence. That country still possessed a fleet, and the local
situation of the island of Zealand gave her the key of the Baltic. Her
confessed weakness could not have permitted her for an instant to resist
the joint influence of Russia and France, even if her angry recollection
of the destruction of her fleet by Nelson, had not induced her
inclinations to lean in that direction. It was evident that Denmark
would only be permitted to retain her neutrality, till it suited the
purposes of the more powerful parties to compel her to throw it off. In
this case, and finding the French troops approaching Holstein, Jutland,
and Fiume, the British Government, acting on the information which they
had received of the purpose of their enemies, conceived themselves
entitled to require from Denmark a pledge as to the line of conduct
which she proposed to adopt on the approach of hostilities, and some
rational security that such a pledge, when given, should be redeemed.
A formidable expedition was now fitted out, humanely, as well as
politically, calculated on a scale of such magnitude, as, it might be
expected, would render impossible the resistance which the Danes, as a
high-spirited people, might offer to such a harsh species of
expostulation. Twenty-seven sail of the line, and twenty thousand men,
under the command of Lord Cathcart, were sent to the Baltic, to support
a negotiation with Denmark, which it was still hoped might terminate
without hostilities. The fleet was conducted with great ability through
the intricate passages called the Belts, and was disposed in such a
manner, that ninety pendants flying round Zealand, entirely blockaded
the shores of that island.
Under these auspices the negotiation was commenced. The British envoy,
Mr. Jackson, had the delicate task of stating to the Crown Prince in
person, the expectation of England that his royal highness should
explain unequivocally his sentiments, and declare the part which he
meant to take between her and France. The unpleasant condition was
annexed, that, to secure any protestation which might be made of
friendship or neutrality, it was required that the fleet and naval
stores of the Danes should be delivered into the hands of Great Britain,
not in right of property, but to be restored so soon as the state of
affairs, which induced her to require possession of them, should be
altered for more peaceful times. The closest alliance, and every species
of protection which Britain could afford, was proffered, to obtain
compliance with these proposals. Finally, the Crown Prince was given to
understand, that so great a force was sent in order to afford him an
apology to France, should he choose to urge it, as having been compelled
to submit to the English demands; but at the same time it was intimated,
that the forces would be actually employed to compel the demands, if
they should be refused.
In the ordinary intercourse betwixt nations, these requisitions, on the
part of Britain, would have been, with respect to Denmark, severe and
unjustifiable. The apology arose out of the peculiar circumstances of
the times. The condition of England was that of an individual, who,
threatened by the approach of a superior force of mortal enemies, sees
close beside him, and with arms in his hand, one, of whom he had a right
to be suspicious, as having co-operated against him on two former
occasions, and who, he has the best reason to believe, is at the very
moment engaged in a similar alliance to his prejudice. The individual,
in the case supposed, would certainly be warranted in requiring to know
this third party's intention, nay, in disarming him, if he had strength
to do so, and retaining his weapons, as the best pledge of his
neutrality.
However this reasoning may be admitted to justify the British demands,
we cannot wonder that it failed to enforce compliance on the part of the
Crown Prince. There was something disgraceful in delivering up the fleet
of the nation under a menace that violence would otherwise be employed;
and although, for the sake of his people and his capital, he ought, in
prudence, to have forborne an ineffectual resistance, yet it was
impossible to blame a high-minded and honourable man for making the best
defence in his power.
So soon as the object of the Danes was found to be delay and evasion,
while they made a hasty preparation for defence, the soldiers were
disembarked, batteries erected, and a bombardment commenced, which
occasioned a dreadful conflagration. Some forces which had been
collected in the interior of the island, were dispersed by the troops
under Sir Arthur Wellesley, a name already famous in India, but now for
the first time heard in European warfare. The unavailing defence was at
last discontinued, and upon the 8th September the citadel and forts of
Copenhagen were surrendered to the British general. The Danish ships
were fitted out for sea with all possible despatch, together with the
naval stores, to a very large amount; which, had they fallen into the
hands of the French, must have afforded them considerable facility in
fitting out a fleet.[302]
As the nature and character of the attack upon Copenhagen were attended
by circumstances which were very capable of being misrepresented,
France--who, through the whole war, had herself shown the most total
disregard for the rights of neutral nations, with her leader Napoleon,
the invader of Egypt, when in profound peace with the Porte; of Hanover,
when in amity with the German empire; and who was at this very moment
meditating the appropriation of Spain and Portugal--France was filled
with extreme horror at the violence practised on the Danish capital.
Russia was also offended, and to a degree which showed that a feeling of
disappointed schemes mingled with her affectation of zeal for the rights
of neutrality.[303] But the daring and energetic spirit with which
England had formed and accomplished her plan, struck a wholesome terror
into other nations, and showed neutrals, that if, while assuming that
character, they lent their secret countenance to the enemies of Great
Britain, they were not to expect that it was to be done with impunity.
This was, indeed, no small hardship upon the lesser powers, many of whom
would, no doubt, have been well contented to have observed a strict
neutrality, but for the threats and influence of France, against whom
they had no means of defence; but the furious conflict of such two
nations as France and England, is like the struggle of giants, in which
the smaller and more feeble, who have the misfortune to be in the
neighbourhood, are sure to be borne down and trodden upon by one or both
parties.
The extreme resentment expressed by Buonaparte, when he received
intelligence of this critical and decisive measure, might serve to argue
the depth of his disappointment at such an unexpected anticipation of
his purposes. He had only left to him the comfort of railing against
Britain in the _Moniteur_; and the breach of peace, and of the law of
nations, was gravely imputed to England as an inexpiable crime, by one
who never suffered his regard either for his own word, or the general
good faith observed amongst nations, to interfere with any wish or
interest he had ever entertained.[304]
[Sidenote: COALITION--BRITISH COMMERCE.]
The conduct of Russia was more singular. An English officer of literary
celebrity was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share
his most secret counsels, to convey to the British Ministry the
Emperor's expressions of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial
Majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in
anticipating and preventing the purposes of France, by her attack upon
Copenhagen.[305] Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with
the Czar, as with a prince, who, though obliged to give way to
circumstances, was, nevertheless, as much attached as ever to the cause
of European independence. Thus invited, the British Cabinet entered into
an explanation of their views for establishing a counterbalance to the
exorbitant power of France, by a northern confederacy of an offensive
and defensive character. It was supposed that Sweden would enter with
pleasure into such an alliance, and that Denmark would not decline it
if encouraged by the example of Russia, who was proposed as the head and
soul of the coalition.
Such a communication was accordingly made to the Russian ministers, but
was received with the utmost coldness. It is impossible now to
determine, whether there had been some over-confidence in the agent;
whether the communication had been founded on some hasty and fugitive
idea of a breach with France, which the Emperor had afterwards
abandoned; or finally, whether, as is more probable, it originated in a
wish to fathom the extent of Great Britain's resources, and the purposes
to which she meant to devote them. It is enough to observe, that the
countenance with which Russia received the British communication, was so
different from that with which she had invited the confidence of her
ministers, that the negotiation proved totally abortive.
Alexander's ultimate purpose was given to the world, so soon as Britain
had declined the offered mediation of Russia in her disputes with
France. In a proclamation, or manifesto, sent forth by the Emperor, he
expressed his repentance for having entered into agreements with
England, which he had found prejudicial to the Russian trade; he
complained (with justice) of the manner in which Britain had conducted
the war by petty expeditions, conducive only to her own selfish ends;
and the attack upon Denmark was treated as a violation of the rights of
nations. He therefore annulled every convention entered into between
Russia and Britain, and especially that of 1801; and he avowed the
principles of the Armed Neutrality, which he termed a monument of the
wisdom of the Great Catherine.[306] In November 1807, an ukase, or
imperial decree, was issued, imposing an embargo on British vessels and
property. But, by the favour of the Russian nation, and even of the
officers employed by Government, the shipmasters were made aware of the
impending arrest; and not less than eighty vessels, setting sail with a
favourable wind, reached Britain with their cargoes in safety.
Austria and Prussia found themselves under the necessity of following
the example of Russia, and declaring war against British commerce; so
that Buonaparte had now made an immense stride towards his principal
object, of destroying every species of intercourse which could unite
England with the continent.
FOOTNOTES:
[294] "De l'Egypte après la Balle d'Héliopolis."
[295] For Sir John Stuart's detail of the memorable battle of Maida, see
Annual Register, vol. xlviii., p. 590; see also Jomini, tom. ii., p.
238.
[296] "The French soldiers had a great contempt for the English troops
at the beginning of the war, caused, perhaps, by the failure of the
expeditions under the Duke of York, the great want of alertness in the
English advanced posts, and the misfortunes which befell your armies. In
this they were fools, as the English were well known to be a brave
nation. It was probably by a similar error that Reynier was beaten by
General Stuart; as the French imagined you would run away and be driven
into the sea. Reynier was a man of talent, but more fit to give counsel
to an army of twenty or thirty thousand men, than to command one of five
or six. It is difficult to conceive how little the French soldiers
thought of yours, until they were taught the contrary."--NAPOLEON,
_Voice_, &c., vol. ii., p. 47.
[297] Reynier died at Paris in 1814, at the age of forty-four. Besides
his work on Egypt, he published "Conjectures sur les anciens habitans de
l'Egypte," and "Sur les Sphinx qui accompagnent les Pyramides."
[298] See the very extraordinary account of the Pampas, published by
Captain Head of the engineers.
[299] See Annual Register, vol. xlix., p. 223.
[300] In the time of Louis XIV., when the French envoy at the court of
Constantinople came, in a great hurry, to intimate as important
intelligence, some victory of his master over the Prussians, "Can you
suppose it of consequence to his Serene Highness," said the Grand
Vizier, with infinite contempt, "whether the dog bites the hog, or the
hog bites the dog?"
[301] See "Particulars from Sir J. Duckworth to Lord Collingwood,
relative to the affairs of the Dardanelles," Annual Register, vol.
xlix., p. 659.
[302] See "Papers relating to the Expedition to Copenhagen," Parl.
Debates, vol. x., p. 221; and "Proceedings before Copenhagen," Annual
Register, vol. xlix., p. 681.
[303] "Russia felt severely the loss which Denmark had sustained. The
Danish fleet was a good third of the guarantee of the neutrality of the
Baltic."--SAVARY, tom. ii., p. 112.
[304] "The attack upon Copenhagen by the English was the first blow
given to the secret stipulations of Tilsit, in virtue of which the navy
of Denmark was to be placed at the disposal of France. Since the
catastrophe of Paul the First, I never saw Napoleon abandon himself to
more violent transports. What most struck him in this vigorous
enterprise, was the promptness of the resolution of the English
ministry."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 312.
[305] Lord Hutchinson. See Parliamentary Debates, vol. x., p. 602.
[306] See Declaration of the Emperor of Russia, dated St. Petersburgh,
20th (31st) October, 1807, Annual Register, vol. xlix., p. 761; and
Parl. Debates, vol. x., p. 218.